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Foreword
This volume focuses on some of the unique parts of the Commission’s mandate
concerning historical injustices related to land, socio-economic rights, economic crimes
and grand corruption. This part of the mandate is unique not because there have been
no previous investigations into these violations (though some of the violations have not
been subject to much attention). Nor is this part of the mandate unique because there
have been no previous commissions of inquiry with respect to them (though many of
these violations have not been subject to previous commissions of inquiry). Rather, this
part of the mandate is unique because the Commission is the first truth commission to
have an express obligation to look at such a broad range of violations, including land,
socio-economic rights, and grand corruption.
Because truth commissions in the past have not focused on these violations – though
some did address them in part in their reports – the Commission was forced to think
creatively about how to capture the narratives and experiences of Kenyans with respect
to these violations. Statement takers discovered, for example, that when asked to talk
about human rights violations within our mandate, most statement givers focused on
bodily integrity violations (such as killings, torture, massacres, etc.) and most focused on
the most immediate and traumatic violations they had experienced, which invariably
were such acts of violence. Yet even in those statements, one can discern elements of
violations related to socio-economic rights. For example, a woman would testify about
being raped and then indicate that she was still suffering from the physical and mental
effects of the rape because she had little or no access to health care facilities.
Faced with this challenge of eliciting individual experiences, perspectives, and narratives
with respect to these violations, the Commission undertook a series of focus group
discussions. The discussions were led by an individual trained in socio-economic rights,
and provided an opportunity for a more focused and detailed discussion of such rights
and their violation in a specific community. (For more on these discussions, see the
chapter in Volume 1 on Methodology and Process.)
The first chapter in this Volume, on economic marginalization and violations of socioeconomic rights, addresses an issue that people in each region of the country raised
with the Commission (economic marginalization), as well as violations that effect at a
fundamental and profound level, the quality of life available to most Kenyans (socioeconomic rights). There is no question that at a particular historical moment most Kenyans
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have perceived their region, or their community, as being the subject of a deliberate
government policy of economic marginalization. It is also clear that during different
periods in Kenyan history, some regions of the country benefited more from economic
development and assistance from the central government than other regions. Despite, or
perhaps in part because of this, the Commission witnessed areas of under development
in all regions of the country. The former North Eastern Province is, for example, a province
with virtually no tarmacked roads, making travel in the region at the best of times difficult
and in the worst of times dangerous.
This was made particularly evident to the Commission when our Acting Chairperson’s
car hit a particularly bad patch of road and rolled into the adjoining ditch (miraculously
the Vice Chairperson and those in the car suffered minor injuries). Yet, the Commission
experienced dirt roads and treacherous conditions in most of the other regions of the
country. While access to water is a particular challenge in the arid parts of the country,
many residents in all regions of the country have little or no access to clean water. The
same, unfortunately, can be said for the other basic necessities of life: shelter; health care;
food; education; employment; etc. While acknowledging that all parts of the country
have suffered marginalization at one point in time, the Commission has identified four
regions that have perennially suffered marginalization: North Eastern and Upper Eastern,
Coast, Nyanza, and North Rift.
The second chapter in this Volume focuses on the issue that many identified as the most
important: injustices related to land. There is no question that land is at the heart of
many of the other violations experienced in most parts of the country, and our collective
failure to “resolve the land question” has continued to fuel the commission of such other
violations. The Commission does not claim here to provide ‘the’ solution to historical
injustices related to land in Kenya. The centrality of the land question to so much of the
nation’s unity, health, and future appropriately led the drafters of the 2010 Constitution to
include a permanent commission whose sole focus is on land, and the mandate of which
includes addressing claims related to historical land injustices. Instead we have provided
what we hope will be a succinct, yet thorough, description of the current perception of
land injustices as reported to the Commission, including proposed solutions suggested
by those most directly involved.
Lastly, this volume ends with a discussion of economic crimes and grand corruption.
While most understand land as at the root of many historical injustices, corruption, and
particularly grand corruption, also has a profound and far reaching effect on the rights
of Kenyans. When it is brought to light and made the subject of criminal prosecutions
or other legal proceedings, the public becomes aware of the extent of such corruption.
Yet the effects of such corruption in even in the case of those scams made public is

iv
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harder to see. Land injustices are often easy to see and experience, as many times they
involve lack of access to a resource that is visible every day to those who have been
displaced. Corruption, on the other hand, involves the siphoning off of public resources
for private gain. The result is less money for infrastructure, education, and health care. The
relationship, however, between such corruption and such deprivations is often hard to
see. The Commission hopes that the content of this chapter will make it more apparent
the profound cost the nation is paying through corruption. Corruption is not just a crime
that provides an undeserved benefit to a private individual (often an enormously large
such benefit). It is a crime that lessens the availability and access to the fundamental
needs of human life: food, education, health care, shelter, etc. In other words, the crime
of corruption is directly related to the violations of socio-economic rights and economic
marginalization discussed in the previous chapter.
As with land, the Commission did not attempt to provide ‘the’ solution to the problem
of corruption. Like land, there is a permanent commission which has as its sole mandate
the combatting of corruption, including grand corruption. That commission has had its
own challenges, including political interference by Members of Parliament. Therefore, the
first step for the government to address the scourge of corruption effectively is to have
genuine political will to tackle the problem.
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A Somali man heading towards a TJRC public hearing.
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CHAPTER

ONE

Economic Marginalisation and
Violation of Socio-Economic
Rights
Introduction
1.

At the opening of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)’s
Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalisation on 13 February 2012 at the NHIF
Auditorium, Nairobi, Commissioner Tecla Namachanja made the following remarks,
which aptly summarise the Commission’s task in relation to the issues of economic
marginalisation:
Ladies and gentlemen, as you may know, it is almost a year now since the Commission
started going around the country, listening to individual Kenyans who have
experienced the violations that this Commission is investigating. Members of the
Commission have come face-to-face with issues of economic marginalisation. We
have been to some areas in this country where the people feel that they are not part of
Kenya. So, we have parts of this country where people consider themselves as coming
from ‘Kenya Four’, ‘Kenya Three’ and ‘Kenya Two’, and we wonder what is ‘Kenya One?’
We have experienced it. They feel so because when you look at issues of infrastructure,
it is pathetic.
We have come across children taking their lessons under a tree, yet they are expected
to compete favourably with the rest of students from other parts of this country who
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are endowed with all the facilities. We have toured places where you cannot get even
a single tarmacked road in almost the entire county. We have met Kenyans who are
not internally displaced persons (IDPs), yet they are landless. We have come across
areas where the residents come from a region which is very productive, but even for
the crops they produce, there are no factories. The factories are elsewhere.
For those of you who live around Nairobi, I once lived in Madaraka and I used to watch
fellow Kenyans, especially from Kibera hit the road very early in the morning, very
energetic, walking to Industrial Area. It would not be until eight in the evening that you
would see them walking back, very tired. So, they work as hard as their fellow Kenyans.
However, when you go to Kibera and Mathare, you wonder what conditions give birth
to people living under such a situation.
We have been in counties where with the creation of counties, there are fears from minority
groups of continued marginalisation, especially when it comes to sharing leadership
positions.1

2.

This Chapter of the Commission’s report deals with economic marginalisation
and violations of socio-economic rights. It provides an analysis of the perceptions
and reality of economic marginalisation. As required by the TJR Act, the Chapter
documents perceptions of economic marginalization and backs the same with
facts.

3.

In particular, it documents narratives of economic marginalisation relating to four
regions. The Commission is aware that since the adoption of the Constitution
of Kenya, 2010, political and administrative units in the country have changed
fundamentally, and in particular, provinces have ceased to be points of reference,
both for administrative and analytical purposes.

4.

However, since provinces were the main political and administrative units during
the Commission’s mandate period, and perceptions of economic marginalisation
are aligned along these units, it was found necessary to use provinces as its point
of reference.

5.

The four provinces or parts thereof that have been identified in this chapter as
having suffered economic marginalisation during the Commission’s mandate
period are as follows:

1

2



North Eastern (including Upper Eastern)



Nyanza

TJRC/ Hansard/ Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalisation and Minorities / Nairobi/ 13 February 2012/ p. 1
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Samburu women getting together for a TJRC session.



North Rift



Coast



Western

6.

The choice of these regions was informed by popular narratives relating to
marginalisation. The Commission then tested these perceptions to establish
whether they could pass the ‘reality test’, that is, whether in fact these regions are
economically marginalized. The reality test entailed weighing regional perceptions
against the extent to which residents of these regions enjoy and access socioeconomic rights.

7.

Valid questions could be posed relating to why the other regions (Nairobi, Central,
other parts of Rift Valley and Lower Eastern) are not profiled in this report, yet
economic marginalisation (insofar as it manifests in poverty) is seen as a national
phenomenon. It is acknowledged that the state of material lack of our people
that manifests in poverty is indeed a national phenomenon as reflected in the
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information the Commission received. However, it understood its mandate relating
to economic marginalisation in a much narrower sense, that is, marginalisation as
understood from inter-regional perspectives. Nevertheless, it is acknowledged
that even in regions that may not be regarded as economically marginalized,
perceptions of marginalisation exist.

4

8.

Firstly, some residents of regions that are not profiled here consider themselves
to have been marginalised at one point or another in history. The Commission
acknowledges and affirms these perceptions. In the case of Central Province,
testimonies were received to the effect that the region’s fortunes dwindled under
the then President Moi, with social infrastructure being degraded and the vast
majority of elites excluded at the top, at least after the 1982 coup attempt.

9.

A similar narrative to that heard in Central was recounted by residents of Rift Valley
region, who see themselves as the main ‘victims’ of marginalisation under the
Kibaki administration, at least as far as appointments to key positions in the public
service are concerned.

10.

Secondly, in its travels around the country, the Commission witnessed poverty all
over the land. Thus, a sense of marginalisation exists even in regions regarded as
relatively more endowed in resources than others. In certain regions, there exist
intra-regional narratives of marginalisation that are blamed on regional and local
rather than national forces. This is true of Nyanza, as it is for Central and other
regions. For instance, in Central Province, residents of Nyandarua, where the
assassinated leader JM Kariuki hailed from, considered themselves marginalised
by others within the region.

11.

The analysis on Nyanza Province demonstrates that residents of Kuria see their
counterparts in the broader region as somewhat advantaged vis-a-vis themselves
and that they (Luo and Kisii) are in some way part responsible for their situation. In
Western Province, a region that appears to share Nyanza’s political and economic
fortunes, narratives of marginalisation are not uniform. Evidence shows that certain
parts of Western that have been close to power, in particular Bungoma and Vihiga
appear to be the main beneficiaries of the limited social goods due to co-option, at
least under the Moi regime. It is notable that within these sub-regions, narratives
of marginalisation do exist.

12.

In North Eastern and Upper Eastern, sub-regional claims of marginalisation
invariably assume an ethnic or clan flavour. For instance, the Commission recorded
testimony from members of the Ajuran clan who see themselves as victims of the
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Degodia clan, and with complicity from the Provincial Administration and central
government. Claims of economic and political marginalisation made by the Ajuran
- in part due to loss of land to the Degodia - had indeed been the subject of claims
submitted to the executive and proceedings in the courts for many years before
the Commission was created.
13.

While Lower Eastern is often not regarded as a marginalised at least not in
popular narratives, this silence (to the extent that it is) obscures shocking levels
of poverty and lack of social facilities in parts of this region. Cases of drought,
famine and starvation in parts of Ukambani have become a staple of national
news and shame. This state of affairs is in part due to policies of marginalisation
by past regimes. Other than the harsh climatic conditions, the failure by
successive regimes to take measures to arrest the perennial food insecurity
situation and enhance access to basic goods such as potable drinking water
must be acknowledged as a key factor.

14.

The South Rift region, in particular the current Kajiado County, presents a curious
case of economic marginalisation. While Kajiado is perhaps rightly ranked as the
richest county (based largely on asset-based assessment), its residents have
some of the lowest levels of access to social goods such as education, health,
water and sanitation and physical infrastructure such as roads and can rightly
claim marginalisation. In the Commission’s view, however, this phenomenon
seems to present a case of mismanagement of resources or outright corruption.
Resources that could improve the socio-economic condition of locals have either
not been tapped, or have been diverted to other extraneous issues.

15.

This brief summary of trends convinced the Commission that economic
marginalisation was indeed a national and cross-cutting theme in so far as the
poor and other disadvantaged groups such as women, ethnic minorities and
indigenous groups are concerned. Issues related to marginalisation of these
groups are dealt with elsewhere in this report. This chapter focuses only on
the regional dimensions of the phenomenon. It is a synthesis of secondary and
primary data that was available to the Commission. Primary data was drawn
from statements submitted by or on behalf of victims in the prescribed form;
testimonies made during hearings (individual and thematic); interviews with
key actors, personalities and experts; memoranda submitted by individuals and
groups; and reports of focus group discussions on economic marginalisation
conducted in January and February 2012 in all the eight regions of the
country. Secondary sources relied on include academic writings and reports by
governmental and non-governmental actors or agencies.
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Legal and Conceptual Framework
Statutory mandate
16.

As already noted, the subject matter mandate given to the Commission by
Parliament was very broad. It entailed investigating, documenting and making
recommendations in relation to human rights violations that fall not only in the
category of civil and political rights, but also violations of what are cumulatively
and popularly known as socio-economic rights. In relation to socio-economic rights,
section 5(a) of the TJR Act requires the Commission to ‘establish an accurate, complete
and historical record of violations and abuses of human and economic rights’. Section
5(b) continues to provide that it should establish ‘as complete a picture as possible of
the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights and economic
rights committed between 12 December 1963 and the 28 February 2008’. Perhaps
more importantly, section 5(f) requires the Commission to:
Inquire into and establish the reality of otherwise of perceived economic marginalisation
of communities and make recommendations on how to address the marginalisation.

17.

In essence, the TJR Act accorded the Commission a clear mandate to deal with
issues relating to socio-economic rights. While other truth commissions have had
the chance to look at socio-economic rights, none have been required to analyze
them in as much depth as Kenya’s TJRC has. The small numbers of truth commissions
that have looked at socio-economic rights have understandably been limited in
their scope, given the other violations that they were required to examine.

18.

Apart from the Liberian truth commission, none of the other commissions that
examined socio-economic rights had any explicit mandate to do so. That they
proceeded to do so is indicative of the reality that human rights violations - civil and
political rights as well as socio-economic rights - cannot be compartmentalized in
truth-seeking without compromising the truth itself. As one author has said, ‘not
only does this compartmentalization oversimplify the relationship between those
un-redressed legacies (of human rights violations) but it also does not reflect the
reality of the societies that seek to address them’.2

19.

Thus, whether as part of their mandate or because there was simply no way in
which to compartmentalize human rights violations that took place over a
significant period of their histories, truth commissions in East Timor, Morocco and

2

6

Ruben Carranza ‘Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes?’ (2008) 2 International
Journal of Transitional Justice 310 pp. 314-315
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Peru ended up approaching socio-economic violations in ways that were organic
to their context.
20.

In East Timor, the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
(CAVR - the Portuguese acronym), was not explicitly mandated to investigate
socio-economic rights, but did a credible and comprehensive effort at examining
violations of these rights not only during the Indonesian invasion and occupation
of East Timor, but even during the immediate post-colonial period just prior to the
invasion. The CAVR heard victims’ statements and conducted thematic hearings on
socio-economic rights violations.

21.

It utilized field and academic research, government and public records, and used
them to scientifically extrapolate the number of violations and victims that could
be attributed to socio-economic rights violations.

22.

Morocco’s Truth & Reconciliation Commission (IER) made findings regarding socioeconomic rights that were directly and specifically related to both the periods and
targets of repression by the regime whose rule it was investigating. Consequently,
the IER had a basis to recommend reparations that were specifically meant to
respond to socio-economic rights violations committed against eleven (11) named
regions in the country.

23.

The work of Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (in Spanish: Comisión de la
Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR)) is especially relevant to this Commission. While CVR did
not have the mandate to investigate socio-economic rights, it arrived at conclusions
that explicitly and strongly indicated that marginalisation was not only part of what
took place in the conflict that it examined, but that the victims of physical integrity
violations in that conflict were already and simultaneously victims of economic and
social rights violations, and of marginalisation. The Peruvian truth commission said:
The TRC has been able to discern that the process of violence, combined with socioeconomic gaps, highlighted the seriousness of ethno-cultural inequalities that still
prevail in the country. According to analysis of the testimonies received, 75 percent
of the victims who died in the internal armed conflict spoke Quechua or other native
languages as their mother tongue. This figure contrasts tellingly with the fact that,
according to the 1993 census, on a national level only 16 percent of the Peruvian
population shares that characteristic…The TRC has shown that, in relative terms, the
dead and disappeared had educational levels far inferior to the national average. While
the national census of 1993 indicates that only 40 percent of the national population
had failed to attain secondary school education, the TRC has found that 68 percent of
the victims were below this level… The TRC concludes that the violence fell unequally
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on different geographical areas and on different social strata in the country. If the ratio
of victims to population reported to the TRC with respect to Ayacucho were similar
countrywide, the violence would have caused 1,200,000 deaths and disappearances. Of
that amount, 340 000 would have occurred in the (capital) city of Lima.

24.

Thus, by including a clear mandate to analyze socio-economic rights, the drafters
of Kenya’s TJR Act adopted a modern holistic approach to human rights that did
not distinguish between bodily integrity rights and socio-economic rights. It
is an approach that more accurately reflects the reality of people’s lives, seen in
the testimony of individuals and organizations that allows the Commission to
more accurately describe the antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of
violations and abuses.

25.

Other than the statutory requirement to focus on socio-economic rights, there are
several reasons of a historical, practical, and conceptual nature why the Commission
considered focus on socio-economic rights and economic marginalisation as an
important element of its mandate. From a historical and contextual perspective,
violations experienced in Kenya were not limited to those in the category of civil and
political rights. State action or inaction negatively impacted the economic lives of
millions of Kenyans in a variety of ways described in different parts of this chapter.

26.

Evidence shows that while the majority of Kenyans may not have been detained
without trial or subjected to torture and other physical integrity violations,
government’s exclusionary economic policies and practices in the distribution of
public jobs and services inflicted suffering on huge sections of society at different
historical moments. As the Commission traveled the country collecting statements
and conducting public hearings, the pervasiveness of socio-economic violations was
evident and have been outlined in several parts of this chapter. It would have been
odd to ignore this historical reality and the legacy of poverty that lives on today.

27.

Indeed, as a function of history, the Commission noted that economic marginalisation
in the Kenyan context was part of a set of violations or injustices often referred to as
‘historical injustices’ in popular discourse.

Conceptual approach
28.

8

The TJR Act mandated the Commission to investigate, document and make
recommendations in respect of ‘gross violations of human rights’. The Act provided
a partial list of what violations met the standard of ‘gross violations’. As discussed
earlier in Chapter Two, Volume 1 of this report, the Commission defined gross
violations of human rights to include violations of socio-economic rights. The
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standard applied in determining whether a violation of a socio-economic rights
is ‘gross’ depends largely on the structural nature of the violation and the impact
of the violation (those violations that affect larger groups of people are more
likely to be considered ‘gross’). However, in this chapter, the gross violations test
is not applied.
29.

Although the TJR Act, 2008 mandated the Commission to investigate violations
of socio-economic rights and to make various findings and recommendations in
this regard, it is worth noting that socio-economic rights were not recognized as
rights under Kenyan law until the adoption of the new Constitution on 27 August
2010. Despite the absence of domestic recognition of socio-economic rights,
Kenya had ratified relevant international instruments that recognized these rights.
These treaties include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) which Kenya ratified in 1972 and the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) ratified in 1992.

30.

The absence of socio-economic rights in the old constitution, coupled with a
dualist practice in terms of which international treaties had no direct application
in Kenya, meant that socio-economic rights were not justiciable and courts were
not a forum where any socio-economic rights related claims could be adjudicated.
The consequence was that individuals and groups could not hold government to
account for failure to meet its obligations undertaken at the international level.

31.

Thus, in its determination of the state’s obligation relating to socio-economic
rights, the approach adopted has been that been that taken by the United
Nations Committee on Economic and Social Rights (the ESR Committee) in its
determination of whether the state had. The ESR Committee has clarified the
nature of a state’s obligations under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

32.

The Commission has thus taken into account the ESR Committee’s interpretation
of these obligations, in particular through its General Comment No. 3 which
established a ‘minimum core’ of obligations in relation to socio-economic rights:
A minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum
essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every state party. Thus, for
example, a state party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or
of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations
under the covenant. If the covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish
such a minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d’être. By the

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

9

Volume IIB

Chapter ONE

same token, it must be noted that any assessment as to whether a state has discharged
its minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying
within the country concerned. Article 2 (1) obligates each state party to take the
necessary steps “to the maximum of its available resources”. In order for a state party
to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack
of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those
minimum obligations.3

33.

For a truth commission examining violations of economic and social rights, the
fulfillment by a state of minimum core obligations under the ICESR is not only a
normative but is also a practical standard. It provides basis for the truth commission
in question to examine whether, in relation to Article 2(1) of the ICESR, the state
has ‘take(n) steps … to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization’ of socio-economic rights.

34.

Using the ESR Committee’s standard in General Comment No. 3 of how ‘progressive
realization’ should be understood, the Commission has examined whether the
state has taken those steps ‘within a reasonably short time after the covenant’s
entry into force’ with respect to Kenya, and whether those steps were taken ‘in a
deliberate, concrete (way) and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the
obligations’ in the ICESR.

35.

Equally important and particularly relevant to the Commission’s mandate to
investigate marginalisation is the obligation of the Kenyan state under Article
2(2) of the ICESR to ‘guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present covenant
will be exercised without discrimination of any kind’. This non-discrimination
obligation, it must be emphasised, is one that must be fulfilled immediately.
In the words of the ESR Committee, ‘non-discrimination is an immediate and
cross-cutting obligation in the covenant’. Article 2(2) requires state parties to
guarantee non-discrimination in the exercise of each of the economic, social and
cultural rights enshrined in the covenant and can only be applied in conjunction
with these rights. Discrimination constitutes ‘any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference or other differential treatment directly or indirectly
based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the intention
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on
an equal footing, of covenant rights’. Discrimination also includes incitement to
discriminate and harassment. The Commission considered whether economic
marginalisation in Kenya over the period covered by its mandate is the outcome

3

10

CESCR, General Comment No.3, paragraph 10
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of discrimination, and whether in itself - apart from the specific violations of ESR
that comes with it - is a violation of the ICESR.
36.

Moreover, the Commission notes that states have three levels of obligation
in relation to human rights: the obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfill
provided for under both international law and national law.

37.

Firstly, the obligation to respect imposes a negative obligation requiring the state
to refrain from any measure that may deprive individuals of the enjoyment of their
rights or their ability to satisfy those rights by their efforts. This type of obligation
is often associated with civil and political rights (e.g. refraining from committing
torture) but it applies to socio-economic rights as well. With regard to the right
to adequate housing, for example, states have a duty to refrain from forced or
arbitrary eviction. Secondly the obligation to protect requires the state to prevent
violations of human rights by third parties.

38.

The obligation to protect is normally taken to be a central function of states, which
have to prevent irreparable harm from being inflicted upon members of society.
This requires states: (a) to prevent violations of rights by individuals or other nonstate actors; (b) to avoid and eliminate incentives to violate rights by third parties;
and (c) to provide access to legal remedies when violations have occurred, in order
to prevent further deprivations.

39.

The obligation to fulfill requires the state to actively take measures towards ‘the
actual realization of rights’.4 With respect to SERs, this obligation could ‘consist
in the direct provision of basic needs such as food or resources that can be used
for food (direct food aid or social security)’.5 Some consider that state obligations
relating to human rights include a fourth level: the obligation to promote. The
obligation to promote (usually subsumed in the obligation to fulfill) entails actions
such as ‘promoting tolerance, raising awareness, and ... building infrastructures.6

40.

The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 recognize socio-economic rights.7 It also captures
the aforementioned obligations by stating that the state shall take legislative,
policy and other measures, including the setting of standards, to achieve the
progressive realization of the rights guaranteed under Article 43 on economic and
social rights.8 In addition, the government is required to use maximum resources

4
5
6
7
8

The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic Rights V Nigeria Communication 155/96 (Hereinafter
SERAC Case)
See SERAC, para 46
SERAC, para 46
Constitution of Kenya, 2010, sec 43
Constitution of Kenya, 2010, sec 21(3)
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available and in an effective and accountable way, to ensure the attainment of
maximum levels of enjoyment of rights for all. Resources include funds, people,
skills, good management and other assets.

Definitions
41.

While the TJR Act mandated the Commission to inquire into and establish the
reality or otherwise of economic marginalisation, the Act did not define the term
‘economic marginalisation’. As such, the Commission had to adopt a working
definition to guide its work by considering various academic writings on the
subject in different contexts.
Marginalisation is the social process of becoming or being made marginal (especially as a group
within the larger society). ‘Marginality’ is seen in two dimensions: societal and spatial. While
spatial marginality relates to geography – existence at the fringes, or at a distance from the
centre – societal marginality ‘focuses on human dimensions such as demography, religion,
culture, social structure (e.g. caste, hierarchy, class, ethnicity, and gender), economics and
politics in connection with access to resources by individuals and groups.9

42.

43.

For some scholars, the concept of ‘marginality’ is generally used to analyze socioeconomic, political, and cultural spheres, where disadvantaged people struggle to
gain access to resources and full participation in social life.10 Others define socioeconomic marginality as ‘a condition of socio-spatial structure and process in which
components of society and space in a territorial unit are observed to lag behind an
expected level of performance in economic, political and social well-being compared
with the average condition in the territory as a whole’.11 As such, marginalisation is
a process that denies opportunities and outcomes to ‘those living on the margins’,
while enhancing the opportunities and outcomes for those who are ‘at the centre’.
In the Kenyan context, those at the centre would be those in power, those
connected to power through client-patron networks and those favoured by the
state in terms of distribution of the benefits of economic development that should
otherwise flow equitably to all citizens. While in the economic sphere individuals
and groups could be pushed to the margins by the operation of market forces,
which is perfectly legal, it is the insertion of the state and its agents in a variety of
ways to tip the balance in favour of particular groups, or its failure to intervene to
prevent the pulverization of the vulnerable, that is blameworthy.

9 See G Gurung & M Kollmair Marginality: Concepts and their limitations (2005)
10 Gurung & Kollmair (n 9 above)
11 L Sommers et al ‘Towards typologies of socio-economic marginality: North/South comparisons’ in H Jussila et al (eds) Marginality in
space: Past, present and future – theoretical and methodological aspects of cultural, social and economical parameters and critical
regions (1999) pp. 7-24
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Against this background, the Commission adopted the following definitions of key
terms used in this chapter:






Marginalisation: a process that denies opportunities and outcomes to those
‘living on the margin’, while enhancing the opportunities and outcomes for
those who are ‘at the centre’.
Economic marginalisation: a situation that is produced by the process
through which groups are discriminated directly or indirectly, in the
distribution of social goods and services.
Discrimination: any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
any ground such as race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.12

45.

On discrimination, the Commission looked at both direct and indirect discrimination
- both those actions committed with the clear intent to discriminate and those
actions that are not, regardless of their intent, having the effect of discriminating.
In other words, the Commission adopted both an intent and effects test in
establishing whether certain conduct (actions or omissions) were discriminatory.

46.

Direct discrimination could be instituted by laws or policies in various sectors
that keep certain groups at the margins. In Kenya, some of the laws that have
been cited as overtly discriminatory relate to citizenship: as it applied to women
by denying them the ability to donate citizenship to children borne of foreign
husbands; and the prohibitive procedures that applied to certain ethnic minorities
only (e.g. Somalis, Nubians and people from the former Northern Frontier District
in general).

47.

With respect to indirect discrimination, certain conduct, policy or law may
lack a discriminatory intent, but its application has a discriminatory effect.13
The removal of the Endorois community from their land to make room for a
public park to generate foreign exchange for the country is a good example of
an action that results in indirect discrimination. Regardless of the intent of the

12 See article 2, CESCR; article 2 ICCPR and article 2 ICERD. See also, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18 adopted
under article 2, paras 6 and 7 of the ICCPR; article 1 of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) which defines discrimination against women as ‘distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status,
on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural,
civil or any other field’. See also CERD, General Recommendation 30
13 See Committee on Eliminations of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), General Recommendation 32, para 7

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

13

Volume IIB

Chapter ONE

state, it is clear that the effect of their removal with no or minimal compensation
had the effect of impoverishing the community. Removed from their lands
and the source of their livelihoods, members of the community live in extreme
poverty.14 Perhaps as evidence of direct discrimination, the spread of economic
development, distribution of social infrastructure and jobs in the public service
to particular regions vis-à-vis others has over the years tended to coincide with
occupancy of the presidency by a member of a community from such regions/
communities (and associated regions and communities). This role of the state in
economic marginalisation is considered in greater detail further below.
48.

In looking at economic marginalisation, the Commission also considered social
and cultural marginalisation because of the complex relationship that exists
between economic, social and political marginalisation. It agrees with the view
that economically marginalized groups tend to be socially marginalized as well,
so that they are disadvantaged with respect to both resources and power.15 In the
Kenyan context for instance, because minorities have historically lacked effective
political representation, they by extension, lacked the ability and avenues
through which to articulate their concerns. In the broader political context,
the reality of lack of democratic space in Kenya was that, even where there was
political representation, power was wielded by others in an exclusionary setup.
For this reason, possibilities for agitation for economic inclusion were largely
absent.

49.

In the Commission’s view, marginalisation combines discrimination and social
exclusion and is often used interchangeably with ‘social exclusion’. Social exclusion
is a process by which certain groups are systematically disadvantaged because
they are discriminated against on some basis.16 This definition emphasises
discrimination as a marker of social exclusion. While some largely associate social
exclusion with poverty, other scholars consider that social exclusion is a broader
concept than poverty, encompassing not only low material means, but the inability
to participate effectively in economic, social, political and cultural life and in
some characterizations alienation and distance from mainstream society.17 Social
exclusion is in fact, ‘a combination of linked problems, such as discrimination,
unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime and family
breakdown’.18

14 On the Endorois see Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois
Welfare Council v Kenya, African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (communication 276 of 2003)
15 R Kanbur and L Squire The Evolution of Thinking About Poverty: Exploring the Interactions (1999) pp. 196-206
16 C Gaynor & S Watson, ‘Reducing Poverty By Tackling Social Exclusion’ DFID Evaluation Working Paper 22 (January 2007)
17 K Duffy Social Exclusion and Human Dignity: Background Report for the Proposed Initiative by the Council of Europe, CDPS (1995)
p.1
18 Social Exclusion Unit (UK DPM Office) Breaking the Cycle: Taking Stock of Progress and Priorities for the Future (2004)
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In a nutshell, marginalisation has three dimensions: political, economic and
social-cultural. In terms of political marginalisation, a group can be regarded as
politically marginalized because it is disempowered in terms of participation in the
democratic process and in decision-making. This could be because such a group is
inadequately represented (despite its numbers) or lack representation altogether.
Since political empowerment is one of the most important tools for accessing
other social and economic privileges, such groups lose the ability to access every
social, economic, and political benefit. People who are socially marginalized are
deprived of social opportunities. According to Duffy, discriminatory social policies
and practices have the effect that these individuals, groups or communities have
relatively limited access to social resources such as education, health services,
housing, income and work.19 Most marginalized communities are also associated
with poverty. Poverty is now more frequently defined as a type of ‘social exclusion’.20

Conceptual and practical challenges
51.

While the Commission benefited from a variety of sources in completing this
Chapter, documenting economic marginalisation presents numerous problems.
The study of economic marginalisation and inequality is a complex exercise
involving issues of causality, multiple dynamics and other technical aspects. A
seminal report on inequality in Kenya identified several issues entwined in studying
inequality, which is in part produced by marginalisation.21 Firstly, does one look
at vertical (income) and horizontal (group, regional) inequalities simultaneously?
Secondly, how are questions of causality and its directions (the role of institutional
and non-institutional factors in creating opportunities and determining outcomes)
resolved? Thirdly, how does one measure inequality (whether Gini-coefficient, an
approach that is used in disciplines such as sociology, economics, and agriculture,
is a good choice and whether focus on assets-based measurements is ideal)?
Fourthly, what is the role of international trade in skewing incomes? These
questions have no straightforward answers.

52.

The Commission, aware of the complex issues involved in analyzing the causes and
effects of economic inequality and marginalisation, was guided by the TJR Act and
chose to adopt a more targeted approach focusing on two aspects of economic
marginalisation:


The role of the state in respect to marginalisation, whether in increasing or
decreasing inequality; and

19 See Duffy (n 17 above)
20 D Narayan, R Chambers, MK. Shah and P Petesch, Crying Out for Change: Voices of the Poor (World Bank Publication), World
Bank Publications, 01 November, 2000
21 SID Pulling apart: Facts and figures on inequality in Kenya (2004)
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Inequality between groups and regions (horizontal inequality) rather than
vertical inequality (income differences within social groups, e.g. the poor and
the rich).

53.

While the limited presence or absence of a particular group in the formal economy could
be indicative of economic marginalisation, this chapter goes beyond participation
in the economy - whether formal or informal - to assess a set of indicators derived
from socio-economic rights such as health, housing, education, access to land, access
to food and water, employment (especially state employment) as well as physical
infrastructure (roads and social amenities).

54.

Beyond conceptual problems posed by the notion of economic marginalisation,
the Commission faced numerous other challenges at a practical level. The
most challenging related to availability, reliability and quality of data, especially
financial data relating to state expenditures on social programmes and infrastructure
over the years in respect to the regions identified as economically marginalized.
This gap in the data is reflected here.

Women keenly following proceedings during the TJRC’s public hearings in Rumuruti.
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55.

Until recently, poverty and health studies or surveys done in Kenya excluded
certain regions such as North Eastern. For instance, the 2003 Kenya Domestic
and Household Survey (KDHS) was the first survey in the Demographic and Health
Surveys (DHS) programme to cover the entire country, including North Eastern
Province and other northern districts that had been excluded from the prior
surveys (Turkana and Samburu in Rift Valley Province and Isiolo, Marsabit and
Moyale in Eastern Province).22

56.

In later studies, the reliability of data is questionable in part because the studies
often do not include rural areas in the region because of the sparse population
and difficulty in accessing them. To compensate for this shortcoming, the
few studies conducted often oversample urban areas. The challenges of
researching North Eastern have been aptly captured by one researcher who, in
lamenting the difficulty of studying poverty notes that:

Chapter ONE

The quantitative poverty reports produced in Kenya have varied geographical and
population coverage. The quantitative reports have emanated from sample surveys
(rather than censuses), with some covering smallholder households, while others are
national but normally omit the sparsely populated districts of North Eastern province
and the North Rift.23

57.

The Commission is of the view that the state’s lack of data and collection of data
in respect to North Eastern and North Rift only perpetuated marginalisation of
these regions. In other words, the failure to statistically track development in these
regions pushed them even further to the margins.

58.

The Commission is not the first to lament the failure of successive Kenyan
governments to collect sufficient data relating to access to socio-economic
goods. The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights similarly lamented
the absence of disaggregated statistical data in the initial report submitted
by Kenya in 2007, making it difficult for that committee to evaluate Kenya’s
compliance with the international obligations it undertook by ratifying the
ICESCR Covenant.24 There is also paucity of academic literature on the subject of
economic marginalisation.25

22 See Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys of 2008 (2009) 6
23 JT Mukui, ‘Poverty analysis in Kenya: Ten years on’ (2005). This is a Study conducted for the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS),
Society for International Development (SID), and Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
24 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights considered the initial report of Kenya on the implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/KEN/1) at its 34th, 35th and 36th meetings, held on 6 and
7 November 2008 (E/C.12/2006/SR.34-36), and adopted, at its 51st meeting held on 19 November 2008
25 Available studies include: reports done by SID Pulling Apart (2004) and Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and
Perspectives (2006). See also KIPRA, ‘Inequality, poverty and the environment in Kenya’; Institute for Economic Affairs, Youth Fact
book (2010)
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Context of Economic Marginalisation
59.

According to one commentator, horizontal inequalities - the socio-economic
and political differentiations based on socio-cultural identities such as ethnicity,
religion or race - remain the single most important determinant of political
contests in Kenya, fueling much of the sometimes violent contests during
elections.26 In his essay, Muhula rightly argues that the socio-economic and
political inequalities in Kenya are rooted in both historical as well as structural
characteristics of the Kenyan state. Four major factors account for this: ethnoregional political patronage; dominance of the Kenyan state; colonial legacy; and
historical grievances and inter-ethnic rivalries.

60.

Indeed, economic marginalisation experienced by various regions, groups and
communities in Kenya since independence has occurred in a historical, socioeconomic and political context marked by certain factors. These include: an
overly centralised state both in terms of power and resources; ethnicisation of
politics and public life in general; an all-powerful ‘imperial’ presidency marked
by lack of accountability, lack of judicial independence, weak rule of law and
personalization of power; bad governance and rampant corruption; a stunted
economy in which the state was the main dispenser of largesse; and conflicts
revolving around land with large swathes of the population unable to access this
important resource. All these evolved against a backdrop of historical irredentist/
secessionist struggles marked by the ‘Shifta War’ and its aftermath in Northern
Kenya as well as independence claims borne out of perceived marginalisation
in the former Coast Province. While some of these factors were the root cause
of marginalisation, they produced distortions that worsened the effects of
economic marginalisation. Some of these are discussed in turn.

Colonial legacy
61.

An important force that has shaped social, economic and political life in postindependence Kenya is the colonial intervention between 1895 and 1963.
Politically, it resulted in the implantation of a Westphalia-style state, with a
constitution designed largely on the traditional liberal model which places
emphasis on checking state power among the arms of government and comes
fitted with strong property rights.27 As outlined next, economically, the capitalist
model introduced by the white settler community would take root in succeeding

26 R Muhula, ‘Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional Politics in Kenya’ 1 (1) Kenya Studies Review (2007) 85. See also Stewart,
F ‘Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities’, 28: 3 Oxford Development Studies (2000) 245-262
27 On the design of the post colonial state, see H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, ‘Law and Government’ in Kenya: An Official Handbook (1988)
27-35.
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years with a newly-created African capitalist class playing a significant role.
Overall, the colonial experience has had a far-reaching impact on our people.
It is accurate to suggest that the seeds of inequality and marginalisation were
planted by the colonial administration.
62.

The colonial project was accompanied by, or rather based, on massive dispossession
of black African communities in Kenya. The Task Force on the Establishment of a
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission created in 2003 noted with respect
to the state that:
[s]ince its creation by the British in 1895, the Kenyan state has largely been a predatory
and illiberal instrumentality, an ogre defined by its proclivity for the commission of
gross and massive human rights violations. Little need be said of the colonial state,
which was specifically organized for the purposes of political repression to facilitate
economic exploitation.28

63.

The loss of lands and livestock by Africans in what was an agrarian society
through predatory legislative machinery would produce widespread destitution.
The failure of subsequent governments (in particular the Kenyatta government),
to correct this injustice by restoring communities to their lands from which they
had been forcibly evicted by the colonial government can be said to be largely
to blame for inequities in land ownership and access in many parts of Kenya
(especially in Central, Rift Valley, Western and Coast provinces).

64.

While post-independence governments have had a role in skewing economic
empowerment in favour of certain ethnic communities, certain communities –
in particular sections of the Kikuyu community – got a head start by virtue of
their proximity to centers of settler economy. In addition, as the focus of early
missionary activity, they had early contact with formal education. Although
many, as historical inhabitants of the fertile central belt lost their land to the
white settlers, they would find themselves inserted into the capitalist settler
economy as farm workers who would later benefit from that experience.
Among this community would be created a new class of large-scale farmers
and capitalist entrepreneurs, when in the 1950s the colonial administration
found it expedient to undertake reforms that created a ‘buffer community’ of
black landed bourgeoisie between white settlers and the agitating masses.29 It
is largely from this group that the new capitalists in post-independence Kenya
would emerge.

28 Government of Kenya, Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (2003) 19
29 On land reforms relating to that period, see S Wanjala (ed) Essays on land law (2000)
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65.

The policies of the Kenyatta regime would entrench the economic hegemony of
the Kikuyu community based on this core group.30

66.

There is another reason why apart from the distortions introduced by the colonial
administration, economic marginalisation took root in post-independence Kenya:
the preservation of the colonial state beyond the departure of the colonial
authority through laws, culture and practices. On economic marginalisation,
the structures that had promoted inequality and marginalisation in the colonial
period remained in place. In this regard, the regional coordinator for Society for
International Development, Ali Hersi, gave expert testimony at the Commission’s
Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalisation stating:
There was the structure of the colonial state itself and the mechanisms that it put
in place to prefer certain groups over others. However, with the end of the colonial
period, issues of inequality did not just go with colonialism. Unfortunately, the first
government that came into power continued some of those policy choices in the postindependence era that not only enhanced it but, in many instances, even deepened
the inequality.31

67.

If the post-colonial state internalized the practices of the colonial state, then
marginalisation experienced in post-independence Kenya is not surprising. This
is particularly telling because the colonial state has been described rightly as ‘a
state of exclusion’ in the sense that ‘it divided the society between those who had
rights of citizenship and those who did not – the urban and the rural respectively’.32
The problematic economic policies pursued by the post-colonial government are
discussed in detail below.

Ethnicity
68.

30
31
32
33
34

20

The problem of ‘negative ethnicity’ also has colonial roots.33 Other than creating
and co-opting some local elite through bribery, one method used by the
colonial government to maintain control was the ‘divide and rule’ approach. One
commentator has described this approach as ‘the conscious effort of an imperialist
power to create and/or turn to its own advantage on the ethnic, linguistic, cultural,
tribal, or religious differences within the subjugated colony’.34 The practices of the
colonial administration planted the seed for ethnic divisions that was to be further
instrumentalised by the new rulers in Kenya.
See K Kanyinga ‘Governance institutions and inequality in Kenya’ in SID (eds) Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics
and Perspectives (2006) 345, 347-348 discussing the role of the colonial state in creating capital among the Kikuyu
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 18
Kanyinga (n 30 above) 351 discussing Mamdani’s view of the post colonial state in Africa See Mamdani, M Citizen and the Subject:
Contemporary African and the Legacy of colonialism (1996)
See Chapter One of Volume Three of this Report
See generally, Morrock, R ‘Heritage of strife: the Effects of Colonialist “divide and rule” strategy upon the colonised peoples’
Science & Society, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer, 1973) 129-151 at pp.133-137
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In Kenya, evidence tends to show that the distribution of public goods such as
education facilities, health, water and physical infrastructure has followed patterns
of access to political power, with Central and parts of Rift Valley that have produced
the three presidents for the last 48 years enjoying the bulk of economic benefits.
Favouritism practiced by those in power meant that members of their ethnic
groups were favoured in the distribution of social infrastructure and employment
in the public service, creating an exclusionary state.

70.

In the previous constitutional dispensation, which established a ‘winner-takes all’
system, the quest for the presidency became a zero-sum game. According to one
commentator, outcomes shaped competition and a high price would be paid for
losing because ‘losing almost meant economic ruin, fringe existence or oblivion.35
Each ethnic community believed that capturing the presidency would guarantee
almost exclusive access to national resources and public sector jobs, since the
president controlled their distribution’.36 These practices resulted in inequalities
and regional imbalances. Such inequalities are manifested in social, economic and
political exclusion as well as disproportionate access to key services. They are also
reflected in poverty patterns.37

Chapter ONE

Centralised state and personalisation of power
71.

Both the structure and preeminence of the state in the political and economic
sphere is central to understanding economic marginalisation in Kenya. Although
the independence constitution provided for a decentralised federal government
with checks and balances, its progressive demolition under President Jomo
Kenyatta produced an overly powerful ‘imperial’ presidency. President Daniel arap
Moi, who succeeded him, completed the process of centralizing power, eventually
establishing a legal ban on multi-party politics in 1982. The ban on political parties
that made Kenya a de jure one-party state was a big blow to development and
democracy in Kenya. Power was personalized in the president following numerous
constitutional amendments that strengthened the presidency to the detriment of
other arms of government and civil liberties.

72.

The struggle to hold onto power produced many casualties, with those outside
power relegated to the fringes of social, political and economic life.38 Due to the
centralization of power and limited economic opportunities, the state became

35 M Akech Institutional reforms in the new Constitution of Kenya (2010) p. 12
36 Akech (n 35 above).
37 Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF), Social Policy, development and governance in Kenya (2009). Report also
Available at http://www.dpmf.org/dpmf/downloads/Evaluation%20&%20Profile%20of%20Education.pdf See a M B Mutuma Case for
the Introduction Of Wealth Transfer Tax In Kenya World Bank Policy Paper
38 See GM Musila A Preliminary Assessment of the Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Bill, 2008. Pretoria: Institute
for Security Studies (2008) 40-41 and see generally M Aseka, Transformational Leadership in East Africa: Politics, Ideology and
Community (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2005) for an exposition on the authoritarian and repressive tendencies of the Kenyatta
and Moi regimes of government
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the main dispenser of largesse and those unconnected to it through client-patron
networks were condemned to economic marginalisation. The ensuing struggle
to control economic production and wealth gave rise to numerous human rights
violations. It is thus not surprising that since the opening of democratic space in
the early 1990s, economic issues became central to most victimization accounts
in Kenya.39

Client-patron relations and corruption
73.

Corruption has been cited as one of the three major problems that afflict African
states, the other two being patronage and tribalism.40 In Kenya, the scourge of
corruption has followed successive Kenyan governments since independence.
Corruption has manifested in a variety of ways. The client-patron political
relationships that formed the basis of the exercise of political power were built
on and sustained by corruption.41 Mismanagement and misappropriation of state
resources by political leaders led to the collapse of key state firms established to
provide important services or to lead the fight against poverty.

74.

In addition, there have been major financial scandals that deprived the state of
huge amounts of money, and as in the case of the Goldenberg scandal, dealt
a major blow to the economy. The Goldenberg scandal, which involved the
facilitation of the exportation of gold and diamonds from Kenya, is estimated
to have cost the country 10 percent of its GDP under the Moi regime.42 More
recently, the ‘Anglo-leasing’ scandal in 2005, which in many ways resembled
Goldenberg and was apparently aimed at marshaling election funds for a
faction within the NARC government, is said to have lost the country billions of
shillings.43

Land and economic marginalisation
75.

Many commentators and witnesses who spoke to the Commission assert, and
it is widely acknowledged even in government circles, that one of the main
problems that has bedeviled Kenya since independence revolve around land.44
In discussing the colonial legacy, it was noted that the dispossession of Africans
by the colonial government in favor of white settlers, coupled by the failure by

39 See Peter O. Asingo, ‘The Political Economy of Transition in Kenya,’ in W Oyugi et al (eds) The Politics of Transition in Kenya:
KANU to KADU (2003).
40 Bruce J Berman, ‘Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: the politics of uncivil nationalism’ African Affairs (1998), 97, 305-341 at
306
41 See Part II of this report
42 On the Goldernberg scandal, see Government of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair (2005). See
also, LA Cherotich, Corruption and Democracy in Kenya. (Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Oxford
43 Cherotich (n 42 above) 44.
44 See Kenya Land Policy
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the post-independence government to rectify the injustice, has been one of the
main sources of economic marginalisation and a trigger of conflict. Dispossession
of certain communities has left strong feelings of unfair treatment among these
communities.
76.

As shown in this report’s chapter on land, the Kalenjin and Maasai communities
feel that they were cheated out of their ancestral land through the resettlement
programme instituted by the colonial government and later by the Kenyatta
government. Similar sentiments continue to brew among inhabitants of the former
Coast province who for a long time have been deprived of their rights. Policies by
the colonial administration and independence government condemned them to
near-permanent squatters.45 While accurate data is difficult to come by, the Kenya
Land Alliance (KLA), a group that has worked on matters relating to land for many
years and have done various studies has claimed that more than 65 percent of the
arable land in Kenya is owned by less than 20 percent of Kenyans.46 It is asserted
that these are largely politically-connected individuals.

77.

For those without access to political power, politically-driven exclusion from
owning land has bred deep resentment, especially where the political patrons
and administrators who control access to land are perceived to favour members of
their own ethnic communities.47

78.

With respect to public land, a weak legal regime led to massive ‘grabbing’ and
misallocation by those legally entrusted with this important asset.48 The vesting in
the president of powers to alienate public land and to grant title by section 3 of
the Government Lands Act (Cap 280) became one of the main avenues of theft of
public land. Under the Agriculture Act, provisions that enabled the Agriculture
minister to take away land that lies idle and give to ‘others’ to farm provided an
avenue for the grabbing of prime land owned by the Agricultural Development
Corporation (ADC).

79.

Various studies have shown that Kenya has a complex land regime, yet the
administrative framework that oversees it is poorly coordinated and gives excessive
power to administrators without establishing mechanisms to ensure that they
not only perform their duties but also do not abuse their powers, thus breeding
corruption in relevant agencies.49

45
46
47
48

K Kanyinga, The Land Question in Kenya Struggles, accumulation and Changing Politics, (1988) Phd Thesis
Kenya Land Alliance Draft report of a consultation on land tenure and conflict in Kenya (2008)
M Akech Institutional Reforms in the New Constitution of Kenya. Nairobi: International Centre for Transitional Justice (2010) p.24
On the illegal and irregular allocation of public land, see Government of Kenya, Report of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry
Into Illegal and Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2005)
49 Akech (n 47 above)
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Historical irredentist/secessionist struggles and state sovereignty
80.

The Kenyan authorities have from a historical perspective discriminated against the
Kenyan-Somalis and Somali refugees. This may be attributed to the long-standing
conflicts between Kenya and Somalia, and the Kenyan authorities’ reaction to what
they perceived as a ‘credible threat’ from the North-Eastern Province (formerly the
Northern Frontier District - NFD). The conflict has its origins in the colonial era when
the British extended their control to the semi-arid area, acquiring it from the Italians.

81.

New policies established by Britain escalated Somali resistance to British colonialism.50
During the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference on Kenya’s independence
(February to April 1962), the thorny issue of Somali self-determination was raised
by members of the NFD and Somali delegations. The NFD delegation and the
Somali government, the latter not officially a party to the conference, demanded
that the NFD question be addressed before Kenyan independence. KANU and KADU
categorically rejected the secessionist proposal, and some members of KANU issued
a rejoinder that the Somalis in the NFD could immigrate to Somalia if they did not
want to accept Kenyan administration. The British government had promised to
resolve the matter, but later on through the Report on the Regional Boundaries
Commission, deliberately recommended (not taking into account the fact that many
of the people in the NFD wanted the region to rejoin with Somalia), that the region
should be kept within Kenya by simply redrawing regional borders.

82.

While massacres (subject of a separate chapter in this Report) constitute a different
category of violations, its prevalence in the former NFD has some relevance for
economic marginalisation for at least one reason. As is shown later, massacres in
this region were often accompanied by wanton destruction of property, livelihood
sources and houses.

83.

The Commission found that there is a perception, at least among residents of the
former NFD, that the claims of secession by a group of Somalis explains, at least
in part, how the region and its residents have been treated by government over
the years. Residents of this region complain of discriminatory laws, regulations,
practices and procedures that apply to them only and not to other Kenyans.

84.

This is especially so in the area of citizenship and immigration laws. Their
complaints centred on the fact that they have to produce more documents than
other Kenyans. The screening exercise of Kenyan-Somalis and their issuance with

50 O Otunnu Factors Affecting the Treatment of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali Refugees in Kenya: A Historical Overview. Refuge,
Vol.12, No. 5 (November-December 1992)
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pink cards by the government in November 1989 is also cited as a clear case of
discrimination. The Commission heard testimony from residents who are unable
to obtain work because of their inability to obtain identity cards.
85.

Information gathered from hearings, investigations and interviews with experts
(including government officials) led to the conclusion that these claims are
indeed credible. Residents of the former NFD have in the past been subjected to
a discriminatory process in the application for national identity cards.

86.

Jarso Forole’s testimony discloses a typical story. Speaking on behalf of the
Inter-Ethnic Consultative Group representing largely all ethnic groups based in
Marsabit County purposely formed to consult on the historical injustices faced
by local residents for presentation before the Commission, Forole stated:
[…] we are facing a dilemma in terms of citizenship. We are suffering. We feel as if we are
third-class citizens of Kenya. It is as if we do not have equal rights with other Kenyans
in terms of citizenship and instructions. We face constant scrutiny in terms of national
registration. I remember that I could not join the university simply because I did not
have an identity card. I got that identity card in a manner which I ought not to have
followed. I had to bribe an official at the registration bureau to have my identity card
issued at Kibera Location. I had applied for the identity card more than two years before
that date. However, my application would be rejected because there was no conclusive
proof that I was a Kenyan.51

87.

With respect to the Coast province, it has been noted that land tenure issues
in the 10-mile coastal strip of East Africa are intertwined with the early Swahili
settlement in the region and the Indian Ocean trade. In Kenya, this area covers
a strip of land of 1 900km stretching from Vanga in the south coast to the Lamu
archipelago in the north. Since the conquest by Omani Arabs of the East Coast of
Africa in 1660 A.D, the ownership of land in this area has changed hands severally
between the Sultan of Zanzibar, the Imperial British East African Company
(IBEACO), and later the British and Kenya governments in 1963.52 The British
recognized the claims of the Sultan of Zanzibar on his 16km coastal strip.

88.

Only the Sultan’s ‘subjects’ (referring mainly to those with some ancestral links
outside the protectorate) could register land in this area. As a result, up to 25
percent of the indigenous Mijikenda were turned into landless squatters, unable
to register the land they had lived on for generations. The Mijikenda are the
nine ethnic group (Digo, Chonyi, Kambe, Duruma, Kauna, Ribe, Rabaj, Jibana

51 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Marsabit/4 May 2011/p. 11
52 G Wayumba. A Review of Special Land Tenure Issues in Kenya. Department of Surveying, University of Nairobi pp 7- 8
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and Giriama) residing along the coast from the border of Somalia in the north to
Tanzania in the south.53
89.

Although some of the land was adjudicated under the Land Titles Act and
registered as private land, mostly by ‘outsiders’ and ‘absentee landlords’, the
prevailing situation is that land occupied by the indigenous Kenyans is still
held under communal customary tenure, as most of the land has not been
adjudicated to determine the individual land rights. Further, although several
settlement schemes have been established over the years by government, they
have not always benefited the locals. The resulting squatter problem has been
the source of a deep feeling of injustice. The land tenure issues remains one of
the most sensitive issues as the local communities feel they were cheated by
different initiatives. The inability of the locals to use the land on which they
live for economic purposes has led to extreme levels of poverty. Thus, lack or
limited government investment feeds an already rooted perception of economic
marginalisation of the region.54

The Role of The State in Marginalisation
90.

One of the specific actions required of the Commission in terms of section 5(a) of
the TJR Act is to establish ‘an accurate, complete and historical record of violations
and abuses of human rights and economic rights inflicted on persons by the state,
public institutions and holders of public office, both serving and retired, between
12 December 1963 and 28 February 2008’. As previously noted regarding state
responsibility for human rights, the state can be said to be responsible, whether
directly or indirectly, in the marginalisation of certain regions, communities and
groups such as women and ethnic minorities.

91.

Other than section 5(a) of the Act, there is conceptual basis and a necessity for the
focus on the state when discussing responsibility for gross violations of human
rights. Under international human rights law, the framework of responsibility is
primarily state responsibility. This means that the obligation to implement human
rights treaties and to ensure that the rights protected therein are realized belong to
the state.

92.

Under the framework of state responsibility, human rights obligations apply to
all branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial) and at all levels
(national and county). The broad role (with illustrative cases) of successive

53 WRI and Landesa Rural Development Institute. “Kenya. Lesson 3: History of Land Conflicts” in Focus on Africa brief, March 2011 p. 3
54 Wayumba (n 52 above) pp. 7- 8
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governments (the state) in economic marginalisation during the mandate period
is hereby outlined and sets the stage for the discussion relating to the economic
marginalisation of particular regions in the next section.

The Kenyan State and economic marginalisation
93.

In discussing the role of the colonial administration in creating economic
marginalisation through a variety of mechanisms, it is noted that the legacy of the preindependence situation can be traced to the years before independence because of
the near wholesale appropriation of the methods, ethos, culture and practices of that
administration by the post-independence governments. According to the Task Force
on the Establishment of a TJRC, ‘[i]n spite of the liberal [independence] constitution,
the post-colonial state was autocratic at its inception because it inherited wholesale
the laws, culture, and practices of the colonial state’.55

94.

While it is true that the post-colonial government adopted an economic policy
framework based on ‘African Socialism’, which came imbued with values of inclusion,
human dignity, brotherhood and social justice and could have anchored equitable
development, certain aspects of the policy, in particular its implementation, carried
the seeds of inequality and economic marginalisation that would characterize the
Kenyan state in succeeding years. Other than justifying prioritization of investment
in certain regions to the exclusion of others, the implementation of the economic
policy contained in Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965 took a decidedly capitalist slant,
with a limited welfare component.

95.

In addition, the restructuring of the state by the Kenyatta government soon after
independence did not match, and in fact undermined the vision articulated in the
economic policy based on African Socialism. The systematic dismantling of the
independence constitution (abolishing of regional governments, the strengthening
of the presidency while emasculating parliament and the judiciary) was inimical to
the stated goals of African Socialism that underpinned economic policy. As at 1966
when Kenya became a de facto one-party state, the oppressive and exclusionist
practices of the state largely mirrored those of the colonial state.

96.

Evidently, within the Kenyan context, horizontal manifestations of inequality
(between groups and regions) point to the role of state institutions and policies in
creating or nurturing inequalities. Both in the political and economic contexts, state
institutions have played a key role in mediating access to economic opportunities
and allocating resources.

55 Government of Kenya Report of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (2003) 19.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

27

Volume IIB

Chapter ONE

97.

As noted earlier, economic marginalisation, and by extension horizontal inequality,
is considered by many as a ‘historical injustice’. According to some accounts, the
reasons for the permeation of the language of ‘historical injustice’ into the discourse
on horizontal inequities is not far to seek, but it poses particular challenges. In
a country where for a long time economic and political power has been heavily
centralised, where the state appropriated for itself the role of being the agency for
development, and where politics is highly ethnicised, the hypothesis of unequal
treatment can be misused.56

98.

Therefore, the Commission notes that while its focus is to look at the role of the
state, there are multiple factors that have produced inequality between regions
and within regions. Clearly from testimonies made during the hearings, it is
emphasised that inequalities do exist even within regions regarded as relatively
advantaged over others. For anyone studying horizontal inequality, the challenge
is to identify with clarity elements of that inequality that are attributable to the
state. Nevertheless it is clear that economic marginalisation by the state can
take place in various ways, through the diverse institutions, legislation, policies,
administrative arrangements, and regulations and practices.

99.

The practices of the colonial administration, mostly through its ‘divide and rule’
strategy planted the seeds of inter-ethnic rancour, but also set off a process that
would produce economic marginalisation. One aspect that is worth discussing is
how those policies determined the outlook and position of certain regions within
the economy.

100. When discussing the role of indigenous capital in the economy, one commentator,
cites several writers and posits that the colonial state facilitated the accumulation
of Kikuyu capital in ways that placed an elite group of the community in a position
to dominate economically in later years. It is asserted that:
[p]rior to independence, state-led initiatives played significant roles in promoting the
formation of the Kikuyu capital and therefore laying the basis of ethnic inequalities.
Proximity to the capital city Nairobi and the White Highlands scheduled for the
white settler economy provided the Kikuyu with opportunities for investment and
accumulation of capital, which other groups could not have.57

101. The apparently advantaged position occupied by certain members of the
community, did not change at independence, adds the commentator:
56 On this issue, see Society for International Development (SID), Introduction to Readings on Inequality in Kenya (2004).
57 Kanyinga (n 30 above) 347.
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[t]he post-colonial state framework nevertheless simply facilitated further accumulation of
Kikuyu capital in both finance and agricultural sectors. Thus, Central Kenya, the heartland
of the Kikuyu, evolved from the colonial period far more advanced than others.58

102. Although the impact of marginalisation of other large groups and the implications
of capitalist development were not addressed in the initial analysis of the Kenyan
political economy, both phenomena contributed to growing regional disparities
and inequalities in development.59

Sessional Paper No. 10: African Socialism as the anchor of economic policy
103. The Commission takes the firm view that in post-independence Kenya, the
seeds of economic marginalisation of certain regions were planted by the first
formal economic blueprint, Sessional Paper No. 10 titled ‘African Socialism and
its Application to Socialism’ published in 1965. The purpose of the policy paper
was to outline both the theory and practical application of African Socialism to
economic planning.
104.

As Tom Mboya - evidently one of the main ideological architects of Sessional Paper
No 10 written while he was Economic Planning and Development minister explained
-, the adoption of the philosophy of ‘African Socialism’ was a necessary measure to
anchor the newly- independent state, both in economic and political terms.

105. Writing in 1963, two years before the Sessional Paper No. 10 was published, Mboya
justifies resort to the philosophy of African Socialism as a choice driven by the
need to respond to contextual demands in African society:
Africans are struggling to build new societies and a new Africa and we need a new
political philosophy - a philosophy of our own - that will explain, validify and help to
cement our experience.60

106. Having narrated the travails of newly independent African states and the need to
transition from colonialism on a firm philosophical basis that was authentically
African, Mboya offered his understanding of African Socialism, which would later
reflect in Sessional Paper No 10. He noted that:
[w]hen I talk of ‘African Socialism’ I refer to those proven codes of conduct in the
African societies which have, over the ages, conferred dignity on our people and
afforded them security regardless of their station in life. I refer to universal charity
which characterized our societies and I refer to the African’s thought processes and
58 Kanyinga (n 30 above) See also Rothschild, D ‘Ethnic inequality in Kenya’ Journal of Modern African Studies 7:4 (1969) pp. 689-711
59 Kanyinga (n 30 above ) 348
60 Tom Mboya, ‘African Socialism’ Transition No. 8 (March, 1963) pp.17-19
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cosmological ideas which regard man, not as a social means, but as an end and entity
in the society.61

107. Sessional Paper No 10 identified several objectives that are of relevance to the
issue of economic marginalisation. It noted that newly independent Kenya placed
particular emphasis on the following objectives: political equality; social justice;
human dignity including freedom of conscience; freedom from want, disease,
and exploitation; equal opportunities; and high and growing per capita incomes,
equitably distributed.62 The policy expressed that applying African Socialism to
economic planning was the best framework of achieving the stated objectives.
108. The policy noted that African Socialism was based on two African traditions:
political democracy and mutual social responsibility. Political democracy implied
that each member of society is equal in his political rights and that no individual
or group would be allowed to exert undue influence on the policies of the state.
The state can never become the tool of special interests, catering to the desires of a
minority at the expense of the majority. Accordingly, the policy contained a pledge
to the effect that ‘the state … [would] represent all of the people and would do so
impartially and without prejudice’.63 Mutual social responsibility was regarded as ‘an
extension of the African family spirit to the nation as a whole … it implies a mutual
responsibility by society and its members to do their very best for each other’. The
state acknowledged that it bore an obligation ‘to ensure equal opportunities to all
its citizens eliminate exploitation and discrimination and provide needed social
services such as education, medical care and social security.’64
109. One of the main forces that drove the adoption of the policy was to respond to
equity demands, mainly from the black African population and thus to address
race related discrimination and exclusion within the economy. While Africans were
restricted to native reserves, the white settlers occupied fertile swathes of land all
over the country. Moreover, Africans performed most of the unskilled jobs, while
Europeans held many of the management, professional, and higher technical posts
in the public and private sectors.
110. For their part, Asians thrived and dominated middle-level clerical, technical and
commercial positions. The category of Asians refers essentially to Indians, most
of who initially came to East Africa (more accurately brought in by the British
at the end of the 1800s) to work on the Kenya-Uganda Railway. Later, they had
61
62
63
64

30

As above.
Sessional Paper No.10, para 4
Sessional Paper No. 10, para 8
Sessional Paper No. 10, para 11

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter ONE

established themselves in business. In a segregated system, Asians were secondclass citizens (with Africans at the bottom). They had better opportunities across
the board. Unlike Africans, their children had access to better education. Before
independence, some could attend school with Europeans, which was the best
education one could get.
111. It is against this background that Sessional Paper No. 10 was developed.
President Kenyatta, when introducing the Sessional Paper, noted with regard
to the adoption of African Socialism – a philosophy that had already been
contained in the ruling party KANU’s manifesto – that ‘[o]ur [the government’s]
entire approach has been dominated by the desire to ensure Africanisation of
the economy and public service’.65
112. Writing in 1970, Rothschild described the state of affairs inherited by the
independence government that provoked African claims for greater opportunity
at independence:
Whereas the statistics on Europeans in the key occupational groups showed 42 percent
in professional and managerial posts and 17 percent in technical and supervisory posts,
those for the Asians were 23 percent and 4 percent respectively and for Africans were
approximately one per cent in the two categories combined. As to the distribution of
earnings, a similar lopsided pattern was evident; in 1962, the small Asian and European
communities earned £46.8m in a total annual wage bill of £88.8m. In the private sector,
29 percent of the regularly employed European males earned more than £1 800 per
annum and another 29 percent earned between £1 200 and £1 799. Comparative
statistics for the other communities showed 18 percent of Asian males earning £720
and over, and one per cent of the African.66

113. The Africanisation programme therefore targeted a range of sectors: education
(requiring 50-50 enrolment in schools previously the preserve of Europeans and
Asians); agriculture (introducing state involvement in several areas including
breeding; land transfers, a resettlement programme that entailed buying land
from non-Africans and resettling Africans on a willing-seller-willing-buyer basis;
providing access to finance; promoting creation of cooperatives and training)
and; public service (affirmative action to increase numbers of Africans).67
114. While the policy articulated the right principles: social democracy entailing equal
rights of participation and mutual social responsibility (which not only entailed
65 Sessional Paper No. 10, p. 1.
66 Rothschild, D ‘Kenya’s Africanisation Programme: Priorities for Development and equity’ 44:3 The American Political Science Review
(1970) 737-752 738 citing Kenya Population Census, 1962, Vol. III (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development,
1966) at 45-52 and Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstract, 1965 (Nairobi: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development)
67 Sessional Paper No 10, para 82
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social justice but also an obligation on the government to intervene in favour of
the disadvantaged), there were serious flaws that laid the foundation for economic
marginalisation in later years, building as well on a number of distortions that
existed in society.

How Sessional Paper No. 10 fostered economic marginalisation
115. It is the Commission’s considered view that the post-independence government
largely got the broad ideological framework and the fundamentals of economic
policy right. In particular, the policy correctly expressed the state’s obligation
thus:
The state has an obligation to ensure equal opportunities to all its citizens, eliminate
exploitation and discrimination, and provide needed social services such as education,
medical care and social security.68

116. However, there are several elements that transformed the policy into a facilitator of
economic marginalisation rather than a mitigator of inequality. Firstly, although it
was recognized that land was previously owned communally with access regulated
through membership in a particular group (clan, ethnic group), Sessional Paper No.
10 asserted that a system of secure private title to land was necessary to anchor
economic growth. Yet, the diversity of claims (that included communal title that
governed property in most communities in the pre-colonial era) as well as the
effects of dispossession during the colonial period does not appear to have been
taken into account. Private individual title was the only recognized title through
laws adopted soon after independence. This became one of the main reasons why
the Sessional Paper No 10 was heavily criticized.
117. Expressing surprise (in respect to non-recognition of communal title to land),
one of the most vehement critics of the policy decried the fact that ‘one of the
best African traditions is not only being put aside … but even the principle is not
being recognized and enhanced’.69 Those who testified during the Commission’s
hearings or made written submissions on issues related to pastoralists and
economic marginalisation blamed the land tenure system for many ills
experienced by communities because of the non-recognition of communal land
tenure. Describing the dispossession that pastoralist communities have suffered
over the years, Michael Tiampati, who testified before the Commission on behalf
of Pastoralist Development Network of Kenya noted:
68 Sessional Paper No 10, para 11
69 See for instance, Barak H Obama, ‘Another critique of Sessional Paper No. 10’ East Africa Journal, July 19 26-33 at 29 expressing
surprise (in respect to non recognition of communal title) that ‘’one of the best African traditions is not only being put aside but even
the principle is not being recognized and enhanced’
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There is also the aspect of land tenure. In these areas, essentially most pastoralists
do not own land individually; they own them on communal basis. Management is
through traditional institutions, but individualization of land ownership has come to
undermine these principles and has also brought about problems.70

118. Acknowledging serious abuses that occurred under the land tenure system
since independence, Chapter Five of the 2010 Constitution recognizes three
categories of land holding, including communal land. The other two are public
land and private land. This is partial justice for communities that have suffered
dispossession and other injustices because of non-recognition of communal
title since 1963. The Commission is of the view that appropriate measures must
be taken under the Constitution to address and correct injustices that have
occurred under the previous land regime that excluded communal form of land
ownership.
119.

The resettlement programme undertaken under Sessional Paper No. 10 was similarly
problematic. The resettlement programme operated on a willing-seller-willing-buyer
basis, a policy which subsequently condemned many to perpetual landlessness.71
While it is difficult to access accurate data, it is often anecdotally suggested that
there are hundreds of thousands, of squatters and landless people in the country,
largely concentrated in the former Coast and Rift Valley provinces.72

120. It is the Commission’s view that in part because of the deep-rooted distortions
introduced in society by the colonial dispensation and in particular the widespread
destitution created by policies of dispossession and selective empowerment, newlyindependent Kenya would have needed a period of adjustment after independence
to correct the ills of colonialism and address inequalities before introducing a
capitalist market with limited state intervention in social programming.
121. Unfortunately, the structures that had promoted inequality and marginalisation in
the colonial period remained in place, as an expert witness noted:
There was the structure of the colonial state itself and the mechanisms that it put
in place to prefer certain groups over others. However, with the end of the colonial
period, issues of inequality did not just go with colonialism. Unfortunately, the first
government that came into power continued some of those policy choices in the postindependence era that not only enhanced it but, in many instances, even deepened
the inequality.73
70
71
72
73

TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 28
Sessional Paper No 10, paras 28-31
See Chapter on Land in this Volume of the Report.
TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 18
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122. In part because of the injustices visited on our people by the colonial administration,
the post-independence government should have taken concrete measures not
only to restore rights of the dispossessed, but also to institute measures that would
have corrected existing imbalances in order to place different sections and regions
in society on an equitable footing as the country embarked on constructing itself
after the end of colonial administration. Investment policies should have aligned
to at least these two objectives.
123. With respect to land for instance, rather than commercializing resettlement
that skewed access in favour of those who had money or could access loans,
resettlement should have been anchored on restoration of rights. This would entail
assessing the claims of those forcibly removed from their land and restoring them
to it while finding alternative settlement in cases where for a limited number of
reasons - third-party interests, sustainability in the use of resources - restoration to
specific land was impossible.
124. Those who presented their views on the question of historical land injustices to
the Commission appeared aware that remedying such injustices would not entail
restitution of land in all cases, especially where third-party interests are involved.
Speaking on behalf of Pastoralist Development Network of Kenya, an organization
that seeks to push for the integration of pastoralist issues in the national
development agenda, Michael Tiampati reiterated the practical solutions to land
injustices that have been made in the past by various aggrieved communities:
At the Bomas Conference on the new constitution, I heard pastoralists say that: You do
not need to carry your skyscrapers in Nairobi and leave our land. You have the skyscrapers
because they work for you, but what is there that is benefitting us? So you do not need to
carry the skyscrapers from Nairobi and leave land in order to address historical injustices
with regard to ancestral land. The question to address is what we want. If the takeover
was by the settlers, yes, a case was raised during the Lancaster House Conference. They
said that they wanted to buy back the land from the settlers who had developed on that
land. That did not come to be. Those are some of the painful issues that will have to be
addressed. They cannot be addressed in a hushed tone. They have to be addressed in
an open and transparent manner so that everybody accepts whatever wrong that was
done. We need to ask the question the Swahili way: Kosa limefanyika, tufanyeje? 74 (A
mistake has been made, how do we correct it?)

125. Secondly, the implementation of the Africanisation programme – which was
aimed at increasing African representation in various sectors including education,
industry and public service – also left much to be desired. One commentator has
74 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and (n 73 above) p. 35
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noted that among the deliberate actions undertaken by political elites between
1964 and 1970 that ‘undermined the liberal democratic constitution and the
values it underpinned’ was the blatant ‘ethnic and nepotistic approach to the
Africanisation of the public service’.75
126.

As shown below in the regional assessments, the perception that over the years, the
composition of the public service or at least the higher echelons has mirrored the
regional extraction of the president is widely held. And while the Commission was
unable to access complete data on the composition of the public service over the
years, some tables and figures are included at the end of this section that point to
this phenomenon.

127. In addition, while the philosophy that underpinned the economic policy (African
Socialism) appeared to reject both Western capitalism and Eastern communism pragmatically preferring to locate Kenya in the middle by adopting a non-aligned
stance during the Cold War divide - in practice, the manner in which African
Socialism was applied followed a decidedly capitalist path, with Kenya remaining
non-aligned in political terms only. Elements of the policy that would have
anchored a welfare state such as provision of social services like education, health
and social security remained unimplemented. This was explained in the policy on
grounds of lack of resources and skilled human resources.
128. The Commission asserts that the elements of the policy of African Socialism that
include social justice, equity and ‘brotherhood’ could have anchored a welfare
state had this path been chosen consciously. As has been shown by the experience
of many western liberal democracies, a welfare state is not incompatible with the
tenets of a capitalist economic orientation.
129. Equally, with respect to affirmative action, the Africanisation programme that
sought to address absence of Africans in the public service and various sectors of
the economy soon after independence should have been implemented in a more
inclusive manner, and with due regard to issues of diversity.
130. From a historical perspective, it is partly the turn to the West and unbridled
capitalism that was one of the main sources of the rift and subsequent fallout
between President Kenyatta and Vice President Oginga Odinga in 1966. While
the socialist Odinga urged that the government should look East for inspiration,
President Kenyatta opted for capitalism and the West. While the conflict was
partly ideological, Odinga had accused President Kenyatta of ‘betraying those
75 C Odhiambo-Mbai ‘The rise and fall of the autocratic state in Kenya’ in W Oyugi (eds) The politics of transition in Kenya: From
KANU to NARC (2003) 59.
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who struggled for a nationalist, inclusive cause’. The departure of Odinga from
government, his banishment and the sidelining of his supporters would cement
the liberal economic policies only three years after independence.
131. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, the deliberate decision expressed in the
policy to prioritize investment into ‘high potential regions’ to the exclusion of ‘low
potential’ ones is key to economic marginalisation of the regions profiled here. The
policy stated at paragraph 133 of Sessional Paper No. 10 reads as follows:
One of our problems is to decide how much priority we should give in investing in
less developed provinces. To make the economy as a whole grow as fast as possible,
developmental money should be invested where it will yield the largest increase in net
output. This approach will clearly favour the development of areas having abundant
natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities and people
receptive to and active in development. 76

132. Many who made representations to the Commission identified this investment
policy as the root of inequity and economic marginalisation of certain regions.
According Ali Hersi, the policy paper left the colonial structures of inequality intact:
[T]his policy paper did not deconstruct the colonial logic that led to basis for inequality
by advocating a discriminatory policy investment of government resources.

133. Part of the problem was that what constituted ‘high potential’ areas was defined very
narrowly. Paragraph 133 of Sessional Paper No. 10 stated that development would
be directed to areas having abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall,
transport and power facilities and people receptive to and active in development.
These happened to be areas previously designated as ‘White Highlands’, largely
in Central and parts of Rift Valley regions. The effect of the narrowly defined ‘high
potential area’ has been that any area that cannot grow certain crops is considered
wasteland more or less. Testimonies, including those from participants in FGDs
countrywide were very critical of the state’s historical preference for cash crop
farming to the detriment of livestock keeping that is the mainstay of the economy
in arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) regions classified as ‘low potential’.
134. The ASALs constitute about 80 per cent of the country’s land mass and it is home to
about 10 million people. Noting that the policy excluded and led to the neglect of
pastoralist areas and productive economic activity, Abdikadir Kaaru Gullet stated:
The Sessional Paper No. 10 of Kenya of 1965 clearly distributed the resources of Kenya to
regions considered to be high potential areas. The benchmark for high potential areas is
agricultural land producing coffee, tea or pyrethrum or cash crops. That is where Kenya
76 Sessional Paper No 10, para133
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distributed its resources. Northern Kenya was not considered as one of the high potential
areas in terms of livestock and livestock production. In other words, areas that do not
produce coffee, tea or pyrethrum are considered to be low potential areas with no much
benefit to the government. Therefore, there is no much need to invest in them in terms of
education, water and other infrastructure.

135. It is important to note that some regions that would fall into the classification
of ‘high potential’ areas because they meet at least some of the conditions set
in Sessional Paper 10 have suffered marginalisation for other reasons. These are
explored in section three of this chapter. In addition, it is worth noting that the
view that certain regions, in particular the former ‘White Highlands’ benefitted in
their entirety from the investment policy is inaccurate. Within these areas, there
are pockets that benefitted more than others, with some not benefitting at all. An
expert witness stated:
Over time, it was recognized that there were gaps in this [the policy of prioritizing
investment in certain areas]. What was intended was that even in these areas that
were being targeted, the resources did not necessarily go towards ensuring equitable
development in that area itself. There were groups that benefited a lot more than others.77

136. Where there has been investment in marginalized regions over the years, planning
has been driven by wrong priorities or by considerations that do not assist the
intended beneficiaries, in part because decisions have been made in Nairobi.
Speaking in relation to misplaced investment in certain pastoralist areas, another
expert witness observed:
This is what my colleague alluded to in terms of development initiatives for pastoralist
areas being decided in Nairobi. I do not know whether you went to Laikipia to a place
called ‘Mugogodo’, where there is a very big cereal store and yet those people do not grow
any cereals because they are pastoralists. Essentially, you see the level of disorganization in
terms of planning for certain communities. So, we feel that these are some of the aspects
that have brought about economic marginalisation.78

137. What is clear is that African Socialism – albeit under a different name, Nyayoism or
Nyayo philosophy - would remain relevant as an ideological framework continued
to inform government economic planning and the government’s approach in
general. Soon after taking over from Kenyatta in 1978, President Moi had declared
that ‘nitafuata nyayo’ (I will follow the (Kenyatta’s) footsteps) meaning that he
would ensure continuity of the principal ideals, policies and philosophy pursued
by Kenyatta.
77 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 19
78 TJRC/Hansard/Thematic Hearing on Economic Marginalization and Minorities/13 Feb 2013/p. 28
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138. The Nyayo philosophy would later be expressed in an acclaimed book by Moi.79
Critics have argued that the manner in which the philosophy of Nyayoism was
practiced led Moi to perfect most of the negative practices predominant in the
closing years of the Kenyatta era, such as neo-patrimonialism and corruption. 80
139. In his communication to the Commission, former President Moi rejects the idea
that any part of the country was marginalized under his rule. He writes that the
central plank of his regime was inclusive development:
The biggest agenda of my government was to distribute resources equitably to all
parts of the country. I cannot agree, even for a fleeting moment, to make reference to
a so called ‘socio-economic marginalisation’ of any part Kenya, by my government.81

140. With respect to specific regions — Nyanza, Northern Kenya (former NFD) and
North Rift— that have often dominated narratives on marginalisation in the past,
Moi cites various projects and the various personalities (especially from Nyanza)
who served in key positions in his administration as part evidence of inclusion.
For North Eastern and North Rift, Moi denies marginalisation, while affirming that
all was done to include Kenyans from those parts of the country. He attributes
challenges faced by residents of those regions largely to natural causes:
As the other areas namely Northern Kenya and Rift Valley Province, these areas faced a
natural drawback of being dry and arid. The speed of development in areas where the
climate and weather are not conducive cannot be compared to areas where land is arable
and accessible by road. Despite these natural impediments, my government made a big
effort to reach our people there, and today, despite all the challenges, the people of the
dry areas feel as Kenyans, as the rest of the citizens. I created the Reclamation of Arid and
Semi-arid Lands ministry and appointed Hon Justus Ndotto as its first minister. This was
one of my attempts to speed up development in the arid areas.82

141. While some initiatives were launched to uplift these regions, especially the ASAL
regions, it appears that measures taken were both inadequate and in some cases
inappropriate. Creating structures does not always translate into results on the
ground. The assertion by the former president that the residents from Northern
Kenya feel like Kenyans today does not reflect the perceptions recorded by the
Commission. While expressing optimism that the situation could change under
the new Constitution, the majority of those who spoke from these regions (as is
79 For more on Nyayo philosophy, see generally Daniel arap Arap Moi, Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles
(1986).
80 Asingo, Peter O ‘The Political Economy of Transition in Kenya,’ in Walter O. Oyugi, Peter Wanyande and Odhiambo Mbai (eds)
The Politics of Transition in Kenya: From KANU to NARC (2003) 22. See also Kyule, L The Politics of the Independence of Kenya
(1999) 203 who notes that ‘the scope for criticism and free debate, already limited, was continually narrowed, civil society crippled
and human rights infringed’.
81 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.20
82 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.23
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shown in testimonies in this chapter) categorically stated repeatedly that even
today, their experiences have made them feel ‘less than Kenyan’, ‘as foreigners’ or
‘unwanted outsiders in their own country’.
142. Quite clearly, it appears that President Moi was and remains out of touch with the
lived realities of Kenyans across the country.

Political power and economic empowerment
143.

In part because of the nature of the state (power and resource concentration at the
centre) and in part because of ethnicity, a clear link can be seen between economic
fortunes of particular regions and control of political power. Hold onto power
allowed ethnic elites to accumulate wealth, invariably within the group. In reference
to the Kenyatta regime, it is noted that ‘power was increasingly concentrated in
the Kikuyu elite who increasingly excluded elite from other ethnic groups from
the centre.83 While the Commission is unable to confirm these statements, similar
sentiments have been expressed at different times with respect to the Moi and
Kibaki administrations. Concentration of political power in the hands of the Kikuyu
elite also provided opportunities through which the group could accumulate capital.
Politics and economy became intertwined. This is a phenomenon that has continued
to underpin Kenyan politics.

144. The circumstances under which Daniel arap Moi assumed power in 1978 – amid
jostling among the ruling elite to succeed President Kenyatta – and how his 24-year
presidency evolved is explained thus: wielding political power meant economic
prosperity for the ruling group, which can be aptly described in terms coined by
Joseph Karimi and Phillip Ochieng as ‘The Family’, referring to rather close political
confidants and business people tied closely to power as opposed to ‘family’, blood
relatives.84 Throup and Hornsby observe:
Under Kenyatta, the Kikuyu had come to dominate business and commerce, the
civil service, many of the professions and, of course, politics … with a comparatively
elaborate communications and power infrastructure, Kikuyu land lay at the heart of
the Kenyan economy in a way that the Kalenjin areas, the core of President Moi’s new
coalition, did not.85

145. Karimi, Ochieng and Asingo recount the intrigues surrounding attempts towards
the end of Kenyatta’s life by members of ‘The Family’ to undermine the accession by
83 Kanyinga, (n 60 above) 348; Bates, RH Beyond the miracle of the market: The political economy of agricultural development in
Kenya (1989)
84 See Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng, The Kenyatta Succession (1980)
85 Throup, D & Hornsby, C Multiparty Politics in Kenya (1998) 26-27; Asingo, 23
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Moi, the constitutionally designated heir, to power.86 While rewarding those who
had supported him among the Kikuyu elite (in particular Mwai Kibaki and Charles
Njonjo (Kibaki became Vice-President, while Njonjo was retained as AttorneyGeneral, only to be ousted four years later for alleged links to the 1982 coup
attempt and his rumoured clandestine attempts to seize power) as the limited
data available to the Commission shows (see tables at the end of this section), Moi
found it necessary to create room for the Kalenjin elite not only by expanding the
patronage network beyond Central Kenya, but also by purging the public service.
146. As Moi embarked on this endeavour of including the Kalenjin, the casualties
were inevitably Kikuyu. Moi’s response to increasingly critical and ‘uncooperative’
Kikuyu elite was ‘swift and economically damaging to the uncooperative Kikuyu
elite, who began to lose out state-mediated economic opportunities to the Asians
and a few Kalenjin front-runners’.87 Complaints leveled against President Kibaki
at the end of his first term and which were expressed to the Commission suggest
that a similar pattern was repeated, with the main casualties being Kalenjin.
147. Commentators attribute Moi’s recourse to authoritarian rule at the start of the
1980s – only two or three years after assuming power – to his inability to ‘rule
through consensus due to the recalcitrance of the Kikuyu elite’. The attempted
coup in 1982 appeared to remind Moi of the insecurity of his rule and he would
immediately move to destroy any opposition and to strengthen his hold on
power. In succeeding years, the Moi regime is said to have attempted to deny
Kikuyu businessmen opposed to its rule state-mediated economic opportunities
and instead elected to work with Asian businessmen to undercut what was
perceived as threat derived from the economic power of this elite.88 Leaders who
worked closely with the administration are said to have flourished economically.
148. The intersection of politics and power in a context where the private sector remained
insignificant over the years heightened political competition and increased
opportunities for conflict over resources because the state had positioned itself as
the main agency of development and ‘dispenser of largesse’. In the Commission’s
view, this situation has had particular importance for economic marginalisation or
inclusion; it meant that economic fortunes of individuals and groups depended on
their acquisition, holding and wielding power or proximity to it.
149. Political competition, as noted earlier, became a zero-sum game: win and be
rewarded, lose and be marginalized, unless you could find some relevance in the
ruling elite struggles to hold onto power. One commentator notes rightly that
86 Peter O. Asingo (n 80 above) 20-22; Throup and Hornsby (n 85 above)
87 Asingo (n 80 above) p. 24
88 Asingo, (n 80 above) p.23; Kasfir, N., ed. Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives (1998)116
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‘the state became the institution critically necessary for changing the economic
fortunes of individuals and their ethnic constituencies.89 This struggle in turn led
to the growth of client-patron political relations on which the political structure
was constructed. In some degree, this explains why, upon the easing of the
authoritarian one-party structure, political contest in Kenya has been a violent
affair from the 1990s.
150. Having identified the three factors that created and strengthened class divisions
in Marx’s Europe (the concentration of economic power; absolute and unrestricted
private ownership and; the close relationship between economic power and
political influence) Sessional Paper No. 10 proposed that the application of African
Socialism would eliminate these problems, asserting:
[t]he concept of political equality in Africa rules out in principle the use of economic
power as a political base. The vigorous implementation of traditional political democracy
in the modern setting will eliminate, therefore, one of the critical factors promoting class
divisions. The policy of African Socialism to control by various means how productive
resources are used eliminates the second of the factors supporting a class system. Without
its two supporting allies, the concentration of economic power cannot be the threat it
once was.90

151. It can be argued that although Sessional Paper No. 10 rightly identified the danger
of concentrating economic power in political hands and pledged to combat it,
history bears out the fact that there has been complete failure in this regard. Kenya
is ranked as one of the most unequal countries in Africa. While the Commission
cannot confirm this, views were expressed that economic power is concentrated
in particular elites who have held political power at one point or another and
invariably, some of the richest Kenyans have either been part of the ruling elite,
senior public servants or businessmen who at one time had a close association
with power through various networks. This is not to suggest that association with
power has been or is the sole origin of economic fortune.
152. As shown subsequently, history depicts that there have been clear links between
politics and economic fortunes/development of ethnic communities and regions
over time. One indicator that is a good marker of economic marginalisation or
inclusion is physical infrastructure, in particular roads. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that by the time of Kenyatta’s death in 1978, of all regions, Central Kenya had the
most well-developed social infrastructure, including roads. These would later
suffer neglect and deteriorate under Moi, while Rift Valley gained the advantage in
this regard.
89 Kanyinga (n 30 above) 348
90 Sessional Paper No 10, para 31
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153. Under Kibaki, Central Kenya arguably has the best road network in Kenya with the old
ones having been replaced and new ones built. While there could be an economic
rationale, and while it is true that some other regions have seen an improvement
in part of their road infrastructure under Kibaki (with Northern Kenya getting its
first tarmac/all-weather road since independence: the incomplete Isiolo-Moyale
highway), the fact that the first ‘Super- highway (Nairobi-Thika) leads to Central
Kenya perhaps confirms the links between politics and economic development
that became a norm in post-independence Kenya. It has been suggested that it is a
continuation of the flawed and biased policy (contained in Sessional Paper No. 10
of 1965) that prioritized development of ‘high potential areas’ over ‘low potential
areas’.

Instrumentalising ethnicity and patron-client political relations
154.

In reviewing academic literature when attempting to diagnose the problem of the
post-independence African societies, Berman cites three main issues: patronage,
corruption and tribalism to which he refers to as ‘the evil triumvirate’.91 Of tribalism,
he writes as follows:
[o]f the three, ‘tribalism’ appeared to be the underlying basis of the other two, the
foundation of the power of the ‘Big Men’ and the catch-all explanation in academic
analysis, as well as the mass media, of catastrophic political failure on the [African]
continent.92

155. As is evident so far, the relationship between ethnicity and social, economic and
political opportunities in Kenya has been clearly pronounced over the years.93
Ethnicity has over the years been manipulated for political and economic gains.
Because of weak democratic and accountability institutions, the attitude that the
elite have towards state power (that is to be used towards personal enhancement,
prestige and social status rather than in the service of some ideal or public good)
has persisted.94 Political manipulation of ethnicity is almost a tradition in Kenyan
politics.95 It has been a common practice for politicians and officials to use state
power and institutions to promote their own interests or those of their ethnic
groups.96 This is achieved through intimidation, violence and other forms of
terror against real and imagined enemies.97 Nowhere is ethnicity more at play
91 Introduced in an article by John Stackhouse titled ‘Are the Big Men Coming Back?’ published in Globe and Mail (Canada) 6 April
1996
92 Berman, Bruce J ‘Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: the politics of uncivil nationalism’ African Affairs(1998) pp.305-341; 306
93 Ethnic Inequalities in Education in Kenya International Education Journal Vol 5, No 2, 2004 Centre for Development Studies
94 PA Nyong’o State and Society in Kenya (1989)
95 See Kenya Human Rights Commission, ‘Warlord Democracy,’ December 2002
96 PA Nyong’o Popular struggles for democracy in Africa (1987)
97 G Hyden African politics in comparative perspective (2005)
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than in the political arena. Ethnicity has become, not only a basis of political
support, but also of political marginalisation.98
156. The political class has, since independence been accused of manipulating
ethnicity in the capture, consolidation and hold onto power.99 Jomo Kenyatta
built his power base among the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru (GEMA) communities,
excluding the majority not only from the political, but also from the social and
economic spheres of the state. Former president Moi, once in power, proceeded
to consolidate it with the Kalenjin community, resulting in its ethnic domination
and hegemony over state institutions. The collapse of the National Rainbow
Coalition (NARC) that swept Kibaki into power only two years into his first term
was largely due to the exclusion, or perceived exclusion, of non-GEMA players
who had contributed to Kibaki’s victory in 2002. In the 2007 and 2013 General
Election, both dominant sides appealed to ethnic bases.

Limiting spread of economic empowerment: Control and selective
impoverishment
157. According to one author, the heavy reliance of private capital on political patronage
and state-mediated commercial opportunities for economic advancement tended
to curtail the scope for a large-scale private enterprise sector. Indeed most of the
large capitalists who emerged were mainly Kikuyu elites with close links to the
Kenyatta regime. Their interests had been secured by the formation of GEMA in
1971. GEMA was created to secure the social and economic interests of Central
Kenya communities. While Kenyatta was the patron of the organization, leading
ministers served as officials (Julius Kiano, Mwai Kibaki, Jeremiah Nyagah, Jackson
Angaine, Maina Wanjigi and Nguret) but were later replaced by businessmen
notably Njenga Karume and Kihika Kimani to lower the political profile of the
organisation following public uproar. GEMA is said to have become the main
vehicle for organizing capital and acquisitions, including land purchases.
158. Commentators note that the state had an interest in maintaining a tight control
over the size of the private sector. State control over the size, nature and mix
of the emerging African capitalist class appears to have been hinged on the
premise that an ‘expansive capitalist class would deprive the political leaders
of the ability to mobilize economic opportunities and resources for political
patronage purposes’.100
98 O Juma & M Munene ‘The Colonial Policies of Segregating the Kikuyu’ (2002) 2 International Journal of the School of Social
Sciences 36
99 O Anthony & J Dan Back to the Future: The 2007 General Election (2007)
100 Kasfir (n 88 above) 112-113.
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A section of a trading center in Northern Kenya.

159. With hindsight, and in the context of client-patronage political relations described
here and elsewhere, it can be concluded with certainty that the composition of the
Cabinet appointed by presidents over the years since independence have been a
good marker of inclusion across several sectors (political, social and economic).
The tables below reflect the evolution under the administration of the first three
presidents.
160.

For President Kenyatta, while his first Cabinet reflected a national outlook, there
would be a dramatic shift only three years after independence, especially after the
fallout between the President and the Vice-President Oginga Odinga, which would
intensify in the 1970s as the elite around Kenyatta (largely from his Kiambu turf)
consolidated power and plotted Kenyatta’s succession. Five major events would
punctuate and affect this evolution: the fallout, expulsion, and banishment of Odinga
from politics (1966);101 an unreported heart attack suffered by Kenyatta (1966); the
assassination of Tom Mboya (1969); the assassination of JM Kariuki in 1975 (a former
confidant of Kenyatta from Nyeri who was apparently seen as a challenge to the
Kiambu group) and; ‘Change the Constitution’ campaign (mounted allegedly to
prevent the then Vice-President Moi from succeeding President Kenyatta). These
events were to dictate changes in the Cabinet and government in general as the
group around President Kenyatta took measures to consolidate power.

101 Odinga would never contest election again until 1992 when multiparty politics was re-introduced. Kenyatta, and subsequently Moi
would — under the one party rule — deny him and his close allies the opportunity to contest any political seat
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First (Republican) Cabinet in Independent Kenya (1964)

MINISTRY

NAME

ETHNICITY

President

Jomo Kenyatta

Kikuyu

Vice-President

Oginga Odinga

Luo

Justice and Constitutional Affairs

Tom Mboya

Luo

Attorney-General

Charles Njonjo

Kikuyu

Finance and Economic Planning

James Gichuru

Kikuyu

Foreign Affairs (previously State in PM Office)

Joseph Murumbi

Goan-Maasai

Internal Security and Defence

Njoroge Mungai

Kikuyu

Education

Mbiyu Koinange

Kikuyu

Health and Housing

Vacated by Njoroge Mungai

Kikuyu

State, Pan African Affairs

Joseph Otiende

Luhya

Agriculture

Bruce Mackenzie

White Settler

Local Government

Samuel Ayodo

Luo

Commerce and Industry

Julius Kiano

Kikuyu

Works, Communications and Powerr

Dawson Mwanyumba

Taita

Labour and Social Services

Eliud Mwendwa

Kamba

Natural Resources

Laurence Sagini

Kisii

Information, Broadcasting, Tourism

Achieng Oneko

Luo

Lands and Settlement

Jackson Angaine

Meru

Home Affairs

Daniel Moi

Kalenjin

Cooperatives and Marketing

Paul Ngei

Kamba

Source: State House website (dominion cabinet) with amendments
by the Commission to reflect the republican cabinet.

161. It should be noted that as Prime Minister during the 6 months ‘dominion status’,
Kenyatta had appointed a cabinet, largely a Kikuyu-Luo coalition (the two largest
ethnic groups at independence and the dominant players in KANU). When Kenya
became a republic on 12 December 1964, changes were made to the constitution
and new ministries were created (Internal Security and Defence). The cabinet was
reorganized slightly to consolidate power in Kenyatta’s Kikuyu confidants held
core ministries in government. Kenyatta would accommodate only two from the
opposition when KADU (the party of minority tribes dominated by Coastal groups,
the Kalenjin and Luhya was dissolved). These two were Daniel arap Moi of KADU
and Paul Ngei of the African Peoples Party (largely a Kamba-dominated party).
Ronald Ngala (Coast), the leader of KADU who had been left out when the parties
merged, would be brought into cabinet in 1966 to broaden the political base after
the sidelining of Odinga and the Luo from government.
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162. Kenyatta would reorganize his cabinet in 1969 (after Mboya’s assassination) and
again in 1975 (after JM Kariuki’s assassination). Out of a cabinet of 22, there would
be 7 Kikuyu holding the core ministries of security, energy, finance and foreign
affairs (he retained his key people from the last cabinet); 2 from their allied
communities within GEMA (1 Meru and 1 Embu); 2 Luo; 2 from Coast; 2 Luhya; 2
(Kalenjin); 2 Kisii; 2 Kamba and 1 European. It is interesting to note that in Moi’s
first Cabinet: there were 10 GEMA (8 Kikuyu; 1 Embu and 1 Meru); 3 Kalenjin; 3 Luo;
3 Luhya; 2 Kamba; 2 Kisii; 2 Coast (1 Digo and 1 Taita); and 1 Maasai. In fact, Moi
had decided to retain all ministers from the Kenyatta Cabinet who won elections.
Bucking the trend that came to reflect in all post-independence cabinets (where all
‘power’/’establishment/core ministries of Finance/Economy, Security, Energy and
Trade/Commerce) have been held by members from the president’s ethnic group
(or close confidants), only one ministry out of a cluster of 5 was held by a Kalenjin
(Nicholas Biwott) in 1979. This was to change in later years.
163.

Moi’s last cabinet (January 1998) when he was serving his last term, secured after
divisive and acrimonious elections, was the perhaps least inclusive (of all his
governments since 1979). For the first time since independence, there was no single
Kikuyu or Luo in the cabinet. In the ethnically charged 1997 presidential election,
while GEMA communities voted solidly for Kibaki (1.9 million) catapulting him into
second position behind President Moi (2.4 million), the Luo, Luhya and Kamba also
voted along ethnic lines with Raila Odinga obtaining (660 000), Kijana Wamalwa (500
000) and Charity Ngilu (400 000) respectively. The only member of the cabinet from
the GEMA communities was Joseph Nyagah, son of Jeremiah Nyagah from Embu,
who himself was a long-serving cabinet minister from 1963 to 1992.102

164. The outlook of the last cabinet would change several times over three years as Moi
maneuvered to muster a winning formula in his succession plan. On 11 June 2000,
the cabinet was reshuffled when KANU entered a coalition - the first since 1963 with Raila Odinga’s National Development Party (NDP). Raila Odinga and 3 others
from NDP would join the cabinet but resign in 2002 together with other longserving KANU ministers when Moi designated Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor.
With an eye on the succession, Moi would make further changes to the cabinet in
November 2001. Having earlier nominated Uhuru Kenyatta to Parliament (he had
lost the contest in 1997), Moi would elevate him to cabinet, together with several
other GEMA leaders.
102 It is notable that even with the banishment and exclusion of the Luo politically and economically during Kenyatta’s time, there would
always be at least single Luo in his Cabinet. During Moi’s time, his contests with Kikuyu elite notwithstanding, Moi would include
several Kikuyu in cabinet. Kibaki would serve as his VP for 11 years since 1978 when he was succeeded by Karanja, another Kikuyu.
Karanja would be succeeded by Saitoti. Saitoti, who has rumoured Kikuyu roots would serve for 13 years before his dismissal in late
2002 just a few months before elections.

46

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter ONE

165. One of the main issues around which the coalition cobbled together by Raila
Odinga mobilized votes in the 2007 presidential elections (and perhaps served to
heighten chances for the violence experienced after the 2007 elections, was that
although Kibaki had assumed power on a popular multi-ethnic platform, he had
reverted to the practices of old by packing government and the public service with
people from his ethnic origin region.
166. In part because members of the Kalenjin community had thrived at high levels
of government under President Moi, they became the main casualty under the
new administration as Kibaki created room for a new group. Other than historic
land injustices (largely blamed on Kenyatta and Moi by those who testified), it
is possible that the disenchantment with Kibaki over perceived marginalisation
of certain elites would translate into the bitter conflict that transformed the Rift
Valley into the worst theatre of the post-election violence (PEV) in 2007/2008.
167. The composition of cabinets and other key government positions (shown
in the tables above and below) appears to reflect the client-patron political
relations described elsewhere. But it also, as noted, serves as a relatively good
measurement of political and economic inclusion. The practices of exclusion
by successive post-independence governments across sectors would result in
inequalities and regional imbalances described in part in the following section.
168. The effects of inequalities attributable to the government are visible today
in various regions. While poverty is a national problem, overall, economic
marginalisation is marked by disproportionate burdens of poverty for certain
regions.
169. According to a report by the Ministry of Medical Services,103 poverty rates in
2006 were ranked as follows: North Eastern 73.9 percent, Coast (69.7), Western
(52.2), Nyanza (47.6, Eastern (50.9), Rift Valley (49), Central (30.4) _and Nairobi
21.3 percent. This reflects, for some regions that have suffered marginalisation
throughout the independence period, the cumulative effects of economic
neglect. Specifically, the effects of economic marginalisation include lack of
social infrastructure and limited or no access to key services such as health
facilities, schools, food and water, shelter and social welfare.

103 Ministry of Health, Facts and Figures on Health and Health Related Indicators (2008)
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Table 2:

Ethnic composition of the government, 1969

Ethnic group
Kikuyu

Ministers*

Permanent
secretaries

Assistant
ministers

Population,
1969 census

7(30%)

8 (38%)

8 (21%)

20%

Luo

3

3

2

14%

Luhya

2

2

8

13%

Kalenjin

2

2

4

11%

Kamba

2

2

2

11%

Gusii

2

2

2

6%

Mijikenda

1

1

2

5%

Taita and Taveta

1

1

0

1%

Meru and Tharaka

1

0

2

5%

Embu and Mbeere

1

0

1

1%

European

1

0

0

0%

Somali

0

0

2

2%

Masaai

0

0

2

1%

Asian

0

0

1

1%

Other

0

0

2

9%

Total

23

21

38

100

*Ministers include the President and the Attorney-General
Source: Hornsby C, Kenya: A History Since Independence (2012) p. 221

Table 3:
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Last Kenyatta Cabinet (1978)

MINISTRY

NAME

ETHNICITY

President

Jomo Kenyatta

Kikuyu

VP and Home Affairs

Daniel Moi

Kalenjin

Attorney-General

Charles Njonjo

Kikuyu

Finance

Mwai Kibaki

Kikuyu

State, Provincial Admin.

Mbiyu Koinange

Kikuyu

Defence

James Gichuru

Kikuyu

Foreign Affairs

Njoroge Mungai

Kikuyu

Local Government

Julius Kiano

Kikuyu

Agriculture

Bruce MacKenzie

White

Lands and Settlement

Jackson Angaine

Meru

Information

Jeremiah Nyagah

Embu

Health

Omolo Okero

Luo

Natural Resources

William Odongo Omamo

Luo

Power and Communication

Ronald Ngala

Coast
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Tourism

J Shako

Coast

Social Services and Cooperatives

Masinde Muliro

Luhya

Commerce and Industry

James Osogo

Luhya

Education

Taaita Toweett

Kalenjin

Works

James Nyamweya

Kisii

Economic Planning

Zachary Onyonka

Kisii

Chapter ONE

Source: Constructed by TJRC largely from Hillary Ng’weno’s A Political History of Kenya and DP Aluhwalia’ Postcolonialism and the politics of Kenya (1996)

Table 4:

First Moi Cabinet after the 1979 General Elections

MINISTRY

NAME

ETHNICITY

President

Daniel Moi

Kalenjin

Vice-President

Mwai Kibaki

Kikuyu

Agriculture

James Osogo

Luhya

Attorney General

Charles Njonjo

Kikuyu

Basic Education

Moses Mudavadi

Luhya

Commerce

John Okwanyo

Luo

Cooperative Development

Mathews Ogutu

Luo

Economic Planning

Zachariah Onyonka

Kisii

Energy

Munyua Waiyaki

Kikuyu

Foreign Affairs

Robert Ouko

Luo

Health

Arthur Magugu

Kikuyu

Higher Education

Joseph Kamotho

Kikuyu

Home Affairs

Stanley Oloitiptip

Maasai

Industry

Eliud Mwamunga

Taita

Information and Broadcasting

Daniel Mutinda

Kamba

Labour

Elijah Mwangale

Luhya

Livestock

Jeremiah Nyagah

Embu

Local government

Charles Rubia

Kikuyu

Environment and Natural Resources

Andrew Omanga

Kisii

Social Services and Housing

Robert Matano

Digo

State, Office of the President

James Gichuru

Kikuyu

State, Office of the President

Nicholas Biwott

Kalenjin

State, Office of the President

Godfrey Kariuki

Kikuyu

Tourism

Gilbert M’Mbijiwe

Meru

Transport and Communication

Henry Kosgey

Kalenjin

Water and Development

Jonathan Ng’eno

Kalenjin

Works

Paul Ngei

Kamba

Source: Weekly Review, Nairobi 30 November 1979 as cited in DP Aluhwalia (1996)
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Ethnicity of Cabinet Appointments 1963-April 2008

Table 5: Ethnicity of Cabinet Appointments 1963-April 2008
Source: Hornsby C, Kenya: A History Since Independence (2012) p 221 and 699 (integrated)

Table 5: Military Heads from 1964-2011
ROLE

NAME

DATES

ETHNICITY

Chief of General Staff

Major-Gen. R.B Penfold

1966-1969

British

Brigadier Joseph Ndolo

1969-1971

Kamba

Gen Jackson Mulinge

1978-1986 (retired)

Kamba

Gen Mahamoud Mohamed

1986-1996

Somali

Gen Daudi Tonje

1996-2000

Kalenjin -Tugen

General Joseph Kibwana

2000-2005

Mijikenda

Gen Jeremiah Kianga

2005-2011

Kamba

Gen Julius Karangi

2011 onwards

Kikuyu

Maj-Gen Ian Freelend

1963-1964

British

Brigadier A.J Hardy

1964-1966

British

Brigadier Joseph Ndolo

1966-1969

Kamba

Maj-Gen Jackson Mulinge

1969-1980

Kamba

Lt-Gen John Sawe

1981-1986

Kalenjin-Keiyo

Lt-Gen James Lengees

1986-1993

Samburu

Lt-Gen Daudi Tonje

1993-1994

Kalenjin -Tugen

Lt-Gen Augustine arap Cheruiyot

1994-1998

Kalenjin - Nandi

Lt-Gen Abdullahi Aden

1998-2000

Somali

Commander of Kenya Army
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NAME

DATES

ETHNICITY

Lt-Gen Lazarus Sumbeiywo

2000-2003

Kalenjin - Keiyo

Lt-Gen Jeremiah Kianga

2003-2005

Kamba

Lt-Gen Augustino Njoroge

2005-2008

Kikuyu

Lt-Gen Jack Tuwei

2008-2010

Kalenjin

Lt-Gen Njuki Mwaniki

2010-2011

Kikuyu

Lt-Gen John Kasaon

2011 onwards

Kalenjin

Deputy Commander of the
Army

Col Joseph Ndolo
Lt Col Jackson Mulinge
Col Peter Kakenyi
Brigadier Lucas Matu
Majr-Gen James Lengees
Maj-Gen Daudi Tonje
Maj-Gen Jeremiah Kianga
Maj-Gen Augustino Njoroge
Maj-Gen Jones Mutwii
Maj-Gen Njuki Mwaniki
Maj-Gen Maurice Oyugi

To 1966
1966-1969
1969-n/a
1972-1974
1983-1986
1986-1992
2000-2003
2003-2005
2005-2008
2008-2010
2010 onwards

Kamba
Kamba
Kamba
Kikuyu
Samburu
Kalenjin -Tugen
Kamba
Kikuyu
Kamba
Kikuyu
Luo

Commander of Kenya Air
Forces

Group Capt Ian Stockwell
Group Capt Fred Rockwell
Group Capt John Edwards
Colonel Dedan Gichuru
Lt-Gen Mahamoud Mohamed
Maj-Gen Dedan Gichuru
Maj-Gen DK Wachira
Maj-Gen Nick Leshan
Maj-Gen Simon Mutai
Maj-Gen Julius Karangi
Maj-Gen Harold Tangai
Maj-Gen Joff Otieno

1964-1967
1967-1971
1971-1973
1973-1980
1982-1986
1986-1989
1989-1994
1994-2000
2000-2003
2003-2005
2005 onwards
2011

British
British
British
Kikuyu
Somali
Kikuyu
Kikuyu
Maasai
Kamba
Kikuyu
Taita
Luo

Commander of Kenya Navy

Commander EMC Walker
Commander Pearce
Commander Hall
Colonel Jimmy Kimaro
Maj-Gen Simon Mbilu
Maj-Gen Joseph Kibwana
Maj-Gen Aboud Rauf Raouf
Maj-Gen Pasteur Awitta
Maj-Gen Samson Mwathethe
Maj-Gen Ngewa Mukala

1964-1967
1967-1969
1969-1972
1972-1978
1978-1988
1988-1998
1998-2001
2001-2003
2004-2011
2011 onwards

British
British
British
Taveta
Kamba
Mijikenda
Bajuni
Luo
Mijikenda
Luhya

Chief of Staff at MoD

Colonel Lucas Matu
Brigadier Peter Kakenyi

1969-1972
1972-1974

Kikuyu
Kamba
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Police and internal security heads, 1969-2008

ROLE

NAME

DATES

ETHNICITY

Commissioner of Police

Bernard Hinga

1965-1979

Kikuyu

Ben Gethi

1978-1982 (sacked)

Kikuyu

Bernard Njiinu

1982-1988

Kikuyu

Philip Kilonzo

1988-1993

Kamba

Shadrack Kiruki

1993-1996

Meru

Duncan Wachira

1996-1999

Kikuyu

Philemon Abong’o

1999-2003

Luo

Edwin Nyaseda

2003-2004

Luo

Mohammed Hussein

2004-2009

Somali

Head of Special Branch

James Kanyotu

1965-1991

Kikuyu

Deputy-director of Intelligence

Stephen Muriithi

1965-1982

Kikuyu

Head of the GSU

Ben Gethi

1967-1978

Kikuyu

Peter Mbuthia

1978-1982

Kikuyu

Erastus M’Mbijjiwe

1982-1987

Meru

Jackson arap Kosgei

1987-1993

Kalenjin-Nandi

Charles Kimurgor

1993-1999

Kalenjin

Samson Cheramboss

1999-2002

Kalenjin

David Kimaiyo

2002-2003

Kalenjin

Lawrence Mwadime

2003-2005

Taita

Mathew Iteere

2005-2009

Meru

Peter Okola

1965-1973

Luo

Ignatius Nderi

1973-1984

Kikuyu

Noah arap Too

1984-1999

Kalenjin-Kipsigis

Francis arap Sang

1999-2003

Kalenjin

Daniel Ndung’u

2003-2004

Kikuyu

Joseph Kamau

2004-2006

Kikuyu

Simon Karanja Gatiba

2006-2010

Kikuyu

Bernard Njiinu

1964-1980

Kikuyu

Elijah Sumbeiywo

n/a

Kalenjin-Keiyo

Stanley Manyinya

n/a

Kalenjin-Nandi

Charles Kimurgor

n/a-1993

Kalenjin-n/a

Samson Cheramboss

n/a -1999

Kalenjin

David Kimaiyo

1999-n/a

Kalenjin

Nixon Boit

n/a-2003

Kalenjin

Mathew Iteere

2003-2005

Meru

Benson Githinji

2005-2010

Kikuyu

Head of the CID

Head of the Presidential Escort Unit
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ROLE

NAME

DATES

ETHNICITY

Permanent secretary for internal
security

James Mathenge

1983-1986

Kikuyu

Hezekiah Oyugi

1986-1991

Luo

Wilfred Kimalat

1991-1998

Kalenjin

Zakayo Cheruiyot

1998-2003

Kalenjin

Dave Mwangi

2003-2006

Kikuyu

Cyrus Gituai

2006-2008

Embu

Lazarus Sumbeiywo

1986-1988

Kalenjin-Keiyo

Wilson Boinett

1988-1990

Kalenjin-Keiyo

William Kivuvani

1991-1995

Kamba

Wilson Boinett

1995-2006

Kalenjin

Michael Gichangi

2006 onwards

Kikuyu

Head of Military Intelligence

Special Branch/NSIS Head

Table 7:

Kenyatta’s key Provincial Commissioners

NAME

POSITION

BACKGROUND

Paul Boit

PC Central, Western and
Nairobi 1964-1980

Kalenjin-Nandi, son of chief

Isaiah Cheluget

PC Nyanza Province
1969-1980

Kalenjin-Kipsigis

Charles Koinange

PC Central and Eastern
1967-1980

Kikuyu from Kiambu, son of Senior Chief Mbiyu
Koinange’s brother and Kenyatta’s brother-in-law

Eliud Mahihu

PC Eastern and Coast
1964-1980

Kikuyu from Nyeri, colonial administrator and ex-Home
Guard

Isaiah Mathenge

PC Coast, Rift Valley and
Eastern 1965-1982

Kikuyu from Nyeri, ex-Home Guard and detention camp
warder

John Mburu

PC Coast, North Eastern,
Nairobi and Western
1964-1979

Kikuyu from Murang’a

Simeon Nyachae

PC Rift Valley and Central
1965-1979

Gusii, son of Senior Chief Nyandusi
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Table 8:

Senior Kikuyu parastatal Heads in the 1970s

NAME

ROLE

BACKGROUND

Ephantus Gakuo

Director-general of East African Railways (later Kenya

Murang’a

Railways), 1967-1970s
Bethwell Gecaga

Chairman, Industrial Development Bank, 1976-1979

Murang’a

Julius Gecau

Managing director, East Africa (later Kenya) Power and

Kiambu

Lightning Company, 1970-1984
James Karani Gitau

General Manager, Kenya National Trading Corporation,

Kiambu

1969-1979
Stanley Githunguri

Executive chairman, National Bank of Kenya,

Kiambu

1976-1979
Charles Karanja

General manager, Kenya Tea Development Authority,

Kiambu

1970-1981
John Matere Keriri

General manager then managing director,

Kirinyaga

Development Finance Company of Kenya, 1972-1982
Peter Kinyanjui

Chairman of East African Harbours Corporation (later

Kiambu

Kenya Ports Authority), 1970-1980
John Michuki

Executive chairman, Kenya Commercial Bank,

Murang’a

1970-1979
Philip Ndegwa

Chairman, Agricultural Finance Corporation to 1974

Kirinyaga

Matu Wamae

Executive director, Industrial and Commercial

Nyeri

Development Corporation, 1969-1979
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Profile and Status Report of Economically
Marginalized Regions and Communities
North Eastern and Upper Eastern
There is one half of Kenya about which the other half knows nothing
and seems even to care less.
Leslie Farson, describing the Northern Frontier District (NFD).

Before we started the session, the National Anthem was sung. I want
to tell you that we have never been part of the National Anthem.
The National Anthem talks of justice, fellowship, awareness, good
life, abundance, among other things. These things have never been
experienced in this region. In totality, I can say that we have never been
part of this country.104
Testimony of a Somali Elder in Garissa

One thing that surprised me was how a soldier, a government officer, the
president of this republic, who equally took the oath of allegiance that
he would protect the interests of his people, would persecute his own
people for 40 years and show no regard for their human rights.105
Testimony of a witness in Wajir

Background
170. This part of the report relates to economic marginalisation of what was previously
known as the Northern Frontier Districts (NFD). The NFD consisted of Upper
Eastern Province (Marsabit, Moyale and Isiolo) and the former North Eastern
Province that consisted of four districts namely Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Ijara.
These three have now been consolidated into three counties: Garissa, Mandera
and Wajir, with Ijara having been subsumed into Garissa County. North Eastern
has primarily been inhabited by ethnic Somalis, Garre/Garri and the Sakuye/
Boran while in Upper Eastern there are the Boran, Rendille, Gabra, Burji, Somalis,
Garri/Garre, Turkana and Samburu.
104 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Garissa/ 14 April 2011/ p.3
105 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Wajir/ 18 April 2011/ p.5
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The law and economic marginalisation
171. The marginalisation of the North Eastern region is marked by four key
developments: the carving off of the NFD; the enactment and application of
separate laws to the region; the Shifta War (1963 to 1967) waged by separatist
ethnic Somali forces and; the application of discriminatory development
policies by post-independence governments. The marginalisation of the
communities in the former NFD, who are largely pastoralists, goes back to the
colonial era.106
172.

During both the colonial and post-independence administrations, the government
enacted several laws targeting only the North Eastern region. First, largely driven
by security concerns, the Outlying District Ordinance of 1902 declared the Northern
Frontier District (NFD), made up of Wajir, Mandera, Ijara, Garissa, Isiolo, Moyale and
Marsabit districts, a closed area.

173. This meant that movement in and out or the region was only possible when using
a pass. This had the effect of cutting off the area from the rest of the country
not just physically, but also in terms of policy implementation. Coupled with a
government policy of neglect, these laws and others enacted later created what
can be regarded as a ‘Kenya of two halves, not just in terms of security but also in
terms of development.
174. Residents attributed the closure of the NFD to the rest of the country and the
imposition of a separate legal regime by the colonial administration to security,
economic and religious concerns. Ali Dubat Amey, an elder who testified before
the Commission, summarises these sentiments as follows:
This NFD was ruled differently by the white man. We had two different sets of laws.
Nobody could go out of NFD to other parts of Kenya. This resulted in us being
segregated, isolated and being kept away from other Kenyans. It was done for two
reasons: One, the white man wanted to protect the Asian businessman. They knew
Somalis were very aggressive businessmen, so they were protecting the Asians and
the white men who were helping them colonize this country. The other thing they
were protecting is that they knew the Somali were Islamic evangelists. We could easily
convert Kenyans, who were mostly traditionalists. So, they created a buffer zone.107
106 For readings on NFD, see Taya Weiss, Guns in the borderlands: Reducing the demand for small arms ISS Monograph No 95;
Onguje, P. Wild Barrel, Incompatible Regimes: The case of violence in Isiolo Central Division. Nairobi: PeaceNet, 2002; Ahmed
Issack Hassan, Legal Impediments to the Development in Northern Kenya. A paper presented at the Consultative Meeting for
Members of Parliament in Naivasha, Kenya 22-23 August, 2008.
107 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Garissa/ 14 April 2011/ p. 3
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The development divide: A country of two halves

Source: KHRC Foreigners at home: The Dilemma of Citizenship in Northern Kenya, p. 20

175. The Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance of 1934, together with the Stock
Theft and Produce Ordinance of 1933, gave the colonial administrators ‘extensive
powers of arrest, restraint, detention and seizure of properties of what was
described as hostile tribes’. This provision also introduced the possibility of using
excessive force on residents. These powers were often abused when government
operations were carried out.
176. The preamble of the Stock Theft and Produce Ordinance provided that the
purpose of the law was ‘to provide for the recovery of fines imposed on Africans
(including Somalis) for the theft of stock or produce by levy on the property
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of the offender or his family, sub-tribe or tribe’. This provision appears to have
legalised collective punishment of ethnic communities and constitutive clans
for the offences allegedly committed by their members, once the Provincial
Commissioner declared such a tribe hostile.
177. At independence, the government enhanced, rather than diminished the
discriminatory and oppressive laws applying to Northern Kenya. Collective
punishment previously applied by the colonial administration remained
a common feature of the post-independence governments’ dealings and
operations in Northern Kenya. Some of the serious episodes of gross human
rights violations such as the ‘Wagalla Massacre’ described elsewhere in this
report fit this collective punishment mould.
178. One resident of the region, Abdikadir Kaaru Gullet summarises their sentiments
in this regard:
The legislation which led to this life of marginalisation and gross violation of human
rights under the seal of the law is explained here. In other words, the independent
government of Kenya subjected its citizens to retrogressive colonial legislation that
was inherited by our independent government of Kenya just to punish the citizens
of Northern Kenya. The colonial legislation eventually became the Kenyan law.

179.

Indeed, many of the laws remained in force after the departure of the colonial
master. For example, the Restricted Districts Ordinance of 1902 became Cap.103 of
the Laws of Kenya. This Act, as its predecessor, declared Northern Kenya a closed
district, meaning that that movement in and out of the district was prohibited and
was only possible with a special permit. Under section 127 of the independence
constitution, the president was granted powers similar to those previously
exercised by the governor-general of ruling the northern region by decree. This
was in addition to the 1934 law whose continued application was recommended
by the Committee on the Bill of Rights at the Lancaster House constitutional
talks.108 Three subsequent amendments to the independence constitution
strengthened the legal regime applicable to the region.

180. First, the third amendment to the constitution reduced the parliamentary
majority required to approve a declaration of a state of emergency from
a two-thirds majority to a simple majority.109 It also extended the period
after which a parliamentary resolution must be sought from 7 to 21 days.
Declaration of the state of emergency was made valid for three months
instead of two.
108 KHRC, Foreigners at home: The dilemma of citizenship in Northern Kenya p. 21
109 Third Amendment, Act No.14 of 1965.
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181. Second, the fourth amendment extended the president’s power to rule the
NEP by decree to districts outside the NFD. These districts, described as
‘outlying districts’, are Marsabit, Isiolo, Tana River and Lamu.110 These ‘outlying
districts’ would later be included in the Indemnity Act of 1970 that was aimed
at providing immunity to security officials and government officials from
criminal and civil liability related to the ‘Shifta War’.
182. Third, the sixth amendment effectively enlarged the government’s emergency
powers by removing parliamentary oversight over emergency legislation.111
The amendment allowed the president ‘at any time by order in the Kenya
Gazette to bring into operation generally or in any part of Kenya, part III of
the Preservation of Public Security Act or any part thereof.’112 With the granting
of absolute, unchecked powers in relation to emergencies and public order in
general, the president had discretion to apply any significant amount of force,
where deemed necessary and invoke the provisions of various laws in enforcing
security in the region.
183. In addition to constitutional amendments, the Preservation of Public Security
Act (1960) was amended to define the full scope and operation of the new
powers granted to the president. A distinction was made between ‘public
security measures’ and ‘special public security measures’. The president could
institute ‘public security measures’ without approval of Parliament. In order
to cover public officials and members of the security forces who could be
responsible for abuses during the ‘Shifta War’, the government passed the
Indemnity Act in 1970. The objective of the Indemnity Act was stated in
the preamble as ‘to restrict the taking of legal proceedings in respect of
certain acts and matters’. The Commission found that there is a perception in
northern Kenya and the Coast that the Indemnity Act is part of the machinery
of oppression and marginalisation because in their view it precludes any form
of inquiry or justice, including by this Commission. The opposition and boycotts
of the Commission by some residents of these regions was due in part to the
perception that it could not legally inquire into gross violations of human rights
perpetrated in these regions.
184. It is notable however that the Commission took the view early on that the
Indemnity Act neither prevented it from investigating gross violations during
the ‘Shifta War’ nor from making appropriate recommendations relating to
reparations.113
110
111
112
113

Fourth Amendment, Act No. 16 of 1966
Sixth Amendment Act No.18 of 1966
See KHRC (n 108 above) 24
See Legal Opinion Relating to the Application of the Indemnity Act (1970) [Annexed to Report]
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Security and economic marginalisation
185. In view of the security challenges posed to the region and the country at large,
it is perhaps not surprising that both the colonial and post-independence
administrations have regarded the North Eastern region through a security lens.
The Commission finds that policy and approaches to issues in Northern Kenya
(and parts of Coast region) have been securitized.
186. Before independence, the colonial administration regarded the region as
inhospitable and occupied by people it regarded as hostile. Having voted to
secede from Kenya in a referendum held shortly before independence in 1963, the
inhabitants of the NFD took up arms when the results were ignored by the colonial
administration. Residents of the region recounted with bitterness how their right
to self-determination was ignored.
187. The incoming government considered the NFD as firmly part of the newlyindependent Kenya. With the support of Somalia that harboured aspirations of
a ‘Greater Somalia’ that would encompass not only Northern Kenya but also the
Ethiopian Ogaden region and Djibouti, Somalis in the NFD led by the Northern
Province Peoples’s Progressive Party (NPPPP) would wage a three-year
secessionist war that ended around 1968.114
188. A mixture of secessionist insurgency, inter-ethnic and clan warfare based on the
struggle for resources, and banditry has characterized the region ever since. In
addition, the civil war in Somalia has contributed greatly to insecurity in Northern
Kenya over the years. These developments have often prompted the government
to respond with armed force in ways that occasion serious violations and disrupt
the economic lives of those involved.
189. In our view, there is a clear link between the government’s policy that has
regarded every issue in the North from a security perspective and the economic
marginalisation suffered by the region. Many residents attribute the marginalisation
the region suffered in subsequent years to the fact that they had expressed an
affirmative voice in favour of secession from Kenya that was brutally muzzled.
According to a witness from Garissa:
First and foremost, there was the emergency during the 1967 period. The declaration
of that emergency led to serious crimes against humanity. The people of this province
were subjected to unfair treatment. For instance, pastoralists were not allowed to graze
114 See KHRC (n108 above) 21 citing B Baker Escape from domination in Africa: Political disengagement & Its consequences (2003)
p. 7
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within a three-kilometre square area. That led to the loss of 90 percent of the basic
livelihood - livestock of the pastoralists of NFD. Otherwise, had that not been there,
today the people of NFD would be the richest in Kenya.115

190. In some cases, the state has been guilty of doing too little in responding to
insecurity generated by inter-ethnic or inter-clan conflicts over scarce resources
and cultural practices such as cattle rustling that deprive citizens of resources
vital for their survival and economic welfare. The generalized sense of insecurity
in the region or parts of the region has had a far-reaching impact in limiting
advancement in education and investment in the region.
191. The state has also been directly responsible for economic marginalisation as a
result of deprivations visited on residents because of policies aimed at enhancing
security. In particular the numerous security operations conducted in this region
has often resulted in loss and confiscation of property, especially cattle, by state
security agents.
192. The securitization of every aspect of life in the region meant that discriminatory
policies were applied with the effect of seriously undermining the economic
welfare of the inhabitants. In addition, the failure by the government to take
measures to remedy the situation - especially after 1997 after many laws were
repealed and recognition emerged that the legal regime applied had produced
gross violations of human rights - compounds the responsibility of the state for the
economic marginalisation of the region.
193.

While much of the oppressive legislation has since been repealed, the consequences
of discrimination still lingers. The enforced isolation since the pre-independence
period through all post-independence regimes, and the discriminatory development
policies retarded the development of the region, resulting in social and economic
under-development. Economic marginalisation manifests in high levels of poverty,
insecurity, high illiteracy rates and poor education facilities, under-developed human
resources, inadequate and poor infrastructure, and high morbidity and mortality
rates.

194. The perception is that even though democratic space may have opened up
in Kenya, nothing much has changed in the former NFD and that there have
been no significant improvements in the socio-economic circumstances of the
inhabitants.
115 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Garissa/ 12 April 2011/ p.13
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195. Insecurity and lack of stability has also remained a major challenge to development.
Conflicts arise mainly as a result of scarce resources, violent armed ethnic conflicts,
external incursions from unstable neighbouring countries and inter-clan rivalries.
Government security operations that target the region have also been a source of
insecurity. A combination of famine (in part attributable to periodic droughts) and
poor social services have made life in Northern Kenya generally difficult for the
inhabitants of the vast, remote region with a largely harsh environment.

Recognition, citizenship rights and belonging
196. One of the main complaints expressed by the residents of North Eastern Kenya
and the entire former NFD relates to recognition of their citizenship rights.
Discrimination is a major complaint. The residents rightly wonder why they have
to be subjected to procedures (when applying for formal documents like birth
certificates, particularly national identity cards and passports) from which similarly
placed applicants (in other border areas) are exempt.
197. The discriminatory procedures to which the residents were, and are still subject
were described to the Commission. Previously, applicants for birth certificates,
national identity cards and passports from the former NFD were subject to
procedures applicable to aliens. Omar Shurie described this experience:
In that same period, the issue of citizenship was a major cancer in the throat. Jambo la
kusikitisha sana, kwa mfano, (the most saddening thing) when we were applying for
citizenship papers, - the identity card, passport and birth certificates, we were subjected
to fill a third form called ‘PP7’. That is the name of the form. The rest of Kenyans were only
to fill the other two forms. In this particular form, the ‘PP7’, above it was written: ‘To be
filled by aliens and those claiming to be indigenous Kenyans’. So, where do we fall? The
people of NFD fell under the latter part.116

198. Following a much-publicised petition to the then Attorney-General Amos Wako
by a group called the ‘NFD Youth Movement’, the requirement for residents of
North Eastern to fill the third form, the PP7, was abolished. However, residents
from that part of the country would continue to be subjected to discriminatory
procedures they described as ‘triple-vetting’ when they apply for national
identity cards and passports. In respect of the ‘triple vetting procedure’, Omar
Shurie testified that:
[…] we are vetted three times: the one that disturbs me a lot is after we are vetted
here in Garissa from the sub-location to the location and the district administration
that is not the end of our process. Documents are sent to Nairobi and the Director of
116 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Garissa/ 12 April 2011/ p.13
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Somali men standing at the start of a TJRC hearing.

Intelligence must endorse them under the pretext that we cannot differentiate Kenyan
Somali from Somalia Somali. That statement is untrue. Any Kenyan can differentiate a
Somali from Somalia from a Kenyan Somali only by their accent. It is not a matter of that
they can disturb anybody. Ironically, there are other communities living along Kenyan
border points who are not subjected to this type of treatment.117

199. There is a sense in which the difficulties encountered by residents of this
region in having their citizenship recognised, acquiring identity documents
and passports goes to the core of the economic marginalisation that they have
experienced. Without citizenship, the people could not claim their rights. They
became vulnerable to abuse. The Commission heard many heart-wrenching
stories about lives that have been destroyed for lack of national identity cards
and by extension passports. Pupils who passed their Form Four exams in very
difficult conditions were unable to advance to university because they could not
secure identity cards. Some Kenyans could not travel abroad to take advantage of
scholarships because they could not obtain identity cards and passports. Other
Kenyans cannot access the employment market because they lack the most basic
identity document: the national ID Card.
200. While government has had legitimate concerns related to security arising from aliens
acquiring Kenyan nationality, the measures undertaken were disproportionate and
in many cases inappropriate. These measures created a sense of impunity among
117 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Garissa/12 April 2011/p. 14
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immigration officers and the security forces. The Commission heard of a Provincial
Commissioner who allegedly nullified 3 000 identity cards in Garissa, apparently
because aliens had infiltrated the system. The applicants remain in limbo, their
lives on hold.
201. Many stories falling in one or other of the categories capture the plight of the
majority of the region’s residents and merit attention. Beka Hidhfi’s testimony,
narrated by Hassan Omar Shurie, has particular resonance in a region that has
felt victimised and marginalized in part because of the religion professed by the
majority - Islam. This story highlights a number of issues, one of which is that denial
of formal identity documents has resulted in violation of a multiplicity of rights,
including the right to practice religion freely:
Madam Acting Chair, my evidence is that - the people know and will bear me witness
- when hundreds of applicants are waiting for identity cards to come, they normally
go to the office to confirm whether they have arrived. It is in that same office which,
without fear, will tell them that the identity cards were cancelled by the PC. I have a
case in point of an old mother who is very religious by the name Beka Hidhfi. I assisted
this lady to the office to apply for an identity card because she wanted to visit Mecca.
She had been told that she could not travel without a passport. To do that, she had
to first get an identity card. The Muslim religion does not force someone to take a
document. Initially, she thought the identity card was not necessary. So, she had
never applied for one, although she is a Kenyan and also her father was a Kenyan. We
prepared an affidavit and attached photocopies of her mother’s colonial passport. The
father used to travel to Tanzania and Mecca. Unfortunately, they were in that block of
2009. Today, she cannot trace the photocopies. It is now a problem because she might
never make it to Mecca. Maybe she could use a camel to Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and
then to Mecca. It is just clear and everybody in Garissa knows that the identity card
applicants for 2009 were cancelled. You can get that information in the registration
office. The reason they give is that there were many aliens among the applicants. Is
that the applicants’ mistake? If aliens slip into the system by bribing, how is a student
who completed Garissa high school affected? I have a brother who completed high
school and got a B+ but could not get an identity card in 2009. In 2010 there was
lack of materials at the head office in Nairobi. Up to now, he is tarmacking and he is
frustrated.118

202. The measures taken to curb abuse in the process of registration have also
fostered corruption, which enhances abuse of the rights of legitimate applicants.
The Commission heard narratives of people having to buy forms in order to
apply for official documents and having to pay a bribe in the process, with no
118 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing /Garissa/ 12 April 2011/ pp.18-19
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guarantees. It was alleged that government officials collect a minimum of Sh1
500 to issue birth certificates, which is required when applying for a national
ID card. For this reason, aliens can obtain documents with ease. Yet it is the
possibility of infiltration of the system that has been used by the government
to justify stringent application procedures. It is indeed unfair for circumstances
to be created where the system is compromised, then genuine Kenyans suffer
because of this.
203. Because of the manner in which they have been treated over the years, the sense
of alienation created among residents of former NFD is palatable. In view of our
findings, we do not find this surprising. Even in the wake of the adoption of the
new Constitution, the perception remains that this part of the country (North
Eastern Kenya) has been forgotten. The words of elder Dubat Ali Amey from
Garissa encapsulate the views expressed by many of the region’s residents:
Before we started the session, the National Anthem was sung. I want to tell you that
we have never been part of the National Anthem. The National Anthem talks of justice,
fellowship, awareness, good life, abundance, among other things. These things have
never been experienced in this region. In totality, I can say that we have never been part
of this country… we have never been considered as part of the diversity of this country.
We have never been considered part of this country as a community, our culture, lifestyle
and partly our religion.119

204. The idea that the former NFD is not part of Kenya is fully ingrained in popular
narrative. Many recounted how, when travelling to Nairobi one would tell you
that they were travelling to Kenya. The statement by Jarso Forole, who presented
a memorandum on behalf of an inter-ethnic group from Marsabit County aptly
demonstrates this sentiment of alienation:
As we travel to Kenya, we face the strict burden of proof that we are, indeed,
Kenyans. If the four of us were to travel in the same vehicle, the presumption
would be that the rest are all Kenyans, but I am a foreigner. So, at the numerous
roadblocks which are lined up all the way from here to Isiolo where Kenya starts,
I have to produce my identity card, in default of which I would face severe
consequences. This scenario does not stop in Isiolo. In our own country, I feel
the indignity of being stopped at a public office and being subjected to security
and other checks simply because from my looks, I am a dangerous person or a
terrorist. This is the kind of pain we have been living in since Kenya attained its
independence.120
119 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing /Garissa/ 14 April 2011/ p.3
120 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/Marsabit/ 4 May 2011/ p.11
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Geographical and climatic factors and economic marginalisation
205.

Northern Kenya has some of the harshest climatic conditions in Kenya. The area,
which has Sahelian features, is mostly arid or semi-arid land (ASAL). The three
counties of North Eastern are described as arid and fall in the category of 85 to 100
percent arid, which is the extreme form of aridness. The region receives minimal
levels of rainfall annually, which is also erratic. Most of the land is not suitable for
agriculture, with only? percent of Garissa’s County being described as arable. Most of
the arable land is found along the Tana River. Weir is characterised by long dry spells
and short rainy seasons, and is mainly classified as Zone VII (entirely arid), except for
Bute and Gurar divisions which are categorized as Zone IV.121 Only 30 percent of Wajir
is arable, however, it is largely rangeland suitable mostly for nomadic pastoralism
due to low rainfall and scarcity of irrigation water.122 Mandera is also very dry and
mostly rangeland viable for nomadic pastoralism. A small strip along the seasonal
Daua River (the only river in the district) has some potential for crop production
through small-scale irrigation. About ( ) percent of the land is cultivable. Given the
low altitude of the region, temperatures are high, ranging from 20o C and 38o C, with
an average temperature of 30o C.

206.

The Northern Kenya region receives only low levels of rainfall per year, less than
300mm. For decades, the region has experienced frequent droughts. Records show
that the region has in recent memory experienced droughts in the years 1927,
1933, 1938, 1949, 1952, 1969, 1979, 1984, 1991, 1993, 1999, 2007, 2008 and 2009.123
Droughts exacerbate the fragility of the existence of pastoralists and their livestock,
which is the main source of income in these areas. Impact of cyclic droughts includes:


deaths and economic ruin for pastoralists;



poverty (reliance on livestock); and



ecurrent droughts hinder the implementation of proposed activities and
programmes since much of the resources are diverted to emergency and
drought recovery programmes.

These cyclic shocks have retarded development in the area as gains of a particular
season are wiped out by drought and famine124 and dependence on food aid.
Even within the middle-income group, there is a high dependence on food aid,
as is evident in analysis of food consumption, further on in this report. But the
lower wealth groups remain the most vulnerable to chronic food insecurity and its
121 As above
122 Republic of Kenya Wajir District Development Plan for the Period 2002-2008
123 Save the Children, ‘Nutritional Anthropometric and Retrospective Mortality Survey Sebule, Habaswein, Diff, Kulaaley and Banane
divisions Wajir South District’, (2010) p. 7
124 Wajir South District Development Plan 2008-2012
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effects. This increased dependency has had a negative effect on agro-pastoralism,
with some farmers declining to engage in crop production since they are assured
of relief in case of any deficit.125
207.

It was explained earlier that state responsibility relating to economic marginalisation
arises either where there is overt discrimination in the distribution of social goods or
when the state fails to take measures in favour of groups who are disproportionately
disadvantaged in terms of access to services vis-à-vis other groups and regions.
With respect to the food security situation in Northern Kenya, recurrent famines
and depletion of livestock through effects of drought show that successive
governments have consistently failed to take measures to enhance food production
and to address vulnerability of populations to broader effects of drought. Although
reliable predictions of climatic conditions and in particular rainfall patterns have
been provided, government’s response has consistently been reactive rather than
preventive. Such responses have often been themselves ineffective in responding to
resultant famine.

208. The districts generally are sparsely populated. The population density for example
in Mandera falls below 35 persons per square kilometre except the Central division,
which has 436 persons per square kilometre. In Wajir, settlement patterns indicate
that Central division has the largest population density of 21 persons per square
km. According to the 2009 Census Report, North Eastern Kenya has a total of 2.3
million people, although questions have been raised in relation to this figure, which
is 65 percent higher than the projected number of 1.3m.126 The low population
density in the region poses serious challenges for planning and service delivery.
209. The population in arid districts is relatively young. According to the National
Bureau of Statistics, the mean age in North Eastern was 20.2 years in 2008, the
lowest in the country compared to a slightly higher national average of 22.5 years.
Ten of the districts with lowest mean age come from ASALs, with six of them from
the northern districts.132 Along with this, the population in NEP is most fertile, with
a total fertility rate of 7.2 percent (against a national average of 5.0 percent).
210.

The impact of the drought on the sensitive pastoralist livelihood has been extensive.
Pasture continues to decline, herds are forced to walk at least 40km between water
points and remaining pasture areas. Pastoralist households derive 40 percent of
their nutrition from livestock meat and milk and declining herds are jeopardizing
this critical food source.

125 Save the Children (n 123 above) p. 7
126 Government of Kenya, 2009 Population and Housing Census, Volume II, at 19
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Socio-economic indicators of economic marginalisation of North Eastern
Employment
211.

Over 70 percent of the population practice nomadic pastoralism and drought has
impacted negatively on them. Several pastoral families have fallen back to sedentary
life and moved to peri-urban areas, increasing the population of peri-urban poor. This
results in high unemployment rates. Employment is mainly provided by the public
sector, which absorbs less than 2 percent of the labour force. Most of the labour
is unskilled, due to high illiteracy rates. There is a need to start income generating
activities and small-scale industries targeting unskilled labourers.

212.

The majority (nearly 70 percent) of the population in North Eastern Kenya is below
25 years of age. This has significant impact on resources as more services and
employment opportunities are needed to cater for this group. The population
growth is also rapid, probably due to socio-cultural practices, which are common to
the pastoralist society. Polygyny probably explains the prevailing high population
growth rate. The dependency ratio is high, thereby retarding development activities.

213. The ability of the province to house, feed, educate, provide health and security
for its people is constrained, as most of the infrastructure facilities were planned
for a smaller number of people. Institutional development has been slow
and inconsistent. North Eastern Province is not well endowed with industrial,
manufacturing and informal sectoral activities. These sectors facilitate employment
opportunities and their absence aggravates unemployment.

Land
214.

North Eastern Province has no medium or high potential land. All the land in the
province is classified as low potential.127 The lack of Lands Registries in the region is
one of the major impediments to the economic progress of the people of the region.
Under the Registered Land Act, Chapter 300, Laws of Kenya, there are established Land
Registries in every district to empower the District Lands Registrar to issue title deeds
for properties in that district. Once land has been allocated, surveyed and a letter of
allotment issued, every allottee is required to meet the conditions on the letter of
allotment to be able to get a title deed. Title to land or property is the legal proof of
ownership. This enables the owner to offer such title as security to access financial
loans, guarantee payment of goods and services and give surety for bail or bond in
Court.128
215. The entire Northern Kenya does not have a single Lands Registry where a title can
be processed, or sales, transfers and charges can be registered. In the first place,
127 See Society for International Development (SID) Pulling Apart: Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya (2004) 16
128 Ahmed Issack Hassan, Legal Impediments to the Development in Northern Kenya. A paper presented at the Consultative Meeting for
Members of Parliament in Naivasha, Kenya 22-23 August, 2008 p. 17
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most of the properties in the urban centres in the region have not been properly
surveyed and very few people have titles to their land. Even then, the few with titles
to their properties have to travel all the way to Nairobi to transact any business on
their land. This is because the Registry Index Map (RIM) for Northern Kenya, which
captures the properties that have been surveyed and registered, is held in Nairobi.
It is therefore imperative that the system of land registration be effected in the
region and land registries established in every district headquarters. As noted by
Hassan, if a person can sell and transfer his lands with a title in Kajiado without
coming to Nairobi, there is no reason why another person from Moyale, Ijara or
Mandera is forced to come to Nairobi to do such mundane things as pay land rates
or apply for official search.129

Infrastructure
216.

Access to infrastructure is a major determinant of overall well-being. This is because
infrastructure helps to diversify production, expand trade and lower the cost of
production. Infrastructure includes public utilities such as power, telecommunications,
piped water supply, sanitation and sewerage systems. There are wide disparities in the
density (length of roads per square km) across the provinces. According the 2004 SID
report, Nairobi had the highest density of roads in the country at 3.2 compared to 0.1 in
North Eastern. There is no tarmac road beyond Garissa town. The first tarmac road since
independence is the Isiolo-Moyale road, currently under construction. Despite the
spread of mobile phones, wide disparities have been evident in access to telephony,

Pupils at a school in Turbi.
129 Hassan (n 128 above).
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with available data indicating North Eastern as the province with the least telephone
connection per population followed by Western and Eastern provinces.130

Poverty
217. Poverty is a serious problem in the whole of the North Eastern Kenya region and is
caused by poor natural resource development, a high population growth rate and
limited employment opportunities outside the livestock sector. Other causes of
poverty include cyclic droughts, lack of a fully developed livestock market, diseases
(livestock and human), illiteracy, lack of proper planning, reduced government
spending in projects that require subsidies, unemployment, land tenure problems,
over-reliance on a pastoral economy and lack of innovativeness.
218. These problems are exacerbated by insecurity. In a report published in 2002, the
Kenya Institute for Public Policy and Research Analysis (KIPPRA), which processed
data from 1994, noted that there were great regional variations in poverty rates,
with North Eastern Province having the highest of its rural population (73.06
percent) living below the poverty line, compared with 35.32 percent for Central
Province.131 In the same study, Homa Bay (Nyanza), with 87.20 percent of its
population living below the poverty line, had the highest poverty level, followed
by Mandera District in North Eastern.
219. In Wajir, poverty is severe and more than 65 percent of the population lives
below the absolute poverty line. 132 Poverty in Wajir is mainly distributed among
pastoralists, small-scale farmers who constantly face crop failure, peri-urban
poor (who sell firewood and charcoal), and extended families, among others.133
The pastoralists are under constant threat of poverty during drought. Severe
drought leads to livestock deaths, which are the pastoralists’ main livelihood.
These communities keep on moving in search of pasture and water and do not
settle to carry out other activities. Furthermore, this constant movement over
the vast and harsh terrain has consequences in terms of education for their
children, thus cyclic poverty seems to persist endlessly. The population is poor
also due to insecurity as a result of frequent attacks from cattle rustlers. Poor
livestock markets contribute to low incomes as middle men take advantage of
the situation and offer low prices.134
130 SID (n 127 above) 18
131 Paul Kimalu et al., ‘A Situational Analysis of Poverty in Kenya’, KIPPRA Working paper Series, Paper no. 6 (2002) p. 32
132 National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (NCAPD), Wajir district Strategic plan for the implementation of the
national population policy for sustainable development 2005-2010 (2005) p. 9
133 National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (n 136 above) p. 9
134 National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (n 137 above) p.10
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The situation is no better in Mandera. Apart from Mandera town which is fairly served
with infrastructure including electricity, piped water and telephones, all the other
centres lack these facilities. Lack of economic facilities except petty trade in livestock
products and handicrafts, which provide a livelihood for some households residing
in these centres, further drives them deeper into poverty. Due to constant drought,
lack of market for livestock and unemployment, most people, especially the poor,
are dependent entirely on relief food of maize rations and water. Based on the Early
Warning Systems (EWS) and community-based food aid targeting and distribution,
about 76 percent accounting for 170 336 persons in 2002 in Garissa are poor.
Other poverty-stricken groups are female-headed households, orphans, widows,
street children, beggars, the physically challenged and the handicapped. The same
patterns of poverty are replicated in Garissa, where the situation is worsened by the
presence of a larger population as a result of the refugee camps. This inadvertently
places more pressure on already over-stretched social amenities and infrastructure.
Levels of poverty among women and children are very high since they are the least
capable of fending for themselves. Cases of abuse, neglect and diseases are also very
high. Education and health are hampered, further compounding poverty levels.

221. While Kenya is generally poor, this poverty is not evenly distributed countrywide
and varies by ecological zones with the arid areas bearing the brunt of its negative
impacts. Part of the reason for this scenario is the lack of diversification of economic
activities in arid areas as opposed to high potential districts. In arid areas, there
is over-dependence on the livestock economy, which is challenged by several
factors, including natural weather and incessant ethnic conflict.
222. These indicators generally show the relative poverty in arid districts compared
to high-potential districts like Uasin Gishu, Kakamega, Machakos, Kericho and
Nyandarua. Comparing Wajir to Nyandarua, the absolute poverty level of the
former is 57 percent while that of the latter is 27 percent. The life expectancy is
almost the same, with Wajir having 52 and Nyandarua 54, but the average family
size in Wajir is much bigger than that of Nyandarua, as it stands as six family
members in contrast with 4.6 in Nyandarua.135
223. Although there is variation in high potential districts, their absolute poverty
rates tend to be much lower compared to those in arid districts. Dependency
ratios also vary, with high-potential districts having lower levels of dependency
135 Republic of Kenya, Kenya National Development Plan 2002-2008. Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and National Development, 2002.
Table 1: Poverty-related indices for selected arid districts and Table 2: Poverty related indicators for selected high potential districts
in Kenya.
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compared to arid districts. This can be explained by the fact that there are less
economically active people than there are dependents and this is linked to the fact
that unemployment levels are higher and that there are fewer economically viable
outlets. The main economic activity is pastoralism, which is adversely affected
by the harsh prevailing droughts and the need to constant migration. Absolute
poverty levels in high-potential districts are lower than those registered in arid
districts, with the implication that the latter are poor.136
224. The life expectancy in arid districts is lower than that of high-potential districts,
mainly as a result of the harsh geographical conditions, malnutrition, poor health
and insecurity. It is also an indicator of the lack of basic social services such as
health amenities and hospitals. Populations in arid districts have slightly larger
family sizes compared to high potential districts. This situation adds to the pressure
exerted on social amenities, as most of the population also tend to be dependents
rather than being economically active.

Food security
225. Low rainfall aggravates the drought conditions, which in turn have severe effects
on the people in North Eastern Kenya. Sometimes households rely on three to eight
litres of water per person per day. Water pans and dams have dried up in most of the
centres. Malnutrition rates are very high. Clashes - related to decreased resources
- often take place and livestock migrations are high because of declining pasture
areas. As a result of drought, there is constant deterioration of food security, which
in effect reduces the purchasing power in food and non-food commodity prices.
Insecurity in the region has continued to pose problems for organizations such as
the UN’s World Food Programme (WFP) that run food assistance programmes.

Institutional framework and capacity
226. Economic and social development hinge on institutional capacity and a fragile
institutional framework compounds the problems of such development. Such
institutional support comes from schools, hospitals and clinics, viable economic
activities (banking, commerce, and manufacturing plants), all of which are in short
supply in North Eastern Kenya. The presence of such institutions opens up avenues
for employment and economic development.
227.

In North Eastern, the institutional framework is inadequate. There are very few
schools and hospitals, leaving the inhabitants in a desperate situation. Economic
activities are limited and there is little industrialization and manufacturing activities

136 Ministry of Planning and National Development (n 139 above)
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in the region. The poor institutional framework is further compounded by the poor
road network, with most rural roads being inaccessible, especially during the rainy
season. Some improvements on the road network, especially the feeder roads, were
done through the Fuel Levy Fund, but there is still substantial work required to
facilitate accessibility.
228.

The continuous drought affects long-term plans to develop water structures. Most
funds were diverted to emergency water trucking and other activities to save lives.
Access to infrastructure and social services in the arid areas is far below the national
average. In 2006 for example, there were 69 public secondary schools in Kitui District
but only 28 public secondary schools in the whole of North Eastern. In addition,
in 2001, there were 86 secondary schools in Uasin Gishu District, but only 16 such
schools in both Turkana and Wajir districts. Closing such a gap and achieving higher
levels of service provision of quality education remains an enormous challenge.

Education
229.

Both internal and external factors influence the uptake of education in North Eastern
Kenya. Internally, cultural practices and stereotypes have continued to hamper
education uptake. Parental attitudes towards education, cultural practices and
beliefs are partly to blame for the low levels of literacy among nomadic pastoralist
communities of Kenya. School dropout rates are high for both boys and girls and
at all levels of the educational stages. The foregoing is generally worse for the girl
child, given the conspicuous subordinate status of women among nomadic pastoral
ethnic groups. Statistics show that about 93 percent of North Eastern women have
no education at all, compared with only about 3 percent in Central Province.137
Furthermore comparatively, of the 92 percent women in Nairobi who are literate,
only 6.4 percent are literate in North Eastern. For men, corresponding figures for
Nairobi and North Eastern Province are 94.2 percent and 29.5 percent respectively.

230. In addition to their multiple domestic responsibilities, certain cultural practices
such as female genital mutilation and infibulations among some of the ethnic
groups, early marriage and the parental preference for boys’ education, greatly
curtail girl child education. Indeed, girl children often lose out to boys when
parents have to prioritize who to educate.
138

231. Girl children often find themselves trapped: teenage pregnancy, early marriage,
motherhood or transactional sex with the possibility of contracting sexually
137 See Society for International Development (SID) (n XX above) VIII. Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (2003), Table 3: Gender
Disparities in literacy and Educational Acquisition.
138 DN Sifuna, ‘Increasing access and participation of pastoralist communities in primary education in Kenya’ International Review of
Education 2005, p.51; p.499-516
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transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV/AIDS. Education is perceived as not
important for girls and therefore they are withdrawn from school so that they can
contribute their labour at home.
232. External factors such as the pastoralist lifestyle that entails frequent migrations
has influenced access, participation and achievement in education. Other factors
are linked to institutional development and capacity. Schools are in short supply
and this has contributed to lowered access of children to both primary and
secondary school education. The cost of schooling is also prohibitive and due
to the high levels of poverty in the region, many parents cannot afford the extra
costs that schools demand. Because of frequent mobility, educational trajectories
are not strictly followed and dropout rates tend to be very high. There are also
very few youth polytechnics and skill training centres to absorb some of these
children. There is need to establish more day secondary schools that are costeffective. These factors mean that school enrolment rates for North Eastern are
far below those of other provinces and the national average.
233. Gross enrolment rates for primary school and secondary school stand at 17.8
percent and 4.5 percent respectively in North Eastern, way below the national
average of 87.6 percent and 22.2 percent. North Eastern has the highest school
drop-out rate, which stands at 12.6 percent compared to Nyanza which has the
lowest drop-out rate in the country standing at 6.8 percent and the national
average drop-out rate of 8.1 percent. The inadequacy at the school level can
be best captured by the non-proportional pupil-teacher ratio in North Eastern,
indicating a shortage of teachers and skills.139
234. Data from the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) in 2008 on enrolment
rates (for boys and girls) indicates that only 32.3 percent in North Eastern have ever
enrolled in school against the national average of 76.8 percent. In Central Kenya for
example, 92 percent of the population has attended school. Worse still, only three
percent (and only 0.5 percent of women) in NEP have attended secondary schools,
against a national average of 8.7 percent. Notably low is the population that has
attended any post-secondary institutions, at only 0.6 % (KNBS, 2008).
235. When it comes to nomadic districts in Kenya including Isiolo, Tana River, Wajir,
Moyale and Turkana, the Kenya National Statistics Plan 2002-2008 figures
highlight the differences in literacy rates, primary school enrolment and dropout
rates, secondary school enrolment and dropout rates in the above regions. From
the data, it is indicative that Wajir has the lowest primary and secondary school
139 See Ministry of education, Statistics Division, Table 3.8: Access to education 2002 and Table 4: National Gross Enrolment, Pupilteacher Ratio and Drop-Out Rates
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joint enrolment rates (boys and girls), standing at 14.5 percent and 4.6 percent
respectively, while Moyale has the highest enrolment rates standing at 63.2
percent and 8.5 percent respectively. Out of the 4.6 percent of students who enrol
in secondary schools in Wajir, over 50 percent of them drop out before completion
of the approved four-year secondary school course.140 Wajir also has very low
literary rates, which impacts the ability to access the job market. For example, the
modest educational achievement registered among pastoral-nomadic children
cannot allow them to compete with those from other communities on an equal
footing when it comes to securing jobs and other self-actualizing opportunities.
They may therefore be left with the option of engaging in banditry, cattle theft,
drug abuse and trafficking, or casual and unskilled manual work. 141
236. Some of the undertakings they engage in are not only poorly paid, but also
erratic. Compounding this situation is the incessant ethnic conflicts and cattle
raids that complicate livelihoods and access to social services such as education.
Indeed, the proliferation of small arms - fuelled by the long armed conflict in
Somalia - and the apparent commercialization of livestock theft, have heightened
insecurity in the region. These conditions have far-reaching implications on
children’s socialization, development and education. In addition, it has the effect
of entrenching and institutionalizing inter-generational poverty transfer.
237.

In Kenya’s high-potential areas, the story is markedly different, which is telling of the
sorry state of the country’s social service provisioning and welfare system. As such,
the corresponding figures on literacy among sedentary communities, especially in the
high-potential areas, are substantially different from those registered in arid districts.
Data from arid areas compare unfavourably with that from high-potential districts.

238.

It can perhaps be hypothesized that in the absence of sustainable economic
opportunities, education remains the best option for nomadic pastoralists. The
present education uptake, even with the application of mobile schools in the province
is less than satisfactory. There are numerous technical and operational problems
that confront the region in terms of accessing, participating and achieving desired
educational outcomes. Because of poor performance in transition exams (the Kenya
Certificate for Primary Education - KCPE and Kenya Certificate for Secondary Education
- KCSE), mobility within the education system remains very low. In particular, poor
performance in KCSE - in part marked by the region’s lowest representation in the top
100 students ranking in national exams (together with the Coast region - means that
very few transition to university and tertiary level education.

140 Kenya, Republic of Kenya, Kenya National Development Plan 2002-2008. Nairobi: Ministry of planning and National Development,
2002. Table 5: Literacy Indicators in Selected Nomad-Inhabited Districts of Kenya
141 Ezekiel Mwenzwa and Eric Masese, From Dim to Full Light: Spotlighting the Education Concerns of Nomadic Children in Kenya
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239.

While the quota system applied in admissions into certain fields such as medicine
has ensured a level of representation in those professions, more appropriate
interventions are required. These interventions should target primary and secondary
levels to increase transition rates and performance.

240. The failure of the education system is largely due to the aggregate nature of its
administration and authorities need to customize education for the circumstances
of a particular region, keeping in mind pastoralism, drought, food insecurity, crisis
and conflicts experienced in North Eastern and the implication of these factors on
education access and retention.

Health, water and sanitation
241. Multiple factors of poor infrastructure, low population density and limited
institutional capacity cement low service delivery on water and sanitation in North
Eastern Kenya. A large percentage (95 percent) of children in NEP are born at home,
against a national average of 69.5 percent. Only 11.8 percent of infants in this
province have an immunization card, against a national average of 63.7 percent.
Nearly a third of all infants are underweight.
142

242. According to a 2004 report, there are great inequalities as to the doctor-patient
ratio in Central Kenya, which is about 1:20 700, compared to North Eastern (around
1:120,000.)143 In terms of disposal of human waste, the 2009 Census shows that
out of a population of 248 000 in North Eastern sampled, only 220 have access
to a main sewer, 212 of these use a septic tank, 62,678 use a pit latrine, while the
majority (184 425) relieve themselves in the bush, equating to 74 percent.144
243.

More than 50 percent of the population either draws water from unprotected wells
(25.4%) or from rivers (25.6%). Only 5.7 percent of the households in the arid districts
have access to piped water, and most of these are concentrated in the urban areas.145
Low nutrition and poor access to medical and related services poses life threatening
challenges to the population. Women’s health needs special attention and maternal
health care centres need to be increased to reduce morbidity and mortality. There is
need for maternity amenities and child care services in the district hospital in order
to improve maternal and child health care services.

142 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Well being in Kenya a Socio-economic profile. Nairobi: 2008
143 SID (n 127 above).
144 Kenya Population and Housing Census Report, volume II: Population and Household distribution of socio-economic characteristics
(2009) p.359
145 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Kenya Integrated Household Budget survey. Nairobi: 2007. See also 2009 Census Report
(above) p. 339
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Economic marginalisation and access to social-economic goods in North
Eastern
Testimony by Jarso Forole
What evidence do we have for being marginalized? I am sure that for those who have
travelled by road, after crossing Merile River, you must have had a feeling of what we
have been feeling since 1963. We have our road to this area. Unfortunately, this is a
road classified as A2 and runs all the way from Cairo right through Addis Ababa all the
way to Cape Town. Until recently, there is one section of that road which had no single
piece of tarmac. This is the section before you get to Moyale, about 500 kilometers. We
are told that there was a time when funds were kept aside to reconstruct that road but
due to the influence of some individuals in the government, the funds were diverted
to other areas. It is recently that the government decided to do something. We are yet
to see the job being completed.
We have very few public health facilities. The existing ones are not fully equipped
and, at the same time, they are under-staffed. We also have very limited maternal
and child health services. Sadly, we do not have any facilities in a county that spans
over 15 percent of the total land mass of Kenya. For instance, if you take the southern
part of Laisamis constituency, you will see that there is no single health facility that
has been established by the government. We have very few that were established by
missionaries. If this is not marginalisation, then what is it?
Illiteracy levels are very high. For instance, close to five decades after independence,
there are statistics which show that Moyale has only 10 secondary schools. Those
schools serve an area which takes up 15 percent of the country’s land mass. There is
no school that gives proper education to secondary school-going children. Moyale
started in 1920 when it was established by the colonialists. However, compared
to other areas which were established recently, you will see that we are highly
marginalized. Take an example of Makueni. We only have 10 secondary schools but
Makueni, established in the late 1990s, has more than 230 public secondary schools.
I do not want to go further into that.
Access to safe water is a luxury for us. Most of the facilities we have were established
during the colonial period to serve the population that existed during that time. For
instance, in Marsabit, we have the Bakuli water supply which was established to meet
the demands of just about 2 000 people. Today, we have gone beyond the 60 000
mark. So, while other Kenyans turn around and turn on a tap to have clean water,
in Marsabit, people have to travel more than 80 kilometers to look for water. If you
were to travel 80 kilometers a day to look for water, would you have time to do things
to gain economically? We have been complaining about chronic poverty. However,
in my considered opinion, one of the factors that have greatly contributed to the
continued poverty is the water crisis. If a 20-litre jerrican goes for almost a dollar

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

77

Volume IIB

Chapter ONE

(Sh70) and we are talking about a poor person who lives below a dollar a day, what
picture are we trying to portray? I have vast experience working in the humanitarian
assistance field and going by the CF Standards, even in a humanitarian situation, a
person needs at least 15 litres of water a day. Just think how much money does a
household need to meet the daily requirement? So, as much as we are facing water
problems, we are cheating ourselves when we say that we are fighting poverty in
Marsabit.
More worrying is the situation of our children. The World Health Organization (WHO) has
established a threshold to determine the nutritional standards among children below
five years of age. One of these standards is the so-called acute global malnutrition rate,
which the WHO worries about when it permanently remained at 15 percent, always. At
times, it goes as high as 30 percent. You can paint the picture of what the local child
goes through.
In a nutshell, I would like to make reference to the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). Every year, Kenya conducts a review of its progress. If we were to conduct
that review in Marsabit, we would not know for sure if we are on the right track
towards achieving those eight goals. This is a largely livestock-based economy.
Our expectation is to have services just like our colleagues who are farmers. While
our Kenyan government has established special funds and subsidies for farmers in
Kenya, we are yet to have any action taken in our favour. We have the Coffee Board
of Kenya, the Pyrethrum Board of Kenya and a sisal board and a sugar board. I am
yet to hear of a board that addresses the needs of pastoralists.
The only industry that is there to serve our interests is based in Nairobi; the Kenya
Meat Commission (KMC). Food security is also a major problem here and we have
evidence of it. If you look through the window or as you were coming from Isiolo,
you must have seen some huge silos, less than a kilometre from where we are.
The silos were established in the 1990s to receive local produce from this
area. During that period, Marsabit was second after Kitale in terms of cereals
production. The need for additional silos was felt because there was a lot of
produce. Similar structures were erected along the way. At that time, we were
self-sufficient in terms of food production. However, today, there is no grain from
the local area that can be traced in those silos. Instead of having local produce,
today, it is housing humanitarian aid. That has led us to claim that the state
provides us with food. At this moment, if you go off the road, you will encounter
very serious humanitarian situations of emaciated lactating mothers, chronically
malnourished children and people queuing at food distribution centers on a daily
basis. 146

146 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Marsabit/ 4 May 2011/ p.13
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Nyanza Province
The question that has repeatedly been asked is: Who is responsible for the sorry
state of the Luo people in Kenya? The answer to this question reveals a litany of
systematic official policy to oppress, subjugate and dehumanize the Luo people,
which would have largely been profiled as follows: economic emasculation, mental
and psychological warfare, utilization and murder of Luo leaders and political
marginalisation.147
I cannot agree, even for a fleeting moment, to make reference to a so-called ‘socioeconomic marginalisation’ of any part of Kenya, by my government.148

244. One of the main narratives in the context of Kenyan politics, development, and
gross violations of human rights, is that Nyanza Province has suffered socioeconomic marginalisation under successive post-independence governments.
Like North Eastern Province and the NFD in general, Nyanza could be placed in the
category of ‘politically dissident’ regions.
245. Speaking during the Commission’s hearings in Kisumu, Phoebe Asiyo, a former MP
for Karachuonyo, provided a moving testimony that summarised the prevailing
perceptions about the economic and political marginalisation of Nyanza, especially
what is popularly known as ‘Luo Nyanza’:
The role of the Luo community in the struggle for independence of Kenya cannot
be over-emphasised. At independence, the whole of Kenya saw the Luo as the most
educated community, with probably the highest number of university graduates,
faculty heads and professionals in almost every other field. The Luo community
produced who was who in all sectors of the economy, political, economic and
intellectual fabric in the Kenyan society. Fifty years down the road, the Luo community
is bedevilled with every other conceivable societal ill, languishing at the bottom of the
ladder of progress.149

246. The disintegration of the Kikuyu-Luo coalition that formed the core of KANU at
independence and the eventual fallout between Kenya’s first President Jomo
Kenyatta and first Vice-President Oginga Odinga in 1966 over differing visions
for the country as described earlier forms an important context within which to
contemplate the marginalisation of Nyanza. It was noted that the fallout between
Kenyatta and Odinga in 1966, the assassination of prominent Luo politician Tom
Mboya in 1969 and the banning of Odinga‘s opposition party, the Kenya People’s
Union (KPU), and Odinga’s eventual detention earlier in 1969, consigned Nyanza
147 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14July 2011/ p. 20
148 Written Submission by Former President Daniel Arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.20
149 TJRC/Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14July 2011/ p. 20.
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Province to enduring conflict with the Kenyatta regime.150 The same would
continue during the Moi regime.
247. In her testimony, Asiyo pinpoints 1969 as the year when the marginalisation of
Nyanza started:” It was soon after the assassination of Tom Mboya in 1969 and the
detention of Jaramogi Odinga that the real marginalisation of the Luo started”.151
Although Moi had in 1980 as president attempted to ‘rehabilitate’ Odinga and
his KPU colleagues politically by restoring their KANU membership and offering
state jobs to some, this attempt was aborted when it became evident that
Odinga’s ideological inclinations and his attitude towards KANU rule - which
he perceived as corrupt and exclusionary - had not changed in his 14 years of
political banishment. It is reported that Moi changed his mind when Odinga
publicly criticised Kenyatta for his alleged exclusionary policies while explaining
why they had fallen out.
248. While there have been prominent personalities from Nyanza who served in
successive regimes, the region has been associated with opposition politics since
independence, save for a few years in the 1960s. As explained earlier, the structure
of the Kenyan state and the nature of politics has been such that the economic
fortunes of communities were largely linked - although not exclusively - to their
standing with the regime of the day. Because of the centralised nature of the
state, patronage, corruption and the politics of exclusion and negative ethnicity
had taken root in Kenyan politics. In this context, the political banishment of
leading political figures coincided with, and meant economic isolation of the
entire region. However, the co-option of leaders from regions that had been
marginalised presented a semblance of inclusion at the centre. Both Kenyatta
and Moi made sure that Nyanza was represented in their governments over the
years, especially in cabinet. Former President Moi rejects the idea that Nyanza
was marginalised under his rule and cites names of prominent Luo leaders who
served in his government. President Moi writes:
The biggest agenda of my government was to distribute resources equitably to all
parts of the country. I cannot agree, even for a fleeting moment, to make reference
to ‘socio-economic marginalisation’ of any part Kenya, by my government. I had a
cabinet for many years which had a proportionately large number of ministers from
the said Nyanza region. [In fact], one of the jokes in Nyanza in the late 1980s was that
every MP was either a minster or assistant minister except James Mbori, MP for Kasipul
Kabondo.
150 Odhiambo-Atieno, E.S. 2002. Hegemonic Enterprises and Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya, African
Studies, 61 (2) pp. 223-249
151 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.20
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249. To emphasise his point, President Moi lists the following who served at different
points in his 24 year rule:
Ministers [and Assistant Ministers]:

14. Valentine Opere

1. William Odongo Omamo

15. Peter Wambura

2. Robert Ouko

16. William Ochieng

3. Wilson Ndolo Ayah

17. Richard Muga

4. Peter Oloo Aringo
5. John Okwanyo

Envoys
18. Michael Okeyo

6. Dalmas Otieno

19. Noah Okulo

7. Stephen Ondiek
8. Raila Amolo Odinga
9. Adhu Awiti

20. Maurice Omwony
21. Pamela Mboya
22. Frost Josiah

10. Peter Nyakiamo
Permanent Secretaries

23. Green Josiah
24. Bob Jalang’o

11. Joab Omino

25. Daniel Mboya

12. Hezekiah Oyugi

26. Ochieng Adala

13. Leo Odero

27. Prof Thomas Ogada

250. With respect to the Armed Forces over which successive regimes have often
sought to have tight control, President Moi compares his administration and that
of his predecessor, Kenyatta. He states that ‘by 1978, the joke of the town was that
no Luo could rise beyond the rank of a major in our armed forces’. He lists the
following to demonstrate that during his tenure, members of the Luo community
were appointed to high positions in the military:


Lt-Gen Daniel Opande



Maj-General Pasteur Awita



Maj-Gen Maurice Oyugi



Maj-Gen Sam Suero



Maj-Gen Barrack Onyango



Brigadier Fred Sidondo

251. The President also cites the names of other senior personalities that he appointed
as follows:
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Police Commissioner: Philemon Abong’o



Heads of Parastatals
Prof Bethwell Ogot
Prof Simeon Ominde
Prof David Wasawo
Prof Otieno Malo
Prof Ojany
Phillip Okundi



Vice-Chancellors
Prof Douglas Odhiambo
Prof Shellemiah Keya
Prof Fredrick Onyango



Directors of Medical Services
Dr Joseph Oliech
Dr James Nyikal



Chief Architect: Joel Nyaseme



Chief Engineer Roads: Engineer Otonglo

252. The Commission takes the view that while the listing of Luo personalities who
served in the Moi regime is evidence of a level of inclusion of people from Nyanza,
the co-option of elites did not necessarily translate into economic inclusion in a
broad sense. As shown below, other indicators assessed by the Commission, such
as social amenities and infrastructure, seem to reflect a different reality.
253. It appears to the Commission that the inclusion of certain elites also had a political
goal under both post-independence administrations: it served to politically
isolate Odinga who had taken a hard-line stance against both the Kenyatta and
Moi governments since the 1966 fallout and his eventual banishment in 1969.
254. In 2003, just as Nyanza leaders appeared to find a new footing at the centre
of power following the formation of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) a
year earlier, commentators note that similar disagreements within the Kibaki
regime (between Kibaki and Raila Odinga) would likewise lead to the blacklisting
of Nyanza both in terms of access to capital development and also in terms
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Miss Phoebe Asiyo (centre) testifying in Kisumu on economic marginilisation of the Nyanza Region.

of appointments to public positions.152 Indeed, following the fallout between
Kibaki and Odinga, Kibaki would sack Odinga and his allies from government in
2003. After the hotly contested and divisive constitutional referendum of 2005,
Odinga would later form the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and contest
the 2007 elections against Kibaki, largely on a platform that held out Kibaki as a
practitioner of the old politics of exclusion.
255.

Odinga and the Nyanza elite would be catapulted to the centre of power following
the negotiated National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process in 2008 that produced
a government of national unity after the post -election violence (PEV) of 2007-2008.
Odinga’s proximity to power (in his capacity as Prime Minister and co-principal)
certainly tempered narratives and perceptions of exclusion, especially as appointments
into public service from Nyanza increased.

256. It is fair to state, as asserted by many who spoke to the Commission, that,
Nyanza has been in the political and economic cold for all but 10 years since
independence in 1963. The systematic isolation of Nyanza since 1966 by
successive governments as narrated by those who made testimonies has led to
the heightening of poverty in the region in general and various social and
economic problems that have gone unaddressed. Some of these issues are
discussed below.
152 R Muhula ‘Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional Politics in Kenya’ Kenya Studies Review (2009) 85-105 pp 99-100
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Socio-economic indicators of economic Marginalisation in Nyanza
Poverty
257. An assessment of poverty is germane to the discussion of economic marginalisation
because poverty is regarded as the inability to access basic human needs by
segments of the population. This inability could be attributed to a set of factors
but does, in our historical context, reflect a legacy of economic marginalisation,
although not exclusively. Poverty assessment reports classify poverty in terms of
food poverty, hardcore poverty, and absolute poverty.153
258.

At 63.1 percent, Nyanza Province is said to have the highest incidence of absolute
poverty in the country. The national average is 52 percent. Kisumu District, one
of the poorest districts, has an absolute poverty rate of 65.44 percent.155 Kisumu
experiences a food poverty level of 54.9 percent, which indicates that food insecurity
is another major problem.156 According to a World Bank Report published in 2008,
incomes of rural households in Nyanza are the lowest of all the provinces, but have
risen over time, while the ‘Gini-coefficient’ increased until 2004 and then moderated.
The report also notes that livestock ownership is lowest in Nyanza and that average
land size fell rapidly, to become lowest across all regions by 2007.157 Asiyo’s testimony
summarises the outlook of Nyanza across various relevant indicators:
154

Luo Nyanza, as Joseph Kaguthi, former Provincial Commissioner called it, is today one
of Kenya’s most under-developed, with all the development indicators grim. Poverty
is rife in Luoland. The disease burden is very high; the mortality rate is higher than it
is in most provinces and life expectancy is low. All health indicators are at their worst
compared to the national indicators.158

259.

Many other witnesses testified that this grim picture is not restricted to Luo Nyanza
but appears to be common to other parts of Nyanza region as well, especially to
Kuria. According to a report by the National Coordinating Agency for Population and
Development (NCAPD), 49 percent of the district population in Kuria lives in absolute
poverty, whereas a large percentage experience food poverty. The District Poverty
Assessment Report for the year 2000 identified the main factors that engender
poverty in the district as rapid population growth, economic and environmental
factors, HIV/AIDS and socio-cultural practices and attitudes such as polygamy

153 See National Bureau of Statistics, Second Report on Poverty in Kenya: Welfare indicators atlas (2000)
154 KS Njonjo and Institute of Economic Affairs, Youth Fact Book: Infinite Possibility of Definite Disaster? (2010)
155 See S Dosker, What Makes the Difference? Socio-economic and demographic determinants of orphan primary school enrolment in
Kisumu District, Kenya. (Unpublished MA thesis, University of Amsterdam & Great Lakes University of Kenya, 2006) p13. See also
Central Bureau of Statistics, Department of Kisumu District. Demographical data (2001)
156 KS Njonjo and Institute of Economic Affairs, Youth Fact Book: Infinite Possibility of Definite Disaster? (2010)
157 See World Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment (2008) p. 60
158 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14July 2011/ p. 20

84

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter ONE

and wife inheritance. Inadequate and unreliable rainfall patterns have immensely
affected agricultural activities in some parts of the district.159
District Level Estimates of Poverty, 2005/6

Source: World Bank Report, Kenya poverty and inequality assessment, 2008
159 National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development (NCAPD), Kuria District Strategic Plan (2005-2010) p. 6
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Health
260. The Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS)160 of 2008 shows that the rates
by province of under-five mortality rate display considerable disparities. According
to this report, Nyanza Province has the highest levels of both under-5 years and
infant mortality rates (import Table 8.2, pp 116). Almost one in seven children
in Nyanza dies before attaining his or her fifth birthday (149 deaths per 1 000),
compared with one in 20 children in Central Province (51 deaths per 1 000), which
has the lowest rate. Thus, the risk of dying before age five is almost three times
higher in Nyanza than in Central. Infant mortality is also highest in Nyanza (95
deaths per 1000) and lowest in Eastern (39 deaths per 1 000).
261. A comparison between the 2003 and 2008 reports shows that there have been
considerable declines in child mortality rates in Nyanza over the five years, with
under-5 mortality declined from 206 to 149 deaths per 1,000 births since 2003.
262. The KDHS report of 2003 shows that except for neonatal mortality, all childhood
mortality indicators are highest in Nyanza and lowest in Central.161 Under-5
mortality is highest in Nyanza (206 deaths per 1 000 live births), followed by North
Eastern (163 per 1000), and lowest in Central (54 per 1000) and Rift Valley (77 per
1 000) provinces. This implies that a child born in Nyanza is four times more likely
than a child born in Central to die before celebrating his or her fifth birthday. The
same pattern is also observed in infant mortality rates, with the highest rate in
Nyanza (133 deaths per 1 000 live births) and the lowest in Central (44 deaths per
1000 live births). The figures shown for infant mortality and under-5 mortality in
2003 and 2008 are consistent with the trend in previous surveys done in 1989,
1993 and 1998.
263. With regard to health facilities, Kuria, one of the poorest and most marginalised
of all districts has 1 hospital and 8 health centres spread across the district. The
doctor to patient ratio is 1:56 913 and households are located an average of 5
kilometres from the nearest health facility. Daniel Chacha Muherei, who testified
on behalf of the local MP Wilfred Machage, captured the poor state of health
facilities in Kuria as follows:
We have very few health facilities, but wherever there is a health facility, the municipal
council helps to open the small routes to access those health facilities. So, we have
160 The Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS) is a programme conducted after every five years by KNBS primarily to provide
demographic, health and other socio-economic indicators to assist stakeholders in planning, monitoring and evaluation of
population and health policies and programmes. The 2003 KDHS was the fourth to be conducted in Kenya, the others having been
conducted in 1989, 1993 and 1998
161 See Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2003 (2004) pp.114-115
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roads which are maintained by the council. However, we do not know if it that council
will continue after 2012. We have a sub-district hospital here. There is a road coming
here, direct to that place, but this hospital has never seen an ambulance since we got
a district here. Therefore, our people are suffering. So, I say it is an injustice. Our people
are dying here; if we do not have money and there is a government facility here. A
mother comes to deliver and dies, when you are just looking at her. Sometimes, she
loses a child. It is a pity.162

264. The most prevalent diseases in Kuria are malaria, upper respiratory tract infections
(URTI) and diarrhoea. HIV/AIDS prevalence is high among the productive age
group (15 to 49). It is estimated to be in the range of 13 percent and is one of the
highest in Nyanza Province.163
265. The disparities across the provinces in under-5 child mortality rates are remarkably
unequal. According to the KDHS (2003), Nyanza’s under-5 child mortality rate was
206, which is much higher than the national average of 115 and is 152 units above
Central’s rate which was the lowest. Nyanza’s low child survival rate is consistent
with its being a malaria-endemic area, with a modest bed net coverage of 32
percent, which includes a small 17 percent of the under-5s sleeping under a net.
According to the 2009 KDHS, Nyanza still has the highest levels of both under-5
and infant mortality rates.165
164

266. Data accessed by the Commission from 2004 shows that there are also wide
regional disparities in life expectancy. While life expectancy in Central is
64.2 years, it is in 44.8 years in Nyanza. The death rate among the people in
Nyanza is high in part because of lack of adequate medical services, particularly
along Lake Victoria, where the outbreak of water-borne diseases is common.
While the government cannot be blamed for these diseases in the context of
economic marginalisation, these diseases compound the effects of economic
marginalisation because of the burden they place on meagre incomes and limited
medical facilities. In the case of HIV/AIDS - in respect of which Nyanza has led
consistently in terms of prevalence - the group most affected is the productive 15
to 35 years band. While feeding on the high rates of poverty, HIV/AIDS heightens
the level of poverty among the affected communities thus compounding the
effects of economic marginalisation.
166

162
163
164
165
166

TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kuria/ 25 July 2011/ p.16-17
KNCAPD (n 159 above) 7
Society for International Development, Readings on Inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perspectives (2006) p.111
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2008-09 (2010) p 106.
See SID (n 127 above) 15, 16 & 26
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Education
267. According to the NCAPD report, the total enrolment in primary schools in Kuria
stood at 90.4 percent for boys and 84 percent for girls in 164 primary schools.
The population in primary schools was 37,356 constituting 36 percent of the
total population in 1999. It was expected to increase to 53,063 in 2008. In the 17
secondary schools, enrolment in 2001 was 2,896, which is only 18.5 percent of
the total population of secondary school-going (15 to 19) youth. The secondary
school population stood at 15,151 in 1999 (14.7 percent of the total population),
implying that during changeover from primary to secondary schools, the dropout rates are very high. The major challenge that has resulted is low enrolment in
schools, a non-schooling gap which is wide and increasing, and the low retention
in schools due as the high drop-out rate increases poverty levels.167
268. Concerning public education, Kisumu District reflects national trends; a primary
school enrolment of 69.7 percent and a low secondary school enrolment of 19
percent. Data from 2006 indicates 322 primary schools, (72 in Maseno, 66 in
Kombewa, 40 in Kadibo and 144 in Winam).169 The teacher/pupil ratio is 1:40.
Due to the introduction of free primary education in 2003, classes became
overcrowded, causing increased pressure on teachers. There are slightly more
boys than girls enrolled within primary education: (51% boys, 49% girls). The
average attendance rates by sex is similar: 8 years for boys, whereas girls only
complete 7 years.170
168

269. In the early years of independence, the government’s education policy was
driving manpower needs in the economy, with the desire to demonstrate to the
public that independence was not a sham but brought real benefits.171 Colonial
policies produced the result that few Africans had more than four years of
schooling and as a result there was a huge skills gap that had to be plugged.
For the first decade following independence, the government focused largely
on expanding secondary and tertiary education. Through the Africanisation
programme pronounced in 1965 through Sessional Paper No. 10, mandatory
quotas (50-50) for inclusion of Africans were imposed on schools previously
reserved for whites and Asians.
167 See Kuria District Strategic Plan (n 159 above).
168 Little Fact Book. (2002). Social Economic & Political Profiles of Kenya’s Districts. Institute of Economic Affairs
169 S Dosker. (2006). What Makes the Difference? Socio-economic and demographic determinants of orphan primary school enrolment
in Kisumu District, Kenya. (unpublished) MA thesis University of Amsterdam & Great Lakes University of Kenya
170 See S Dosker. (2006). What Makes the Difference? Socio-economic and demographic determinants of orphan primary school
enrolment in Kisumu District, Kenya. (unpublished) MA thesis University of Amsterdam & Great Lakes University of Kenya p.14-15
& Central Bureau of Statistics (2002). Department of Kisumu District. Demographical data
171 See Moses Oketch and Caine Rolleston, Policies on free primary school education in Easter Africa: A review of the literature
Institute of Education, University of London , Monograph No 10 (2007) 10-11
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270. Rolleston and Okech record that by 1978 when Moi took over from Kenyatta, the
best secondary schools had been concentrated in Central Province, the home
of Kenyatta and Nyanza.172 The concentration also reflected where Christian
missionaries had made their bases. Central in particular had benefited from early
access to education because of penetration of the earliest Christian missionaries.
271. While the Kenyatta government placed emphasis on secondary and tertiary
education to implement its Africanisation policy, it had identified “ignorance”
and illiteracy as two of the problems that it needed to tackle through education,
essentially by expanding primary education. Consequently access to primary
education became linked to the notion of development.
272. The First National Development Plan 1964-1969 highlighted the need to
expand education noting that “education and national development are so
closely related that it is almost impossible to speak of one without the other”.
Sessional Paper No. 10 included education as an instrumental part of Kenya’s
development strategy with emphasis placed on the economic value rather
than social value of education. Education was to be “regarded as the principal
means of relieving the shortage of skilled manpower and equalizing economic
opportunities among all citizens”. Although there was rhetorical commitment
to universal free primary education in the earliest government development
plans, primary education was regarded as a long-term objective of the
education programme, which at the time focused on furnishing manpower
needs of the economy.
273. On assuming power, Moi was to shift the education policy fully towards free
primary education. Under Moi, the development language had shifted from that
of emphasising secondary education to that of recognising primary education
as the foundation of economic and national development.173 The government
would provide universal primary education (UPE) for seven years, free of charge
to all children of primary-school age; abolish building and other school funds in
primary schools and provide free milk to primary school children throughout the
country (Republic of Kenya, 1979:155). The feeding programme was mainly to
attract pupils from semi-arid areas to attend school. With the economic downturn
in the early 1990s, elements of UPE disappeared, with fees reintroduced (as
building levies) and the milk programme ended. UPE would later be reintroduced
by the NARC government after the 2002 elections.
172 Moses Oketch and Caine Rolleston (n 171 above) p.12
173 Government of Kenya, Fourth National Development Plan, (1979-1983) p.155
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274. It is fair to note that the expansion in primary education instituted by Moi and
investment in education generally is one of the main positive legacies of his
24-year rule. Kenya’s achievement in the development of basic education was
a showcase among sub-Saharan African countries at the World Conference on
Education for All in 1990. However, the effect of the Moi policy of leaning towards
primary education is that secondary education was undermined. The government
announced that due to the high cost of secondary education, parents would be
asked to contribute more and that the bursary scheme at secondary education
would also be reviewed. The policy was to allow only for a modest expansion in
secondary education in order to correct the imbalance between districts and
between boys and girls.174
275. This policy had the result that investment would shift from Nyanza and Central
provinces. For many years, these two provinces, especially Nyanza were at the
top in terms of performance both in primary and secondary level despite the
political and economic isolation of the region. However, education would suffer
neglect, in later years especially in Nyanza, with accusations levelled against the
Moi government that it had set out to undermine education standards in that
province through a variety of means, including the systematic transfer of the
best teachers.
276. In Kuria, where education standards have remained very low, perceptions of
marginalisation, which appear to be borne out of experience, persist. Testimonies
attributed lack of schools and equipment in the area to “sabotage” and deliberate
policies pursued since independence that benefited certain parts of the country
to the exclusion of others. Residents of Kuria feel that other parts of Nyanza
benefited as the neglect of their region continued. Daniel Chacha, again speaking
on behalf of his local MP, stated:
Let us now talk about education injustice and sabotage. While education is the key
to success, Kuria was intentionally shoved off-target by our neighbours through
deliberate designs schemed to obliterate our intellectual skills. Government schools
were concentrated in other parts of Nyanza Province. For instance, in a memorandum
dated 3 November, 1963 presented to the late President Kenyatta, the Kuria delegation
complained of among other anomalies, educational marginalisation. For instance,
the single administrative division in the neighbouring Nyanza Division, the then
Central Division in South Nyanza District had nine government-aided schools, while
Kehancha Division had only one partially-aided school, Taranganya secondary school.
Our schools are extremely poor in performance as they are poorly equipped. All this is
a result of marginalisation due to that Sessional Paper No.10.175
174 (n 176 above p.12)
175 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kuria/ 25 July 2011/ p.5
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277. The Ministry of Education recognises that poor infrastructure is one of the major
barriers to improving access to primary and secondary school education in Kenya.
Furthermore, experience shows that physical facilities are an important factor in
both school attendance and achievement.176 Often, the best performing schools
in national examinations are also the best-equipped in terms of infrastructure. In
2005, the Kenya government came up with the Kenya Education Sector Support
Programme (KESSP) whose vision was to provide quality education and training
to all for development. The main goal of KESSP was to improve education by
ensuring that there was adequate and proper education infrastructure.177 KESSP
was created in response to the major backlog of infrastructure provision and
the shortage of permanent classrooms, particularly in poor districts. It was also
recognised that the existing infrastructure was generally in poor condition
due to lack of investment capital, poor construction standards and inadequate
maintenance.178

Water and Sanitation
278. According to the KDHS 2003, there are marked provincial differentials in the source
of drinking water and by extension access to piped water. More than three-quarters
of the households in Nairobi have piped water in their dwelling, compound, or
plot compared with only 2 to 4 percent of households in Western, Nyanza, and
North Eastern provinces.179 According to the same survey, only about 1 percent
of households in Nyanza had water piped to their houses, compared to about 33
percent in Nairobi and about 12 percent in Central.180
279. In recent times, water supply to both villages and municipalities in Nyanza has
been affected by the water hyacinth through blockage, which lowers the quantity
of water pumped. Water hyacinth infestations have been reported to lower the
water quality in Kenya and Uganda (in terms of colour, pH, turbidity (suspended
solids) and hence increase the treatment costs.
280. Increased costs are associated with keeping the water intake points free of water
hyacinth. The villages bordering the Lake Victoria have no access to the lake for
their water needs at times when the beach is heavily infested with the obnoxious
weed. Even if they do access the water, it is dirty and often smelly because of the
rotting mats of the weed.
176 Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2005) Kenya Education Sector Support Programme 2005-2010. Nairobi: Ministry
of Education Science and Technology Pg. ix
177 Minister of Education, Science and Technology (n 176 above).
178 Ministry of Education, Science and Education (n 180 above) 1.
179 KHDS (2003) 24
180 See SID (n 108 above) p.18
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281.

Pollution is another major problem. The quality of water in Lake Victoria is threatened
by the increased inflow of nutrients into the lake from surrounding areas, leading to an
increase in levels of phosphorous, nitrogen and silt. Also the fivefold increase in algal
growth since 1960, and the shift in its composition towards the dominant blue green
algae, reduced the oxygen levels in the lake waters, increased the risks of sickness
for human and animals drawing water from the lake, clogged water intake filters
and increased chemical treatment costs for urban centres.181 There has also been an
increase in pollution of the lake waters as a result of disposal of domestic and industrial
waste, discharge of raw/untreated sewage and discharge of agro-chemicals among
others into the lake. Some of these pollutants contain heavy metals and persistent
organic chemicals, which are very harmful to both human beings and animals.182

282. Flooding poses a serious problem for sanitation in Nyanza. The overflow of
refuse from the simple pit latrines mostly in use in Nyanza has been the source of
numerous outbreaks of water-borne disease. According to the Kenya Integrated
Budget Survey, about 56 percent of urban households in Kenya use pit latrines
compared to 79 percent of rural households.183
283. According to the Annual Health Sector Statistics Report of 2008, only 76.3 percent
of households in Nyanza had toilet facilities compared to 98.7 percent in Nairobi
and 99.6 percent in Central. Poor sanitation is dangerous as evidenced by the health
statistics from hospitals in Nyanza, which show that cases of cholera and other
water-borne diseases like diarrhoea, typhoid and parasitic infections frequently
occur, especially during the rainy season, when pit latrines get flooded, polluting
the drinking water resources like wells and rivers.184

Housing
284. According to the KDHS of 2003 and 2008, house ownership in Nyanza is as
high as 84.6 percent of the population owning a home and 83.9 percent also
owning the land on which the home stands.185 This is markedly high compared
to Nairobi, where only 10.4 percent of the population own homes and 8.3
percent also own the land on which the home stands. Although this feature has
been praised as positive, given that the percentage of house owners in Nyanza
is even higher than the national average of 70.5 percent and those owning the
181 National Environmental Management Authority, Provincial Environment Action Plan: Nyanza Province 2007-2011. Nairobi: NEMA,
2007 p. 39
182 National Environmental Management Authority (n 181 above) p. 40-43
183 The Water Sector Sanitation Concept- WSSC (Ministry of Water and Irrigation/MWI, Kenya, August 2009)
184 Case Study of Sustainable Sanitation Projects: UDDTs Implemented via CBOs and Water Services Trust Fund, Nyanza, Western
and other Provinces, Kenya. Nairobi: EU, SIDA, GTZ & BMZ. Available at- http://www.susana.org
185 KHDS (2003) pp. 24-26
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land on which their home stands being at an average of 64.3 percent,186 these
figures are misleading because the value of the property is very low.
285. The national survey does not appear to distinguish types of houses: whether,
permanent (stone built), semi-permanent (plastered mud walls with iron roof )
or mud walls and grass-thatched. Although iron sheet roofs are increasingly
common, the predominant houses in rural Kenya (outside Nairobi) have mud
walls and floors and grass-thatched. Since the value of land in Kenya is not
regulated, there are huge price differentials between land in urban areas (cities
and towns) and rural (agricultural land). A metre square of land in Nairobi and
neighbouring provinces of Central and parts of Rift valley is definitely of higher
value than in rural Nyanza. Price differences exist even within Nairobi. While
one can obtain one acre of productive land in many parts of rural Kenya for an
average Sh200,000, a similar piece of land on the outskirts of Nairobi would fetch
several million shillings. Although land holders may have a secure title, the low
value of the land undermines its potential use to secure loans for development
projects.
286. Access to electricity has a wide urban-rural gap, despite the country having had in
place a rural electrification programme for many years. As of 2004 only 5 percent
of the households in Nyanza had access to electricity. In Nairobi, 71 percent of
the households have electricity. This distinctly shows an unfair distribution of
electricity supply among regions and amounts to marginalisation.187

Economy and Unemployment
287. Unemployment has been a persistent national problem for many years.
According to Njonjo, unemployment increased from 6.7 percent in 1978 to 25.1
percent in 1998/1999 before easing to 12.7 percent in 2005/2006. Data shows a
general trend of increasing unemployment rates over the years. As many people
lost their jobs through the structural adjustment programs (SAPs) of the early
1990s, the informal sector became increasingly important, accounting for most
of the growth recorded: the informal sector is the highest employer followed by
agriculture and manufacturing. The table below reveals considerable variation in
unemployment among the different age-groups, with the youth category (15 to
34) recording relatively higher rates of unemployment.188
186 See KHDS (2003); SID (n 108 above) 17
187 See Society for International Development (SID) Pulling Apart: Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya. Nairobi: SID (n 108
above) p.19
188 Youth Fact Book, p.128
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Table 9:
Age Cohort

Youth Unemployment in Kenya between 1978 and 2005/2006
1978

1986

15 – 19

26.6

36.2

47

25

20 – 24

18.5

29.2

47.3

24.2

25 – 29

4.8

8.6

25.1

15.7

30 – 34

1998/99

2005/06

2

2.7

14.3

7.5

12.97

19.2

33.4

18.1

35 – 39

1.8

2.1

12

7.6

40 – 44

0.7

0.7

11.2

6.4

45 – 49

1.1

2

14.7

5.7

50 – 54

1.4

0.9

18.9

4.7

55 – 59

1.5

4.1

40.6

4

60 – 64

3.2

45.2

2.5

Average

6.7

25.1

12.7

Av

9.7

Source: GOK, Various Statistical Abstracts

288.

Unemployment increased from 6.7 percent in 1978 to 25.1 percent in 1998/1999
before easing to 12.7 percent in 2005/2006. The table also reveals considerable
variations in unemployment among different age cohorts, with the youth category
(15 to 34) recording relatively higher rates of unemployment. According to Omolo
(unpublished), youth overall unemployment has persistently been at least double the
national unemployment rate.

289. Unemployment was found to be high in many areas of Nyanza, especially among
a majority of young school leavers. Idleness among unemployed youth leads
to crime and other vices. There are inadequate training institutions, denying
youth the skills required for gainful employment, which coupled with a high
rate of school drop-outs, becomes the root cause of unemployment.189
290. Over the years, especially during the Moi regime, the manufacturing base,
industries and cash generating farming activities in Nyanza were allowed to
collapse. These included the fishing industry, rice farming, cotton and the sugar
industry, which had previously thrived. Most of these sectors were mismanaged
by state corporations under which they operated. The centralisation of key
players in Nairobi did not serve local economies. For example, while Nyanza
189 Geoffrey Njeru, Mapping the Root Causes of Conflict: An Agenda for Sustainable Conflict Mitigation and Peace Building in Kenya.
Nairobi: KEC-CJPC and Diakonia- Sweden (2009) p.29
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has relied on fishing and Lake Victoria was the mainstay of production, many of
those who testified lamented the fact that the only fish factory in the country
was located in Thika, more than 400km away.
291. Moi cites several projects undertaken by his government in the Nyanza region to
counter claims of marginalisation, asserting:
[o]ther development projects at the time included the creation of the Lake Basin
Development Authority (LBDA), with its headquarters in Kisumu. The government
sourced and installed ultra-modern rice mills of the time at Kibos and Ahero, which
are still operational to date. An inland container depot was built in Kisumu and a
Central Bank division was also opened.190

292. Despite Moi’s assertions, claims of marginalisation dominated the hearings.
The collapse of manufacturing linked to the agricultural sector in the Nyanza
region was the subject of the majority of testimonies related to economic
marginalisation. Charles Omondo Oyaya, a one-time cotton farmer and local
leader stated:
This region is known for a lot of potential. It has some of the best natural resources one
would need in any given country. We are just sitting at the gulf of Lake Victoria, which
is rich in fisheries resources. You might want to know that unlike all other resources
that we have that are productive, until only five years ago, we did not have a fisheries
policy. We did not have a marketing instrument or structure. The whole of the Lake
Victoria circuit had no motorable road, no electricity. So, it means that their resource
could not be used. This region was known for producing the best quality of cotton.
I say this with confidence because I was involved in this sector. I was shocked at the
quality of the produce of cotton in this Region. We know that the cotton sector died
through systematic policy inaction and lack of State support.191

293. Witness Oyaya expressed similar views about the sugar cane industry, arguably
the most expansive and potentially lucrative sector for both Nyanza and Western:
We know that this is the area that produces sugarcane. All the factories are on their
knees through receivership. On the contrary, the region has been presented to be
unproductive, full of lazy people who cannot produce anything. The Kenya Revenue
Authority records show that actually, Nyanza is number 3 in revenue generation after
Nairobi, Coast and then you go to Western. In our minds, these are the poorest areas, but
it does show that they produce but nothing comes back.192
190 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.23
191 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/ Kisumu/14 July 2011/ p.22
192 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Kisumu/14 July 2011/p. 22
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294. Dr Israel Kodiaga, on behalf of a group of elders decried economic marginalisation,
alluded to the collapsed textile industry and the under-performing fishing industry:
On the economic front, you will realize then that a lot of industries in Luo Nyanza
and specifically Kisumu have been allowed to go under as one of the many ways
of dispossessing the people. Cases in point include, but are not limited to, Kicomi,
Kisumu Breweries, the fish processing plants […] That there are no roads linking
the lake region and the fish sources and beaches is a further manifestation of the
same [marginalisation]. The sugar industry or the sugar factories here are under
receivership, with heavy debts, but the successive governments have always bailed
out coffee farmers, tea farmers and dairy farmers in other regions to the neglect of
cotton and sugar.193

295. While the Commission is aware of the diplomatic dimensions of another dispute,
it is of the view that the manner in which the government handled the Migingo
Island dispute appears to reflect attitudes towards the economic situation in the
region. Those who stated that the dispute is more than just a struggle over a
patch of land in the lake could be right. The waters around the island are said to
be some of the richest in terms of fish, which Kenyan fishermen are prevented
from accessing.
296. It has been noted that the government has taken action to revive most of the
sectors that had collapsed in the region, in particular the cotton and rice industries.
Meanwhile, the sugar industry, perhaps the single largest industry in the Nyanza
and Western regions, continues to experience serious problems that hold back the
region’s economy. These problems include corruption, importation of cheap sugar
and mismanagement.

Infrastructure: Roads
297. A World Bank report rightly links the state of infrastructure and economic welfare
of households. It suggests that improved infrastructure access is associated with
movements out of poverty. By way of example, it explains that one reason why
infrastructure variables are important is that households that are closer to, among
other things, a motorable road, fertiliser and piped water, grow more crops (in
absolute number) and are more likely to diversify economic activities in which
they are engaged and therefore move out of poverty.194 In rural agricultural
settings, availability of motorable roads increases access to markets and
agricultural services (for example, extension services). In its province by province
193 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 19 July 2011/ p.15
194 World Bank World Bank, Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment (2008) viii
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analysis, a World Bank report notes that Nyanza starts off worst on motorable
roads in 1997, but ends up better than Coast and Rift Valley in 2007 and that
Central is the best throughout.195
298. Of the roughly 14 500 km of roads in the Lake Victoria basin, only about 1
200km are paved (8%). These carry more than 80 percent of passengers and
freight traffic. However, serious under-investment and lack of commitment
to maintenance have left the road network in a poor state of repair. This
poor condition contributes to a high rate of road accidents and deaths as
well as to extensive economic losses in maintenance and repair of vehicles.
Road safety is further reduced by the operation of matatus, which comprise
close to 78 percent of the public transport system.196 Moi has rejected claims
that Nyanza can be regarded as economically marginalised, in part because
of the poor state of roads, provides as evidence several roads his government
constructed or improved: Kisumu-Bondo; Awasi-Chemilil; Kibos-Chemilil, Miwani
(sugar belt road); Migori-Isebania; Luanda-K’Otieno-Sori and Homa Bay-KatitoKisumu. While this network had the desired effect of opening up certain areas
in the region, most are in a poor state of repair. In addition submissions were
received from residents who claim not to have benefited at all, or who were, in
their view, ‘accidental beneficiaries’ of projects that did not target their needs.
299. Decrying the poor state or roads in Kuria, one witness stated poignantly:
There has not been any tarmacked road in Kuria since the world was created, apart
from a small stretch that links Migori to Tanzania through Kuria. This was a road
constructed in the early 1970s and does not very much serve Kuria, apart from being
a highway passing through Kuria. It is against such a backdrop that while we embrace
nationhood, ethnic unity and patriotism, we similarly envisage with gusto unity in
diversity, unity of purpose and equitable community development that is enshrined
in devolved systems worldwide.197

300. The assumptions made in this study are borne out by testimonies by residents
linking the difficulties they experience in accessing services such as health and
economic stagnation to poor road infrastructure. Lack of motorable roads has
also hampered access to markets for agricultural produce. Some speakers linked
lack of investment and the subsequent poor state of infrastructure to politics,
lack of accountability and corruption. When responding to the question whether
195 World Bank (n 194 above) p.56
196 National Environment Management Authority (2007); Provincial Environment Action Plan Nyanza Province 2007-2011. Nairobi:
NEMA p.75
197 TJRC/ Hansard/Public Hearing/Kuria/ 25 July 2011/ p.6
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she was aware that any monies were ever allocated for infrastructure, Phoebe
Asiyo responded:
During my time in Parliament, you could not trace where monies were sent to by the
Treasury. Yes, you passed the Bills, but the ministries did whatever they wanted with
those monies. I will give you an incidence or two that took place in my constituency.
Money was allocated for rural electrification in Kendu Bay. All the equipment were
delivered together with the poles and everything. Because I did not quite agree with
everything the establishment said and I was critical of some of the policies of the
government, some very big vehicles came and took away all the poles and equipment
that would have given the people of Kendu Bay electricity in 1980. It is only this year
that Kendu Bay is getting electricity, yet that allocation was made in 1980. You can
count how many years it has taken for electrification to get to Kendu Bay.198

301. On the role of politics in economic inclusion, Asiyo’s testimony is instructive:
There was a road from Oyugis to Kendu Bay, which was allocated funds for tarmacking.
The funds were raised by Tom Mboya when he went to the USA. In 1971, that road
was supposed to be tarmacked. The money for that road was used to tarmac a road
in Thika and yet, the road would open up South Nyanza to Tanzania. Up to this
minute, the road remains un-tarmacked. These are some of the issues we raise when
we talk about marginalisation of Nyanza Province. Of course, there are much bigger
issues; for example, the irrigation of Kuja/Miriu. It was intended to provide light and
irrigation for Nyakach, all the way to Kobala in Rachuonyo. Today, that face of it is out
and nobody is talking about irrigation, yet it was key for food security in that very
dry area. So, I am just mentioning the few instances in my constituency where the
government has withdrawn money and even equipment and taken them to other
areas. There are much bigger development programmes that were taken away from
Luo Nyanza to other areas on the pretext of siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya.199 (wrong
politics, bad life)

302. As noted previously sections, the Commission is convinced that economic
fortunes of some regions have turned on whether they supported or antagonised
the regime of the day. While we cannot confirm the veracity of the assertion
that money intended for a road in Nyanza was diverted to Thika in 1971, Asiyo’s
testimony seems to bear out the perceived link between politics and economic
inclusion. It is sad that that the adage, siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya (wrong
politics, bad life) captures a past reality and experience of Kenya’s people. It
is hoped that the new constitutional dispensation, with all its stipulations on
inclusion and social justice, will banish this way of managing national affairs.
198 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14 July 2011/ p.40
199 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kisumu/ 14 July 2011/ p. 40
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Coast Province
303. The idea that the former Coast Province has been marginalized economically by
successive governments since independence is a central feature of the historical
narrative in the context of Kenyan politics, development and gross human
rights violations. Like the former North Eastern Province, the NFD in general and
Nyanza, the Coast region could be placed in the category of ‘politically dissident’
regions that have suffered marginalisation under successive regimes. However,
marginalisation experienced in the region, especially when understood from the
point of view of dispossession, is due also to the confluence of interests arising
from the region’s strategic value as a principal gateway to the country and the
East and Central African region and its valued seafront land resources.
304. The Coast consists of 13 districts and 21 constituencies, with a population of 3.3
million people, according to the 2010 national census. The main ethnic groups
are the Mijikenda comprising of nine culturally and linguistically inter-related
sub-groups, among them the Rabai, Chonyi, Giriama, Mjibana, Kauma, Kambe,
Digo and Duruma. Most of them profess the Christian faith, save for the Digo
who are mainly Muslims. The non-Mijikenda groups are the Taita-Taveta, Orma,
Pokomo, Munyoyaya, Malokote, Bajuni, Swahili and people of Arab descent. The
last three mainly inhabit the coastal towns. In total there are 15 coastal ethnic
groups and a growing Caucasian community.
305. However, over the years, there has been a significant migration of Kenyan
citizens from upcountry regions drawn to the Coast in search of better economic
prospects. The region has therefore become a mosaic of various identities.
This has had a profound bearing on the socio-economic and political relations
within the region. Perceptions of marginalisation of the region yielded a sense
of ‘otherness’ with some ethnic groups being classified as ‘insiders’ or indigenous
communities, while other communities are routinely referred to as wabara or
upcountry people.
306. The latter group includes the Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and other groups. Over
the years, the indigenous communities residing in the Coast have consistently
complained of exclusion from the hinterland and exploitation of their resources
without reward. This partly explains political dynamics. The persistent claims
and allegations of exploitation and exclusion are blamed on the so called nonindigenous communities commonly referred to as ‘watoka bara’ or wabara (those
from the hinterland).
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307. The Commission visited various parts of the region and received numerous
written and oral submissions from residents. Travelling across the region,
we experienced what Coast communities have for years decried what they
perceive as marginalisation and under-development of the region. We came
to the conclusion that as is the case for other marginalized regions, successive
governments have since independence failed to take tangible action to deal
with these deep-rooted feelings among the inhabitants of the Coast. One of
the critical issues, described by some as ‘a ticking time bomb’, is the seemingly
intractable land question.200 More recently, other factors including the perceived
mistreatment of residents at the hands of police in the context of Kenya’s
efforts in the American-led ‘war on terror’, poor education levels and lack of
infrastructure have all served to fuel feelings that successive governments do
not care about the region. We hereby outline findings on marginalisation at the
Coast.

Particulars of economic marginalisation
308. To observers, the Coast region embodies a series of paradoxes, which appear
to summarise the narrative of economic marginalisation of the region. About
a decade ago, Ali Mazrui, a leading Kenyan scholar characterized Kenya’s Coast
Province by a number of dichotomies (or “paradoxes”). 201 He noted that while
the Coast has been historically the most “cosmopolitan” of all regions that
constitute Kenya today, a region which has attracted immigrants from highly
diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds over several centuries, and which has
played a central role as a hub of commerce and infrastructure, the region was
relegated to a secondary position in terms of political and economic power
in colonial and post-colonial times. Although Mazrui positively described the
Coast as heterogeneous and being the ‘least tribal’ of the regions of Kenya,
he observed that it is “among the least ‘national’ in power, influence and
orientation”.
309. Mazrui states that despite having provided Kiswahili as a lingua franca, the Coast
was and continues to be relatively under-developed in modern education,
infrastructure and other factors. He also notes that although the Coast has not
been under-represented in the political system in a formal sense because it has
had a fair number of constituencies measured by population figures, there is a
persistent perception of being politically marginalized, with people of Coastal
200 Government of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) 220.
201 AA Mazrui The Kenya Coast: Between Globalization and Marginalization (2000)
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Abeid Abdalla Kavanga, a representative of the Mombasa Republican Council, testifying before the TJRC.

origin holding relatively few executive positions in the central administration,
civil service and parastatals.202 It is our view that while the participation or
inclusion of residents of one or other part of the country in the public service
is not necessarily important for its own sake - and that service delivery is what
is crucial - we have shown earlier in section one of this chapter that Kenyan
history demonstrates that economic fortunes of regions or parts of regions have
historically been tied to proximity to power. Claims of exclusion (whether proved
or not) should be taken seriously.
310. The Commission heard that for the coastal region, the overall outlook of
marginalisation does not appear to have changed over decades since independence.
Residents expressed their disappointment that the change promised by the
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) coalition of 2002 that they overwhelmingly
supported did not materialize with the disintegration of the coalition soon after
President Kibaki’s election.
202 G George ‘Changing Political Faces on Kenya’s Coast’ (2008) Journal of Eastern African Studies 1992-2007
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Testimony on Economic Marginalization
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Hola/12 January 2011/p. 23
People of Tana River, Munyoyaya, Moilana, the Pokomo and the Orma have been denied these
rights. Our hospital is like rotten house that has been abandoned. It is in a pathetic state, but that
is where we are admitted. We do not get proper medication. You get a prescription and you are
told to go and buy medicine from other private hospitals. When you are discharged, you get a
bill that you cannot afford to pay. That is one right that we have been denied. I have complained.
I have gone up to the President, and asked for this to be looked into, but it has not been done.
The third issue is about education. I wonder why our schools do not excel in national
examinations. Even if they do not do well, there is no institution of higher learning in our
area. These are some of problems we face in Tana River.
Our roads are terrible. The Garissa-Mombasa road is impassable. I do not know whether your
officers came here by road or air. If they came by road, I am sure they saw how bad this road
is. This has been our concern for many years. Since the time of Mzee Kenyatta, this road has
remained in the same state up to today. I do not know whether we are waiting for the trumpet
to be blown so that this road can be tarmacked up to Garsen.
The other issue which I have followed with the authorities is the recruitment of youth into the
army, police, prisons and AP service. During the recruitment exercise, money changes hands. If
you cannot part with KSh60,000, your son cannot be employed. We formed a committee of 40
elders from this district and went to Nairobi to complain about these malpractices, but nothing
has happened so far. We have not succeeded.
With regard to agriculture, we do not have market for our produce. For example, our mangoes
rot in the shamba because we cannot sell them. We have struggled to do mango farming on
a large scale, but with little success. We are also exploited by middlemen from Nairobi. They
buy them as they wish. Since we have no other market, we sell to them at a throw-away price.
We have tried to get this market in Nairobi, but all in vain. We have never succeeded. We have
gone through members of Parliament. We have tried to go through the civil servants, but it has
not worked out. These are injustices that they have visited upon us in Pokomo land. Businesses
are dying. This does not just affect the Orma or the Pokomo or the Munyoyaya, but all the
communities that live in this district. It is the same situation. I am speaking the truth that is
known among all these communities.
I appeal to this Commission to visit the hospital and see the condition in which it is. It is the same
government that is in Kenya, but if you look at our schools, starting from Mororo all the way up
to Kipini they are in pathetic condition. You cannot believe that this is where your children live.
Will they benefit in any way? Will they get any treatment? For three days, they do not get any
water yet, that is a boarding secondary school where children are supposed to be learning. If
you look at the desks, they would rather sit on the cement. The situation is very bad. We are all
Kenyans and we should be treated equally. We have pleaded for these issues to be addressed,
but we have not succeeded. Today, you have come here to listen to us and we are not talking
politics. I am talking about the problems that Tana River is facing and what the elders have tried
to solve without any success.203
203 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Hola/ 12 January 2011/ p. 2-3
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The land issue
311. Land and associated concerns, which is the subject of a more detailed chapter
in this report, is one of the region’s most intractable problems, and the centre of
most marginalisation accounts. Many observers note that the land question is a
potential trigger of conflict, owing to its peculiar historical and legal origins and
the impact dispossession has had on the economic fortunes of locals.204
312. The persistent failure by successive governments to address the issue has not
helped, but fueled theories of conspiracy of wabara or non-coastal leaders and
communities. The single most conflictive issue in Coast region is land or rather, the
loss or lack of access to it, faced by many communities and individuals. In virtually
all accounts, problems of land access for the local population play a very important,
if not the dominant role205. The substantive chapter on land deals with this issue on
detail. A short summary of the historical origins of the problem will suffice here.
313. The period leading up to the affirmation of protectorate status over East Africa on
August 15 1895 is important, since it is during this era that native communities
(mainly the Mijikenda) were driven out of their ancestral land by Arab invaders
who were seeking to establish permanent settlements as a way of consolidating
trade with Asia and the Middle East or looking for slaves.
314. In 1886 when the British and German governments established the 10-mile
coastal strip or Mwambao and ceded control over it to the sultanate of Zanzibar, the
assumption was that the sultan’s subjects within the strip would retain rights to
land vested in the Imperial British East Africa (IBEA Co) and later the British imperial
government within the strip was restricted to waste and unoccupied land. The
indigenous communities within the Mwambao were treated as if they did not exist.
From 1896 up to the period 1908, the British authorities, in their quest to establish
the full extent of land accorded to `private’ ownership, passed an ordinance for the
adjudication of claims within the strip.206
315. The land titles ordinance provided at section 17 (1) that all land that would
not have been claimed within 6 months would be considered as Crown Land.
Certificates of title issued by the recorder of titles were to be conclusive evidence
of ownership and could be held up against all persons (including government)
that the person to whom the certificate is granted is the owner of the land and
all that was on it.
204 See for instance, M Mwandawiro Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province,
205 M Mwandawiro “Investigation Report on Violence at Kenya’s Coast Province for the NGO Council” (2009) p.17
206 Land Titles Ordinance(1908)
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316. This ordinance was applied to Malindi, Lamu, and Tana River District. By 1975, this
ordinance had been applied to the whole of the 10-mile coastal strip. In the process
of adjudication, only the claims lodged before 1922 were accepted by the recorder
of titles in a process that dragged on until 1975. Many of these were reportedly
fraudulent, undocumented and unverified.
317. As a result, 95 percent of all land within Mwambao was recorded in the name of
Arab immigrants, the remaining 5 percent being declared Crown Land for lack of
claims. In what is now Lamu District, claims were lodged only in respect of the
island. The entire mainland was declared crown land, later government land.
318. During the period leading up to the independence of the Kenyan republic, the
colonial government in 1926 took measures that ensured that ‘native resources’
in this part of the country were delineated `outside’ Mwambao except some
(13) pockets of land in what is now Kwale District. The indigenous people were
dispossessed. The independence constitution confirmed and satisfied all land
rights (regardless of how the land was acquired) before 1 June 1963, thus giving
legitimacy to a fraudulent and clearly unjust process of expropriation.
319. The Land Titles Act radically altered the concept of land ownership under African
customary tenure governing the indigenous coastal communities and created
biases in the land adjudication against the indigenous communities.207 The abuse
of the Land Titles Act has had a great negative impact on coastal land, leading to
the area having the largest single concentration of landless indigenous people.
320. Specifically, this is manifested in the form of “squatters” on government land,
absentee landlords, tenants-at-will, idle land, mass evictions and lack of access to
the sea. The slow land adjudication process and delay in finalization of settlement
programmes have denied the locals secure access to land.208
321. It is maintained that the process of adjudication was riddled with fraud and lacked
transparency. It did not benefit the locals who had lost their ancestral lands to
Arabs and the colonial government and subsequently the post-independence
government. Speaking in relation to Lamu, Hussein Sudi El-Maawy stated:
From the onset of independence, Lamu residents were unaware of the extent of the
government land; they were precluded from obtaining land; land was provided as
gifts to individuals who were deemed loyal to that administration, or on the basis of
ethnicity, thus advocating nepotism within government ranks. These allocations were
done illegally as the individuals concerned failed to follow the proper procedures as
207 Cap. 282 Laws of Kenya
208 National Land Policy, articles 184-186. Ministry of Lands, 2007 p.39
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mandated by the Land Acquisition Act. An example is publicizing the distribution of
land. The people who were involved in this irregular allocation were the surveyors, the
physical planning officers, the Lamu County Council Chairman, Members of Parliament,
chiefs, the District Commissioner and the Commissioner of Lands.209

322. Successive post-independence governments maintained the status quo, leaving
land grievances, particularly the squatter problem unresolved. While local claims
remained unaddressed, huge tracts of land were leased out to investors (99-year
leases). One commentator suggests that while much of the Arab-Swahili control
over coastal land has been eroded in the decades since independence, it was not
the local communities that profited from this process.
323. Instead, much land went to large-scale agro-industrial ventures (such as sisal
estates), the tourist sector or private developers along the ocean shore. Kenyans
will remember that until the directive was overturned by a court of law in 2012,
only the President of the Republic of Kenya had the power to allocate beach plots
and land facing the sea. It is not surprising that most of this land would be allocated
and is now controlled by well-connected “up-country” Kenyans or foreigners, many
of them “absentee landlords”.
324.

The report further suggested that a clear indicator that the successive governments
continue to marginalize the coast area is that the government has not come up with
a solution to the problem of absentee landlords and that of squatters in Mombasa,
despite many promises that action would be taken. On assuming power in 2003,
the NARC government, through a ministerial order from the Ministry for Lands and
Settlement, directed the termination of payments of ground rent to the landlords until
the government found a permanent solution to the squatter problem in the ten-mile
coastal strip. It is reported that the order would change nothing on the ground.

325. The widespread nature of the land problem in Coast was a persistent issue in
our hearings. It was revisited by the majority of those who interacted with the
Commission. Speaking in Wundanyi, Frida Mghanga Mwadime recounted:
Concerning land, this is a critical issue, not only in Taita Taveta County. I think you heard
of it as you travelled around Coast Province. In Taita Taveta, land is a very crucial issue
because 63 percent of our land is comprised of a national park, Tsavo East and Tsavo West.
Thirty three percent of it comprises personal land and ranches. We have sisal estates in Voi
and in Taveta and those who own this land are senior [well-connected] people. I will not
mention their names because they are known. In Voi, we also have such land-owners. The
209 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p.4
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Taita and Taveta are only left with 6 per cent, on which we have constructed our schools,
dispensaries and it is also used for farming…210

326.

The theme of dispossession of ancestral lands by the colonial government and
post-colonial governments is quite prominent. Tales of dispossession dominated
submissions from residents. In Taita Taveta, the Commission heard about loss of
land to national parks, sisal farms and ranches owned by the rich and powerful. It
was reported that 63 per cent of land in the region is covered by the Tsavo East and
Tsavo West national parks, while 33 per cent is personal land and ranches owned
largely by ‘outsiders’. This was ancestral land that had been taken over by the colonial
government and held under sisal plantations. When the white farmers departed,
ownership was transferred to rich and powerful people from ‘upcountry’ rather than
to locals who had been forcibly removed. The testimony by Christopher Nyange
raises some of these key issues:
The third issue is with regard to land that was taken by people for sisal plantations. This
area was given as a gift to the people who had helped the British government. Why
should they have given gifts in Taita when the war was not concerning the Taita? The
question seemed to be hard for the colonialists to answer. In 1964 when they left, they
said that the affected areas should be compensated. Money was given but it has never
reached the Taita or Taveta people. Instead, land was transferred from them to the same
people. It went to the Kenya government or administration led by Kenyatta, who took
the compensation money and land as well. The injustice was started by the colonialists.
All this land should have been given back to the owners.211

327. With respect to one 7 000 acre farm in Taita Taveta forcibly taken in 1932 and
passed down from a Mr Grogan, to a Mr Patel, then to one Basil Criticos, Kio Kisala,
who spoke on behalf of the more than 12 000 residents of Titobo and Timoribo
locations, narrated their travails, with this plea:
Our expectations are that since the Greek man [Basil Criticos] on that land has no
grandfather, we ask who passed on that land to him? Our expectation is that the land
should be reverted back to the citizens. We should occupy it as local residents. The farm
was taken away in 1932. He should give up the land for us and let it be sub-divided
among us. I would also like to say that our elders be compensated for guarding his farm
against invasion by monkeys, forced labour and arbitrary arrests. This was against their
human rights.
In Taita Taveta, this has left the majority of the population landless and destitute, with
only six per cent to go around. Very few residents have very small plots that they can call
their own, yet many do not have titles, which has rendered their hold as tenuous as that
210 TJRC/Hansard/ Public Hearing/ Wundanyi/24January 2012/ pp.6 - 7
211 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/Wundanyi/24 January 2012/p.26
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of those who squat on big farms. Historical dispossession abounds in other parts of the
region. As a result of this state of affairs, the squatter problem is serious in the region.212

328. Expressing views similar to those of Dorothy Munene below, several speakers
questioned the authenticity of titles of private developers from outside the region,
while imploring the government to de-gazette the park as well as repossess and
redistribute privately-held land to locals:
We ask that the land that is owned by the private developers be looked into; how did
they acquire it? Where did they buy it? If you look at history you will see that when
Grogan left, none of the presently rich people bought that land. So how did they acquire
it? This land is supposed to be returned to us. Most of us have one acre and six to ten
children. Where will these children live? The places are so congested and you would
think it is Mathare slum. So we are asking the government to look into such land so that
the land is returned to its rightful owners.213

329. The Commission also heard accounts of residents who lost their land during
security operations or were forced to move for security reasons, never to recover
it again. These accounts relate both to the ‘Shifta War’ and subsequent security
operations in the region. Some residents expressed the view that in certain parts
of the region such as Lamu, security was used as an excuse to dispossess them
of their land. According to multiple accounts, many were not restored to their
land, (which was taken over by the government and subsequently grabbed by
powerful people) or to recover compensation for the same.
330. In respect of lack of compensation, one speaker notes as follows:
[…] little consideration has been given to the Lamu community members who were
forced out of their farm lands in 12 villages, including those in Shakani, Shendeni,
Vundeni by the security forces during the ‘Shifta War’ in the 1960s. These locals, who
were, in essence, the first IDPs in independent Kenya, were forced to move into slums
in Lamu or to migrate to other areas of Kenya and Tanzania and, to date, no form of
redress has been made.214

331.

Submissions from Coast residents invariably link their state of economic marginalisation
marked by poverty, illiteracy and lack of access to basic services to these varied acts of
land-related dispossession. The Commission heard of many accounts of police brutality
and other kinds of mistreatment by the provincial administration, extra-judicial killings,
arrest and imprisonment of those who agitate for restitution as well as the destruction
of property and evictions of those who live off these lands with contested titles.

212 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Wundanyi/ 25 January 2012/ p. 21
213 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women Hearing / Wundanyi/ 24 January 2012/ p.7
214 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4
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332. The control of land by absentee landlords has left many local communities
despondent. Indeed, the landlessness of the native communities of the Coast
region is mainly responsible for the high levels of poverty. In some areas, local
communities find it difficult to continue fishing operations as hotels and other
plot owners have blocked access to roads and beaches.215 In respect of land and
poverty, the views expressed by Hussein Sudi El-Maawy a retired senior lecturer
and now a community elder in Lamu are relevant for other parts of the region:
It has been found that the land insecurity and inequitable access to natural resources
led to vulnerability and is one of the biggest causes of poverty. It, therefore, comes as
no surprise that Lamu County remains one of the poorest in Kenya. Decades of inherited
poverty have led to the disenfranchisement of the people; they have been denied access
right over their land since colonialism; later, they were forced out of their homes during
the ‘Shifta War’ of the 1960s. Lamu has reached a boiling point after the government
failed to address the historical injustices as well as curtail ongoing fraudulent land
procurement in the area.216

333. Residents are of the view that although the new Constitution and the National
Land Policy have finally acknowledged indigenous ownership of land, and the
importance of addressing historical injustices in the coastal region, the delayed
reforms and political blockage towards development of power to manage their
land and natural resources persist.

Education
334. Experts suggest that the problem of marginalisation in the education sector at
the coast has historical roots in the colonial and pre-colonial era. It is notable that
until shortly before independence in 1963, the provision of education in Kenya
was segregated along racial lines, with separate systems for European, Asian and
African pupils. From a national perspective, the Coast region is among the most
‘under-developed’ areas of Kenya in the provision of education.
335.

This section highlights some of the factors that contribute to the low quality education
at the Coast together with the more institutional and financial aspects of educational
policy. The slow uptake of western education upon introduction has had a bearing
on standards and coverage. At the Coast, western education took long to take
root. Some reasons have been proposed by experts why this is the case.217 Western
education, which before World War I was introduced through mission schools, made

215 M Mwandawiro ‘Usipoziba ufa utajenga ukuta; Land, elections, and conflicts in Kenya’s Coast Province.’ (2009)
216 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 3
217 See for instance, Robert Makonde, Challenges of western education in the Coast Province of Kenya, 1890-1963, Unpublished Phd
Thesis, Columbia University (1980)
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little headway among Muslims, who feared that their children would be proselytized.
Special consideration was given to the Arab communities in the protectorate, but their
former slaves and servants, predominantly black Africans, were largely ignored.
336. State educational policy calling for government-missionary ‘cooperation’ in matters
concerning African education did little to improve opportunities among Africans in
the province. Makonde points out that the evidence from this region is especially
strong in showing how Indians and to a lesser extent Arabs were provided with
better schools and skills training in preparation for middle-level positions in the
���
colonial administration and society. 218
337. In contrast, only a small percentage of African children were encouraged to pursue
‘industrial’ training. The attempt to ‘reform’ education through measures such as
those proposed in the Beecher Report served between 1950 and 1963 to mollify
discontent and prepare for decolonization. The Beecher Committee was appointed
in 1949 and mandated to investigate, evaluate and report upon the structure and
functioning of the African educational system.
338. Makonde argues that the implementation of the Beecher Committee report
allowed the rich districts to benefit far more than the poor ones at the Coast. Within
the protectorate, almost nothing was done to provide even primary educational
services to Africans. Further, research suggests that the inequalities inherent in the
coastal region before colonial rule have not only been sustained but have also
been exacerbated both by the racially divided and stratified school system and
by the policies for funding through the Local Native Councils. These policies laid a
strong foundation for the persistent problem of marginalisation in education.219
339.

Today, the Coast remains one of the lowest-literacy regions in the country. According
to government statistics, both Kwale and Kilifi districts had the highest primary
school enrolment rate between 2002 and 2004 in the Coast. In the same period,
Lamu and Taita Taveta districts’ enrolment rates continued to lag behind the other
districts, although there was a slight improvement in the latter. The low enrolment
rate is attributed mainly to poor facilities and infrastructure, lack of trained teachers,
and early marriage of girls, particularly in the rural areas.

340. Overall, literacy levels are low in the Coast, but are higher in urban than in rural
areas. According to the Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey of
2005, a significant disparity in literacy is found between men and women, with
218 See for instance, Robert Makonde, Challenges of western education in the Coast Province of Kenya, 1890-1963, Unpublished PhD
Thesis, Columbia University (1980)
219 Makonde (n 218 as above)
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that of women being much lower. Kilifi, Tana River and Kwale districts have the
highest disparities between men and women.220
341. In terms of numbers of schools and learning centers, the Kenya Central Bureau
of Statistics’ Economic Survey of 2005 revealed that inadequacy and distribution
are a problem. In Kisauni constituency, for example, with a population of over
300 000, the constituency had only sixteen primary schools and four government
secondary schools. This contributes to the prevalence of illiteracy in the area, and
it could be contrasted with Wundanyi constituency (Taita), which has less than 100
000 people, but only 56 primary schools and 15 government secondary schools.221
342. Lack of facilities and trained teachers in adequate numbers and their impact
continues to be a persistent complaint. Speaking in relation to Lamu, Mohammed
Abdikadir portrays a picture that is replicated across the region:
The other issue is poor performance in national examinations. We have a shortage of
teachers in Lamu. We do not have sufficient equipment. You find that we have schools,
but no laboratories. The schools do not have sports equipment and libraries. This has
made it impossible for them to compete effectively against other counties. Out of 47
counties, we are ranked in the 44th position. This is very sad because we know that our
children would like to study like others, so that when it comes to employment, they can
also compete with the rest of the country.222

343. It appears that the government’s policy of free primary education has been
undermined by lack of teachers and other facilities. Bakari Ali Mohamed concurs:
Everybody is talking about the shortage of teachers in schools. Parents have to employ
some teachers. Children do not perform well because the school committees are not
able to employ teachers.223

344. Widespread complaints were recorded that although national universities have
started their campuses at the Coast, the region does not have a fully-fledged
university based in Mombasa, the second largest city in Kenya. In addition, until
the elevation of three coastal schools (Kenyatta High, Mwatate, Mama Ngina Bura
Girls’ School and Ribe Boys’ High School) to national school status in May 2011,
there was no single national high school at the Coast. The three were among
27 other schools granted this status around the country. The grievance appears
justified given that national schools represent the mark of excellence as they are
220 Government of Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey (2005)
221 Kenya State of the Coast Report (2008) : United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the National Environment Management
Authority
222 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 37
223 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January 2012/p.51
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often better resourced; admit top performers and generally top national exams
and the number of those who subsequently get university admission.
345. Lack of education and poor education standards have a direct bearing on economic
prospects. Residents lamented unemployment among their ranks. Unable to access
work, many young people resort to joining the security forces. Speaking on behalf
of the Munyoyaya community from northern Tana River region, Hirsi Sheikh Dulow
lamented the poor education standards, unemployment and marginalisation of
that community. In our view, this is the fate of most communities in the Tana River
region:
[…] You will be surprised to hear that in Kenya, this community does not have a single
officer in the government, not even a District Officer. You cannot find a lieutenant in the
military, the Kenya Police or the Administration Police. Their highest rank would be that
of sergeant. In terms of education, we do not have officers. The few who are there are
clerks. This is because of victimization. There is no development in our area and in terms
of education, we have been so much marginalised that we cannot compete effectively
with other communities in Kenya and that means that when it comes to employment,
we encounter problems. It is only recently that we had a few people who have studied
to degree level, but before that the level of education was so low. So, when we talk of
being marginalised and receiving no justice in Kenya, we know what we are saying… this
community has suffered great injustice since independence. Even long after attaining
independence, they have been victimized. They have not received sufficient education
and they are left behind on all fronts of development and we think this commission
should address that … Those who get D grades are unable to go to secondary schools.
Even if they are not admitted by the Joint Admissions Board (JAB), they are unable to pay
for the parallel degree courses and because of that, they rush to join the security forces.224

346.

The Commission also recorded a persistent complaint that most learning institutions
such as primary schools, especially in rural coastal areas, experience a severe shortage
of well-trained teaching staff. It was reported some of these primary schools largely
depend on untrained teaching staff. For instance a report compiled by Ujamaa, an
NGO, revealed that 45 percent of teachers in primary schools around Mtaa and Taru
locations of Kinango District are untrained. These teachers are tasked with the duty
of teaching examination candidates. While the real impact of this shortage cannot
be ascertained, it is noted that lack of adequate trained teachers must have a bearing
on the quality of education and literacy levels in affected areas.

347. Testimonies cited the location of Utalii College in Nairobi as further evidence of
marginalisation of the region. Utalii is the premier government training college
in matters of hospitality and tourism. The Coast is largely known as the hub of
tourism, with tourists-related sectors as its economic mainstay. While we may not
224 TJRC/ Hansard/ Thematic Hearing / Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 12
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be in a position to verify these claims, Coast residents submitted that other than
the location of the college, numerous other factors - including poor transition rates
at primary and secondary level - conspired to ensure that they had insignificant
representation in this important institution. A branch of Utalii was opened at the
Coast in 2010 and although this is an important development, it is not easy to
immediately gauge its impact.

Health
348. The health care system in Kenya comprises of several providers and levels of
health care provision, mostly the government’s ministries of Medical Services
and Public Health and Sanitation and private health care providers such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs).
The public health system consists of national referral hospitals, provincial general
hospitals, district hospitals, health centers and dispensaries. Private health care
systems are mostly run by NGOs, faith-based organizations (FBOs) and CBOs.
Health facilities including dispensaries, health centres, district hospitals, provincial
hospitals, teaching and referral hospitals, private maternity and nursing homes,
private clinics and voluntary counseling and testing facilities (VCTs) are run by
government, NGOs, CBOs or FBOs.225
349. Despite the centrality of the Coast region to the Kenyan economy, it records
the lowest health infrastructural development as seen in the low number of
healthcare facilities (402 facilities by the end of 2007). A key factor in explaining
this trend has been attributed to exclusionary practices of the governing elites.
Other factors include the low levels of adult education and adherence to the
local ways of defining and maintaining health, some of which are not beneficial.
High costs hinder the use of modern health services in most parts of the coast
province. A survey in Kwale District conducted by the Health Management
Information Systems (HMIS) indicated that high costs hamper the use of modern
health services for 10 to 30 percent of the population.226 As a result, many people
have turned to traditional healers.
350. The survey in Kwale showed that 40 percent of the mothers take their child
to a traditional healer when they fall sick. Reliance on traditional medicinal
practitioners is higher if the mother has no formal education or is a Muslim, and if
the condition of the child is chronic. Reports and anecdotal evidence suggest that
the Coast region has largely been ignored when it comes to the provision of social
225 Social policy, development and governance in Kenya; A Profile on Healthcare Provision in Kenya. Research Report by: Keriga, L
(DPMF Researcher) Professor Bujra, A (Director of Project) Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF)
226 The health facilities provided only include health facilities which have been registered and provided codes by the Ministry of Health.

112

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter ONE

amenities.227 The table below shows that the number of government hospitals
increased considerably by six facilities and government-manned dispensaries by
24. Urban bias creates inequality in accessing health facilities, with most of them
located in the better-developed commercial centres such as Mombasa. At the
district level, Kilifi records two hospitals, while Kwale has no hospital, but has five
private health clinics. The influx of commercial sex workers too has implications on
the disease burden, mainly HIV/AIDS, with Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu districts
the most affected. Insecurity in the districts of Kwale and Likoni also influences the
distribution of health facilities.

Table 1.1
Year

2003 — 2004

2005 2006

2006 — 2007

No of Health Facilities

No of Health Facilities

No of Health Facilities

GOK

9

9

15

NGO/Missions

2

2

4

Private

10

10

7

Hospitals

CDF

0

Dispensaries
GOK

152

152

176

NGO/Mission

55

55

57

Private

9

9

38

CDF

63

Health Centres
GOK

32

32

38

NGO/Mission

2

2

2

Private

1

1

2

CDF

-

-

0

Total

272

272

402

In addition, the table below shows the dire situation that some of the coastal people in
rural areas face in pursuit of medical care. In Kilifi, the doctor-to-patient ratio was 1 doctor
to 100 000 patients. This statistic, as one may readily deduce, is a big contributing factor
to the low quality medical care provided to such rural people.
227 See Abdalla Bujra and Leah Keriga ‘Social policy, development and governance in Kenya; A Profile on Healthcare Provision in
Kenya’ Development Policy Management Forum (DPMF)
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Table 1.2
Health Indicator

Mombasa

Malindi

Lamu

1:3000

1:19502

1:36343

211

83

5

No. of hospitals

9

3

1

No. of nursing homes and h/centers

19

2

-

No. of dispensaries

183

24

-

0.5km

1.5km

5km

Doctor: Patient ratio (GOK)
No. of health facilities

Average distance to Health centre

Kwale

Kilifi

Taita
Taveta

Tana River

1:41000

1:95500

73

44

57

2

3

2

5

7

5

21

22

36

5km

10km

50km

1:82690 1:100000
57

5

30km

Source: Research Report by Leah Keriga and Prof Abdalla Bujra

Infrastructure and social amenities
351. Despite the government having undertaken a number of policy measures to
develop infrastructure and services for human settlement since the 1970s, a report
by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the National Environment
Management Authority (NEMA)228 suggests that very little progress has been
made in their implementation. Among the policy measures developed to address
infrastructure and service provision include the ‘Growth Centre Policy’, ‘Rural Trade
and Production Centre Strategy’, ‘District Focus for Rural Development’ and ‘Slum
Upgrading’. Even in areas where infrastructure has been built applying these
policies, the expected results have not been realized. The Growth Centre Policy, for
instance, has failed to redirect human settlement away from Nairobi and Mombasa
cities. A result of the ineffective implementation of these policies has been the
continued poor state of infrastructure in many areas, including coastal rural areas
(NEMA, 2004).229

Roads
352. The UN and NEMA-prepared State of the Coast Report230 provided data showing
that most of the roads in Mombasa District converge on the city due to its
importance as an industrial and commercial centre. It is relatively well-served
by both classified and unclassified roads, although the network is not equally
228 Kenya State of the Coast Report Published in 2008 by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the National
Environment Management Authority (NEMA)
229 Kenya State of the Coast Report Published in 2008 by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the National
Environment Management Authority (NEMA)
230 Government of Kenya, 2008. “Kenya State of the Coast Report: Towards the integrated management of Kenya’s coastal and
marine resources.” UNEP and NEMA, Nairobi p.90
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distributed, with many of the roads concentrated on the Mombasa/West
Mainland axis. This has left the North/South mainland areas with few vehicular
roads, which has been a contributing factor in the relative under-development of
these parts.
353. Kwale District has probably the densest road network on the Coast outside
Mombasa. Kwale has the longest motorable road network of 1129.6 km, followed
by Mombasa, which has 109.6 km. The bulk of the road network in Kilifi is mainly
unclassified and seasonal. The same situation is found in Lamu, Tana River and
Taita Taveta districts. Inadequate repair and maintenance, and uncoordinated
and unplanned development on road reserves have worsened the situation of
roads in the region. The Coast is also served by a railway line from Mombasa to
Nairobi, branching at Voi to serve Taita Taveta township. The railway is used to
ferry passengers and cargo from the port of Mombasa.
354. However, Kwale is divided into two unequal parts by the Lunga Lunga-KihanguSilaloni road, with one-third lying to the western side served by unclassified
roads. The remaining two-thirds lying on the eastern side are well-served by
classified roads as it is densely populated and economically more significant.
355. The road network in Kilifi is composed mainly of unclassified roads, nearly all of
which are impassable during the wet season. Tana River, Lamu and Taita Taveta
districts have few tarmac roads, the majority of which are usable only in the dry
season. It has been estimated that nearly 75 percent of all goods imported and
exported through the port of Mombasa are conveyed by road, underlining the
critical importance of this means of transport.

Water and Sanitation
356. Government statistics231 suggest that nearly 50 percent of households at the
Coast are connected to a reticulated water supply, whereas the national figure
is only just over 40 percent. The number of connected households is highest on
Mombasa Island, with nearly 20,000, followed by Mombasa mainland, where
nearly 13,000 are connected and fewer household numbers for the other centers
making a total of over 45,000 households connected to a reticulated water supply
in the Coast.
357. The water demand is estimated at 190,000m3/day during the low season and 210
000m3/day during the high tourist season. Despite a number of major sources
being fully operational, there is a shortage of water due to the high demands
231 Ministry of Planning and National Development Kwale and Kilifi District Development Plans for 2002-2008
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arising from the growth in population and industry. Consequently, private and
communal boreholes are quite common supplementary sources of water. Over
65 percent of the coast population is served by pit latrines. Over 25 percent have
no provision for domestic waste water whatsoever. These data contrast somewhat
with national averages where 6 percent have a flush toilet and only 16 percent
have no provision for sewage disposal whatsoever.
358. The main sources of fresh water in rural areas at the Coast are ground water, surface
water and roof catchments, according to the UN/NEMA report. Mombasa Island
and district has the highest number of households with access to piped water
supply, while Lamu has the lowest. Water demand in the coastal region has been
growing rapidly over the years. The demand estimated for 1995 was about 200 000
m3 /day and was projected to rise to 280 000m3 /day by 2010 and 380 000 m3/day
by 2020 (World Bank, 1996).
359. The water supply system has been overtaken by demand, which has increased
rapidly in concert with the growth of the tourism industry and irrigation schemes.
The main uses of water are domestic (which accounts for 35 percent of the total
water demand), livestock, irrigation and industry. To address water shortage,
complementary water sources such as communal boreholes, roof catchments, dams
and wells are common. There is need, however, for the quantity of groundwater to
be assessed, and this information to be used for its management.
360. Increasing pollution from domestic sewage and solid waste is the most severe
pollution challenge in the Kenya Coast, particularly at hotspots located in and
around main urban centers like Mombasa. Over 65 percent of the Coast has
no sewage system and is served by septic tanks, soak pits and pit latrines. In
Mombasa, wastewater management is not adequate and only 10 percent of
the population is connected to the sewage system. Individual houses have pit
latrines while most institutions dispose their wastewater in soak pits, which
contributes to groundwater pollution. Areas served by sewage systems, however,
also contribute to environmental degradation because treatment works are not
operational and the sewage is disposed directly into the sea, threatening public
health and marine life. The situation is compounded by the fact that Kenya does
not yet have any effluent standards for discharge into the sea, and most water
projects have been implemented without due consideration of sanitation and
other complementary infrastructure. The main causes of the poor urban water
systems in coastal regions include poor planning, mismanagement and lack of
technical expertise.232
232 World Bank, Meeting the Challenges of Mega Cities in the Developing World: A Working Paper. (1996)
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Housing
361. Most communities at the Coast build houses using mangrove poles, coral rubble,
palm thatch and clay. Due to high poverty levels and poor development of
infrastructure, most rural houses are not connected to modern amenities such as
piped water, electricity and a sewer system.233 In most urban centres, the demand
for housing has outstripped supply, leading to the spread of slum and squatter
settlements without clean water supply or sewerage. While rapid urbanization
and poverty are the main causes of this scenario, the situation is aggravated by
inappropriate and ineffective regulatory frameworks, limited access to affordable
finance, high construction costs and inaccessibility to affordable, serviced land.
As the demand for low-cost housing increases, especially in the urban centres,
new ways of providing housing need to be sought. The insecurity of titles due to
unresolved historical land ownership issues has had an impact on the ability of
residents to develop permanent structures or use the land they occupy to obtain
loans to invest in economic development.

Gender and marginalisation
362. Gender equity at the Coast hinges heavily on the religious, cultural and economic
dynamics of the different communities that inhabit the region. Deep-rooted
religious, traditional and cultural values militate against gender equity with regard
to opportunities for equitable sharing of household and societal responsibilities,
inheritance and employment.234
363. For instance, 48.6 percent and 42 percent of men work in the formal and informal
sectors respectively. The corresponding figures for women are 34.8 and 55.1
percent, indicating that men have greater access to livelihood opportunities than
women. It is however important to note that these aspects indicate marginalisation
of women by their communities rather than by the state. While this is not directly
attributable to the state, cultural and religious practices compound the effect of
marginalisation of women.

Intra-regional disparities
364. It is evident that some areas of the Coast are better endowed than others, due to
the status of the region (whether a city or not), economic power and/or political
influence. As the capital city of Coast, Mombasa tends to have an advantage
over other regions economically, mainly in terms of infrastructure. In healthcare,
233 Government of Kenya Coast Province Profile (2002) Central Bureau of Statistics, (Unpublished data)
234 J Hoorweg, D Foeken & RA Obudho, Kenya Coast Handbook: Culture, resources and development in East African Littoral (2000)
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Mombasa has about 211 health facilities compared to five found in Lamu District.
The average distance a person can walk to a health centre in Mombasa is 0.5km
compared to 50km walked by a patient in Tana River.
365. Most rural areas at the Coast are served by a dilapidated and narrow road
network, in contrast with urban centers such as Mombasa, Kilifi and Kwale, which
are well served by both classified and non-classified roads. The better roads are
generally concentrated around important industrial and commercial centres,
which also host the air traffic infrastructure. Mombasa has the main airport in
the Coast region, Moi International Airport, serving international and domestic
air traffic. Malindi, Lamu and Ukunda have smaller airports, while other towns
have airstrips.
366. In terms of CDF allocation, Taita Taveta is allocated more resources compared
to Mombasa. One argument for this is that Taita Taveta ranks lower on the
poverty index and has suffered greater marginalisation than urban Mombasa,
therefore the need for more allocation of resources for development purposes.
However despite the fact that it receives more money, the county remains one
of the poorest in the country. Taita Taveta is one of the richest districts in the
country in terms of land and land-based resources, an integral component of the
Tsavo economic system, which accommodates more than half of the country’s
population of elephants.
367. However, most of its population is entirely dependent on rain-fed agriculture,
whose production has declined by a factor of two over the last couple of years as
a result of land degradation, unprecedented droughts and destruction of crops
by wildlife. Notably, most of the district has some intractable land issues, with
the huge portion of land owned by non-residents and a large part is the Tsavo
national park. Some estimates indicate that only 25 percent of the land is held by
locals.
368. It can be argued that while CDF has empowered local communities to initiate
development programmes, the management of these funds must be improved.
Apart from increasing the amount disbursed to previously marginalized regions,
cancelling the legacy of marginalisation will require a comprehensive programme
that includes land reforms, supporting farmers to improve agricultural production
and a state for locals in the extractive industries.
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Western Province
369. In terms of size, Western Province is the second smallest province in Kenya. It
borders Uganda to the west, Rift Valley to the east and Nyanza Province to the
south. Under the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, it comprises four counties - Bungoma,
Busia, Kakamega and Vihiga. The predominant inhabitants of the Western region
are the Luhya, whose large populations live in the rural areas and agriculture is the
main economic activity.
370. While all indicators and perceptions among the people have Western region as
a marginalized region, this characterization has not featured as prominently in
formal accounts as is the case for Nyanza, Northern Kenya and the Coast regions.
This depiction is perhaps attributable to a combination of factors, including the
fact that due to its rich fertile soils that favour agriculture and relative security,
Western has been perceived to be economically stable, in spite of the high levels
of poverty.235
371. Western has often been ignored in classification of marginalized regions in Kenya,
yet its historical evolution and political fortunes are closely tied with that of
Nyanza province, which is acknowledged in formal accounts as a marginalized
region. Both provinces had been administered as one unit during the colonial
period. In addition to the historical ties, leading figures from both regions shared
ideological orientation and have jointly been at odds with both the Kenyatta and
Moi governments. A thriving agricultural sector, both subsistence and cash cropbased meant that the region had the ability to produce food, and the influence of
churches in the education sector appear to have cushioned the region from the
effects of economic marginalisation experienced in Nyanza. It is notable however
that there has been a diversity in political orientation within the region in the sense
that while the region remained marginalized, sections of its leadership were coopted into government.
372. Backed up with a history that lacks political favour with successive governments
and the high level of poverty, it is evident that Western Kenya is marginalized.
Recent trends reveal that the region has been forgotten in the development
agenda. It would therefore be worthwhile to specifically examine key indicators
of marginalisation in the region generally and specific parts suffering from gross
cases of marginalisation.
235 See PF, Hebinck & M Omosa Chronic Poverty in Rural Western Kenya: Its Identification and Implications for Agricultural
Development (2003)
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Socio-economic indicators of economic marginalisation
Education
373. Education and literacy is one of the indicators for measuring human development.
According to the Kenya National Adult Literacy Survey report conducted in 2006
by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with UNESSO,236 regional
disparities confirm the trend that economically-privileged areas have a higher rate
of academic achievement compared to poverty-stricken areas. Western Province
had a 54 percent desired level of mastery and a 57.9 percent minimum level of
mastery - below the estimated 61.5 percent national literacy level.
374. There are fewer government schools in Western compared to the Rift Valley and
Central region. Most are mission schools run by religious institutions or private
schools. The limited input by government in education has adversely affected the
overall situation of access to education in the region. Only the middle-class and
upper-class can afford private schools, shutting out the poor.
375. The quality of education is determined by the quality of teachers and the
distribution of educational facilities. While this assertion cannot be confirmed, the
popular perception in the past was that Western was short-changed in terms of the
quality of teachers posted in the region. In the early 1970s, there were allegations
that teachers at some schools in did not have the required qualifications, leading
to low pass marks.237 Records from 1986 show that the number of trained teachers
in secondary schools in Central, Rift Valley, Eastern and Nyanza was higher than
that of Western and North Eastern.238 In the late 1990s, Nairobi and Central had the
highest percentage of qualified teachers, compared to North Eastern and Western.
376.

The rate of pre-primary attendance in Western is encouraging. According to the 2009
census, Western is ranked third in the country. The population attending primary
stands at 1 276 295. Western is ranked third with places like Rift Valley, Eastern and
Nyanza having a higher number of students attending primary school. However,
the Commission has been unable, from the available sources, to establish what this
absolute number represents in terms of the percentage of children eligible to attend.
The transition from pre-primary to primary education in Western is commendable.
When it comes to secondary school and tertiary education, the province ranks 6th,
with less than 200 000 and 12 000 respectively attending such schools.

236 The Kenya National Adult Literacy Survey was conducted in 2006 by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics in collaboration with
UNESSO. The report presents the findings on the status of literacy in Kenya. The specific objectives include identifying issues that
relate to adult literacy, obtain comprehensive data on adult literacy and the magnitude of literacy. This report gives the regional
disparities in the level of literacy in Kenya with places like Nairobi and Central having above75% minimum level of mastery
237 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) March 21- May 12, 1972
238 Educational Statistics Unit, Ministry of Education
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377. The transition rate has been inconsistent between 2003 and 2008 following the
introduction of free primary education by the Kibaki administration. At 2003
it was 43.8 percent, below the national rate of 52 percent. It increased in 2004
and 2004 2005 then dropped in 2006. The highest transition was in 2008 where
the rate rose to 45.7 percent but this was still below the national average of 52
percent239 In terms of the drop-out rate, Western is ranked second. The national
dropout rate is 5.4 percent, while that of Western is 8.0 percent.240 Causes of
drop-outs include poverty, substance abuse and poor performance.
378. One of the main complaints from residents in relation to education is the lack
of tertiary institutions to absorb those who graduate from secondary schools as
Frederick Wandera Oseno from Busia stated:
Our main problem is that we do not have tertiary institutions and that is why, at the
moment, if we want to employ 20 nurses, for example, you can get seven. There are
many students with a mean grade of C+ and above, but because of lack of money, they
are just at home. When they stay at home, they become idlers. It is high time we got
a tertiary college around that can accommodate them. The teachers and lecturers to
those institutions should ensure that the students who have got C+ and above get
sponsorship and training. Whenever we look for nurses, they are not there because of
lack of finances to take them to colleges.241

Agriculture and economy: The case of the cotton, rice and fishing industries
379. During the 1960s and 1970s, agriculture was generally good in the region. The
situation however changed in the 1980s and 1990s with the deterioration of
the economy. This period was marked with poor market prices and relapse of
basic infrastructure.242 Certain parts of Western, especially Busia District, with
its poorer soils that could sustain only certain crops (cotton and rice), suffered
more than others as state corporations dealing with them were systematically
destroyed and bankrupted during the Moi era. The popular perception is that
the cash crop industry in Western and Nyanza (especially rice, sugar and cotton)
was systematically destroyed by the government in order to impoverish the
region associated with opposition to successive governments.
380. Cotton farming was introduced in Kenya in the 1900s, by the late 1960s it had been
introduced to many parts of the country. Cotton has great potential in Western as
the soil is quite fertile for cotton growing. At one stage, Busia in Western produced
about 60 000 bales of cotton per year.243 Cotton growing provided employment
239
240
241
242
243

Public Expenditure Review: policy for Prosperity Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030
G Odipo & O Abagi Efficiency of Primary Education In Kenya: Situational Analysis And Implications For Educational Reform (1997)
TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Busia/ 1 July 2011/ p. 25-26
R. Ochieng (ed) Historical studies and social change in western Kenya: essays in memory of Professor Gideon S. Were (2002)
Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard) 20 June 2006
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opportunities to many people, however there has been a decline in cotton
production not only in Western, but also in the country generally. In 1991 when the
Cotton Lint and Seed Board was privatized, the industry suffered major challenges
which led to the closure of major ginneries. The ginneries previously owned by the
Cotton Board were later sold to private entrepreneurs. In 1992, the government
made efforts to revive cotton growing in Western and Nyanza with two ginneries
built at Asembo Bay and Malakisi. Despite these efforts, the mismanagement and
controversial privatization of the Cotton Board during the Moi regime adversely
affected the industry.
381.

Residents lamented the neglect the cotton industry suffered, partly attributing it to
government policies and the location of related factories away from the region of
production. Witness Frederick Wandera Oseno, told the public hearings in Busia that:
Samia and Busia are well-known for cotton farming and it has helped us in education.
Interestingly, cotton farming is done in Busia County and the industry is (sic) in Eldoret.
The second industry is being taken to Kisumu. That has deteriorated cotton farming,
with low prices and no markets for the cotton. When farmers saw all those violations,
some could not continue with cotton farming. I cannot blame the past government. If
there was somebody to ensure that there is ready market and good prices of cotton, we
would not be having many deaths and poverty in Samia and Busia counties.244

382.

The government initiated several rice irrigation schemes in the 1960s and 1970s.
The largest one is the Mwea irrigation scheme in Kirinyaga, Central Kenya. There
is also the Ahero scheme in Kisumu County and the Bunyala irrigation scheme in
Busia, which was launched in 1968. Mismanagement and lack of investment by the
National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) brought the industry to its knees in the
late 1980s and 1990s. Scheme operations eventually stalled in 1999 due to depletion
of the revolving funds following the 1998 Mwea crisis. Ahero also collapsed, leaving
Mwea as the only major functional rice irrigation scheme in Kenya.

383. As in Nyanza, fishing is an important economic activity in the Western region,
where it is practiced on a commercial and subsistence scale in Budalang’i and
Funyula constituencies in Busia District which border Lake Victoria. Despite its
importance, the industry has suffered decades of neglect: fishermen receive little
or no state support to buy equipment, cooling facilities lack, marketing is scanty
and there are no local factories to process fish. Speaking in Busia, witness Zainabu
Muyoti complained:
We have fish, but we do not have cold storage facilities. We are requesting this
Commission to make suggestions that we are provided with cold storage facilities. If we
had cold storage facilities, we would bargain on the prices. But when third parties come
244 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Busia/ 1 July 2011/ pp. 25-26
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into play, they dictate and we are afraid that our fish will go bad and nobody will buy
them. So, we normally sell them at a throwaway price.245

384. There are complaints that government response to the hyacinth weed menace
that has adversely affected fishing activities has been less than adequate.
Recently, the minister in charge of Fisheries acknowledged that the government
has done very little to revive the fishing industry in Western Kenya. It is reported
that today, pond-based fishing in other parts of the country could have overtaken
Nyanza and Western in overall yields following government investment in fishing
ponds.

Land
385. While land title issues in most of Western are settled, conflict remains in parts
previously vacated by white settlers and where government initiated settlement
schemes, especially in Mt Elgon and Bungoma. The land issue as it relates to
conflicts in Mt Elgon and Bungoma is the subject of a separate chapter in this
report. While large-scale land-related conflicts such as those witnessed in the
Rift Valley and Coast regions are not common in Western, land fragmentation is
however a problem due to population pressure. This situation is a result of the
small land sizes which averages is 1.1 hectares per household compared to land
size averages in the Rift Valley that stands at 2.6 hectares per household.246

Security and economic marginalisation
386. Western is home to the agriculturally-rich Mt Elgon District, which has been at the
centre of long-standing disputes over land. What initially started as land disputes
soon spread to criminal acts. A militia group called the Sabaot Land Defense Forces
(SLDF), whose activities are described in detail elsewhere in this Report, had been
blamed for committing most of these criminal acts. The motive of the group is
reportedly to seek redress for alleged injustice during land distribution in the
Chebyuk settlement scheme. Mt Elgon has suffered from high rates of insecurity
and people have lived in fear due to the continued violence.
367. As a result of the insecurity in Mt Elgon region, people lack basic medical services,
clothing, and sufficient food.247 Other socio-economic effects of the violence in
Mt Elgon include poor agricultural production as well as threats to food security.
Mass displacement and creation of new groups of destitute IDPs has resulted,
with competition over basic goods and services such as water, food and shelter.
245 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Busia/ 5 July 2011/ p. 44
246 The emergence of land markets in Africa: assessing the impacts on poverty, equity, and efficiency Stein Terje Holden, Keijiro
Otsuka, Frank Place .Washington DC : Resource for the Future (2009)
247 http://www.msf.org/source/countries/africa/kenya/2008/MSF_MtElgon_May2008.pdf Mount Elgon. Does Anybody Care (2008)
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According to humanitarian organizations such as the Kenya Red Cross Society,
lack of adequate water has caused health problems. Coupled with inadequate
sanitation supplies, the situation gets worse. Due to the violence and insecurity,
the provision of medical care by the government has starkly declined. Schools
have also been affected by the rise in insecurity. Many children have been
forced to stay out of school, while others have transferred to other schools in
safer areas.
388. Due to the escalating violence, the Kenya Army was deployed in 2008 to calm the
situation in response to the atrocities allegedly committed by the SLDF. However,
the army, which was supposed to protect people in this region, was accused of
committing various human rights abuses on the people of Mt Elgon, leading to
fear by the local people of both the militia and the army.
389. Other than insecurity in Mt Elgon, other parts of the Western have over the years
experienced insecurity linked either to post-election violence or ordinary criminal
activities. In the 1980s and 1990s, economic activity was disrupted in many parts
of Western, especially in Kakamega, due to the activities of a militia group/gang
called ‘Msumbiji’. Before 2007, Western experienced cycles of political violence
and land clashes in 1992 and 1997. According to the Commission of Inquiry into
the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) of 2007 chaired by Justice Philip Waki, the
violence experienced in Western is not well-understood or fully-acknowledged.
This violence posed great security challenges in Western, with great loss of life.
According to the CIPEV report, areas that were most affected were Busia, Vihiga,
Kakamega, Lugari, Mumias and Mt Elgon districts. Violence took the form of
killings, mostly by security forces, looting and destruction of property. Overall, the
violence as in previous cycles has had a serious socio-economic impact because of
the depressed local economy.

Health, water, sanitation and housing
390. According to the National Health Survey, Western has low numbers of health
facilities.248 Many hospitals are mission hospitals, clearly indicating the absence
of or a limited role of government in the sector. A Medical Services ministry
survey reveals that there are eight district hospitals, 13 sub-district hospitals, one
rural training health center, three rural demonstration training health centers, 56
health centers, 158 dispensaries and one provincial general hospital in Western.
Child and under-5 mortality is very high, with 121 children under-5 dying per
1 000 births and closely follows Nyanza, where 149 out of 1 000 children die.249
248 Social Policy, Development and Governance in Kenya
249 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (2008-09)

124

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter ONE

In 2003, Western ranked third in child mortality.250 A witness noted the lack of
adequate health facilities in one part of Kakamega, which reflects a region-wide
trend:
We really do not have very many health centres. The few that exist do not have enough doctors
and nurses. There is only one doctor with a few assistants at the nearby hospital and they
do not work on Sundays. It is also difficult to run this hospital because it lacks water. Blood
transfusion is not done at Shibuye health centre. This service is only available at Kakamega
General Hospital. If it is at night, like yesterday there was a woman who was bleeding and she
was told to pay money to be transported from Shibuye health centre to Kakamega General
Hospital. This lady continued bleeding until she lost the child. The lady is still alive. They had
gone looking for money, but when they came back she had lost her baby through miscarriage.
She was supposed to be transferred to Kakamega General Hospital for proper medical attention.
So, it becomes very difficult. We die because of petty things which the government would have
helped us to manage.251

391. The 2009 census records that Western, Nyanza and North Eastern provinces have
the lowest supply of piped water. Only 7 percent of the households in Western
can access piped water, despite of the presence of numerous permanent rivers
and other water sources that can be tapped and processed. The access rate is
below the national average, which stands at ()percent. In terms of water quality,
the number of people who access water is much lower. At the county level, there
are several disparities. Lugari District for example, suffers from diminished access
to safe drinking water and sanitation at only 16.4 percent, which is way below the
national rank which stands at 53 percent.252
392.

Over the years, the availability of safe water for drinking has been below the Kenyan
average percentage. Sanitation both in homes and in urban centers remains poor in
Western. The 2009 census notes that ‘poor sanitary conditions impacts on prevailing
health standards and development’. The percentage of the main mode of human
waste disposal in Western is alarming - only 0.9 percent of the households have
access to a main sewer, 0.7 percent to a septic tank and 0.1 percent to a cesspool.
Western however ranks highest in the percentage of households with a pit latrine,
with 95.5 of the households having pit latrines. While this is a good thing, serious
health problems are posed by pit latrines in areas like Busia that experience periodic
flooding during the long rainy season.

393. According to the Demographic and Health Survey, the percentage of home
ownership in Western is above the national one, with 89.6 percent of the people
250 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (n 265above)
251 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women’s Hearing / Kakamega/ 28 June 2011/ p. 22
252 Little Fact Book : Social Economic & Political Profiles of Kenya’s Districts (2002)
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owning houses and 7.8 percent paying rent.253 However, as in the case of Nyanza,
these are mostly non-permanent houses made of mud walls and floors with grass
thatches or iron sheet roofing.

Roads
394. According to NEMA, infrastructure in Western is fairly well developed and evenly
distributed.254 From our travels as a commission, this statement contradicts the
reality on the ground. It also does not align with perceptions of the residents who
feel that the poor state of roads is a clear indicator of the marginalisation that the
region has suffered. Overall, the road network can be said to be bad in this region.
In fact, it is the most cited indicator to demonstrate that the Western region is
marginalized.
395.

There are some tarmac roads, all-weather roads and a railway line (the main Kenya
Uganda Railway) that has been out of commission for more than a decade. The rainy
season has however spoilt the state of roads, which are in a bad state of disrepair.
In addition, huge trucks used for transportation to neighbouring countries are a
major cause of deterioration of the condition of roads. The Parliamentary Committee
on Transport and Housing blames the Roads ministry for the poor state of roads in
Western and Nyanza, despite the government allocating funds for rehabilitation in
the whole country.

396. On the road infrastructure, Mary Emadau from Teso region made remarks which
apply to the whole of Busia and neigbouring counties:
Teso has never had a tarmacked road except the Trans-Africa road. We have been told
from time to time that the road that joins us with Busia and Mt Elgon is supposed to be
tarmacked but even today, I used it and it is a murram road.255

397. The lack of all-weather roads is a countywide problem. Witness Zainabu Muyoti
weighed in during the public hearings in Busia:
We are requesting that as a country we want a road to come from Amurai passing
through every constituency going through Amukura, Nambale, Butula, Funyula to go to
Port Victoria. If women and men do business, we will interact with all these communities.
Busia people do business in Amagoro. Let us work together and do business together
to bring peace among us.256

398. The same situation exists in other counties which have minimal coverage of tarmac
roads. In Kakamega, a case was made by one of the witnesses, a Ms Machoto and
253
254
255
256
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Kenya Demographic and Health Survey, 2003
NEMA Provincial Environmental Action Plan (2007-2011) Western Province
TJRC/ Hansard/ Women’s Hearing / Busia 5 July 2011/ p. 7
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Commissioner Prof. Ojienda walking to a commission forum in Mt Elgon.

others on the impact of lack of infrastructure on health and development:
On issue of infrastructure, our roads are very bad. The Sigalagala to Butere road, for
example, is impassable. I live in Isulu. This road is not passable. Sometimes expectant
women deliver their babies on the roadside before reaching hospitals. This is very
dangerous for our wives and daughters. The nearest facility like Shibuye health centre
does not have enough facilities. Patients go all the way to Kakamega General Hospital
where they can get proper medical attention. However, to visit Kakamega General
Hospital, you need to have transport. If you want to take your patient to this hospital
at night, the transport cost is normally between Sh5 000 and Sh7 000. Our people are
poor and they cannot afford this mode of transport. We are endangering their lives.
My recommendation is that we equip all our district health centres and hospitals so
that they serve our sick people.257

Employment
399.

Nairobi, Coast, Western and North Eastern provinces have more people who
are unemployed than employed.258 The unemployment rate of persons aged
between 15 and 64 years dropped from 27.5 percent in 1998/99 to 9.6 percent in
2005/06.259 The limited number of factories employs only a few people. In Kenya,
youth unemployment is a major development issue. Unemployment of the youth in
Western is also high. The major challenges posed by unemployment are participation
in social ills and high dependency rates.

257 TJRC/ Hansard/ Women’s Hearing / Kakamega/ 28 June 2011/ p. 22
258 Pulling Apart Facts and Figures on Inequality (2004)
259 http://mirror.undp.org/kenya/NESCUnemploymentinKenya.pdf
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Busia County Case Study
400. Busier comprises five constituencies of Budalang’i, Amagoro, Nambale, Butula
and Funyula. Like in the entire Western region, the main economic activity of
Busia is agriculture. Fishing is the second most important economic activity. It is
the poorest county in Western.260 According to the Kenya poverty maps, about
two-thirds of the county’s residents are unable to meet their basic minimum
requirements.261 Busia is one of the counties faced with many challenges, high
poverty levels262, the complex effects of HIV/AIDS, a high TB burden and a high
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. The rate of mortality in Busia is relatively high with the
key causes being malaria, HIV/AIDS, anaemia, pneumonia and gastro-enteritis.263
The major development challenges and constraints facing the county include
increased food insecurity, declining levels of agricultural production and poor
conditions of roads.
401. Busia has various sources of water including Lake Victoria and two main rivers,
Nzoia and Soi. In relation to piped water, access is different in rural and urban
areas. The urban areas in Busia tend to have a higher percentage of access to
piped water (14.7 %), compared to rural households (3.6 %). These differences are
also visible in access to main sewer and septic tank with urban areas having 4.4
percent access compared to 0.2 percent access in rural areas.264
402. Infrastructural facilities in Busia are generally under-developed. Most of the
roads are impassable during the rainy season.265 Regular flooding in areas like
Budalang’i worsens this situation. Lack of industries inhibits infrastructural
development and the low supply of energy is a major impediment to
industrialization. Most of the energy needs of households are met through
use of firewood, posing negative environmental consequences as it leads to
depletion of forest cover. Industrialization is a major factor in the provision
of infrastructure since areas with industries attract construction of roads,
settlement and investment opportunities. For agricultural development to
thrive in Busia, it is necessary that industries are built to facilitate development
in terms of raw materials, agro-processing, value addition sales and marketing
of produce.
260 Little Fact Book. (2002). Social Economic & Political Profiles of Kenya’s Districts. Institute of Economic Affairs
261 CBS (2003). Geographical Dimensions of Well-Being in Kenya. Who and Where are the poor? From Districts to Locations. Volume
1. Figures in parentheses in the table are the poverty gaps, expressed as a percentage of those living below the poverty line
262 The poverty index stands at 68 percent
263 http://www.husobusia.org/
264 http://opendata.go.ke/Counties/Busia-Fact-Sheet/snf5-d89k
265 Food Security District Profile, District Profiles for 23 Districts(2007) FAO Kenya
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403. Agriculture is the main economic activity in Busia, contributing nearly 36 percent
of household income and employing over 81 percent of the workforce. The
major cash crops are rice, sugarcane, cotton and coffee. Sugarcane and coffee
production are carried out in the high-potential areas of Butula and Nambale.
The unemployment rate in Busia stands at 13.65 percent.
404. Fishing is the second most important economic activity in Busia County. The
Busia people’s livelihoods largely depend on agriculture and fishing, which
provides employment. The major problem fishermen in Busia face is cross-border
conflict between fishermen in Kenya and Ugandan security forces. Robbery on
the lake has also become a major issue because armed pirates/robbers from
Uganda often steal fishing boats and fish.266 Other challenges of fishing in Busia
include lack of storage facilities, poor marketing infrastructure and lack of a fish
processing plant.
405. Busia still has a high prevalence of absolute poverty. According to the Kenya
poverty maps, about two-thirds of the district’s residents are unable to meet
their basic minimum requirements and the majority of the populace lack proper
employment. The informal sector accounts for a large number of employment
opportunities. At the divisional level, the poverty incidence ranges from 63
percent to 74 percent, with Budalang’i, Funyula and Butula divisions registering
the highest proportions. The major causes of deprivation are low and poor
utilization of agricultural land, collapse of the cotton industry, lack of organized
marketing channels and widespread unemployment.
406. Despite agriculture being the main economic activity, food shortage is a major
concern. Cases of malnutrition are also common and are attributed to the low
purchasing power due to widespread poverty and over-reliance on starchy foods.
Generally, food insecurity is common in Funyula and Budalang’i divisions that
experience flooding annually.
407. Adequate and affordable health services lack in Busia, with few public health
facilities. Statistics show that in 2003 there were 29 health facilities in the district;
two government hospitals, 17 dispensaries, six health centers and 10 private or
mission hospitals. Busia, Funyula and Budalang’i had hospitals with resident
doctors.267 The number of private or mission hospitals supersedes that of
government hospitals, evidence of limited government support to develop health
266 Special Report: Kenya’s Lake Region Short Rains Rapid Food Security Assessment (2006) USAID
267 Kenya Country Programme Annual Report (2003)
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in Busia. Morbidity rates in Busia differ for men and women, with women having a
higher morbidity rate (50 %) than men (46 %).268 Infant mortality stands at 75/1000,
while life expectancy is at 210/1000, with a crude death rate of 23/1000.
408. Busia has low enrollment in schools, attributed to high poverty levels. A
large number of children are school drop-outs as evidenced by the levels of
education attainment in the region as well as transition from one level to the
next. Statistics in 2009 show that the transition from pre-primary education
to primary education is very encouraging in Busia, with 16.4 percent of the
school-going population attaining pre-primary education and 72 percent
primary education. It is the transition from primary to secondary education
that is worrying.
409. Out of the 72.3 percent of those that attain primary education, only 9.8 percent
attain secondary education; while only 1.4 attain tertiary education. Some of
the direct consequences of dropping out are the use of child labor and early
marriages. Apart from the discouraging levels of education attainment, the
level of school performance in national exams is also very low. This is attributed
to factors such as poverty, inadequate infrastructure: classrooms, learning
materials and a limited number of schools that increases distances for schoolgoing children. In addition, the student-teacher ratio is very low. This is a major
development challenge.
410. Floods in some parts of Kenya including Kano plains in Nyanza and Budalang’i in
Busia, Western have become a major development challenge. The Nzoia River in
Budalang’i is annually prone to flooding and many people are displaced during
these periods. More than 28 000 families were affected by floods in Budalang’i in
2007 with 6 000 to 8 000 displaced and 2 000 marooned.
411. Negative economic and social impacts of floods include reduced or hampered
economic growth and development, damage to buildings, roads and other
infrastructure, loss of lives from drowning, outbreak of diseases, contamination of
water and loss of food due to destruction of crops. Flood control in this area is
dependent on dykes. The 1997 El-nino rains destroyed some of the dykes in this
area. Over the years, the maintenance and rehabilitation of the dykes has been
poor, posing serious challenges for future flood control. The persistence over
many decades of a problem that can be solved has consigned many residents of
Budalang’i to a life of destitution.
268 http://opendata.go.ke/Counties/Busia-Fact-Sheet/snf5-d89k
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North Rift
412. The North Rift region comprises districts of the Rift Valley to the north of Nakuru
district and is generally accepted to comprise the districts of Turkana, West Pokot,
Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu, Marakwet, Baringo, and Samburu. This area suffers from
developmental and educational neglect, and violence from cattle rustling, both
within Kenya and across the border with Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan.
413. Marginalized under the colonial government and isolated politically and
developmentally after independence, the North Rift shares characteristics of
pastoralist poverty with other arid and semi-arid land (ASAL) districts such as
Marsabit, Moyale, Mandera, and Wajir.269 Unlike the named districts from the former
North Eastern and Upper Eastern provinces, the marginalisation of Turkana, and
by extension the North Rift, is due in large part to its distance from seat of the
central government in Nairobi, rather than perceived ‘political incorrectness’ or
‘political dissidence’.
414. Turkana District, part of ASALs, is arguably the most challenging region of Northern
Kenya and the people of Turkana are some of the most marginalized people living
in the country. According to the 2009 census, the Turkana number close to one
million, approximately 2.5 percent of the Kenyan population. Turkana comprises
of 6 districts: Turkana North, Turkana Central, Turkana West, West Pokot and Pokot
North and has an area of 77 000 square kilometers. It shares international borders
with the three countries of Ethiopia, Uganda and Southern Sudan.
415. A combination of climate and conflict makes the Turkana region of Kenya a very
difficult place to live in, and results in high levels of malnutrition, poverty and
unrest. Nearly 75 percent of the population relies on food aid to survive. The
region’s remote location and poor infrastructure make the area inaccessible to
most government and development efforts to improve the local economy and help
people achieve a better way of life for themselves. Increasing drought has obliged
pastoralists to travel further in their search for pasture and water. This often brings
them into conflict with rival pastoralist communities such as the Pokot.270
416. Turkana is home to Kakuma, one of the largest refugee camps in Kenya. The
communities hosting the camp, like their counterparts in Fafi and Lagdera districts
which are home to the other major camps, are characterized by widespread
269 Taya Weiss, Guns in the Borderlands, North Rift (2006), [Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria]. Available at- www.iss.co.za/pubs/
monographs
270 Northern Kenya caucus- http://nkcaucus.blogspot.com/search/label/United States African Development Foundation (USADF)
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poverty, with absolute poverty at 74 percent; a high level of dependency on relief
food and scarcity of water supply both for livestock and human consumption.
417. According to a UN report, since the establishment of the refugee camp in 1992
adjacent to Kakuma town in Turkana North and Dadaab/Fafi, there has been an
increase in rural-urban migration in search of food, employment and other services
in the camps. This has resulted in increased urban destitution, family separation,
child labour, and increased petty crimes, leading to a significant breakdown of
the social fabric. The presence of the camp resulted in an increase in population
density in the area surrounding the camp.
418. For example the population of Kakuma town grew from 5 000 in 1991 to
approximately 40 000 by the year 2000. The population of Dadaab refugee camp
now stands at almost 200 000.271 The increased feeling of marginalisation among
the Turkana and Dadaab people compounds the problem. The community
views the international agencies with wariness, and believes that the refugees
are leading a better life than they are, characterized by their adequate access
to social services. Hostilities, latent and violent conflicts often characterize the
relationship between the two communities.272

Insecurity and marginalization
419. Insecurity is rife in the North Rift region. Cross-border conflicts between Kenya,
Uganda, Ethiopia and Southern Sudan have continued without or with limited
government action. Neigbouring foreign armies attacking communities in the
North Rift and even shelling bombs by rockets have continued without any
government intervention. Inter-district boundaries not marked by councils lead
to conflicts among communities. These inter-district conflicts are encouraged by
the absence of government protection or by insufficient, demoralized security
personnel at the outpost:273
Turkana borders Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Pokot on the southern part and no border
is peaceful. Turkana is even protecting these borders for the country, but massacres have
been happening all over. Much has been discussed in different meetings. The government
has also sometimes come down, but little has been done. Sometimes we speak to the
government to put offices to guard the border, but you find that little is done. Recently
we had some attacks at Todonyang’, Lokori and Kainuk in the months of June and July,
whereby even policemen were killed. These were husbands and fathers. So, we feel that
the government of Kenya is lacking somewhere.274
271 Refugee Host Communities - Joint Agencies Project. Available at- http://mirror.undp.org
272 Refugee Host Communities - Joint Agencies Project. Available at - http://mirror.undp.org
273 Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, April, 2010 Report of the Committee of National Elders Conference
on Cohesion and Integration. Nairobi: Government Printers. 210
274 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lodwar/ 10 October 2011/ p. 11
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Small arms and light weapons’ proliferation has made traditional raiding (cattle
rustling) a commercial venture, more deadly and severe. Small arms including
automatic and semi-automatic weapons have become widely available and are
increasingly used in the pastoralist districts. These weapons have come from a
variety of sources, including conflict-prone neighbouring countries such as Sudan,
Somalia, Ethiopia and Northern Uganda. With each community constrained to arm
itself due to the inability or unwillingness of the government to assure residents of
security, local “arms races” are created.275 There is inadequate policing of pastoralists
areas as both the national and district police and security forces are either unable
or are unwilling to confront cattle rustlers who have more often than not struck
with impunity. The state’s obligation and duty to provide security to her citizens is
conspicuously under siege in Northern Kenya. This has greatly contributed to the
spiraling gun culture, self-defence and retaliation missions. The arming of local
vigilante groups, popularly known as ‘Home Guards’ by the state, in response to
security problems, has exacerbated the cattle rustling conflict rather than ease the
situation. There are credible reports suggesting that legal state arms issued to these
groups have been used in criminal activities, including cattle rustling raids.276

Political exclusion and marginalisation
421. The North Rift region has experienced political marginalisation since the colonial
period. Regarded as part of the Northern Frontier region (together with North
Eastern Province), the closed-area policy imposed by the colonial regime isolated
the region from the rest of the country and made it impenetrable by ‘outsiders’.
Later, successive regimes imposed the kipande, a pass system or a traveling permit
that made it difficult for the community to interact with the rest of the country. The
colonial administration suppressed any form of development, terming residents as
‘fierce’, ‘savage’, ‘warlike’ and had to be separated through a variety of restrictions.277
In contemporary times, the people of North Rift have complained that they are
inadequately represented in national political institutions and the public service
since independence. It is a glaring contradiction that in representation in Parliament,
a vast county like Turkana with an area covering 77,000 square kilometers with a
population of one million, only has three constituencies. Furthermore, for a long
time it has been administered as one district until recently, when President Kibaki
created new districts. Equally, new constituencies were proposed for the region by
the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC) and later ratified
by its successor, the Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC),
which conducted the March 2013 General Election, in which they participated.
275 R Pkalya, M Adan and I Masinde. (2003). Conflict in Northern Kenya: A Focus on the Internally Displaced Conflict Victims in
Northern Kenya. Nairobi: ITDG-EA 64
276 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 275 above)
277 Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs (n 297 above) p.209
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422. The people within this region feel inadequately represented not only in
government and national elective bodies, but also allege marginalisation
in public employment in relation to other ethnic communities due to the
perception that they are not educated. People from outside the region also form
an overwhelming majority in local public service positions: an estimated 99
percent of departmental heads in Turkana County are not ethnic Turkana. This
is the trend even in UN agencies and NGOs that operate in Turkana. Therefore,
there is a perception that all avenues through which the locals could channel
their grievances are blocked. The new county dispensation however presents
better prospects for the community.
423.

Because of the harsh climatic conditions in the region, many public servants
including teachers regard a posting in Turkana as a disciplinary measure. Practices
abound within the civil service whereby disciplinary cases and those who fall out
of favour with their superiors are sent to the ASAL regions like Turkana as a form of
punishment. The perception among locals is that those posted there have no passion
in tackling concerns that afflict the community. Poor leadership is also a hurdle to
participation by the community. They blame the government’s wrong methods of
decision-making in processes such as disarmament and the misuse of the provincial
administration in dictating to the community on what to do. Many government
projects in the region have turned out to be white elephants due to failure to consult
and involve the community in the design and planning of such activities.

Inter-ethnic conflicts, cattle rustling and droughts
424. Various factors compound the effects of economic marginalisation. Physical
boundaries cutting across traditional migratory routes and wars in neighbouring
countries continually bring increased problems in accessing traditional
grazing resources by the people in the North Rift. Weapons entering Kenya
from neighbouring war-torn countries have made raids between communities
increasingly dangerous and sophisticated. In addition to traditional cattle raiding,
conflicts in the region have at times assumed economic and political proportions.
There have been allegations in the past that economically-powerful people fund
livestock thefts and politicians are encouraging conflicts to flush out would-be
supporters of political opponents from their political turfs.278 These factors have
compounded and complicated conflict management processes, especially when
remoteness and the nomadic nature of the pastoralists are taken into account.
Any positive impact of the work of development agencies is negated by persistent
conflict:279
278 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde. (n 275 above).
279 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 275 above).
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I would like to make a presentation about raids and killings and other occurrences within
Turkana South District. It is the same issues concerning Turkana East District, which was
part of Turkana South until it was hived off. In the previous years, especially in the 1970s
and 1980s, there were cattle rustling between the Turkana and the Pokot. This was not
taken very seriously, because they thought it was just raids; the Pokot stealing from the
Turkana, and the Turkana stealing from the Pokot. They killed each other. But in the 1990s,
the cattle rustling changed into something completely different. It became attacks. It was
transformed into burning of villages, killing people in villages, attacking government
camps, and there was lot of more killing than when the traditional cattle raids used to be
there. This went on from 1992 and led to the people from areas of Katilu, Kainuk, Kaptiur
and Lokori to move towards the north. They all moved towards the north. These raids
made them to be poor. But because of the mercy of the Almighty God, he got us manna
from heaven, and put gold in some of the northern areas. The people of south and east
moved into the north. They started surviving on gold. The rest of us who were left in those
centres would not sleep. We did not have morning, or evening. It was fighting all through.
This went on for many years until, eventually, we had a bit of peace. This peace was shortlived. They, eventually, came back.280

425.

The North Rift region has suffered perennial drought over the years with devastating
effects for human and animal life. Images of starving children and dead livestock
have become almost synonymous with the experience in North Rift and Northern
Kenya in general. Yet despite the regularity and predictability of drought, adequate
arrangements to enhance communities’ resilience to cope with severe droughts
and other disasters have not been undertaken in northern Kenya. During droughts,
the pastoralist’s livelihoods become particularly precarious. There are worrying
incidences of conflict over scarce water and pastures during dry spells, which can
last for as long as eight months. Economic insecurity and deprivation during drought
has increased the risk of violence and social breakdown.281

426. There have been persistent food shortages among the pastoralist communities.
Food insecurity in the region arose due to the collapse of irrigation schemes and
the construction of a hydroelectric dam/power plant that has interfered with
the Turkwel River.282 The effects of drought produce displacement. Women and
children bear the brunt of these forms of violence and many of them go without
food for days. They depend on wild fruits (Elamach and Edapal), which are scarce
and seasonal. Cases of malnutrition are rampant in these conflict-prone districts,
as the communities’ traditional diet consisting of meat, milk and blood becomes
increasingly unavailable. Deaths from starvation have become a common feature
of life in this part of the country.283
280 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lodwar/ 10 October 2011/ p. 25
281 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 275 above).
282 Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs, April, 2010 Report of the Committee of National Elders Conference
on Cohesion and Integration. Nairobi: Government Printers 210.
283 As above.
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427. In terms of public employment, the North Rift region lags behind because of the
high levels of illiteracy due to the low number of schools in the region, especially
secondary schools. Insecurity has been a major challenge to school attendance, as
children fear going to school. There have been reports of children being attacked in
schools by bandits and rustlers. Some schools have closed due to insecurity and the
effects of drought. According to a website operated by Turkana professionals, many
Turkana graduates are jobless. Yet, almost all employees in government offices in
Turkana and NGOs are non-Turkana. Even in the newly-created districts, no District
Education Officer (DEO), District Officer (DO), or District Commissioner (DC) from the
community was posted to the district.284
428. The North Rift is almost without any physical infrastructure. The Kitale-Lokichoggio
road is the only meaningful road in the region which is tarmacked. It has however
eroded badly over the years. There are no access roads to rural land and crossborder roads have been neglected.285

Land and investment
429. The land tenure system in Turkana is in need of serious reform. While collective
holding of land is useful in protecting land resources for a pastoralist community,
the near absence of individual titles poses serious problems for would-be investors.
Most of the land in the region is held as trust land by the county council. Animals are
not insured and when stolen in raids, the owners are not compensated. According
to the KIPPRA…….. Land Reform and Poverty Report286 the region has shown low
levels of land ownership rights which is indicated by the proportion of individuals
with title deeds to a parcel of land. The fact that the people are not issued with
title deeds limits them economically as they cannot access loans from financial
institutions or any commercial use.
430. Conflict acts as a disincentive to investment by the communities and development
agencies, both in the long-term and short-term. At the local level, a lot of effort
and funds go to contain conflicts and to mitigate against conflict-related effects,
rather than being channeled to development work. Similarly, market centres such
as Chesegon, Marti and Nachola are virtually deserted due to conflict and the
resultant insecurity. Many roads are no longer useful economically. The Turkana,
Pokot, Marakwet and the Samburu communities have lost between 50 percent
and 80 percent of their livestock to either drought or cattle rustling. It is extremely
difficult for pastoralists to get started over again after such heavy stock losses.287
284 Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs (n 307 above).p.210
285 As above, 209
286 Joseph Kieyah and Robert K Nyaga Land Reform and Poverty in Kenya. Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and
Analysis (KIPPRA) p.8
287 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 295 above) p.15
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431. Turkana in itself is richly endowed with natural resources, but which remain
largely untapped. Turkana District has rich building sand and quarry materials.
Small-scale mining is found in the southern part of the district at Nakwamoru
and central parts at Makutano near Kakuma. While there are some reported gold
deposits, mining is not of a commercial nature, though an alluvial type of gold is
being exploited.288

Pastoralism and other cultural practices
432. Most of the people living in the North Rift region are pastoralists. Pastoralists
are some of the most marginalized people in Kenya, often having virtually no
say over the changes that are impacting on their lives. Pastoralists derive their
livelihoods mainly from natural resources - pasture, water, natural vegetation
and livestock. However, reduced access to these resources, particularly land and
water, has increasingly put pastoralists under intense pressure. As a result, they
are increasingly finding themselves fighting for their survival.289
433. In most of the areas in the North Rift, conflicts have increased economic hardship
as the people’s only livelihoods option (pastoralism) has been ravaged. Cattle have
been stolen in raids, increasing the vulnerability of resource-poor pastoralists
to hunger, malnutrition and abject poverty. Livestock, food, crops, money and
property are looted in raids and schools, health facilities and settlements are
destroyed.
434. Cultural practices such as cattle rustling and banditry have led to the loss of many
human lives and the displacement of various population groups. The raiding is
accompanied by indiscriminate killing of innocent people, the majority of them
women, children and the elderly. One morning alone in Marakwet District, more
than 50 people were killed in cold blood in one cattle rustling incident. The
practice has undergone fundamental transformation from a cultural practice of
replenishing cattle, to a more militarised, predatory and destructive practice. The
practice has experienced significant commercialization.

Education
435. Learning is affected when teachers are forced to withdraw from conflict-stricken
areas and the communities re-locate their settlements for fear of being invaded.
Education for children and the youth is affected and interrupted in the short and
long run. In the conflict between the Marakwet and the Pokot, about 25 schools
have been abandoned, while at least 27 schools have been closed in Samburu
288 Security Research and Information Centre Terrorized Citizens p.16
289 Pkalya, Adan and Masinde (n 295 above)
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Commissioners touring the collapsed Turkana Fishermen Cooperative Society in Lodwar.

District. Moreover, although primary schools are widely available, secondary
schools are few and tertiary colleges are non-existent, except for some few
satellite programmes at certificate and diploma level confined in Lodwar town
run by Mt Kenya University. Turkana District has about 175 pre-primary schools,
136 primary schools, eight secondary schools, two youth polytechnics and one
medical training college.290
436. Efforts have been made to improve access to education by pastoralist
communities. The first one is the creation of mobile schools, whereby around 50
mobile schools are now in operation in six arid districts including Turkana and
Samburu in the North Rift. Teachers in these schools are attached to a nomadic
family or group of families. After three years in the mobile school, the children
are supposed to enrol in conventional boarding schools. The advantage of this
type of schooling is that children do not have to leave home and can continue
their household work. The disadvantage is that mobile schools are difficult to
staff, manage and monitor. Households can scatter at any time, causing students
290 J Kamenju, M Singo and F Wairagu. (2003). Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Kenya.
Nairobi: Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) p.17
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to move in and out of the system with negative consequences.291 There are
also sedentary schools for mobile populations. Alternative Basic Education for
Turkana (ABET) has set up learning centres at semi-permanent villages near
important roads. In Samburu District, shepherd schools (Ichekuti) have evening
classes in conventional schools for village children who spend the day herding.292
437. In his 2011/2012 budget speech the Finance minister recognized that education
is a lifelong investment that should be extended to Kenyan children so as to
secure the future of the nation. So Sh8.25 billion was allocated for free primary
education, Sh18.5 billion for free day secondary education and Sh1.67 billion
for the free school feeding programmes in the ASALs areas like those in the
North Rift. Sh387.7 million was allocated for early childhood development.293
For educational development and infrastructure, Sh750 million was allocated
to upgrade national schools, Sh680 million for the purchase of computers for
schools to enhance access to quality learning materials, Sh780 million for the
improvement of infrastructure in schools and Sh380 million for the construction
of low-cost boarding schools in ASAL areas.

Health Services, social amenities, water and sanitation
438. The number of health facilities has increased in all the districts, but most of them
remain under-utilized probably because of cultural reasons, cost-sharing and
insecurity. In many cases government hospitals do not have drugs to dispense.
Malnutrition among children below five years is rampant, especially among the
poor.294 There is limitation in the number of health facilities in Turkana, with only
one district hospital serving the entire county of six vast districts.
We find that some facilities like maternity wards are not found back in our villages
and even here in town. You just find that it is only the district hospital that has such
facilities. Most of the hospitals or dispensaries are owned by a church diocese and
other institutions like Care International and the Africa Inland Church (AIC). The
government has not put up dispensaries and hospitals for the people. In many cases,
our women want to go for delivery services, and when there are complications, they
take time to reach the district hospital; as a result many die on the way.295
291 David Siele, Jeremy Swift and Saverio Krätli (2011). Reaching Pastrolists with Formal Education: A distance-Learning Strategy of
Kenya. Paper presented at the International Conference on the Future of Pastoralism, 21-23 March 2011. Organized by the Future
Agricultures Consortium and the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sessex and Feinstein International Center of Tufts
University 5.
292 Siele, Swift and Krätli (n 291 above)
293 2011-12 Budget Statement for the Fiscal Year 2011/2012 (1st July-30th June) by Hon. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta
294 R Pkalya, M Adan and I Masinde (2003). Conflict in Northern Kenya: A Focus on the Internally Displaced Conflict Victims in
Northern Kenya. Nairobi: ITDG-EA. P.20
295 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Lodwar/ 10 October 2011/ p. 14
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439. Conflict also leads to destruction of social amenities. Postal services, social
amenities are only dotted along the dilapidated highway road linked to South
Sudan. Water is a scarce resource, particularly during the dry season. People
often travel more than 10 kilometres in search of water for domestic use and for
livestock. Thus, conflict over water sources and pasture between Turkana and
their neighbours is common.296 Most of the people in the North Rift also have
no toilets or latrines. They help themselves in the bush. They have poor housing.
Houses are made from brushes, wood, branches, leaves, grass and with no doors
and windows for protection. Electricity penetration remains negligible. This is
despite the fact that Turkwel gorge electric power originates from Turkana, but
services other districts.

State Responses to Marginalisation
440. In analyzing the context within which economic marginalisation has occurred
in Kenya, one of the main features noted is the centralised nature of the state
and its, fusion with the private sector. This fusion generated client-patron
networks as different actors vied to gain access to resources at the centre. In
the face of agitation linked to economic marginalisation, the state traditionally
responded in one of two ways. The first impulse on the part of the incumbent
government was invariably to work against any attempt to weaken the power
of the centralised state and to defend the incumbent leader’s hold on power
and the economic trappings that came with it. Some of the political events that
have defined Kenya - assassinations (Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya, JM Kariuki
and Robert Ouko), major political fallouts (Kenyatta-Odinga; Moi-Odinga;
Kibaki-Odinga), and recourse to authoritarianism marked by detention without
trial and torture - can be attributed to the fear of those at the centre that they
would lose power or their perch at the economic table that holds the proverbial
‘national cake’.
441. Where grievances were acknowledged, the state responded by ceding to minor
demands for inclusiveness and the wider distribution of national resources, but
largely channeling this through co-opted individuals from particular ethnic/
regional constituencies. Such a response did not touch the existing political
structure or dislodge patronage networks and the inequitable resource flows
from the centre to ‘favoured regions’. In the early years of independence and
296 J Kamenju, M Singo and F Wairagu. (2003). Terrorized Citizens: Profiling Small arms and Insecurity in the North Rift Kenya.
Nairobi: Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) 17
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early in President Moi’s rule, changes in the law (the constitution) were not
directed at empowering the regions, but rather were geared towards creating
a stronger, more centralised state marked by personalisation of power. These
changes produced a state that ended up being less just, more authoritarian and
exclusionary.
442. The second way in which the state responded was politically through co-option,
especially of key leaders from marginalised communities. However, since the
clamour for economic goods was invariably linked to, and in fact preceded
demands for greater democratic space, co-option of certain groups was often
accompanied by continued marginalisation of the respective community and
clamping down on popular dissent that was expressed politically from respective
communities. Apart from failure to confront embedded structural economic
injustice, co-option almost always brought no benefits to communities from
which beneficiary leaders hailed. Benefits accrued only to those co-opted
and in very exceptional situations other elites around the co-opted individual
or indirectly to their respective groups of origin. This is an approach that was
perfected by both the Moi and Kenyatta regimes. Asingo’s comments relating to
the latter apply with equal force to the former:
In order to entrench his leadership, Kenyatta perfected the art of neo-patrimonialism.
This involved incorporating into the political system and the bureaucratic institutions
the patrimonial logic of ascribing the right to rule to a person rather than to an office.
Kenyatta’s neo-patrimonialism was characterized by what Bratton and Walle refer to
as systematic clientelism, where public sector jobs, material rewards and economic
opportunities were offered as favours to clients who in turn mobilized political support
and loyalty to the patron.297

443. While co-option can be regarded as a response to marginalisation to the extent
that it brought particular individuals within existing client-patron networks, cooption had a marginalizing effect in respect of non-cooperative elites and the
broader community; and was perhaps designed to pacify a few while consigning
the majority to the fringes of the economic system. In any case, providing
any economic incentive for political support for the broader group appeared
unnecessary because their support was presumed once their leaders had been
accommodated somewhat within the economic patronage network.
444. Throughout the years, the tokenism involved in co-option of leaders from different
ethnic communities who then became ‘point men’ for political mobilization not
297 Asingo (n 30 above)
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only lent an appearance of inclusiveness to an otherwise exclusionary economic
and political system, but also ensured that the national leader had just enough
support beyond his ethnic base to hold onto power and to command a level of
popular legitimacy.
445. Once this support was secured, the rest of the population was dispensable.
Asingo blames the patron-client system for Kenya’s slide into dictatorial rule and
corruption. In this regard, he notes of the Kenyatta regime - a statement that
applies as well to the post-1982 Moi regime - that “the corporatist aspirations
of the state elites and their reliance on patron-client political ties was largely
responsible for the transformation of the Kenyatta regime to an authoritarian
state”. Bratton and Wale, cited with approval by Asingo have observed in this
regard that:
[r]elationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative
system and officials occupy bureaucratic positions less to perform public services,
their ostensible purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status. Although state
functionaries receive an official salary, they also enjoy access to various forms of illicit
rents, pre-bends, and petty corruption, which constitute a sometimes important
entitlement of office.298

446. A lot more than dictatorship and corruption can be blamed on the patron-client
political relations in post-independence Kenya.

Responses to Marginalisation in the pre-2010 era
447. The struggle for economic empowerment and inclusion in Kenya is inseparable
from the struggles for the expansion of political and democratic space. Minimal
reforms of the political system undertaken in the 1990s form the basis of the
more fundamental changes introduced by the 2010 Constitution. The democratic
reforms have relevance at two levels at least.
448. First, the repeal of Section 2A of the previous constitution that allowed the
introduction of multi-party politics opened up the hitherto closed political space
for the oppressed and marginalised sections of society to speak up and express
their concerns. Before 1990, any form of agitation was ruthlessly suppressed, with
those involved thrown into jail, often without trial. Civil society groups equipped
with the tools of mobilization, an essential element in securing social goods for
economically marginalised groups, began to take root.
298 Asingo (n 30 above).
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449. Secondly, by expanding political participation, divergent views and leaders
acquired increased space for expression and accommodation at the national
level. Although the political and economic structure had not changed in
any fundamental way, their participation started to chip away at the system,
culminating in the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group Reforms (IPPGR) in 1997 that
opened further the democratic space while repealing numerous oppressive laws
including emergency laws under which the former NFD had been governed since
the late 1960s as well as laws that authorized detention without trial. However,
while political space opened up, the economic structure largely remained intact
and with the independence party KANU retaining power in both multi-party
elections in the 1990s (1992 and 1997), the old patronage networks remained
undisturbed.
450. Moi as president had managed to retain power in both elections through the
expansion of the patronage network by co-opting from opposition ranks, thus
weakening the opposition. As the economic situation worsened in the 1990s,
public land - including forests and land set aside for utilities - became the main
currency used to purchase political support. It is reported that the worst forms of
grabbing of public land, including forests, happened during this period.
451. The nature of the economic structure and the manner in which it furthered
economic marginalisation of those not at the centre in post-independence
Kenya was examined in Part II of this chapter. As noted, Kenya has had two
long-term development policy frameworks and subsequently, several five-year
policies. The two long-term policy frameworks were: 1) Sessional Paper No. 10
of 1965 entitled ‘African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya’ and;
Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 entitled ‘Economic Management for Renewed
Growth’.
452. Sessional Paper No 10, the blueprint for economic development at independence,
had several objectives: to ensure equal opportunities for all citizens; to provide
democracy; to ensure that resources were used for the benefit of society and its
members; to encourage various forms of ownership of property; and, to promote
freedom of conscience and human dignity. As earlier discussed, although newlyindependent Kenya and subsequently the Moi regime had developed a useful
economic framework that would have created an equitable, inclusive and fair
economic system, these frameworks were never really properly put to use. What
ruled the day was political survival and the use of the state machinery to enrich
those at the centre of power or those connected to power and to some degree
their respective communities.
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453. A state that had responded forcefully to the marginalisation of Africans by
introducing affirmative action measures through the Africanisation programme
soon adopted the exclusionary practices of the departing colonial administration
that was once loathed. Only this time the divide was not racial but rather ethnic
and regional. In the Moi era, there were fringe and token measures that did
not touch the core architecture of the exclusionary state, notwithstanding the
good record that the Moi regime had in the education sector. (In discussing the
case of Nyanza, it is acknowledged that there were attempts to reorient policy
- especially in education - to benefit areas that had been marginalised under
Kenyatta). However, the manner in which corrective measures were implemented
was such that it had the effect of not only erasing the legacy of lagging behind,
but also tilted the balance completely in favour of certain regions, thus creating
new ‘victims’ of marginalisation.
454. Although co-option seemed to be the favoured approach to inclusion, there
is evidence of policy measures that benefited or that at least had the effect of
benefiting the wider population in regions that were considered marginalised.
One of the programmes that received attention in our hearings was the district
focused-development instituted by Moi. In his communication to the Commission,
Moi cited this programme as one of his major projects that was meant to enhance
equitable development. Moi asserts that his policy of ‘District Focus’ brought
development to the previously marginalised areas and should be applauded as
the basis of devolution as conceived in the current Constitution, stating:
In an effort to create equitable system of development countrywide, I also formed the
district focus for rural development, which is a concrete pre-cursor of devolution, which
we have formally adopted in our Constitution.299

455. Indeed, testimonies were heard from Kenyans who said they had benefited in
some way from the ‘District Focus’ programme, which they claimed was a success.
Daniel Chacha Muherei, from a region itself regarded as marginalised and one of
the poorest districts in Nyanza, testified on behalf of Kuria MP Wilfred Machage:
In a teacher training intake, huge disparities occurred with other Nyanza communities
grabbing most of the chances, including those designated for the Kuria students. For
example, in 1973, Kuria was given five chances to train P3 teachers, but instead only
two were taken and the rest of the positions were filled by other communities. Such
a practice continued for a long time until former President Moi sympathised with
the Kuria people and gave us our own Kuria District, which became the focus for the
teacher recruitment.300
299 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.24
300 TJRC/ Hansard/ Public Hearing / Kuria/ 25 July 2011/ p. 5
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456. The north of Kenya is one region that has received special attention in terms of
targeted projects, all of which unfortunately failed either because they were illconceived, were not funded, money was lost through corruption, or they did not
receive local buy-in. Rejecting the claim that his government had economically
marginalised that part of the country, Moi appears to cite the creation of a special
ministry for that region as evidence of inclusion, adding that his government took
various measures to promote equitable development, including that of North
Eastern and North Kenya:
[…] But despite these natural impediments, my government made a big effort to
reach our people there, and today, despite all the challenges, the people of the dry
areas feel as Kenyans, as the rest of the citizens… I created the Ministry of Reclamation
of Arid and Semi-arid Lands and appointed Hon Justus Ndotto as its first Minister. This
was one of my attempts to speed up development in the arid areas.301

457. What is not stated is that little was achieved through this ministry, for reasons
that the Commission was not able to ascertain. A similar ministry was created
by the Kibaki administration, but complaints relating to lack of a specific kitty
allocated to it to carry out development projects were voiced. MPs from Northern
Kenya complained that they had thought that this would not be the case, but to
their chagrin, the ministry made no difference because it ‘had been reduced to
coordinating other government agencies’.
458. These examples led the conclusion that while the need to address marginalisation
in certain regions was clear and programmes had been created for this purpose,
there was lack of implementation. The Commission concurred with views
expressed by some that such programmes were only initiated ‘”for political
reasons” to give the impression that something was being done could be justified.

Responses to economic marginalisation in the period 2003-2011
459. Kenyans began 2003 with great euphoria. They had, in the historic elections of
2002, brought to an end the 40-year dictatorial and exclusionary rule of KANU,
the independence party. When supporting the Kibaki-led ‘Rainbow Coalition’
of key leaders from different parts of Kenya, they were rejecting ills associated
with the previous regimes, including marginalisation, widespread inequity and
exclusion. Writing just before the 2002 elections, Odhiambo Mbai, (an eminent
scholar and head of the Devolution Committee during the National Constitutional
Conference held at Bomas of Kenya, Nairobi) described the elation that met the
appointment of a generally balanced cabinet on January 3, 2003:
301 Written Submission by Former President Daniel arap Moi to the TJRC (2012) p.23
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President Kibaki announced his new cabinet at a function at State House, witnessed
by the media. It was a leaner cabinet than the one that had been presided over by
Moi. It comprised 24 Ministers and 24 Assistant Ministers. He named three women to
full ministerial positions and four Assistant Ministers—the highest number of women
ever appointed into the cabinet since independence. Despite a few murmurs, the
cabinet was hailed as truly representative of the country.302

460.

Mbai then captured the beginning of disappointment with the Kibaki government,
one that would partly precipitate fallout within the coalition in 2004, serving as a
precursor to the hotly-contested National Referendum on the Constitution in 2005
while setting the stage for the tragic events of 2007-2008:
[…] when it came to the second batch of appointments of permanent secretaries,
widespread outrage was expressed. The appointments included people who are well
past their official retirement ages and thus lack in energy, drive and creativity. Besides,
the appointments reflected an attempt to recycle key officials from the Moi regime
who had been responsible for the excesses of the regime in the first place. Due to this
fact, the majority of Kenyans were already wondering whether the new government
was serious about implementing the change for which they had voted.303

461. Although at its core, the Kibaki administration can be said to have largely maintained
most of the practices of the previous regimes - concentrating appointments to
key public positions in one region and similarly focusing development money,
especially for infrastructure - it must be given credit for increased inclusion at the
centre It can be argued that this has perhaps been the case because inclusion was
in part mandated by political agreements (NARC in 2002 and the National Accord in
2008). Increased scrutiny of governmental processes by citizens, itself attributable
to increased political consciousness among Kenyans has had an important role in
forcing inclusion, at least in appointments.
462. One of the key responses to marginalisation that had a visible structural impact
in thinking at the centre as well as visible economic effect in the regions was the
introduction of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). Perhaps because of
the involvement of MPs (who are national political actors) and the larger sums of
money involved, CDF has had great visibility. It is often forgotten that CDF operates
alongside other devolved funds, most of which pre-date the CDF. As of 2011, there
were about 13 different devolved funds.
463. It is arguable that in the period 2000 to 2011, Kenya tried to shift its approach to
development from the top-down to a more people-centered, bottom-up approach
302 C Odhiambo-Mbai ‘The rise and fall of the autocratic state in Kenya’ in W Oyugi (eds) The politics of transition in Kenya: From
KANU to NARC (2003) 51, 92.
303 As above.
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to development. This is perhaps best seen in the increase in both the devolved
funding initiatives and increased funds allocation to particular devolved funds.
In the 2007/2008 budgetary allocation, more than Sh58 billion went to devolved
structures. Despite some challenges, milestones have been marked under the
decentralised funds regime: schools, health centers and recreation facilities
have been built, water and sanitation facilities have become more accessible,
employment opportunities have been created through enterprise and the roads
network has been improved.
464. The CDF has become one of the more successful devolved funds since its
inception. According to a report on devolved funds, CDF has been viewed as a key
strategic driver of socio-economic development and regeneration within Kenya. It
is a development initiative targeted at the constituencies by devolving resources
to the regions to meet socio-economic objectives which have previously been
managed from the centre established in 2003 through the CDF Act as published in
the Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 107 (Act No. 11) of 9 January 2004 (later replaced
by the CDF Amendment Act of 2007), the main objective of CDF is to fight poverty
and shift planning and identification of projects to local communities. At least 2.5
percent of Government revenue is allocated to the Fund. It is reported that almost
KES 60 billion has been channeled through CDF since its inception. CDF is reported
to contribute over 10 percent of all development in Kenya.

Responses to economic marginalisation in the new constitutional era
465. The main and most structured response to economic marginalisation in postindependence Kenya is the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Other than its specific
provisions that relate to particular groups considered as marginalised, such
as women, ethnic minorities, indigenous people and the disabled, there are
provisions that are overarching in nature. They have relevance for all groups that
have previously suffered economic marginalisation. These provisions relate to: 1)
national values; 2) the Bill of Rights; 3) the devolution framework; 4) affirmative
action and; 5) land reforms.

National values and the interpretive process
466. Unlike the previous constitution, the entire constitutional framework is today
underpinned by certain fundamental principles provided for under Article 10(2)
and provides that the national values and principles of governance include:


patriotism, national unity, sharing and devolution of power, the rule of law,
democracy and participation of the people;
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Human dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights,
non-discrimination and protection of the marginalised;



Good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability; and



Sustainable development.

467. While all the principles are important, those captured under Article 10(2) (b)
have direct relevance for marginalised groups. There are specific provisions
elsewhere in the 2010 Constitution that regulate specific issues, granting rights,
imposing duties, prescribing actions, donating powers and so on. However, the
importance of constitutional values and principles is that they tie everything
together. Principles and values are really the soul of the Constitution, the
guiding light providing a kind of roadmap and justification of the entire laws.
While principles and values stand as a pursuit of their own, their main function
is to guide the interpretation of specific provisions of the Constitution and
of legislation (Acts of Parliament, county legislation and local government
by-laws).
468. Article 10(1) provides that the values bind all state organs, state officers, public
officers and any person who applies or interprets the Constitution’ as well
as any of these when they enact, apply or interpret any law. Similarly, these
constitutional values enumerated in Article 10 must underpin the making and
implementation of public policy decisions by the named individuals and entities.
Legislation, policy, regulations, administrative directions or other measures that
do not accord with these values and principles are in their face, unconstitutional
and thus null and void. Accordingly, measures taken by various state organs in
respect of previously marginalised groups can, and should be tested against
these values and principles for constitutional validity.

The Bill of Rights and socio-economic rights
469. One of the main claims made by those clamoring for a new constitution was that
it must come equipped with a comprehensive Bill of Rights that would provide a
bulwark against a powerful and unaccountable Executive that routinely cracked
down on dissent by all means available to it. People wanted a constitution that
would guarantee them justice whenever any of their rights were violated by the
state or private entities. Today, it is accurate to state that one of the main gains for
Kenyans in general in the new Constitution is a robust Bill of Rights, which boldly
addresses the claims already enumerated, but goes much further in a number
of respects. From the perspective of social exclusion and marginalisation, the
Bill of Rights forms the basis, both of claims specific to marginalised groups, and
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a robust adjudication framework that could be activated when these rights are
breached.

The Bill of Rights as a mandatory framework for social policies
470. The Bill of Rights is a mandatory framework for social policies. Under the new
Constitution, the Bill of Rights is a central pillar for inclusion. The Constitution
locates social, economic and cultural policies within the Bill of Rights. This means
that the government - at national and county level - must ensure that all policies
they adopt are Bill of Rights compliant. In this regard, Article 19(1) provides that “the
Bill of Rights is an integral part of Kenya’s democratic state and is the framework
for social, economic and cultural policies.” It continues to state at sub-section 2
that “the purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities and to promote
social justice and the realization of the potential of all human beings.”
471. It is also crucial to note that the Bill of Rights binds all organs of state. Article 2(1)
enacts that “this Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and binds all
persons and all state organs at both levels of government”. In the exercise of their
functions - the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government at both levels
- must be guided by the Constitution. This provision renders any act performed by
these actors unconstitutional if it done outside the bounds of the Constitution.
In dealing with previously marginalised groups (women, the poor, minorities and
indigenous people) relevant constitutional provisions discussed here must be
adhered to.
472. In terms of implementation, the responsibility of all state organs is also engaged.
Article 2(1) provides that ”it is a fundamental duty of the state and every state
organ to observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights and fundamental
freedoms in the Bill of Rights.” It is also important to note that one of the principles
to guide state action is equality and non-discrimination. Article 27(4) prohibits
direct or indirect discrimination of any person on any ground, including race,
sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age,
disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth. This
provision, as well as other provisions in Article 27 on equal opportunities, is a
potent tool that previously marginalised groups can use to attack discriminatory
legislation, policies and other measures in a variety of sectors including public
employment, distribution of resources and social goods.
473. The Constitution itself empowers the government by providing it with a
constitutional mandate to remedy marginalisation. Article 27(6) provides that
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the state is required to take measures, including instituting affirmative action
measures, to ensure that the right to non-discrimination is enjoyed by those
previously marginalised. As will be clear later in this Report, this provision
would sanction measures such as reservation of political seats for previously
marginalised groups and special budgetary allocations that benefit these groups
alone to the exclusion of other groups or the broader public.

Socio-economic rights as a framework for social Intervention
474. One of the greatest innovations in the Bill of Rights is the inclusion of a catalogue
of socio-economic rights (SERs). By providing for these rights, the Constitution of
Kenya, 2010 stands among few in the world. This inclusion is revolutionary for at
least one reason which is relevant for marginalised groups. Like the South African
constitution, the Kenyan Constitution differs from the traditional liberal model
(with its minimalist state with limited powers) to a transformative model, which
requires state intervention to advance equality, human dignity and social justice.
To be specific, Article 43 of the Constitution provides in part as follows:
Every person has the right— (a) to the highest attainable standard of health, which
includes the right to health care services, including reproductive health care; (b) to
accessible and adequate housing, and to reasonable standards of sanitation; (c) to be
free from hunger, and to have adequate food of acceptable quality; (d) to clean and
safe water in adequate quantities; (e) to social security; and (f ) to education.

475.

For its part, Article 20(2) recognizes the difference in the nature of rights (especially
civil and political and social economic rights) by providing that ”every person shall
enjoy the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights to the greatest
extent consistent with the nature of the right or fundamental freedom”. Other than
the nature of the right, the Constitution also recognizes that SERs impose certain
burdens — especially budgetary — on the state and that realization of this category
of rights should be progressive. However, the state cannot just sit by because these
rights impose special obligations. In terms of Article 21(2) of the Constitution, the
State is required to take legislative, policy and other measures, including the setting
of standards, to achieve the progressive realization of these rights.

476. The state must demonstrate that the stated goals can be achieved. The test of
compliance will include criteria relating to whether the state has taken any measures
and whether the measures taken can reasonably be considered to advance the
realization of the right in question. Since the marginalisation of groups often has
the result of depriving them of social goods, vast opportunities are presented by
SERs in the Constitution (Article 43) for previously marginalised groups, including
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possibilities for litigation to hold government to account. To ensure that these
groups can benefit from this facility, several measures are recommended for
relevant actors at the end of this chapter.

Access to Justice Rights
477. Informed by Kenya’s past history where ‘Executive-friendly’ courts found reasons
to refuse to hear or order remedies in cases of human rights violations, the
Constitution provides for the right of access to justice as a free-standing right.
This is a right that is of particular importance for previously marginalised groups
who often not only operate on the fringes of the mainstream socio-economic
system, but also struggle to access justice in a variety of ways.
478. As a new right in the Constitution, the High Court will have to consent to it. In
this exercise, there are likely to be theatres of contest. For our purposes, it is
suggested that the following elements – already flagged in certain provisions of
the Constitution – should be considered as integral to the discussion: distance
(relating to geographical reach of forums of adjudication by litigants); cost (which
is often-times prohibitive, especially for the poor); process (in terms of rules and
procedures that hinder or facilitate adjudication of claims) and; time (the need for
expeditious justice).
479. The 2010 Constitution has put to rest the heated philosophical debate that
continues to rage elsewhere: whether claims related to SERs are knowable in law,
and that they can be adjudicated upon by a court as legal claims. It is important to
remember that rights in the Bill of Rights, including SERs, are justiciable claims. This
means that they impose certain obligations on the state (vertically) and on private
actors (horizontally), and that when these are breached, they can be adjudicated by
a court of law. Those with tangible claims of a socio-economic character, including
those around dispossession of land can bring them to a court of law.
480. When the provision on access to justice is read with those that deal with locus standi,
(that is, the ability of an individual, group or entity to bring claims before a court of
law) it becomes evident that previously marginalised groups have at their disposal
a very robust mechanism within which they can articulate their interests. Article
258 and Article 22 of the Constitution provide for the most expansive possibilities
on who can bring a claim to court. Article 258, which relates to the enforcement of
the Constitution as a whole and is thus the basis of locus for any claim relating to
the enforcement of the Constitution, provides in sub-section 1 that every person
has the right to institute court proceedings, claiming that this Constitution has
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been contravened, or is threatened with contravention. Sub-section 2 then adds
that in addition to a person acting in their own interest, court proceedings under
clause (1) may be instituted by:


a person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own
name;



a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons;



a person acting in the public interest; or



an association acting in the interest of one or more of its members.

481. Article 22, which is located in Chapter IV of the Constitution (Bill of Rights)
reproduces the terms of Article 258, but adds a provision for the Chief Justice
to make rules relating to human rights claims and criteria for bringing the
same. The test of compliance will include criteria relating to whether the state
has taken any measures and whether the measures taken can reasonably be
considered to advance the realization of the right in question. Vast opportunities
are presented by SERs in the Constitution for previously marginalised groups,
including possibilities for litigation to hold government to account. To ensure
that previously marginalised groups can benefit from this facility, this Report has
recommended several measures for relevant actors.

Devolution framework
482. Although at independence Kenya bucked the trend in the majority of African
countries by adopting a devolved system of government, it was dismantled by
1966, paving way for a centralised state. Centralised systems of government that
were preferred by newly-independent states began to be associated with state
failure in Africa and the developing world.
483. The abuse associated with a centralised system, including exclusion and
marginalisation of certain regions by successive post-independence governments
led to the clamour for a devolved system that was more equitable, fair and
accountable. In Kenya like in many other countries, devolution of powers was
touted as a means of enhancing participatory governance, accountability, good
governance and equitable development. Thus during the making of the current
Constitution, devolution of powers became a major feature.
484. The 2010 Constitution creates 47 Counties in Kenya as centres of devolution.
The main objectives of devolved government are to: promote democratic and
accountable exercise of power; foster national unity by recognizing diversity;
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give powers of self-governance to the people and enhance the participation of
the people in the exercise of the powers of the state and in making decisions
affecting them. It also recognises the right of communities to manage their
own affairs and to further their development; protect and promote the interests
and rights of minorities and marginalised communities and to promote social
and economic development and the provision of proximate, easily accessible
services throughout Kenya. Devolved government also aims at ensuring the
equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout Kenya; facilitating
the decentralization of state organs, their functions and services, from the capital
of Kenya and also to enhance checks and balances and the separation of powers.
485. The 2010 Constitution, through the introduction of devolution, supports
development of infrastructure in the country and ensures that all marginalised
areas are developed and up to pace with other areas. Devolution will result in
general increase in supply, distribution and access to goods and services through
decentralization. Each county will independently plan for its residents’ basic
amenities such as water, energy and infrastructure, tourism, agriculture, building
and construction at county level. There will also be increased access to financial
services such as banking, capital markets (stock exchanges), insurance and fund
management.
486. Devolution has many benefits. For our purposes, we focus only on the economic
aspects of devolution. Devolution financially empowers the regions. Revenue
raised nationally is to be shared equitably among the national and county
governments. County governments may be given additional allocations from the
national government’s share of the revenue, either conditionally or unconditionally.
Criteria for equitable sharing are set out in Article 203, but the amount allocated
to county governments must not be less than 15 percent of the national revenues
of the preceding year. Marginalised areas will receive an additional 0.5 percent of
all the revenue collected by the national government to bring the quality of basic
services including water, roads, health facilities and electricity in those areas to the
same level as that generally enjoyed by the rest of the nation.
487.

The Commission on Revenue Allocation (CRA) was established under the Constitution
to make recommendations for equitable sharing of national government revenue
between the national and county governments, and among the county governments.
At the national level there is a Consolidated Fund and for all counties there is a
Revenue Fund. Into these funds are placed all revenues from which payments must
be approved by the respective legislative assembly. Only the national government
may impose income taxes; value added taxes; excise taxes as well as customs and
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other duties on the import and export of goods. A county may impose property
rates; entertainment taxes; and any other taxes authorized or imposed by an Act
of Parliament. Both the national and county governments may impose charges for
services.
488. The socio-economic status of those previously marginalised at the periphery
will be enhanced. With outflows of finances to the regions, devolution can lead
to more rapid and more balanced economic and social development. Writing in
2007 about the proposed regional and district governments, Prof Yash Pal Ghai
noted that the centralised system - with the concentration of all government
institutions and decision making at the centre - leads to the concentration of
economic activities in the capital city area. The result is uneven development and
growing disparities of economic opportunities and attendant impoverishment
of regions and communities. This explains rural-urban migration into already
crowded Nairobi. With county governments with the constitutional mandate and
responsibility for the welfare and development of their constituents, new centers
of growth can emerge.
489. Devolution introduced by the Constitution would provide a solution and alternative
to the under-development problem in the regions. According to the Task Force on
Devolution, the building blocks of developmental devolved government include
the growing and sustaining of county cooperation and competitiveness; county
public service delivery; building and maintaining quality places for investment
and living and; managing counties for prosperity. One commentator notes that
devolution could provide for an enhanced framework for economic management
of Kenya at national and devolved levels. The two-tier government introduces a
new threshold for investment through counties with the potential to enhance
service delivery to citizens and to promote economic growth, especially since
counties will have financial security and independence.

Affirmative action and the equalization fund
490. Article 27 (6) obliges the government to devise legislative and affirmative action
programmes and policies to redress the disadvantage suffered due to past
discrimination. Affirmative action is defined at Article 260 as “any measure designed
to overcome or ameliorate an inequity or the systemic denial or infringement of a
right or fundamental freedom.” It is a deliberate policy or programme that seeks to
remedy past discrimination by increasing the chances of the affected to participate
in what they were previously denied. The object of affirmative action otherwise
known as positive discrimination is to enhance the participation of marginalised
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groups in decision-making and implementation and make a difference in the
political climate and culture.
491. Affirmative action policies are recognized as useful mechanisms through which
states can redress past and existing injustices and inequalities. Accurate statistics
often reveal the outcome of discrimination against, neglect of and unconcern for
the marginalised populations within a state. Affirmative action performs three
key functions. First, it remedies past discrimination through programmes to
benefit individuals or society as a whole. Article 56 of the Constitution provides
for both. Second, affirmative action enhances diversity so that a state will be able
to grow with better values, peace and stability. Third, affirmative action increases
political power of the marginalised, enabling them to influence decision-making.
Affirmative action is thus used to ensure fairness and equal representation in all
spheres of life in a state.
492. Article 56 obliges the government to put in place affirmative action programmes
for minorities and marginalised groups to allow them to participate in governance
and other spheres of life.
493.

Such programmes further provide special opportunities for marginalized groups
in educational and economic fields, access to employment, development of their
cultural and linguistic heritage and ensure access to water, health services and
infrastructure. Article 27 (8) seeks gender balance in elective and appointive bodies
by obliging the state to ensure that no more than two-thirds of the members of such
bodies shall be of the same gender. To this end, it provides that the state shall take
legislative and other measures to implement the principle that not more than twothirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender.
In line with the need to have affirmative action on this issue, Article 203 (1) (h) on
public finance enacts that one of the criteria for determining budgetary allocations
is the need for affirmative action in respect of disadvantaged areas and groups.

494.

The Equalisation Fund for marginalised areas is established under Article 204 as an
affirmative action towards economic and social rights. The fund consists of money
amounting to one half of one percent of all revenue collected by the national
government each year. This fund is to be used by the national government only for
the purpose of providing basic services such as health, water, roads and electricity to
marginalised areas. The fund may also be directed to the provision of either direct or
indirect conditional grants to counties in which marginalised communities exist.

495. The government, and in particular Parliament that has power to legislate on
this issue should devise criteria - based on the less than adequate definitions of
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‘marginalised community’ in Article 260 of the Constitution - for the purpose of
identifying groups and areas that are marginalised. It is hoped this TJRC Report
on economic marginalisation will inform the process of identifying marginalised
areas and devising ways of deploying the Equalization Fund as addressed with
recommendations in Part IV of this chapter.
496. Parliament may only pass Bills that appropriate funds from the Equalisation Fund
on the recommendation of the Commission on Revenue Allocation that must
obtain approval by the Controller of Budget for all withdrawals from the fund.
With the understanding that affirmative action introduces reverse discrimination
(although constitutionally-sanctioned) and that it serves a crucial but limited
purpose of improving the situation of previously marginalised regions, the fund
is set to lapse in 20 years from the effective date, unless Parliament extends it for
a fixed period of years as per Article 204 (6) and (7).

Public service and employment
497. We have previously described how ethnicity has played an important role
in Kenyan politics and the fact that the composition of the public service has
mirrored the ethnicity of those in power. Partly as a reaction to a report by the
National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) that painted a damning
picture of the outlook of the public service, the then Head of the Civil Service
Francis Muthaura directed permanent secretaries to ensure that members of
one community should not take up more than 25 percent of the jobs in the
civil service and in government. Heads of state corporations, departments and
institutions were requested to comply with the directive immediately, although
the Commission is unable to establish whether this directive has been complied
with.
498. Article 27 of the Constitution breaks with the past and will hopefully introduce
a new practice in public employment. In general terms, it provides for nondiscrimination in all spheres of life, including in employment and calls for
affirmative action. Article 232 (h) (i) puts representation of Kenya’s diverse
communities and affording equal opportunities for appointment, training
and advancement for members of all ethnic groups in the public service as
part of its core values and principles. Article 227 (2) (b) puts,” the protection
or advancement of persons, categories of persons or groups previously
disadvantaged by unfair competition or discrimination” as one of the
considerations to be factored in the procurement and disposal of public goods
and services.
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Land reform and economic inclusion
499.

Kenya had not had a clearly defined a National Land Policy since independence
until one was adopted in 2009. This, together with the existence of many land laws,
some of which were incompatible, resulted in a complex land management and
administration system.

500. From the advent of colonialism, Kenya has grappled with the land question, which
subsequent regimes have been unable or unwilling to resolve. Challenges relating
to land include fragmentation, breakdown in land administration, disparities in
land ownership, landlessness and poverty. This has resulted in environmental,
social, economic and political problems, including deterioration in land quality,
squatting and landlessness, disinheritance of some groups and individuals, urban
squalor, under-utilization and abandonment of agricultural land, tenure insecurity
and conflict.
501. Item Number 4 of Kenya’s National Dialogue and Reconciliation Process clearly
articulated the need for comprehensive land reforms on three fronts: anchoring
the Land Principles in the constitutional reform process; finalization, adoption and
implementation of the National Land Policy; and redressing historical injustices in
order to foster national harmony through the National Land Commission and the
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation process.
502. Discussions in Part III show that land is Kenya’s most intractable national issue.
Access to and ownership of arable land underlines the deep-seated political,
socio-economic and regional inequities in Kenya. According to the Kenya Land
Alliance, more than half the arable land is owned by 20 percent of the population
while 13 percent of Kenyans are landless. Land is tied with ethnic identity. There
are lingering claims by communities related to alienated ancestral lands. The
Pokot say they were not compensated for the alienation of what is now Trans
Nzoia District. Similarly, the Maasai assert that they were swindled out of their
land through the Maasai Agreements of 1904 and 1911.
503.

The Ndungu Commission Report revealed that landlessness among squatters
is linked to the failure of the post-independence governments to implement a
comprehensive resettlement programmed and because they lack ethnic entitlement,
squatters are vulnerable to frequent displacements and dispossession.

504.

The unresolved grievance of colonial land alienation underlies the risks of social
and political conflict. Many analysts have argued that land is the main reason why
Rift Valley was the epicenter of the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Unresolved
historical claims to ‘ethnic territory’ render existing property rights weak or uncertain.
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505. The Commission notes that the recognition of communal title to land in the
Constitution as well as the creation of the National Land Commission, whose
mandate includes settling historical land injustices, provides a basis for
addressing some if not the majority of these claims.
506. One of the major problems that has bedeviled Kenya since independence is
the illegal allocation of land. People entrusted with the protection of public
property infringed on the rights of the masses by grabbing huge tracts of land
as allowed by the old legislative and constitutional framework. For instance,
the Government Lands Act that empowered the President to grant titles in
‘unalienated government land’ was for years at the centre of massive alienation
of land. The Commissioner of Lands, on behalf of the government, would issue
a simple letter of “reservation” on government land to individuals. Provisions
under the Agriculture Act that enabled the Agriculture minister to alienate idle
land and give it to others, led to mass grabbing of Agricultural Development
Corporation (ADC) farms.
507. Various studies have disclosed that Kenya had a complex land regime, yet
the administrative framework that oversaw it was poorly coordinated and
gave excessive power to administrators, without establishing mechanisms to
ensure that they not only performed their duties, but that they did not abuse
their powers, thereby breeding corruption in the relevant agencies. Land
redistribution schemes initiated in the post-independence period have been
rightly criticized for unfairness. Amendments to the Constitution that vested
power of alienation of public land in the President created more problems in
part because access to land was determined by political influence.
508. Most holders of the huge parcels of land are concentrated within the 17 to 20
percent of the country that is arable, such that more than a half of the arable
land is in the hands of only 10 percent of the 40 million Kenyans. That leaves up
to 29 percent of the population absolutely landless while another 60 percent
on average own less than one hectare of land. According to the National
Development Plans from 2001 to 2008, pastoral activities occupy 70 percent of
Kenya’s land mass area, and support 25 percent of the human population and
50 percent of all livestock. Less than 20 percent of the land in Kenya is high
potential and accommodates about 70 percent of the population. The result is
landlessness and squatting in both rural and urban areas, leading to congestion
and fragmentation of land into uneconomic units and subsequently ethnic
conflicts, particularly in the pastoral areas.
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Changes introduced in land by the new Constitution
509.

It is in the light of these historical injustices that far reaching reforms relating to
land were formulated in the new Constitution. Chapter 5 of the new Constitution
establishes a framework to ensure that the process of allocation, adjudication,
consolidation and registration of land is done equitably, transparently and
sustainably.

510. The National Land Policy approved by the Cabinet at the end of 2009,
introduces far-reaching reforms that will go hand in hand with the provisions
in the Constitution, paving way for the resolution of perennial land problems
and to redress historical injustices inherited from the colonial administration.
Major highlights of the new policy include barring non-citizens from absolute
ownership of land and subjecting them to a leasehold system as well as a set
of principles developed to govern land ownership and safeguard women’s land
rights. The policy gives the government powers to reclaim grabbed public land,
to tax idle land, and reduce all leaseholds to 99 years. Furthermore, Article 68
requires Parliament to enact a law that will “enable the review of all grants or
dispositions of public land to establish their propriety or legality.”

Principles governing land ownership
511. The Constitution enacts a set of principles on issues relating to ownership of
land under Article 60, which stipulates that land in Kenya shall be held, used and
managed in a manner that is equitable, efficient, productive and sustainable, and
in accordance with principles which include: equitable access to land; security of
land rights; sustainable and productive management of land resources; transparent
and cost effective administration of land; sound conservation and protection
of ecologically sensitive areas and elimination of gender discrimination in law,
customs and practices related to land and property in land. The Constitution also
establishes principles and mechanisms for resolving the claims of dispossession
that have so often been used by political actors to mobilize their constituents
along ethnic lines. Its principles and mechanisms on the resolution of historical
land injustices and on state acquisition of unlawfully-acquired private property so
that it can be used to benefit the public, should be analyzed from this perspective.

Taxation of idle land and reduction of 999-year leaseholds
512. There are so many people in Kenya who own huge tracts of land, which remains
idle and is held largely for speculative purposes. The Constitution introduces tax
on idle land or else its reclamation. It also solves the problem of absentee land
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ownership which has been a serious problem especially at the Coast. Article 65 of
the new Constitution provides that a person who is not a Kenyan citizen may hold
land on the basis of leasehold tenure only. It reduces the maximum period to hold
leasehold retroactively from 999 to 99 years, which means that all land currently on
999-year lease automatically reverts to 99 years. Article 65(2) specifically stipulates
that, if a provision of any agreement, deed, conveyance or document of whatever
nature purports to confer on a person who is not a citizen an interest in land
greater than a 99-year lease, the provision shall be regarded as conferring on the
person a 99-year leasehold interest, and no more. An independent National Land
Commission has been created to maintain oversight and manage all public land
among other related duties.

Land Acreage
513. Article 68(c) (1) of the Constitution requires Parliament to enact legislation to
prescribe minimum and maximum land holding acreages in respect of private land
to protect the public against land grabbing.
514. Other than just ensuring fair distribution of land resources from those owning more
than 10,000 hectares to those owning less than one hectare, this clause also guards
against congestion and parceling of land into uneconomic units. A combination
of these clauses in the Constitution and ongoing computerization at the Central
Land Registry in Ardhi House, will contain land grabbers. A general overview of
Article 68 reveals that it provides for the regulation of the minimum and maximum
land-holding acreages, thus promoting sustainable use of land resources and
conservation. This provision will prevent a few individuals from hoarding arable
land to the exclusion of the majority.

Protection of community land
515. Article 61(1) classifies land and provides that all land in Kenya belongs to the
people of Kenya collectively as a nation, as communities and as individuals. It
therefore makes provision for communally-owned land unlike before, thus it
protects the interest of the various communities, especially the marginalised
ones. Article 63(1) goes further to provide that community land shall vest in and
be held by communities identified on the basis of ethnicity, culture or similar
community of interest. Any unregistered community land is required to be held
in trust by county governments on behalf of the communities for which it is
held and such land shall not be disposed of or used except in the terms of a
legislation which specifies the nature and extent of the rights of members of
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each community individually and collectively. The government is required to
enact legislation to give effect to these provisions.
516. To this extent, community land in Kenya shall consist of land lawfully registered in
the name of group representatives under the provisions of any law; land lawfully
transferred to a specific community by any process of law; any other land declared
to be community land by an Act of Parliament; land that is lawfully held, managed
or used by specific communities as community forests, grazing areas or shrines;
ancestral lands and lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherer communities;
or land that is lawfully held as trust land by the county governments, but not
including any public land held in trust by the county government under Article
62 (2). For its part, Article 66 seeks to ensure that investments in property such
as land benefit local communities. This provision would, for example, address the
grievances of the residents of the Coast region, who claim that they have been
excluded from sharing the revenues generated from tourism and other coastal
resources.

Policy responses
517. The Kenya Budget 2011/2012 makes efforts towards remedying marginalisation.
For the poor, it provides for funds to support education (free primary and
secondary education) and health. It also expands spending on safety nets to
cushion the vulnerable from the challenges of high food and fuel prices. For the
youth, the Budget continues to provide resources by supporting existing public
works programmes that the government started two years ago, commonly known
as the Economic Stimulus Programme (ESP) and Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV) (Work for
the Youth). The Budget will also scale up programmes aimed at increasing labour
absorption, skills training and enhancing the employability of the youth.
518. For farmers, the Budget has set aside funds for agribusiness to begin the journey
of leveraging lending to the agricultural sector and rural development, targeting
1.5 million smallholder farmers and over 10 000 agribusinesses throughout the
country. For the rural and marginalised, there is increased funding for CDF to
complete critical projects that benefit the poor and earmarked sources for basic
services in the marginalised areas in the spirit of the Constitution as relates to
progressive equitable development.
519. One policy response that the government has established is through annual
budgetary allocations to increase steadily the amount going to the devolved
funds. In his 2011/2012 Budget Speech, the then Finance minister Uhuru Kenyatta
stated that funds will be provided for the poor to support education (free primary
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and secondary education) and health as well as to expanding spending on safety
nets to cushion the vulnerable from the challenges of high food and fuel prices.
520.

The Youth Enterprise Development Fund and the Women Enterprise Fund was
further enhanced by the government’s contributions of Sh385 million and Sh440
million. Consequently, the minister challenged the management of these funds
to show results for Kenyans. Sh667 million was awarded for physically challenged
persons.

521. The (appropriate) budgetary allocations to the various marginalised groups and
various devolved funds is an assuring way of the Government acknowledging
and responding to marginalisation. Despite the response through budgetary
allocations, there has been criticism that the allocated funds to the different groups
of persons or devolved funds are not enough when held against the actual number
of people who need the resources.

Vision 2030
522. Vision 2030 is Kenya’s current development blueprint covering the period 2008
to 2030. It aims to transform Kenya into a newly-industrialising “middle-income
country providing a high quality life to all its citizens by the year 2030”. It is
anchored on three ‘pillars‘: economic, social and political.
523. The economic pillar aims to improve the income and livelihoods of all Kenyans
through an economic development programme, covering all regions of Kenya,
and aiming to achieve an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of
10 percent per annum beginning 2012 through focus on tourism; agriculture,
wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, business process outsourcing and
financial services. To realise these aims, there is a commitment to develop a
governance system that is able to support the governance demands of a middleincome, rapidly-industrializing country. To achieve this goal calls for deep structural
reforms to strengthen the rule of law and transparency, accountability and integrity
in the public and private sectors.
524. Perhaps the most relevant pillar for economic marginalisation from the perspective
of rhetorical commitment, the social pillar seeks to build a just and cohesive society
with social equity focusing on eight key areas of education and training, health,
water and sanitation, environment, housing and urbanization, and gender, youth
and vulnerable groups.
525. There is commitment to develop social safety nets that re-orient service delivery
and public funding towards vulnerable, disadvantaged and marginalised groups in
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order to build a just and cohesive society that enjoys equitable social development
in a clean and secure environment. On education, Vision 2030 provides that Kenya
recognises that the education and training of all Kenyans is fundamental to the
success of its aims. It further acknowledges regional disparities and inequality
especially in the marginalised ASALs. It provides that ”although the primary school
enrolment rates increased from 70.4 percent in 2002 to 83.7 percent in 2005, there
exist great gender and regional disparities, with the ASAL areas being the worst
affected.” To address this issue, Vision 2030 will anchor the promotion of equity in
access to education through a variety of measures.
526. Vision 2030’s political pillar aims to realize a democratic political system founded
on issue-based politics that respect the rule of law, and protect the rights and
freedoms of every individual in Kenyan society through focus on six strategic
areas - the rule of law, electoral and political processes, democracy and public
participation, transparency and accountability; public administration and service
delivery; security, peace-building and conflict management.
527.

Vision 2030 also recognizes vulnerable people to include widows and widowers,
orphans and children at risk, persons with disabilities, under-age mothers, the poorest
of the poor, internally and externally displaced persons and the elderly. Some of the
strategies identified to reduce marginalisation among this group include expanding
pro-poor financial services, for example, through micro-finance institutions and
village financial associations, full implementation (including appropriate budgetary
allocations) of the Disability Fund, building more financial institutions in rural
areas for access, increasing savings by rural poor and improving access to food and
healthcare services for marginalised groups and ensuring adequate representation
of marginalised groups in decision making.

Conclusion
528.

It is going to take years for Kenya to reverse the legacy of economic marginalization
of regions identified as marginalized in this Chapter: North Eastern, Upper Eastern,
Nyanza, Western and North Rift. However, it is encouraging that positive steps are
being taken towards that direction. This Chapter has provided detailed discussion
of the historical context for understanding economic marginalization in Kenya,
which context must be taken by the relevant authorities charged with dealing with
the multiple legacies of economic marginalization. The Commission’s findings and
recommendations in this regard are contained in the findings and recommendations
volume of this Report.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

163

Volume IIB

164

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

CHAPTER

TWO

Land and Conflict
Introduction
1.

The Republic of Kenya is approximately 581,751 square kilometres (44.6 million
hectares) of which 97.8 percent is land and 2.2 percent is comprised of water
surfaces. Only 20 percent of the land surface could be classified as medium to high
potential land, while the remaining 80 percent is either arid or semi-arid. Forests
and woodlands occupy about 7 percent of the country’s land mass. Some of the
forests and woodlands form part of national parks and reserves.1 The analysis
shows that there is only about 43.62 million hectares of land in Kenya that is
suitable for human settlement for the more than 42 million Kenyans. In the absence
of any possibility of elasticity of available land to accommodate an increasing
human population, the situation points to the reality of land scarcity, a challenge
that is compounded by the critical nexus between land and both subsistence and
economic development in the country.

2.

In Kenya, the availability of land to both the private and the public sectors remain
vital to the country’s development and to the subsistence of its increasing human
populations. The reason is that Kenya is a country that is endowed neither with
sufficient mineral resources, nor with a strong manufacturing base. This provides
an understanding of the significance of land for both subsistence and commercial
agriculture and as the basis of many of the related economic activities, especially
manufacturing of raw agricultural products. For the majority of the Kenyans, land is

1

National Development Plan 2002-2008, Government of Kenya, Nairobi, 2002.
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the basic, and in most cases, the only economic resource from which they eke out a
livelihood.2 The ability to access, own, use and control land has an implication, not
only on one’s ability to feed and provide for his/her family but it also determines
his/her socio-economic and political standing in society.
3.

Moreover, it is around land that socio-cultural and spiritual relations among
community members are defined and organized. It is viewed as having an ancestralcultural bond, spiritual and philosophical dimensions, thus linking the physical
and metaphysical worlds. To this extent, land provides some form of ethno-cultural
identity and social security: the medium which defines and binds together social
and spiritual relations within and across generations.

4.

For the foregoing reasons, individuals and communities have developed a
sentimental attachment to land and any significant loss of land not only threatens
the basic means of subsistence for many, but also a fundamental aspect of
the foundation of their socio-cultural system.3 It is no wonder then that land
retains a focal point in Kenya’s history, culture and politics and access to land
as well ownership, use and control remains an emotive and politicized issue in
contemporary Kenya,4 with many being prepared to risk their lives to acquire or
defend it from real or perceived threats. It is not surprising, therefore, that land
has since the colonial times to the present day, been the subject of myriad statemanaged policy and legal relations. Neither is it surprising that it has been the
subject of several commissions of inquiry.5

5.

The situation summarized in the foregoing paragraphs explains why ownership
and use of land in Kenya or the absence thereof is very closely linked to poverty
on one hand and improved livelihoods on the other, and hence the quest for every
Kenyan to own land and the actual and likely determination by every landless
person in Kenya and every person facing land ownership and use injustices in the
country to explore every possibility, including those of a violent nature, to acquire
or recover and own land.

6.

In order to fully understand the causes of land-related conflicts in Kenya, one needs
to trace the problems of land acquisition, ownership and use to the pre-colonial
period to properly appreciate where the problems currently causing land-related

2
3
4
5
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RR Simiyu, ‘Militianisation of resource conflict: The case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon region of Western Kenya’ (2008)
Institute for Security Studies 4 available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/M152FULL.PDF (accessed on 3 May 2012).
ML Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu: A study of the relationship between land and kikuyu political movements’ (1995) 40 (2) The
Journal of Negro History 104.
Robert Simiyu, ‘Militarization of resource conflict: The case of land-based conflict in the Mount Elgon region of Western Kenya’
(2008) Institute for Security Studies 4 available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/M152FULL.PDF (accessed on 3 May 2012).
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, (2004) Government Printer xvii.
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conflicts and violence originated and to design mechanisms that are cognizant of
both root causes of the problem as well as historical factors that continue to foster
the problems and related violence and strife so that the underlying fuelling factors
may also be addressed.
7.

Therefore, the following section presents a historical background to the existing
land tenure and related acquisition, ownership and use problems, some of which
continue to bedevil Kenyans to date. This section explains, among other things,
how settlement patterns of the various ethnic communities in the region now
called Kenya attracted ‘tribal’ identities to land in various parts of the country and
how colonial policies and practices generated some of the current land-related
problems [with acquisition, ownership and use] including landlessness of a large
segment of Kenya’s population, such that any effort to address the problems,
as presently manifested, ought also to factor what occurred with acquisition,
ownership and use at that point in time.

8.

The presentation in the following section provides the basis for understanding
why colonial land policies and practices regarding land acquisition, ownership
and use partially, but significantly prompted the struggle for independence.
Most importantly, it explains why, at independence, many Kenyans who had
suffered land-related injustices awaited anxiously for redress by the first
independent government in the form of land restitution, restoration and/or
compensation which is, significantly, the reason many who were disappointed
have, over the years, resorted to self-help measures to realize what they believe
to be injustices whose redress are long overdue, but have been flagrantly
overlooked or ignored.

Historical Background
9.

This section explains the origins of land tenure (acquisition, ownership, use) and
related problems in the coastal region of Kenya and in Kenya’s mainland. The
explanation generally, demonstrates why and how colonial land policies and
practices generated some of the land-related problems, including land scarcity
and landlessness that have resulted in violent conflicts among Kenyans so that
suitable measures may be designed in light of identified injustices from their very
beginning.

10.

It is recognized that although land-related problems in the colonial period,
especially at the Coast, predated occupation of Kenya by the British colonialists
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and that although the manner of acquisition, ownership and alienation of land
by Arabs at the Coast was slightly different from that of the British in relation to
mainland Kenya, this fact has not been properly appreciated. Yet certain tenets of
the “policies” and practices of Arabs, coupled with subsequent collaboration with
the British and failures of the independent Kenya government, may have been the
cause of widespread landlessness, land scarcity and absence of titles to occupied
lands by many individuals, families and communities at the Coast.
11.

Therefore, an analysis of Arab land acquisition, ownership, alienation and related
activities at the Coast is important in presenting some of the unique features
of the land problems there. It goes without saying that colonialism includes
colonization by Arabs, especially at the Coast and, subsequently, colonization by
the British.

Land ownership before the advent of colonialism

168

12.

Before the commencement of colonisation by the British, each of the various
indigenous ethnic communities in the region now known as Kenya communally
occupied distinct territories in various parts of what constitutes the land within
the country’s internationally-recognised borders. The history of Kenya indicates
inward migration of whole groups (ethnic communities) of people and settlement
by the groups (communities/tribes) in areas distinctly identified by their presence,
wherein land was allocated by tribal elders to families for cultivation or grazing,
depending on need and in accordance with traditional customs and practices.

13.

Communities’ need for more land was identified collectively and the need was
often satisfied by expansion onto nearby unoccupied areas. Because population
in the region was generally low, community expansion to satisfy need for land
occurred, in many cases, peacefully. However, where one community occupied
land deemed necessary for expansion by another, land was, often, acquired
through conquest, characterized by inter-tribal wars which, in many cases,
resulted in the acquisition of land by one community from another. But history
reveals that communities displaced from their homelands, as it were, through
conquest, had no difficulty finding alternative land by moving away from
invaders to unoccupied areas because the population was low and there were
vast unoccupied lands in the region.

14.

Even in the absence of conquest, communities, having exhausted land in one
area, moved freely to other areas to allow already utilized lands (for grazing or
cultivation), to regenerate. For pastoralists, movement was often extended over
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long distances. In many cases, community members returned to areas where
vegetation had regenerated and therefore, there was movement back and forth
in areas that were, in the main, distinctly identified with specific tribes. One of
the key factors that emerges from the manner of acquisition, distribution and
utilization, is that the need for land of all individuals and families within each of
the communities/tribes was fully satisfied.
15.

There is no known case of any individual member of a community or family
within a community in need of land that community elders could not or did not
satisfy. There is also no known case of land-related disputes that arose between
individuals or families within a community that community elders failed to address
conclusively. History shows that generally, there was peaceful co-existence within
communities and that external threats to communal land ownership and use were
tackled collectively. The situation was disrupted and distorted, first, by Arabs at
the Coast and subsequently, the British, followed by individuals and groups of
individuals in the succeeding independent Kenya government in ways that have
had far-reaching consequences on the livelihood of the people of Kenya and the
development of their nation.

Origins of land-related problems at the Coast
16.

From the explanation presented in the foregoing paragraphs, especially that
different ethnic communities/tribes in the region that is now the country called
Kenya occupied distinct areas of land across the region, it can be understood
that not all of the presently 42 tribes (ethnic communities) in Kenya occupied
the coastal area or, as it is more otherwise known, the ‘Coastal Strip’. The fact
provides basis for understanding that land problems at the Coast whose origins
are traceable affected only some of the communities/tribes in Kenya which
is why, if a peculiar or special factors is revealed that may have precipitated
the current land problems at the Coast, those factors ought to receive specific
consideration.

17.

Against the backdrop of communal ownership and utilization of land at the
Coast, characterized by general peaceful communal coexistence, Arab traders
from Arabia and Persia invaded the coastal region in the early 1800s and their
subsequent activities generated land-related problems first, by their practice of
the slave trade and secondly, by their forceful acquisition of land occupied by
local communities and land available for their movement and expansion, as they
were accustomed to do. Arab traders, who occupied the region, were, under the
leadership of the Sultan of Zanzibar, heavily involved in the slave trade.
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18.

The significance of this activity in relation to land is that it is a factor that made many
indigenous communities, especially the Mijikenda, to flee areas that they were
occupying around the beaches for fear of being captured and sold as slaves. Effectively,
indigenous communities vacated their homes and grazing and agricultural lands
which were soon thereafter occupied by the Arabs, especially along the beaches,
which, today, constitute the most prime land in present-day Kenya. Questions arise:
Are the Arabs still in control of the area and occupation of the lands? If not, who
assumed ownership of the lands? How were the lands transferred successively to the
current owners? Were the Mijikenda (comprising the Dorobo, Boran, Digo, Chonyi and
Duruma, among others) and the Taita and Pokomo who also occupy the Coastal Strip
rendered landless by occupation of the land by Arabs and their subsequent successors?
Were the Mijikenda rendered landless by activities of Arabs and their successors? Has
the fact that indigenous communities at the Coast were dispossessed and displaced by
colonialists and subsequent governments been subject of land-related investigations
in independent Kenya? If such investigations have been conducted, have there been
recommendations for restoration, restitution or compensation in their favour? Have
any of such recommendations been implemented, especially considering those who
ended up as owners of the lands along the beaches that were previously theirs? Is the
fact that some individuals and businesses from outside of the Mijikenda (as presently
manifested) acquired land previously belonging to them likely to raise disquiet among
the Mijikenda, especially if they have ended up as landless people or are facing land
scarcity? Should subsequent acquisition of land (from the British onward) previously
belonging to the Mijikenda be traced (to determine subsequent injustices from those
of Arabs) for purposes of compensation or restitution?

19.

In order to adequately address the foregoing questions, it is necessary to
understand that changes in coastal land ownership and utilization, first, from Arabs
to the British, and later, from the British to present owners. At the time of the arrival
of the British, Arabs, under the leadership of the Sultan of Zanzibar, had already
established control along the Coast, whose land they acquired and occupied,
indigenous communities having been disposed of through the slave trade and
direct forceful evictions. In 1888, the British Imperial East African Company (IBEA
Co.) that had come, on behalf of the British government, to administer the presentday Kenya - which was then referred to as the East Africa Protectorate -6 signed a
concession agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar in which all rights to land in his
territory except “private lands” (which were land held under certificates of ownership
issued by the Sultanate7), were ceded to IBEA.8

6
7
8
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Leys, C., Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism, Berkeley University of California Press (1994) at
28.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21.
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This agreement affected indigenous community ownership and occupation of land
in the ten-mile coastal strip that runs from Vanga, at the border with Tanzania to
Kipini on the mouth of River Tana, together with the Lamu archipelago. To gain
control and administration over the areas, the British government, through IBEA
signed an administration agreement with the Sultan in 1895 which, in effect gave
it control over all the land that the Sultan had ceded to the British under the 1888
concession agreement that it had previously concluded with the Sultan of Zanzibar.9
The only parcels of land that were exempted from British alienation were the ‘private
lands’10 which were not land held by the indigenous communities that previously
owned them, but land held by Arabs under certificate of ownership issued by the
Sultanate, having violently acquired it through the slave trade or forceful eviction.

21.

The 1888 and 1895 agreements terminated the land rights of indigenous
Africans at the Coast, especially the Mijikenda, Taita and Pokomo and formed the
basis of acquisition, ownership and control of their land by the British colonial
administration which, in 1895, declared a protectorate status over Kenya to mark
its official assumption of jurisdiction over Kenya for a variety of reasons, including
interest in establishing trade routes to Uganda through construction of the KenyaUganda railway, which required huge financing and the Kenya colony had to be
economically productive to generate finances to build the railway and to fund the
colonial British administration.

22.

To make the Kenya colony economically productive to be able to finance its
administration and establish the Kenya Uganda Railway, the British colonial
administration deemed it necessary to secure incoming settlers’ right to productive
land, but the declaration of a protectorate status over Kenya in 1895 had not given
the colonial administrators authority to deal with land, meaning that without
further measures, the administration and its invited settlers could only acquire
land from natives through conquest, agreements and treaty or sale, all of which
proved inefficient means of acquiring land.

23.

The hurdle was overcome, first, by extension of the application of the Indian Lands
Acquisition Act of 1894 to East Africa Protectorate (including Kenya) in 1899. This
piece of foreign land legislation converted all land in Kenya that had not been
appropriated by individuals or by the colonial administration into ‘Crown Land’,
meaning land belonging to Her Majesty, the Queen of England, which she could
grant to individuals in leaseholds for a term of years or in fee simple.11

Chapter TWO

9

Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21.
10 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21.
11 For further reading, see Okoth Ogendo, H.W.., African Land Tenure Reform in Agricultural Development in Kenya 152 (Heyer, J.,
ed., 1976).
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24.

However, there was no clarity on what constituted ‘Crown Land’ for purposes of
acquisition and use by the growing number of settlers and it was limited in quantity
for the desired ends. In response and to expand the scope of what constituted
‘Crown Land’, an East Africa Order in Council was passed in 1901 in respect of land
to define it, thereby to become public land, including all land under the control of
the Queen through agreement, treaty or convention and all other lands that she
was to acquire.12

25.

By the 1901 Ordinance, land that the British had acquired from the Sultan through
the two agreements of 1888 and 1895 became ‘Crown Land’. However, part of the
land ceded to the British by the Sultan had been occupied not only by indigenous
communities, mostly the Mijikenda, but also by Arab traders who had settled
at the Coast under the Sultanate and both groups had claims to it. Therefore, in
order to “put to rest any claims by indigenous inhabitants of the Coastal Strip to
land ownership’13 and ‘determine accurately how much land was actually “owned
privately” so that the limits of ‘Crown Land’ at the coast could be defined,”14 and to
ascertain land that was available for disposal to prospective settlers,15 the British
colonial administration that was taking shape in Kenya, having assumed the
position previously held by IBEA Co. in relation to land at the Coast, enacted a Land
Titles Ordinance in 1908, with limited application to the Coastal Strip.16

26.

Accordingly, the Land Titles Ordinance of 1908 required “all persons being or
claiming to be proprietors of, or having or claiming to have any interest whatever
in immovable property within the ten-mile Coastal Strip to lodge their claims,
whether of title, mortgage or other interest, within six months with a Land
Registration Court which was presided over by a Recorder of Titles.17 Where the
Recorder was satisfied that a particular claim was valid, he would issue a certificate
to that effect.18 Such certificate was:
Conclusive evidence against all persons (including the crown) of the several matters
therein contained, and a certificate of ownership shall be conclusive proof that the
person to whom such certificate is granted, is the owner of the land.19

12 Section 1 of the East Africa Order in Council passed in 1901.
13 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National land Policy Framework, Constitutional
Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for land Administration (2002) 21.
14 Report of the Select Committee on the issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya (1978) Government
Printer, 2.
15 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along The Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printer, Nairobi, 1979) at 2.
16 No. 11 of 1908.
17 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 2.
18 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 2.
19 Reproduced in, The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya,
(1978) Government Printer 2.
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27.

The Ordinance also declared that “all land ... concerning which no claim or claims
for a certificate of ownership shall have been made ... shall be deemed to be ‘Crown
Land’ ... and was henceforth to be governed by the Crown Land Ordinance, 1902.”20
The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 applied to the whole of Kenya.

28.

From the wording of the Land Titles Ordinance of 1908, it appears that the
indigenous communities at the coast, notably, the Mijikenda, Taita and Pokomo,
were, in the law, given a chance to present their claims to land that, much of
which had, in the first place, been taken away from them by Arabs. However, the
indigenous Africans within the ten-mile Coastal Strip did not make claims over
land in the region during the six months provided by the Land Titles Ordinance
for reasons revealed by the Select Committee that investigated the issue of land
ownership along the ten-mile Coastal Strip as follows:

Chapter TWO

First of all, the indigenous people of the strip had no knowledge of the existence of
the Ordinance. Even if they did, they never understood its provisions. Secondly, the
Ordinance had no relevance to indigenous conceptions of land tenure. That they should
be asked to lay claims upon the soil was a startling preposition. Third, the Ordinance was
clearly biased against these people. For the colonial government and courts believed
that no African, whether as an individual or a community had any title to land. Hence for
purposes of the 1908 and other colonial land ordinances, land occupied by Africans was
always treated as ownerless. Fourth, the actual investigations of claims were done mainly
by Mudris - usually Mazrui Arabs absorbed into the colonial administration - who were
generally unsympathetic to the indigenous people. Fifth, the time limit within which
claims could be made was extremely short. And indeed after 1922 claims would no
longer be received at all. Besides, when in 1926 three “native reserves” were established
in Kwale and Kilifi, any further doubts concerning the possibility of ever receiving claims
from indigenous coastal peoples were laid to rest. For with the exception of 13 pockets
of land in Kwale, land comprised within these reserves was deliberately delineated
outside the ten-mile strip…21

29.

Moreover, apart from the Recorder himself, the only other statutory officers were
surveyors and administrative officers. The duties of these two officers included
boundary surveys and preparation of maps to be attached to certificates of
ownership. The latter only had the duty to receive claims but had no power to
adjudicate them. The process of adjudication was thus left to only one man, the
Recorder.22 Although in practice, two intermediate committees were appointed to
assist the Recorder, the process was one that would be difficult, if not impossible

20 Land Titles Ordinance, No. 11 of 1908.
21 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.
22 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

173

Volume IIB

Chapter TWO

for indigenous Africans to know about or to follow. It remained essentially judicial,
involving issuance of summons, administration of oaths and invitation of parties to
argue their claims either in person or through lawyers.
30.

Matters were made worse by the fact that no proper investigations were conducted
on claims presented. Most claims were presented on the basis of old Arabic
documents or allegations of possession or inheritance that were mainly false. Where,
as was often the case, no objections were raised or if an objector failed to appear
altogether, no further proof was ever asked for. In the very few cases where claims
by indigenous Africans were allowed, the size of their land was deliberately reduced
by the Arab assistants of the Recorder.23 In such circumstances, Mazrui Arabs made
claims to large tracts of bush lands whose boundaries they could not even point out,
resulting in their appropriation of 18,000 hectares of land in Central Kilifi over which
they declared a Mazrui trust. The same flawed process also allowed over 95 percent
of land in Malindi to be taken by Arabs. Since very few claims were received in Lamu,
much of the land there was declared ‘Crown Land’.24 In Kwale where there were fewer
claims, much of the land was subsequently sold or granted in leaseholds to Indians,
Europeans and other concessionaires interested in large-scale agriculture.25

31.

For the reasons elaborated, indigenous Africans at the Coast lost a chance to lay
claim to their land and their right to do so under the British administration was
foreclosed even though many families and communities remained resident on
some of the land which they would, for failure to lay claim, continue to occupy for
years without any recognition or registration of title thereto.

32.

Arabs, on the other hand, were quick to lay claim over land along the Coastal Strip
which was not originally theirs. A select committee established by the government
in 1978 to investigate issues of land ownership along the ten-mile Coastal Strip
established that the Registrar of Titles did not take time to verify the claims placed
before him. 26 The effect of this was that the Mazrui Arabs took most of the land in
the coastal strip, leaving the indigenous communities, including the Mijikenda, the
Pokomo and the Taita, landless and as squatters on their farms.27

23 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.
24 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.
25 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.
26 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.
27 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.
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33.

For the foregoing reasons, The Land Titles Ordinance has been attributed to the
state of widespread landlessness in the coastal region, 28 and yet at independence, it
was adopted as the Land Transfer Act. As explained subsequently, new legislations
passed in 1938 extinguished any other rights that “natives” in Kenya as a whole
might have had outside their respective reserves.

34.

Moreover, 1908 Ordinance introduced a British conception of land, that is;
that whatever is attached to the land becomes part of that land, such that as
indigenous ethnic communities at the Coast lost their land, they also lost
whatever rights they may have had under Muslim or customary law to farm
produce. In addition, many missed compensation for permanent improvements
that they had made to land in the form of permanent structures. Therefore, the
majority of the indigenous people who still remained on the land - because the
new unjustified owners never resided on the land anyway - so simply in the belief
that it was still theirs, recognised ownership and control having shifted to either
the Arabs or the British and their collaborators.29

35.

Unlike mainland Kenya which was under the control of the colonial government
throughout the colonial period (from 1895 to 1963, first, as a protectorate and
subsequently, as a colony), the ten-mile Coastal Strip remained under the control
of the Sultan of Zanzibar until 1963, when the Sultan renounced sovereignty
over the strip following the signing of an agreement between the British, Kenya
and Zanzibar governments which effectively integrated the Coastal Strip into
independent Kenya.30

36.

The foregoing explanation appears to be the genesis of the widespread squatter
problem at the Coast, characterized by large numbers of families and communities
occupying land for which they have no title and therefore, do not own and
consequently, many indigenous people at the Coast are exposed to forceful and
unexpected evictions by those who hold titles to the land they occupy, their
assigns or successors in title. Resolution of the problem of landlessness at the coast
was made more difficult, if not impossible by the provisions of section 75 of the
independence constitution which provided that:

Chapter TWO

28 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.
29 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.
30 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 4.
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all existing land rights irrespective of the manner in which they were acquired be
confirmed and guaranteed.31

37.

The independence constitutional provisions which were buttressed by those of
sections 27 and 28 and the Registered Land act (Cap. 300, now repealed) ruled out
the possibility that historical claims would ever be the basis for land distribution
after independence, in the country as a whole.

38.

Some of the pertinent questions that deserve answers integrated in national solutions
to conflicts over land are: (a) whether the agreement signed at independence
between Kenya’s government, the outgoing British administration and the Sultan of
Zanzibar took cognisance of the loss of land by indigenous Africans to Arabs and the
British and made provisions for them; (b) whether any scheme of land registration,
compensation or restitution was implemented for the benefit of indigenous people
who lost their land to Arabs and subsequently to the British; and (c) what measures
have subsequent governments made to redress the situation?

39.

Another factor that should be borne in mind in the a search for solutions to the
land problem at the Coast is the subsequent establishment, in 1926, after much of
the land there had been declared ‘Crown Land’, of three “native reserves,” mostly
outside of the ten-mile Coastal Strip, in Kwale and Kilifi.”32 As subsequent sections
of this chapter disclose, from the year 1926, the British colonial administration
confined indigenous Africans to “native reserves”, meaning that those who
continued occupying their land after it was acquired by Arabs or the British were
compelled to move out of the land into the designated reserves. Many questions
arise concerning the confinement of Africans to reserves, including land allocation
practices and policies in the reserves, but for purposes of determining causes of
current land-related conflicts, two pertinent issues arise.

40.

Firstly, whether Africans occupying a particular reserve were considered to be
collectively owning it. Secondly, whether, at the time a system of land registration
was introduced in post-independent Kenya, land was distributed to all occupants
of a particular reserve and registered in their names or land constituting any
reserve remained in the collective unregistered ownership and use of a community
as communal land, which was subsequently alienated to a few members of the
reserve or sold to persons from outside the community, leaving original occupants
as squatters or landless.

31 The provision was wrongly informed by a feeling that land redistribution should not be made at the expense of economic (mainly
agricultural) stability, id., at 4.
32 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 3.
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Origins of land-related problems in mainland Kenya
41.

For mainland Kenya, change in land tenure and related policies and practices
first occurred with the coming of the IBEA Co. that was mandated by the British
government in 1888 to administer the present-day Kenya, which was then referred
to as the East Africa Protectorate and in the process, to facilitate construction of
a railway to link Kenya and Uganda.33 The company also had the task of raising
revenue to finance British administration of the protectorate and to accomplish
the task, it encouraged and facilitated many settlers of British and, to a smaller
extent, Dutch origin, to take up residence in Kenya for the purpose of undertaking
agricultural activities in the hope that their agricultural productivity would
generate much-needed revenue to fund construction of the railway as well as
finance administration of the colony.34

42.

IBEA Co. was unable to administer the territory, prompting the British government
to declare the region now Kenya a protectorate in 1895 and on 1 July 1895 the
British government posted the first Governor, Sir Arthur Hardinge, to establish a
formal British administration in Kenya.35 However, declaration of a protectorate
status over Kenya had not conferred authority on colonial administrators to deal
with land, meaning that without further measures, the administration and its
invited settlers could only acquire land from natives through conquest, agreements
and treaty or sale, all of which proved inefficient means of acquiring land. As
already noted, the hurdle was overcome, first, by extension of the Indian Lands
Acquisition Act of 1894 to the East Africa Protectorate, including the region now
Kenya, in 1899. Through this piece of foreign legislation, the British administration
developed rules to guide its acquisition of land in Kenya.

43.

Among other effects, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 vested all unoccupied land,
including all lands situated within one mile on either side of the Kenya-Uganda
Railway that was deemed necessary for the construction of the railway on the
Commissioner for the Protectorate and lands over which indigenous communities
shifted back and forth for cultivation and grazing.36 The Act also allowed for the
acquisition of land for the construction of government premises and roads.37 In
addition, it empowered the Commissioner for the Protectorate to allocate land to
settlers on leases not exceeding 21 years.38

33 Leys, C., Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-colonialism, Berkeley University of California Press (1994) at
28.
34 C Leys, ‘Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism’ (1994) Berkeley: University of California Press 28;
35 Kahl, C.H., Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: The Case of Kenya, 1991-93,
International Security (1998), Vol. 23 (2) at 106; and Leo, C., The Failure of the “Progressive Farmer” in Kenya's Million-Acre
Settlement Scheme, Journal of Modern African Studies, (1978), Vol. 16 (4) at 620.
36 Land Acquisition Act of 1894.
37 Land Acquisition Act of 1894.
38 Land Acquisition Act of 1894.
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44.

The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 had the effect of converting all land in Kenya
that had not been appropriated by individuals or by the colonial administration
into ‘Crown Land’, meaning land belonging to Her Majesty, the Queen of England,
which she could grant to individuals in leaseholds for a term of years or in fee
simple39 but there was no clarity on what constituted ‘Crown Land’ for purposes
of acquisition and use by the growing number of settlers and it was limited in
quantity for the desired ends.

45.

Further, On 29 December 1897, the British administrators passed the East African
Land Regulations which extended the period lease granted settlers to 99 years.
The regulations also sought to safeguard some areas under African occupation
described as those lands “that were cultivated or regularly used by any native
or native tribes.”40 Alienation on such areas could only be permitted once the
Commissioner for the Protectorate was satisfied that the land “was no longer in use
by the native or native tribes and that the issuance of the certificate of title would not
be prejudicial to the native interests.”41

46.

It appears from the wording of the East African Land Regulations of 1897 that initially,
British administrators sought to protect land use and occupational rights of indigenous
Africans in mainland Kenya. However, the years that followed saw an influx of settlers
into Kenya, prompting the government to avail more land for their occupation and
utilization. The colonial government realized that the 1897 Regulations were restrictive
since they disallowed the alienation of land under occupation of natives or native
tribes. Accordingly, it enacted the East Africa Order in Council in 1901 to provide the
Commissioner with full authority to alienate ‘Crown’ lands. The Order in Council was
also intended to define ‘Crown Land’ for purposes of acquisition and use by the growing
number of settlers because until then, there was no clarity of what constituted it.
Because ‘Crown Land’ was limited in quantity for the desired ends, the Order in Council
also sought to expand the scope of what constituted ‘Crown Land’.

47.

The Order defined ‘Crown Land’ to include all land under the control of the Queen
through agreement, treaty or convention and all other lands that she was to
acquire.42 By the provisions of the order, all such land became public land which
was, by the law, under the control of the Queen.43 However, the order fell short of
conferring direct authority on the British administration to acquire land. Therefore,

39 For further reading, see Okoth Ogendo, H.W.., African Land Tenure Reform in AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA 152
(Heyer, J., ed., 1976).
40 East African Land Regulations.
41 East African Land Regulations.
42 Section 1 of the East Africa Order in Council passed in 1901.
43 Section 1 of the East Africa Order in Council passed in 1901.
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in 1902, another ordinance - the Crown Lands Ordinance - was passed, which vested
power in the British High Commissioner to Kenya Protectorate both to acquire
land, including land in native settlements and villages and to sell land acquired in
freeholds to any settler in lots not exceeding 1 000 hectares.44
48.

In the process of passing, importing and implementing legislation, including the
Indian Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the Crown Lands Ordinance, the British
introduced a new concept of land ownership and use, with the ‘Crown’ or, in modern
parlance, the state, asserting itself as a political entity owning land in Kenya and
having the right to grant portions of it to individual users. In some cases, the state
granted rights over land occupied by natives to settlers, where such land was
perceived to be owned by it, the state, on the basis of newly-introduced legislation.

49.

It is important to note, for example, that section 31 of the Crown Lands Ordinance
allowed the Commissioner to “grant leases of areas of land containing native villages or
settlements without specifically excluding such villages or settlements.” The only land
it excluded from leases to be so granted related to the “land in the actual occupation
of natives at the date of the lease.” It has been argued that the failure of the colonial
government to define “actual occupation” left land that was in actual occupation and
use by indigenous communities which was, by provision of the Ordinance, excluded
from alienation, undefined.45 The failure exposed such land to further alienation
and indeed, in subsequent years, a meaning of actual occupation was adopted and
thereby, the British alienated more land from Africans in the region now Kenya.46

50.

With a lot of land at its disposal, the British administration encouraged many
Europeans to settle in Kenya and in order to facilitate their agricultural production
to meet the objectives already stated, they allocated settler tracts of land of up to
1 000 hectares as permitted by the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902. For purposes
of understanding why certain areas in Kenya are, to date, prone to land-related
conflicts, it is instructive to note that when European settlers arrived in Kenya, they
preferred to live in certain areas that came to be known as the ‘White Highlands’.
The areas include present-day Rift Valley, Western, Nyanza and Central regions
which were considered as favourable for settlement because of their “temperate
climate, fertile soil, and relatively disease-free environment.”47

44 Section 4 of the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902.
45 ML Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu: A study of the relationship between land and kikuyu political movements’ (1995) 40 (2) The
Journal of Negro History 112.
46 ML Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu: A study of the relationship between land and kikuyu political movements’ (1995) 40 (2) The
Journal of Negro History 113.
47 CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 23
(2) International Security 106.
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51.

For further expansion, construction of the railway line and the extent of “unused
land” were the main determinant of which areas became the ‘White Highlands’.48
The railway was essential to the settlers since it not only determined the boundaries
of the ‘White Highlands’;49 it also determined the usefulness of land since “only land
within reach of it was regarded as being of any commercial use.”50 Despite the fact
that local communities were in actual occupation of the ‘White Highlands’, settlers
viewed the areas as unoccupied and thus available for their occupation because they
equated uncultivated land as unoccupied, possibly because they did not understand
the shifting nature of occupation of land by both agrarian and pastoral communities
in the region. No wonder, Sir Harry Johnston, a British administrator, described
‘White Highlands’ at the time as “utterly uninhabited for miles and miles or at most
its inhabitants are wandering hunters who have no settled home, or whose fixed
habitation is the lands outside the healthy area.”51

52.

To increase and expand settler occupation and utilization of the so-called ‘White
Highlands’, British administrators applied the full import of provisions of their laws,
including the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902,
which authorized them to acquire land through conquest, sale and agreement but
there are indications that the provisions of their laws were not strictly followed because
in some cases, various tactics appear to have been applied in acquiring land, including
tricking illiterate community leaders into signing land alienation agreements whose
terms and implications they could not and did not fully understand.

53.

Consequently, dispossessing whole communities of their land set the stage for
some of the violent conflicts of land ownership and user rights that have been
witnessed in recent years in Kenya.

54.

There are examples of some of the methods the British applied to acquire land from
indigenous Africans. They reveal the injustices perpetrated in the process, which,
in subsequent years, precipitated violent conflicts between affected communities
and individuals and families from outside of the affected communities who have
been deemed as unjustifiably claiming land from communities that have already
suffered what, in their view, is illegal land alienation. The very act of alienation of
land was an injustice. In the process, several other injustices and atrocities were
committed against indigenous Africans by the British, which is why as the country

48
49

WTW Morgan, ‘The “White Highlands” of Kenya’ Vol. 129, No. (June 1963), The Geographical Journal, pg 144.
The boundaries were for many years described only by reference to two points on the railway, at first from Kiu to Fort Ternan [now
Lake Victoria], and later from Sultan Hamud to Kibigori. The alignment of the railway therefore helped to determine the areas first
settled by Europeans.
50 WTW Morgan, ‘The “White Highlands” of Kenya’ Vol. 129, No. (June 1963), The Geographical Journal, pg 144.
51 WTW Morgan, ‘The “White Highlands” of Kenya’ Vol. 129, No. (June 1963), The Geographical Journal, pg 140.
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approached independence, large groups of people anxious for justice, such that if
their land-related grievances were not addressed, they were likely to resort to selfhelp justice.It is important to consider British policies and laws which guided their
contestable practices in relation to Africans’ land.
55.

The laws were, at independence, adopted with very minor changes and by so
doing, the independent government of Kenya appears to have integrated, not only
an alien land tenure on a people who had greatly suffered its injustices, but also
embraced the spirit of the laws which was singly in favour of alienation of land
from Africans for the benefit of the British administration and its invited European
settlers. Could the spirit of the laws and, in cases where legal provisions were
adopted verbatim, the letter thereof also, been the cause of failure to address land
injustices at independence and the subsequent emergence of official practices in
relation to land that were akin to those of the colonialists? Some insight might
allow a deeper understanding of the root causes of land grabbing phenomenon in
post-independent Kenya and the related violent conflicts.

Acquisition of land via agreements


1904 Anglo-Maasai Agreement

56.

The Maasai community remains one of the communities that has in postindependence Kenya been engaged in perennial wars, especially with members
of the Kikuyu community over land ownership and use, especially in Enoosupukia,
parts of Naivasha, and in Molo. To a small extent, the Maasai have also been
periodically engaged in violent conflicts with members of the Kuria community,
their neighbours to the south, especially over utilization of pasture land and
watering points. What could have placed the Maasai community in a situation of
actual or perceived land scarcity to the extent of armed conflict in case of perceived
encroachment by members of other communities? Causes of the conflicts should
be understood in a historical perspective to factor the root causes of injustices that
were perpetrated by the British and subsequently, at independence, in order to
find lasting solutions to the problems.

57.

The Maasai community is Nilotic, because of its movement into Kenya from the
north, having followed the River Nile into the region that is now Kenya. Upon entry
into the region, the Maasai originally occupied the area now bordered by Suswa,
Ol-Joro Orok and Ol-Kalou.

58.

Being pastoralists, they moved freely with their cattle in the areas, especially
in search of pasture and their movement was planned in a way that allowed
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vegetation in overgrazed areas to regenerate before moving back with their
cattle. Because their population was relatively low, it was not difficult for them
to move back and forth with their cattle. However, they lost their land and all
use rights to the British through a purportedly signed agreement in 1904.
59.

In 1904, Maasai elders, known locally as laibons, through Lenana, their leader,
entered into the first “agreement” with the British administrators in which they
purportedly agreed to surrender their prime grazing lands in Suswa, Ol-Joro Orok
and Ol-Kalou areas and move to Laikipia.52 It is estimated that under this agreement
approximately 11 200 members of the Maasai community and over two million head
of their livestock, lost their land to only 48 Europeans.53

60.

Those who signed the agreement on the part of the British administrators
considered the agreement binding, even though the Maasai elders who signed
it purportedly on the part of the whole community were, apparently, uneducated
and may not have fully appreciated the full import of an agreement based on
foreign and customarily incompatible notions of land use and related tenure.
Nevertheless, once the agreement was considered to have been signed by the
Maasai, they were driven to Laikipia, to pave way for settler occupation. The Maasai
did not take long in their newfound land in Laikipia before they were, again, driven
away, purportedly by another signed “agreement”.



1911 Anglo-Masaai Agreement

61.

When the land in Laikipia became attractive to settlers, Maasai elders purportedly
signed a second agreement with the British in 1911 in which the Maasai gave away
the land in Laikipia and, purportedly, agreed to move many miles away to the more
arid terrain of the southern Rift Valley in the current Narok and Kajiado districts.
This long journey, coupled with harsh weather condition, saw the community
suffer heavy losses of human life and livestock only to settle in an area with scarce
pasture and water resources, not to mention the prevalence of livestock diseases
which was worsened by the presence of wildlife in the area.

62.

Realizing that the land to the south might not sustain their livelihood, and
convinced of their inability to militarily resist their removal from Laikipia,

52 See, generally, Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of
“Marginalized” Communities (2011).
53 JM Klopp, “Ethnic Clashes” and Winning Elections: The Case of Kenya’s Electoral Despotism’ (2001) 35 (2) Canadian Journal
of African Studies 487; O Lumumba, ‘The National Land Policy in Kenya: Addressing Historical Injustices’ (2004) 2 Kenya Land
Alliance Issues Paper 10; H Lotte, ‘Rough Time in Paradise: Blames, claims and memory-making around some protected areas in
Kenya’ (2007) 5(3) Conservation and Society 310.
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the Maasai challenged the 1904 and 1911 land agreements in a civil court in
1913,54 demanding that they return to the northern highlands as well as receive
compensation for the loss of their livestock.55 Among the arguments presented
were that the community leaders who purportedly signed the two agreements
were illiterate and therefore unable to enter into any valid agreement.56 They
further stated that community leaders who purportedly signed the agreements
had not consulted with members of the community and therefore could not be
assumed to have acted on behalf of the whole community. However, despite
the active assistance of sympathetic British activists and lawyers, the Maasai lost
the case, as it was dismissed on technicalities and received no compensation.57
63.

In rejecting their claim, the court stated that the Maasai ethnic community as
living within the limits of the East Africa Protectorate are not subjects of the
Crown, nor was East Africa British territory. East Africa, the court maintained, being
a Protectorate in which the Crown has jurisdiction is, in relation to the Crown, a
foreign country under its protection and therefore, its native inhabitants were
not subjects owing allegiance to the Crown, but protected foreigners who, in
return for that protection, owed obedience.58 The agreements were interpreted
as, “…not constituting legal contracts between the protectorate government
and the Maasai signatories, but rather, as treaties between the Crown and the
representatives of the Maasai, a foreign tribe living under its protection.”59

64.

By covering the heinous acts of the representatives of the British government under
the protective umbrella of “acts of state”, the court found itself unable to grant
relief to the Maasai plaintiffs for the serious damages suffered through deaths of
their members and loss of livestock, among others. The court erroneously found
that “acts of state” could not be subject of an examination by a municipal court,
regardless of whether they were “just or unjust, politic or impolitic, beneficial or

54 In Ole Njogo & Others v. The Attorney General & Others, Civil Case No. 91 of 1912 which was filed in the High court of East Africa
Protectorate at Mombasa(reported in (1913) 5 EALR, 70- 80), the Maasai resorted to court as the platform where they could
channel their opposition to illegal alienation of their land by the colonialists. The Maasai challenged both the British representatives
of the Crown and Maasai signatories to the 1911 agreement. Specifically, they challenged the validity of the agreement on the
ground that the signatories did not have the authority to represent the Maasai tribe. Invoking the terms of the 1904 agreement,
they requested the court to issue an injunction restraining the British administration officials involved from preventing their return,
together with their livestock to Laikipia District or from forcing those still in the District to move out.
55 See, facts of the case in, Ole Njogo & Others v. The Attorney General & Others, Civil Case No. 91 of 1912, id.
56 Who owns the Land: Blood and Soil issues in the Kenya Rift Valley (2008), available at www.ogiek.org/indepth/ind-who-owns-theland.htm, last accessed on (15 May 2011).
57 The case is reproduced, in part, in, Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for
Empowerment of “Marginalized” Communities (2011) At 273 - 274.
58 See the extract of the ruling in, Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment
of “Marginalized” Communities (2011) at 274.
59 Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of “Marginalized” Communities
(2011) at 274. An ambiguity/contradiction in the ruling in the case relate to the fact, as stated by the court, that although East Africa
was a foreign country outside of the dominions of the British crown, the Crown or its representatives had unlimited power in the
protectorate.
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injurious to those whose interests are affected.”60 The Court of Appeal upheld the
dismissal of the case by the lower court on the same grounds.
65.

Two years after the court’s decision and perhaps, in recognition of the dire
consequences that the two agreements had on the Maasai community and the
embarrassment that it might have caused the British administration, it passed
the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 which prohibited land transactions between
white settlers and Africans without the prior consent of the Governor of Kenya.61
The Ordinance also brought all land under the control of the ‘Crown’, including lands
previously reserved and actually occupied by indigenous ethnic communities and all
lands reserved for the use of any particular ‘tribe’.62

Acquisition of land through establishment of reserves
66.

In investigating the causes of land-related conflict in Kenya, the establishment of the
so-called “native reserves” is relevant for a variety of reasons. First, the establishment
of the reserves was another tool applied by the British colonial administration to
further alienate local communities’ prime land, thereby exposing communities, over
time, to land scarcity and landlessness. Secondly, the establishment of reserves for
exclusive of use specific communities created a sense - in the minds of community
members - of exclusive domains from which various tribes did and to date, seek to
exclude members of other ethnic communities from occupation, to the point of
violent conflicts, as clearly manifested, for example, soon after national elections in late
2007 and early 2008. Further, the establishment of reserves and confinement of African
communities therein made it easier for the British colonial administration to undertake
further draconian measures against local communities and their members, including
the introduction of forced labour upon populations captivated in the reserves, which
further exposed individual community members to loss of land and use rights during
long periods of forced service in European farms, as elaborated next.

67.

The British administration’s efforts to alienate land in mainland Kenya accelerated
after World War I, when former British soldiers were encouraged to settle and
engage in agricultural production activities and for that purpose, they were allowed
to acquire land, ostensibly from the Crown, at concessionary rates.63 Settlement of
ex-soldiers was facilitated by the Ex-Soldier Settlement Scheme and backed by the
Crown Lands (Discharged Soldiers Settlement) Ordinance of 1921, Kenya having

60

Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of “Marginalized” Communities
(2011) At 274.
61 Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915.
62 Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915.
63 CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 23
(2) International Security 106.
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been declared a British colony in 1920. However, only a limited amount of ‘Crown
Land’ was suitable for settler cultivation and this provided impetus for the colonial
government to alienate more land from indigenous Africans, in areas that were
deemed to be of high agricultural potential by establishing and confining African
communities to what was referred to as “native reserves.”
68.

As was the custom and policy of the British, a law called the Kenya (Native
Areas) Ordinance, was passed in 1926 to provide basis for the establishment of
reserves and to confer official recognition of their existence.64 By then, the colonial
government, had, in 1915, amended the Crown Lands Ordinance which brought
all designated reserve lands occupied by Africans under the control of the Crown,
thus paving way for their various forms of control of not only allocation and use
of the land, but also movement within and between the lands, including forced
migration onto settler farms. The 1926 Native Areas Ordinance and subsequently,
the Lands Trust Ordinance passed in 1930, had indications of intention to confer
Africans ownership and use rights over land in the reserves and to protect the rights
by stating, for example, that in the reserves, land was set aside for use and benefit
of African communities for ever and by prohibiting alienation of such land except
for public purposes, in which case, land of equal value was to be substituted.65
However, the colonial system of reserves proved to be another tool for alienation
of local communities’ prime land.

69.

As the British colonial administration forced Africans into reserves purposely
designated in marginal and unproductive areas which were also very limited in size,
considering the numbers of individual community members and the likely increase
in their population, they took over African communities’ land left behind, which
then formed part of ‘Crown Land’ to be made available to an increasing number of
settlers. In most cases, reserves were designated for occupation by particular ethnic
groups. The colonial government defined the boundaries of each reserve and later
established the kipande system, an identification system, aimed at controlling the
movement of local communities and their individual members from one reserve
area to another. Over time, the system created, in the mind of confined communities
and their members, the sense that the reserves were their exclusive domains.

70.

It is on this basis that such communities sought to resist what they perceived as
intrusion of their spaces, by the immigrant communities, 66 a notion that persisted

64 ML Kilson, ‘Land and the Kikuyu: A study of the relationship between land and kikuyu political movements’ (1995) 40 (2) The
Journal of Negro History 115.
65 EW Smith, ‘Land in Kenya’ (1936) 35 (140) Journal of the Royal African Society 246.
66 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Law System of Kenya on Principles of a National Land Policy
Framework, Constitutional Position on Land and New Institutional Framework for Land Administration, Nairobi, Government of
Kenya,2002.
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to the present time, now manifested by contentious rejection of individuals and
families seeking to undertake business or settle in areas considered as belonging
to other tribes and forceful eviction of families and individual members of
communities considered not to belong to a particular ethnic community, in
various parts of Kenya. The Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System in
Kenya established in the year 2002 found that it is on the basis of the notion
that reserves were their exclusive domains that communities (tribes) sought and
still seek to resist what they perceive as intrusion of their space by immigrant
communities and/or their members.67

Acquisition of land through coercive measures
71.

Related to the establishment of reserves were other measures whose end result
was exposure of individuals and families to landlessness and poverty - the
introduction of forced African labour, forced military service and forced taxation
upon communities already held captive in defined reserves. The financial and
political measures introduced included the introduction of the Hut and Poll
taxes under the Native Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance requiring payment of taxes
by Africans, the Masters and Servants Ordinance mandating Africans to provide
forced agricultural labour to Europeans, the 1918 Resident Native (Squatters)
Ordinance and the kipande (pass book) system, to mention a few. Moreover, as
African populations increased, the reserves, in time, became overcrowded and
could not accommodate all community members and yet movement from one
reserve to another was restricted.

72.

In order to create a large, cheap African labour force to serve as agricultural
labourers in settler farms, the British colonial administration imposed taxes on
individual Africans and tax had to be paid in the British currency, which could only
be earned by employment in the service of the British and the only employment
available for most Africans already quarantined in the reserves was labour on
European farms.68 In many cases, Africans were also forcibly captured from the
reserves and compelled to provide labour on European farms, while other captives
served in the British military.69

67 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Land Law System of Kenya on Principles of a National Land Policy
Framework, Constitutional Position on Land and New Institutional Framework for Land Administration, Nairobi, Government of
Kenya, 2002.
68 These financial and political measures included the introduction of the Hut and Poll taxes under the Native Hut and Poll Tax
Ordinance, the Masters and Servants Ordinance, the 1918 Resident Native (Squatters) Ordinance and the Kipande (pass book)
system to mention a few.
69 These financial and political measures included the introduction of the Hut and Poll taxes under the Native Hut and Poll Tax
Ordinance, the Masters and Servants Ordinance, the 1918 Resident Native (Squatters) Ordinance and the Kipande (pass book)
system to mention a few.
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Since most of the pastoralist communities in the ‘White Highlands’ did not have
cultivation of land as an established practice, the colonial administration resorted
to forced recruitment of labour from the other areas, Central, Nyanza and Western
provinces, which saw mass migration of the Kikuyu, Abagusii, Luhya, and Luo as
‘squatter’ labourers on settler farms.70 As individuals entered into forced labour,
they and in many cases, other members of their families, lost their lots in the
increasingly crowded reserves. Immigrant communities were also victims of land
alienation, having lost their land to the European settlers in other parts of the
‘White Highlands’.71

74.

As the population of Africans increased in the reserve confinement, families suffered
land scarcity and landlessness, many ending up as squatter labourers on European
farms to eke out a living. It also resulted in subsistence production pressures on
land which had negative implications for the livelihoods of Africans, especially
because native reserves consisted of large numbers of people concentrated in
small land areas to allow intensive and extensive extraction of land resources in
the settler farms. The capacity of Africans to purchase land elsewhere was curtailed
by a blanket prohibition of African cultivation of cash crops and rearing of graded
cattle as a way of shielding European settlers from economic competition.

Chapter TWO

Acquisition of land through forced evictions
75.

Evidence obtained through testimonies of affected community members indicated
that a number of African communities lost their land to British settlers through
forced evictions. It emerges from the evidence that the British applied a number
of tactics to first gain acceptance by Africans and then use their acquaintances
to better understand community members enough to develop strategies for their
eventual eviction from prime lands.



Forceful eviction of the Talai, Pokot and Turkana

76.

Three of the communities that suffered loss of land through such schemes are the
Talai, a sub-tribe of the Kalenjin community, and the Turkana. In both cases, white
settlers who came as either investors or missionaries established their homes in
close proximity to African families and first developed friendly interactions with
the Africans, characterized by giving of free gifts to the Africans in circumstances
shrouded in false religious piety.

70 CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998)
23 (2) International Security 106; Human Rights /Africa Watch, ‘Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya’
(November 1993) Human Rights Watch 23.
71 CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 23
(2) International Security 106 quoting Africa Watch, ‘Kenya: Taking Liberties,’ p. 2
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77.

Once they gained acceptance and trust of local communities, the settlers advanced
their schemes to requests for farm produce from Africans and eventually, followed
by demands for livestock and livestock products and, where families resisted,
confiscation of the products. In some cases, African communities living in close
proximity to Europeans making such advances fled their homes and farm lands
when the settler demands became unbearable, whereupon, the settlers took over
their prime lands. In other cases, African resistance of white settler demands caused
the settlers to forcefully evict them from their homes and once they vacated their
land, the settlers took them over without compensation or consideration of their
plight at all. The situation is best described by the testimony of John Auta Asili below:
The colonialists came as investors and missionaries. They build their houses on top of
the hill. During that time, the community was attracted to known white persons. First
of all, they did not understand each other because their languages were different. The
colonialists used to speak in English while the local people used to speak in Kikuyu and
Kamba languages. They tried being friendly by using religious phrases....They built their
houses near that community. During that time, the farms were so big that some of them
were not used. First, they tried being friendly by giving sugar to Matongoro and Misooni
communities in Garech, Jericho, Mti Mmoja and other areas. They even taught them
how to make sugar. They attracted the community very much. They started to ask them
about their ways of living. They started sending them to the communities to ask for
milk. They would use sentences such as “Sir, I need milk”. The community used to think
that these people were only being friendly to the community. Later on, terrible things
started to happen. The colonialists started asking for cows so that they could slaughter
for their visitors. Things started to become terrible because there were people who
used to betray others in the community. The English people started using such persons
to solicit for cows. So, there emerged a struggle between the local communities and
the English people. That was when the community decided to move further away, and
their friendship with the English people stopped at that time. The colonialists started
grabbing the land of the communities and even took their animals by force. They started
saying that all that property was theirs.72

78.

72

188

For the indigenous communities that attempted to resist the oppressive interactions
of white settlers and fought back, such as the Pokot and the Talai, the manner of
forced eviction attracted dire consequences. The colonial government responded
with great force and evicted them from their land, with the Pokot being driven to
Uganda while the Talai clan members were forced to move far away from the Rift
Valley to Gwassi in South Nyanza. The testimony of David Nasura Tuwei, on behalf
of the members of the Talai clan, explains the tribulations that the community
underwent and the effects of forcible eviction that they suffered as follows:
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Murang’a/ 10 November 2011/p. 21, para 1-4.
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Our forefathers resisted the colonialists and were either exiled or imprisoned. The most
interesting or sad thing is that never in the history of Africa regarding the European
intrusion has a whole community consisting of children, women, old men and even
animals been exiled. They were not given a chance to defend themselves in the court of
law. Normally, leaders would be exiled or jailed just like Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and Nelson
Mandela of South Africa. But in this case, it was hundreds of innocent people. This was
the worst violation of human rights by the colonial government…They [the colonial
administrators] chased them [members of the Talai clan] to Gwassi in South Nyanza
which is a dry place with little rain and is infested with tsetse flies, snakes and other
animals…In October, 1934, the Talai trekked for 13 days from Sondu, near the Kipsigis
boundary to Gwassi. Within that period, 14 women who were pregnant miscarried while
cows, sheep and goats died…several Talai women and children died as a result of the
Gwassi bug. That confirms that the colonial government wanted those people to die…
The British Colonial Government uprooted the Talai from the prestigious positions of
leadership to destitute marginalized minority groups that have been relegated from the
leadership and reduced to useless beggars. Their position before the colonialists was
equivalent to the British Royal Family and Uganda’s Kabaka Kingdom.73

79.

The eviction of the Talai clan was apparently effected under the Laibon Removal
Ordinance of 1934, which contained harsh provisions for forceful eviction of African
communities, directing those removed, as the Tala:
to the settlement area and compulsory settlement in the “rocky area with high hills” on
the shores of Lake Victoria and Mung’ori Bay.74

80.

On the basis of its provisions, the Talai appear to have suffered the worst form of
human of human rights deprivation in Kenya.75

81.

To ensure that resistant communities such as the Talai did not return and as a way
of guaranteeing security of persons and property to the European settlers and
that land alienation from Africans to white settlers proceeded without hindrance,
the colonial government established a number of police forces and security

73 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/p. 54 & 55.
74 The Laibon Removal Ordinance (1934) (Kenya), section 7.
75 Under the Ordinance, the Provincial Commissioners of Rift Valley and Nyanza were granted sweeping powers to take the
fingerprints of all the members of the Talai clan for the purposes of compiling a register. The PC had the powers to demand answers
to questions of ancestry from any person suspected to be a Talai and he, alone, could declare one a Laibon and cause him to be
removed to Gwassi or other concentration camps.
“Any person who is aggrieved by any entry relating to him or his family made or proposed to be made in a register may appeal to
the PC against such entry,” reads section 8 (5) of the ordinance. The law further gave the PC powers to establish concentration
camps to collect and detain the Laibons and their families therein and also organise compulsory movement of the Laibons and their
livestock.
Section 10(c) of the Ordinance was meant to deter any escape as the PC was given powers to: “To arrange for the guarding of the
Laibons and their families in camps or temporary halting places to prevent their escape.”
The Law was very harsh on any member of the clan who withheld any information concerning their parentage and ancestral
background and provided for the arrest of such individuals without a warrant who upon conviction could be jailed for six months or
fined a maximum of Sh. 300.
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formations which included the White Settler Regiment, Police Reserve, the General
Service Unit, and the Home Guard unit. The forces were notoriously associated
with severe physical assault of community members prior to eviction from their
land.76 The Home Guard unit grew into a formidable counter-African insurgency
force under the control and command of chiefs, the provincial administration and
local settlers.77


Forceful evictions of the Elgon Maasai/Sabaot

82.

The Sabaot, as they are widely known in Kenya today, offer the clearest example of
a people in Kenya who have, in the recent past, organised what might appropriately
be referred to as a ‘tribal army’ to fight for land-related injustices, especially forceful
eviction and acquisition of their land. Although most Kenyans may be familiar with
the internal wars waged by the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) in recent years,
especially in 2008 to 2010 to evict those they perceive to have either directly illegally
acquired their ancestral land or assisted members of other ethnic communities to
acquire their land unjustifiably, few people, if at all, are aware that since the period
of colonialism, the Sabaot have suffered systematic forced evictions and illegal
alienation of their land, first, by the British and later, by officials in subsequent postindependence governments. The Sabaot’s plight is hereby elaborated in the hope
that it will elicit immediate government action to address both past and recent landrelated injustices that members of the community have been subjected to. It comes
out clearly that had the previous post-independence governments addressed the
land-related injustices that the Sabaot have suffered, the country would not have
experienced repercussions of the self-help measures of SLFD.

83.

As early as 1913, the Sabaot, then known as Elgon Maasai, suffered forced evictions
by the British settlers who ordered them to move out of Trans Nzoia to pave way
for white settlements.78 In 1914, the following year, forceful eviction of the Sabaot
community was intensified by settlers in an operation dubbed, “Elgon Kwenda
Operation” which involved, among other things, confiscation of their livestock
while the livestock belonging to Africans who collaborated with the British were
spared, in order to force the community to move further away from Trans Nzoia,
which was their homeland.79

84.

Forceful actions targeting the whole community were complemented by actions
targeting key members of the community who were deemed to be occupying

76
77
78
79
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Gertzel, Cherry, The Politics of Independent Kenya, 1963-8 (Nairobi, 1970),pp.13-5.
See, Gertzel, Cherry, The Politics of Independent Kenya, 1963-8 (Nairobi, 1970),pp.13-5.
The eviction is recognized in Gazette Notice No. 418 of 11th June 1932 which details the finding by the Carter Commission.
The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaots Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at page 16 (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
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prime land. For example, in 1920, Sabaot Chief Kasis arap Kipkwemboi was forced
to give his homestead to a Mr Arthur M. Champion, the First District Commissioner
for Trans Nzoia District, to establish an administration centre, and his homestead
later became the DC’s office.80
85.

Between 1921 and 1922, more members of the Sabaot community were moved
out of Trans Nzoia after the land they were occupying was declared part of ‘Crown
Land’. The rest of the people were forcibly recruited as farm labourers for Europeans.
In 1924, all of the members of the community who had, for one reason or another
remained in the region were declared squatters in Trans Nzoia. When, in 1929, an
opportunity became available, they were the first African community in the region
now Kenya to present their claims to the Carter Commission on land that had been set
up by the British.81 However, although the commission, headed by Sir William Morris
recommended that the community be given 80,000 hectares of land in compensation
for lost land and two million pounds in compensation for lost livestock and homes,
the recommendation was never honoured. Instead, the community was further
dispossessed when in 1931, the then District Commissioner, John Lionel Bretherton
Llywelyn, moved 200 members of the tribe with their 5,600 heads of cattle to Sebei
country (District) in Uganda while between 12 and 15 remaining families were sent
off to the Maasai reserve in Narok and West Suk (Pokot District).82

86.

The situation of the Sabaot including their livelihood was worsened by the fact that
when, in 1938, a Native Land Trust Ordinance was passed for the purpose of settling
African communities that had been dispersed and detribalized through forceful
evictions, no reserve was established for the Sabaot/Elgon Maasai.83 Moreover, in
1940, male members of the Sabaot were deliberately recruited as carrier corpse
while their wives were encrypted into forced labour force for white settlers.84

87.

During negotiations for independence, the British government and representatives
of Kenyatta’s government that was to take over governance agreed to resettle African
communities that had been displaced by white settler activities in the country. To
give pre-eminence to resolution of their grievances over land, the Sabaot, then
known as Elgon Maasai, were represented in Lancaster House conferences where

80 The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaots Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at page 17,(TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits)..
81 The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 17 – 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
82 The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
83 The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
84 The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
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it was agreed in 1961 and 1962 that land that had been forcefully taken away from
African communities, including the Sabaot, would be restored to them. Kenyatta
who was to become the first president affirmed the agreement on 5 February 1962
upon his return from London by stating that:
Katika katiba mpya, serikali yenu imeahidi kila sehemu ya inchi, kama ni ya Maasai, itakaa
kama ilivyo, ikitawaliwa na Maasai wenyewe… kama ni ya wa Nandi, wa Nandi watatawala
inchi yao, hiyo ni kusema, ardhi yao. Hakuna mtu kutoka inje kwenda kunyakua mali yao.
Mashamba yao ni shauri yao kujua watafanya nini nayo.85

88.

Kenyatta’s sentiments and pledge echoed the intention and measures that the British
government had established to resettle African communities that were evicted
from their homelands during the colonial administration which had, by the time
of the negotiations, also established a Ministry of Lands and Resettlement for the
purpose of resettling African communities that had lost their land to white settlers
through forced evictions. However, Kenyatta never honoured the promise. Instead
of resettling the Sabaot community in Trans Nzoia, parts of Trans Nzoia District,
including Uasin Gishu District (now, Lugari), were carved out and made settlement
schemes for members of the Luhya communities from North Kavirondo.86

89.

Members of the Sabaot community claim that, in an unexplained change of mind,
the Kenyatta administration not only changed the name of the Ministry of Lands
and Resettlement to the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, for which the Sabaot
still demand an explanation, but also “facilitated the re-grabbing of the Sabaot
homeland by Luhya political allies of both Kenyatta and Moi, including Masinde
Muliro.”87 It was shocking for members of the Sabaot community that in 1963,
when Masinde Muliro became Member of Parliament for Kitale East, he moved to
Trans Nzoia in the Rift Valley Province to campaign for or advance the interests of
the Bukusu community who, by then, occupied parts of former ‘White Highlands’
farms that had been forcibly taken away from the Sabaot community.88

90.

By the time Moi took over power, some members of the Sabaot community had
settled at Kiboroa as a result of forced evictions during the colonial period.89 A head
count conducted in 1987 by the provincial administration in efforts to re-settle
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The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 19, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
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members of the community found that 1 062 families had settled in Kiboroa. However,
instead of affirming their re-settlement in the area, the provincial administration
evicted them after the count and in the process, they were scattered, some living
in forests, others in trading centres, while some ended up as farm labourers.90 Thus
Moi’s administration failed to recognise and address the community’s land problem.
91.

Apparently, members of the Sabaot community had very high hopes for the
addressing their land grievances through a new national constitution. During the
National Referendum held in 2010, they voted in favour of a new Constitution
that would establish a National Land Commission to address the historical land
injustices that they have suffered over the years.91 However, to their dismay, instead
of resolving their land grievances, the government, in February 2011, brought
internally displaced persons (IDPs) to settle on part of their land in Chepchonia.92

92.

The foregoing analogy of the Sabaot’s land problem indicates that when members
of the community finally decided to take matters in their hands to resolve their
problem through self-help measures, they had valid reasons for doing so.
Therefore, it is very unfortunate that the Mwai Kibaki administration responded to
the problem with brutal force that was never complemented by any meaningful
efforts to address the root causes of emergence and activities of the SLDF.

Land alienation and displacement by multinational corporations
93.

Apart from the colonial administration and its white settler demand for land,
multinational corporations, many of which had European origin, also contributed
to displacement and landlessness of African communities, especially in Kericho
and other parts of the Rift Valley. In various parts of Rift Valley, especially in
Kericho, such companies acquired large tracts of land that was initially meant for
the resettlement of African communities in the area for cultivation of tea.93

94.

Companies that were allocated most of the productive land in the Rift Valley in
1923 on lease for 999 years were, notably: James Finlay Company Limited (formerly
the African Highlands Produce Company Ltd) and Unilever Kenya Ltd (formerly
Brooke Bond). These companies, among others, acquired land at the expense of
the local landless Africans in the affected areas.

90

The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
91 The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 20, (TJRC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
92 The Indigenous- Elgony-Maasai (Kony) Sabaot Memorandum Presented to the TJRC at Kitale, Trans Nzoia County, 20th October
2011, at 20, (TJTC/KTL/001(Exhibits).
93 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/ p. 49 & 50.
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95.

Land leases granted to the companies by the colonial government was also for
very long periods of time, being 999 years from 1923, yet the leases covered
very large tracts of land that should have benefited the landless at the time of
allocation and provided room for local community expansion necessitated by
population growth.94 It is recommended that on the basis of permissive provisions
of the current Constitution, the 999 lease period should be reviewed with a view to
reducing it to no more than 45 years.

Land alienation during the Mau Mau movement
96.

Repressive tendencies of the British, especially forced eviction of Africans from
their homelands, coupled with alienation of evictees’ land, which was made
worse by, among other things, the suffering of Africans in squalid conditions in
the overpopulated reserves and restrictions on African commodity production,
precipitated an African freedom movement in the nature of a land and freedom
army, known as Mau Mau.95 The Mau Mau, which comprised members of a number
of African ethnic communities that had, among other things, been dispossessed of
their land, under the leadership of members of the Kikuyu community, launched
several violent assaults against officers serving the colonial administration in Kenya
and their African collaborators, in a bid to recover their land and regain freedom
from oppression.96 Attacks organized largely in forest areas and staged by the
Mau Mau prompted the colonial government to declare a ‘State of Emergency’ in
Kenya in 1952 and that provided the colonial administration another chance to
unjustifiably alienate Africans’ land.

97.

During the emergency period, persons suspected to be members of the Mau
Mau movement were either killed, detained or repatriated from their settlement
schemes, including Olenguruone Settlement Scheme in Nakuru, Rift Valley, from
which some of the members of the Mau Mau were repatriated to Central Province.

98.

Under the guise of the declared State of Emergency, the British colonial
administration took draconian measures against Africans, including repatriation
from their settlements, arrest and detention of members or sympathizers of

94
95

TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/ p. 49 & 50.
Kanyinga, k., ‘Land Redistribution in Kenya’ in HP B Mkhize Et al (eds) Agricultural land redistribution: Towards greater consensus
(2010) 93; JW Wakhungu, C Huggins & E Nyukuri, ‘Land tenure and violent conflict in Kenya’ (2008) African Centre for Technology
Studies 2; C Leo, ‘The Failure of the “Progressive Farmer” in Kenya's Million-Acre Settlement Scheme’ (1978) 16 (4) The Journal of
Modern African Studies 620; Human Rights/ Africa Watch, ‘Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya’ (November
1993) Human Rights Watch 23; RR Simiyu, ‘Militianisation of resource conflict: The case of land-based conflict in the Mount
Elgon region of Western Kenya’ (2008) Institute for Security Studies 4 available at http://www.iss.co.za/uploads/M152FULL.PDF
(accessed on 3 May 2012).
96 CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998)
23 (2) International Security 107; C Leys, ‘Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism’ (1994) Berkeley:
University of California Press 49;
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Mr. Charles Njaraba testifying on the plight of Mau Mau families during the TJRC’s Rumuruti hearings.

the Mau Mau. Land was alienated from those associated with the Mau Mau and
allocated to those who were loyal to the administration as a punishment for
what it considered as acts of terror against the settler community.97 Thus the
Mau Mau movement attracted further African land alienation by the colonial
administration and attendant landlessness and destitution because when Mau
Mau fighters and their collaborators returned from war, they found that their
land and other property had been confiscated by British administration loyalists
including ‘home guards’ and the provincial administration. It is noted that the
declaration of emergency also, as a colonial measure, permitted the colonial
administration to suspend hearing and determination of land-related suits in
African courts through the enactment of the 1957 African Courts (Suspension of
Land Suits) Ordinance, which made it impossible for affected Africans to present
their claims in court for redress and thus foreclosed their right to justice in respect
of land ownership and utilization in the colonial period.98
97
98

JW Harbeson, ‘Land reforms and politics in Kenya, 1954-70’ (1971) 9 (2) The Journal of Modern African Studies 236; C Leys,
‘Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism’ (1994) Berkeley: University of California Press 48.
JW Harbeson, ‘Land reforms and politics in Kenya, 1954-70’ (1971) 9 (2) The Journal of Modern African Studies 236; C Leys,
‘Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy of neo-colonialism’ (1994) Berkeley: University of California Press 48.
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99.

The significance of loss of land through alienation during the Mau Mau movement
lies not only in its precipitation of land scarcity, landlessness and destitution, but
also in the fact that it precipitated inter and intra-ethnic tensions and subsequent
violent conflicts among ethnic communities, including the Kikuyu and between
the Kikuyu and Maasai and the Kalenjin before and after independence.99 Some
of the then precipitated land-related violent conflicts have been witnessed
between the Kikuyu and the Maasai in Olenguruone and also between the
Kikuyu and the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley, even as late as the year 2008. That
said, it is worth noting that in post-independent Kenya, certain factors emerged
soon after independence that have fostered and worsened inter-ethnic landrelated conflicts in the areas cited, among others, in the country. For a better
understanding, the factors are elaborated in following sections of this chapter.

Land alienation and the Swynnerton Plan
100. The Mau Mau uprising, being the only concerted and determined violent effort
by Africans from across the ethnic divide - with sustained impacts on white
settlers since invasion by Arabs at the Coast of Kenya to gain independence
from colonialism - compelled the British colonial administration to reconsider
their policies and practices in relation to Africans’ land, apparently to make land
concessions to Africans. In that regard, a policy in the form of the Swynnerton
Plan was developed in 1954 which stated that the traditional system of tenure
in African reserves promoted fragmentation of the land holdings into smaller
and uneconomical land units for production and sought to provide solutions
to improve and make African land tenure systems contribute to the economic
development of the colony.100 For the first time, the colonial administration,
through the Swynnerton Plan, allowed Africans to not only buy land and acquire
titles to land in the White Highlands but also, facilitated the acquisition of credit,
and removed the restriction on the cultivation of export crops by Africans.101
However, the Swynnerton Plan generated serious negative consequences, which
are, to some extent, still being felt in Kenya to date, as the following paragraphs
reveal.
101. Measures that were provided for and implemented under the Swynnerton
Plan failed to properly factor African’s widespread customary land tenure
and introduced a title registration aspect of a colonial land tenure that was
both alien and incompatible with Africans’ land holding, use, distribution and
99 JW Wakhungu, C Huggins & E Nyukuri, ‘Land tenure and violent conflict in Kenya’ (2008) African Centre for Technology Studies 2.
100 The Swynnerton Plan was named after R.J.M. Swynnerton, the then Assistant Director of Agriculture who designed it.
101 CH Kahl, ‘Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, and State-Sponsored Violence: the Case of Kenya, 1991-93’ (1998) 23
(2) International Security 107; K Kanyinga, ‘Land Redistribution in Kenya’ in HP B Mkhize Et al (eds) Agricultural land redistribution:
Towards greater consensus (2010) 92.

196

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter TWO

transmission customs and practices. It also failed to recognize and redress of
previous cases of Africans’ land alienation by both the British and Arabs and
resulted in more landlessness and scarcity in many areas and communities
across the country.
102.

The Swynnerton Plan provided for, among other things, a process of land
adjudication, consolidation and registration of adjudicated parcels of land in the
names of those identified as owners.102 However, under the plan, land was registered
in the names of present male-heads of households who were conferred use rights
without recognition of use rights of female heads of households whose husbands
were still operating in the Mau Mau, largely outside of designated settlement areas.
It did not also recognize the use rights of those whose husbands had died - some
of them at the hands of the British and female relatives who had use rights over the
land.103

Effects of colonial land laws, policies and practices
103. In a number of paragraphs in the foregoing section, a various impacts of
colonial land policies, laws and practices on Africans and their land ownership
and use rights have been explained in the expectation that it provides the
basis for factoring the injustices in current measures for redress. The discussion
reveals, among other things, that colonial policies, laws and practices had both
immediate and long-term effects on African communities, including permanent
displacement. They further created arbitrary ethnic specific boundaries, thus
generating a notion of exclusivity of land rights by certain communities in certain
areas. They disrupted the socio-cultural and economic life of many communities,
including those at the Coast, thus exposing families and succeeding generations
to landlessness. These policies, laws and practices promoted inequality in land
and related rights, poverty and destitution in addition to barring Africans from
owning land in the White Highlands.
104. When, in subsequent years, the ban was lifted; the interests of communities and
families that were evicted from prime lands in the highlands ought to have been
considered first. They also created a system of land tenure based on hitherto,
alien principles of English property law, with limited application to highpotential areas, while largely neglecting the regime of customary property law in
the marginal areas to which they were confined with negative consequences on
Africans’ land use practices, productivity and progress. They diminished African
102 Swynnerton, R.J.M., A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, (Nairobi, 1954), Government Printer.
103 Wakhungu, J. W., Huggins, C. & Nyukuri, E., Land Tenure and Violent Conflict in Kenya, African Centre for Technology Studies
(2008) at 2.
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customary land tenure, making the establishment of an appropriate, comparable
and compatible tenure necessary during and after independence. They caused
many local communities including the Maasai and Nandi lose an estimated five
million hectares of land to white settlers.104 Further, they generated equality and
discrimination in access to land and related infrastructure and social amenities
that were mainly concentrated in the areas occupied exclusively by the colonial
administrators and the white settlers and thus was the genesis of the current
imbalance in the country in the various respects. The selective registration
system generated tension within and between families and several land-related
injustices that required immediate redress after independence.
105. The elaboration also shows why land-related conflicts were likely to arise
among various communities in the country and between communities and the
government, if prompt and appropriate redress measures took long to genuinely
implement. It reveals, for example, that reserves for confinement of Africans
were created by the British arbitrarily in various parts of the country and their
boundaries defined, regardless of previous occupations by communities (tribes)
in the pre-colonial period, thus compelling communities of different origins to
live together as neighbours regardless of whether they had nothing in common
such as shared ancestry, identity, language, economic livelihood or culture.105 The
situation did and has, over the years, resulted in ethnic suspicion, mistrust, tension
and structured violent conflicts.106
106. Further, elaboration on the preceding paragraphs show that although the letter
and spirit of colonial land laws and related facilitating laws and regulations such
as the Masters and Servants Ordinance were intended to extract both Africans’
land and labour for the benefit of the British and their collaborators, many of the
laws (including their letter and spirit) were adopted at independence without
overhauling their basic tenets that were, not at all, in the interest of Africans.
Therefore, the laws could have hindered an acceptable transition in terms of land
ownership and use rights from the British to Africans at independence and in
years to come thereafter.

104 See for example Maloba, Wanyabari, Mau Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt (London, 1993), p.27. ; Lonsdale:
‘Conquest State” in Berman, Bruce and Lonsdale, John, Unhappy Valley, Book One: State and Class (London, 1992), p.38.
105 Anderson, David M. , ‘Yours in Struggle for Majimbo’, Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 195564’,
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 40, no. 3 ( 2005) confirms that ethnicity was an important variable in the definition of
administrative boundaries, since it was based on the colonial policy of divide and rule.
106 Kenya Regional Boundaries Commission, Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission (London, 1962).
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Land and the Transition to Independence
107. This section of this chapter explains, among other things, that there has always
been a strong linkage between land and politics in Kenya. It also explains that land
occupied settler politics throughout the colonial period and was the fundamental
issue in the independence movement,107 which helps to understand why land
remains a politically sensitive issue in the country. It is revealed that the role of
political parties in addressing land questions at independence was significant in
so far as party founders, members and their leaders embraced the land question
as key. The section further demonstrates that land was the focus of negotiations
for independence between the British colonial administration and the local elites
and the negotiations raised the hope of Kenyans at the time that upon attaining
independence, all land-related claims would be resolved with finality, which is why
failure by the first independent government to fully address existing land issues
was likely to perpetrate inter-ethnic conflict for years to come. Further, it reveals
the historical roots of some of the current political and related land struggles.
108. All of the foregoing colonial policies, laws and practices, as well as the negative
impacts that they engendered, collectively generated a land question embodying
various land issues arising during colonialism, which became a key motivation for
the formation of various local political groups pressing for Kenya’s independence.
Political parties which emerged from various parts of the country in the late
1950s with land rights for Africans and freedom from colonisation as a common
agenda included the Kikuyu Central Association, the Young Kavirondo Tax Payers
Association and the Mwambao United Front.
109.

Although land was a common agenda for all the groups, there was constant tension
and conflict between their members representing Africans in the Legislative
Assembly (Legco), especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s on modalities and
arrangements for independence, which would have skewed negotiations between
them and their British counterparts. In order to overcome the hurdle, on 14 May
1960, the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU) was founded as some sort of umbrella
political organization, but with leadership dominated by representatives from larger
and more influential ethnic groups including the Kikuyu, Luo, Embu, Meru and
Kamba. Divergence of views between KANU and other parties subsequently formed
was to delay negotiations with the British on land but eventually, agreements were
reached which Kenyans could lay their hopes on for resolution of land rights claims.

107 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 1.
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110.

KANU favoured rapid decolonisation, social reforms, a prominent state role in the
economy and open competition for land, based on the willing-buyer, willing-seller
options and availability of and access to resources, unfettered by ethnic boundaries, in
which case, their communities would perform relatively well.108 The position was not
well received by political representatives of other local communities who seemed to
prefer a more cautious and tolerant (to settlers) approach to the land question.

111.

Consequently, on 25 June 1960, the leaders of four regional alliances - the Kalenjin
Political Alliance of Daniel Moi and Taaita Towett, the Coastal African People’s Union
of Ronald Ngala, the Maasai United Front led by John Keen and John Konchelah, the
Kenya Africa People’s Party of Masinde Muliro and Somali leaders - agreed a merger to
create a competing national coalition, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Its
key assets were its position on land, and the desire of the (more socially conservative)
coastal and pastoral communities to avoid continued dominance by the Kikuyu and
Luo themes in post-independence politics. KADU had the backing of the European
settlers as it promised to protect their farms and support liberal economic policies.109
The divergence of views, especially on land, between the then political coalition parties
threatened to derail discussions between them and negotiations on land, as part of the
independence package, but the situation was saved by a surprising position adopted
by a British party leader during one of the conferences that were held in London to
discuss the issues, known as the Lancaster House conferences.

The First Lancaster House Conference
112. At the First Lancaster House Conference held in London between January and
March 1960, conflict between KANU and KADU arising from their divergent views
on land marred negotiations. However, with the continued African pressure for
independence, the toll it wrought on British settlers and continued conflict over
land, strengthened by changing British attitude over Kenya colony prompted Mr
Harold Macmillan, a British Conservative Party leader, and the newly-appointed
British Colonial Secretary Ian Macleod to agree that British rule could no longer
hold in Kenya simply because of the white settlers’ interests, which were mainly in
land within the White Highlands.110 Both British representatives also expressed the
view that since multi-racialism policy attempts could not offer a long- term solution
to conflicts between white settlers and Africans, the legitimacy of African nationalism
must be accepted.111
108 Charles Hornsby, KENYA, A History Since Independence, 2012, p.61
109 Ibid.p.61.
110 The First Lancaster House Conference is described in Oginga Odinga, ‘Not Yet Uhuru’, pp.178-82, see also Kyle: Politics, pp.1028.
111 Kyle, Keith, ‘The Politics of Independence of Kenya’ (Basingstoke, 1999), pp.99-102.
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On the basis of strong sentiments expressed by the colonial administration’s
representatives to Kenya, the colonial administration declared Britain’s intent to
recognize a “wind of change” blowing across the continent of Africa that colonial
powers could no longer hold back and the need for it to withdraw from all its
remaining colonies. Although they feared that their African colonies, including
Kenya, were not ready for independence, the British judged the dangers of delay
- violence, radicalization and a turn to communism - to be a higher risk. As part of
the package of the expected political change, the colonial secretary appointed a
new British representative, Sir Patrick Renison, to replace Governor Evelyn Baring in
Kenya.112

114. After the deliberations at the First Lancaster House Conference, many European
settlers felt abandoned by the British government, with no guarantee of what would
happen to their land if Kenya attained independence. Unless they were willing to
resort to violence, the colony would move towards a majority rule, dominated by
Africans. To avert looming danger to settler interests, an arrangement was made,
under the British influence, to include four African leaders, Ronald Ngala, James
Muimi, Gikonyo Kiano and Taaita Towett, under the African Elected Member
Organization (AEMO), in the colonial government, to represent the interests of
Africans. However, hard-line members of KANU, led by Oginga Odinga, in contrast,
rejected the arrangement - until Kenyatta was released from detention.113
115. Finally, Jomo Kenyatta was released from detention and he joined the KANU
leadership as chairman, after James Gichuru stepped down in his favour. Despite
the new dynamics that came with Kenyatta’s release, the KANU leadership
remained sharply divided on the land question. One group led by Odinga Oginga,
Bildad Kaggia and Paul Ngei opposed recognition of pre-independence land
deals, believing it would entrench European interests. They even went ahead and
campaigned against the sale of any European land to Africans.114
116. The other group led by Jomo Kenyatta, James Gichuru and Mbiyu Koinange were
in support of the settler proposals for a large-scale , foreign–funded, buyout policy
arrangements with the colonial administration.115 According to Jomo Kenyatta,
the British had to fund a large-scale settlement programme that would settle
the landless, using long-term loans with easy repayment conditions.116 The KANU
faction of Odinga remained unhappy and only reluctantly accepted that land was to
112
113
114
115
116

Kyle, Keith, ‘The Politics of the Independence of Kenya’ (Basingstoke, 1999), pp.99-102.
Goldsworthy: Mboya,pp.137-8
See Harbeson, John ‘Nation- Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform’ (Evanston, 1973), p.122..
Harbeson, John, ‘Nation- Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform’ (Evanston, 1973), p.122.
Kenyatta, Jomo, ‘Suffering Without Bitterness: The Founding of the Kenya Nation’ (Nairobi, 1968), pp.163-4
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be purchased from the European settlers to settle the squatters and the landless.117
The reason was that Africans could not buy back land that was originally theirs and
that during their election campaigns, the leaders had promised their supporters
that when the country attains independence, they would get their land back at no
charge.
117. The perception of Odinga and his allies in KANU did not go down well with Kenyatta
and Mboya. Kenyatta categorically maintained that there were no free things and
that land was not free, but must be purchased. His position shocked many of the
KANU supporters who felt that he and his allies betrayed them because the political
leaders had made election pledges to the effect that Africans would recover their
stolen land after independence.118

The Second Lancaster House Conference
118.

The Second Lancaster House Conference took place between 24 February and 6 April
1962 in London and was attended by representatives of KANU, KADU, communities
in North Eastern and Eastern provinces and delegates of the Mwambao United
Front (MUF) from the Coast of Kenya. At the conference, political differences within
KANU and between KANU and KADU especially over the unresolved land question,
which was not concluded during the First Lancaster House Conference, featured
again. Notwithstanding the political differences, an agreement was reached to grant
Kenya autonomy, based on KADU’s regionalist/federal model of governance. The
British government favoured KADU’s views, mostly because of its concerns about
land and the future of the white settlers and their economy under KANU. Also, KADU
represented ethnic groups that had remained loyal to the British during the State
of Emergency, and whose leaders had agreed to take office when KANU refused. In
addition, KADU represented many of Kenya’s pastoralists. Moreover, the Maasai and
Kalenjin leaders, including Justus ole Tipis, William Murgor and John Marie Seroney,
had threatened civil war or violent conflict if their demands were not met.119

119. At the Second Lancaster House Conference, an agreement was also reached on
the outline of Kenya’s independence land programme. KANU and the settlers later
agreed that there was a desperate need for rapid expansion of the land purchase
and settlement programme, while Rift Valley KADU leaders, including Moi and Tipis,
defended the historical right to land of the Rift Valley people and the centrality
of communal land rights, which would give the Maasai and Kalenjin most of the
White Highlands. Contrary to the position of Rift Valley KADU leaders, KANU,
117 Oruka, H. Odera, ‘Oginga Odinga: His Philosophy and Beliefs’ (Nairobi, 1992), p.75.
118 Kyle Keith, ‘The Politics of Independence of Kenya’, ( Basingstoke, 1999), pp.99-102
119 Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference ( London, 1962)
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especially its Kikuyu leaders and supporters (both loyalists and ex-detainees), was
vehemently opposed to proposals that recognized communal land rights. The fear
of the big ethnic community elite was that any sub-division based on pre-colonial
occupation or spheres of influence was unlikely to give them the lion’s share of the
land that they desired.
120. Therefore, senior Central Province personalities led by Gichuru, Koinange, Kiano,
among others, well before independence, began to scheme for the willing-buyer,
willing-seller option of land re-distribution. To them, it was clear that the populist
campaign of Oginga Odinga and his allies about free distribution of land after
independence to KANU supporters was not a viable option.120
121. There was a third position to the land question which only made resolution of
outstanding issues more difficult. KADU members, led by Muliro, Moi, Towett and
Ngala, with dominant support from the Kalenjin, Luhya, Mijikenda and Maasai
communities, preferred a multi-racial approach that guaranteed security of land
rights for the settlers who wished to stay on after independence as well as the
systematic transfer of land to the Africans.
122. Because of their position regarding the land question, the colonial administration
and white settlers rallied their support behind KADU and also orchestrated the
split of the AEMO.121 Whereas KANU’s dominant position at the Second Lancaster
House Conference was that the sanctity of individual titles for settlers only should
be respected, KADU demanded that it should apply to both ethnic communities as
well as to individuals.122 The confluence of land and negative ethnicity, apart from
personal interests among the elites, created ethnic tensions and conflicts that were
to dominate the next four or more decades.123
123. The Report of the Second Lancaster Constitutional Conference indicates that in
accordance with agreements made between representatives of the British and
Africans, former Crown lands became the responsibility of the regions, while
the un-demarcated ex-reserves were handed over to the new county councils to
allay fears about their future. However, not all of the representatives of African
communities who attended the conference were satisfied with the outcome of
deliberations and the dissatisfaction, with a feeling of betrayal underlying most of
the political and land-related struggles in Kenya for years to come.
120 Leys: Underdevelopment, pp.56-7.
121 Rothchild, Donald, ‘Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A study of Minorities and Decolonization’ (London, Oxford University
Press, 1973); AEMO was a loose political organization of African leaders elected to the Legislative Council between 1957 and 1960,
before the formation of KANU and KADU.
122 Harbeson, John, Nation- Building in Kenya: The Role of Land Reform (Evanston, 1973), p.115.
123 See Goldsworthy, David, ‘Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to Forget’ ( London,1982), pp.173-8
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124.

The report indicated that the Maasai who attended the conference in a unique status
because of previous land treaties made on their behalf with the British colonial
administration were left with little apart from the promise of the ethnic purity of
their districts. Their delegation refused to sign on the Land Deal at the Second
Lancaster Conference, claiming a second British betrayal, although their refusal to
sign had no practical effect on the land deal.124 Resolutions of the Second Lancaster
Conference may have been a good compromise for the British, but for the Maasai,
failure to discuss the land question and the future of the Maasai in light of the two
agreements made between their leaders and the British, before independence
would have left them with serious liabilities in the event of future expropriation.125
The Maasai were and continue to this date to be dissatisfied with the agreements
reached at the conference over land.

125. Representatives of other communities, including the Mijikenda at the Coast and
pastoral communities in North Eastern and parts of the Eastern provinces were
equally dissatisfied with the outcome of deliberations on land at the conference.
Representatives of the communities were and still are dissatisfied, not only with the
land agreement made at the Second Lancaster House Conference, but also with
policies adopted at the conference and by the post-independence governments.
As a result, soon after independence, pastoral communities from the region that
became known as the North Eastern Frontier (NEF) demanded to be joined with
the ‘Greater Somalia’ country than to remain in Kenya.
126. For communities at the Coast, dissatisfaction with agreements over land arrived
at the conference, made worse by exclusionary policies and practices of postindependent governments, could have been the genesis of land and related
political struggles at the coast, which have given rise to the emergence of the
Mombasa Republican Army (MRC). At the Second Lancaster House Conference,
delegates of the Mwambao United Front (MUF) from the Coast Province
attempted to introduce the ‘Land Question of the Ten- Mile Coastal Strip’ through
a memorandum that demanded their autonomy from mainland Kenya after
independence, but their move was rejected by the conveners of the Conference,
on the advice of the Secretary of State, who argued that the Coastal Strip land
question fell outside the scope of the conference. In addition and unfortunately,
the conference, instead of addressing the real and pressing land question at the
Coast, took note of “Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to continue to discharge
as hitherto, its responsibilities with regard to land matters at the Coast under the
existing Agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar.”126
124 Report of the Kenya constitutional Conference (London, 1962), Annex C pp.29-30; Hughes, Lotte, ‘Malice in Maasaland: The
Historical Roots of Current Political Struggles’, African Affairs, Vol.104,No.415( 2005),pp.209-11
125 Leo, Christopher, ‘Land and Class in Kenya’ (Toronto, 1984), pp.91-4.
126 Robertson, James, W, ‘The Kenya Coastal Strip: Report of the Commissioner Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State
for Colonies by Command of Her Majesty’ (Cmnd.1585, London, December 1961), p.13.
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127. The situation at the Coast was particularly complex because of the size and
influence of the Muslim Arab and Swahili communities, many of whom saw
little future in an African dominated Kenya, and who campaigned for coastal
autonomy. Ronald Ngala, the coastal Mijikenda communities’ representative,
pushed for a middle ground position, but was not supported by representatives
of the Muslim Arab, Swahili, Shirazi and Bajuni communities who had also
attended the conference. Eventually Ngala reluctantly supported the integration
of the 10-mile Coastal Strip into mainland Kenya for the sake of harmony and
transition to independence.127

The Third Lancaster House Conference
128. During the third and final Lancaster House deliberations of September to October
1963, KANU successfully managed to weaken the ‘Majimbo Constitution’ that
was drafted during the Second Lancaster House Conference, which proposed
an independent government based on regionalism. KANU, with the unexpected
support from the British, reneged on the constitutional agreement which had
incorporated regionalism (a Majimbo system of government) before even it was
implemented to address land issue, among other things. Therefore, although on 20
October 1963 Kenyatta issued a categorical assurance that under the independence
Constitution, “all ‘tribal’ land would be entrenched in tribal authority and that no
one could take away land belonging to another tribe,”128 that appears to have been
just an attempt to appease Ronald Ngala and other minority community leaders
who were planning secession or alliance with Kenyan Somalis on account of failed
promises on land restoration and establishment of regional governments across
the country. Indeed, it was a vain hope that was likely to engender anger and
frustration in communities that had hinged their hope in recovering land lost to
Arabs and European settlers after independence.
129. By the time land issues were negotiated at the Lancaster House Conferences, African
elites appear to have known that a redistribution of land in the White Highlands
was inevitable and therefore, they positioned themselves for competition for
the land, based on colonial tenure. Contrary to their expectations and schemes,
communities that had unjustifiably and painfully lost the land, such as the Maasai,
the Kalenjin and other pastoralist communities, based their claims on pre-colonial
usage of land. The situation was made more tenuous by the Kikuyu and other
sedentary African communities who also claimed land in the White Highlands, also
basing their claim upon colonial tenure.
127 Salim A. I., ‘The Movement for Mwambao’ or Coast Autonomy in Kenya, 1956-63, in Ogot, Bethwell (ed), Hadith 2 (Nairobi, 1970).
128 Letter from Kenyatta, Kenya Independence Conference 1963, Cmnd.2156 (London, 1963), Annex C; see also Kenyatta, Jomo,
Harambee! (Nairobi, 1964), p.14. The assurance soon turned out to be false as the powers of the regional or federal government
over trust land was eroded and transferred to the central government through a stage managed constitutional amendments and
defections to KANU by KADU proponents of federalism. In fact regionalism was crippled before it was implemented.
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130.

The varying positions, worsened by the failure of regionalism and the land buyout
scheme discriminately implemented at independence, became the genesis of interethnic tensions and perennial conflicts between the communities over the former
White Highlands.129 The potential for conflict was made worse by the fact that due to
increase in population and pressure on land, many ‘squatters’ from Central Province,
who were not lucky to get land allocations from the White Highlands in their ancestral
homeland, either bought land through land-buying companies or were allocated
land by the government in areas perceived to belong to other communities, northwest of their province, as far as Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia.

131. From the foregoing and other relevant literature, Kenya’s independence was a
negotiated process between the British colonial administration and a group of
African elites in their position as representatives of their people, in which there was
a strong expectation on the part of the British that the colonial system (including
its system of land ownership and use already established) would continue, in order
to allow settlers to adapt to changed political circumstances.130
132. Most importantly, the British considered that protection of property rights already
acquired by settlers was vital to the conclusion of independence negotiations
held between 1960 and 1962.131 On the basis of that understanding, part of the
land deals made at Lancaster House Conferences which were based largely on
proposals from white settlers was that regionalism would be the supportive
governance structure and that it would be accompanied by a dramatic extension
of settlement such that most settler ranches and plantations would remain intact
in the White Highlands, while a million acres of mixed farms (half of what settlers
already owned) would be taken by the independent government and used to
settle Africans.132
133. The one million acres of land to be acquired from white settlers for settlement of
Africans displaced during colonialism was to be funded by the British government
and international loans, and executed through private land purchases. However,
both KADU and the white settlers had favoured a more limited settlement
approach. The fear of KADU was that the Central Land Board that was proposed to
manage the transfer of white-owned lands to Africans would favour the majority
ethnic communities such as the Kikuyu, and therefore it sought to ensure that the
regions would play a role in the board, but this was not to be.133
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Resettlement programmes
134. By the early 1960s, the problem of landlessness had been worsened by population
increase in the designated native reserves, thus heightening desperation for
lasting solutions. As the country approached independence in 1963, many
communities that had lost land to the colonial administration and its settlers were
eagerly awaiting restoration of their land, at no charge. While some of the landless
community members ‘squatted’ in certain areas in the hope that their occupation
would be regularized by the government, others took a confrontational and violent
approach to the land question on grounds that they were just recovering their land
which had been ‘stolen’ or annexed by force by the colonialists, with the help of
their African collaborators.
135. As explained in the preceding section, there had also emerged a group of African
elites and business people who were eager to acquire land, especially in the White
Highlands, for commercial purposes. Thus African interests generated a near
scramble for land in the former White Highlands and other strategic areas. However,
as demonstrated by the divergent views of Africans’ political representatives
during the Lancaster House conferences where the existing land questions were
negotiated as part of the independence package, some of the proposed measures
would not be favourable to many of the communities that had lost their land to
colonialists. Moreover, the colonial government changed its attitude towards Jomo
Kenyatta whom it initially perceived as a radical or trouble maker and maintained
cordial working relationships with him, thus compromising his perceived capacity
to genuinely address land issues after independence.134
136.

The situation resulted in agitation by Africans who were dissatisfied with the buyout
policy arrangement between the incoming independence administration and the
outgoing colonial administration, especially in view of the fact that the African
communities were pressing for a return of their land that was forcibly and unjustifiably
taken away from them. There were also those who fought for independence with the
expectation that they would recover their alienated land or, at least, compensation
for the loss of their main source of survival and livelihood, whose claims threatened
to turn the White Highlands into battle grounds between Africans who remained
landless on the one hand and African elites who were poised to acquire land
therefrom, based on British land tenure and remnant white settlers on the other.

137. To avert political pressure and the looming dangers from agitated Africans, the
incoming independent government, with approval and financial backing of the
British colonial government in its last years of administration in the early 1960s,
134 H.O.Oruka, ‘Oginga Odinga: His Philosophy and Beliefs’ (Nairobi, 1992), p.75.
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made settlement proposals including offers for British funding of settlement
schemes for Africans, but as is shown next, subsequent implementation of the
schemes failed to fully address the existing land question, at the time.
138. Instead, officials of the newly-formed independent government in Kenya turned
the foreign-funded settlement schemes into cartels for their own acquisition of,
and benefit from large tracts of land in the Rift Valley, among other parts of the
White Highlands and in the process, defrauded communities that were affected by
land alienation by the British even more and set the stage for some of the battles
over land witnessed in recent years.


The Mackenzie scheme

139. At independence, Jomo Kenyatta became Prime Minster of Kenya and soon, at his
insistence, the Constitution was amended to create the position of an Executive
President, as both Head of State and Head of Government. Kenyatta appointed
James Gichuru as Minister for Finance, Bruce McKenzie Minister for Agriculture
and Jackson Angaine Minister for Lands and Settlement. The three ministers
played key roles in the design of settlement programmes and in the acquisition of
loans granted by the British government to buy out white settlers for purposes of
resettling African communities that lost their land, in both low and high-density
settlement schemes. Settlement arrangements had been agreed during the
Lancaster House conferences.
140. In 1964 Mackenzie, as Minister for Agriculture, made some initial proposals for
resettlement. His proposals were more concerned with the highest quality of
land, and were based on a large farm model. Such a model would never meet the
political demand for land among the majority of Africans who had held higher
expectations about independence and the opportunity to own land or recover
what was alienated from them by the white settlers with the support of the colonial
administration.135
141.

However, McKenzie’s recommendations had key ingredients for a final resettlement
plan. He spearheaded the design of two types of resettlement schemes. The first a
‘yeoman’ scheme, in which large farms would be created for experienced farmers and
were to be interspersed with European farms. For that category of farms, recipients
would contribute five hundred (500) sterling pounds. The second was a peasant
scheme designed to create smaller farms for which recipients would contribute
one hundred (100) sterling pounds. The peasant scheme category was planned for
establishment in the borderlands between native reserves and the highlands.

135 Ibid., pp.59-61.
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142. To capacitate Africans to make payment for farms in the two categories, the British
government, with contribution from the World Bank, advanced a loan of 7.5 million
sterling pounds to the incoming government of Kenya.
143. The funding was intended to facilitate the buyout and resettlement programme
in different parts of the country, especially in regions previously occupied by the
white settlers.136 However, the scheme also offered credit facilities to non-affected
Africans who wished to purchase farmlands in the White Highlands. The ‘Yeoman
Programme’, as it was called, which was later renamed the Assisted Farmers Scheme
(AFS), envisaged buying 240,000 acres in the White Highlands to be sub-divided
into 100 acres parcels and distributed to a select group of Africans who would
farm alongside white settlers.137 However, access to loan facilities and subsequent
allocation of land in the Mackenzie schemes to certain groups of individuals,
especially ex-loyalists of the colonial administration, did not please members of
communities that had genuinely lost land to the colonialists.
144. In particular, the arrival of the first wealthy Africans who happened to be ex-loyalists
of the outgoing colonial administration from their native reserves to acquire the
newly-demarcated large farms on the basis of loans facilitated by the independent
government attracted resentment from communities that felt entitled to the land
on the basis of having lost it to white settlers and in some instances, resulted in
violent conflicts between the new African elite settlers and those who remained
landless.138 Moreover, resettlement schemes based on the Mackenzie proposals
were focused on the former White Highlands without serious consideration of the
dire need to resettle the Mijikenda who also lost their land at the Coast and were,
by then, largely, landless.
145. In addition to imbalanced allocation of land to ex-loyalists who were deemed to be
undeserving of land allocations by landless African communities and communities
facing land scarcity, other political developments introduced by the Kenyatta
administration further diminished the chances of landless and land-scarce local
communities to recover their lost land or receive compensation therefore.
146.

Land, or more specifically, recovery and restoration thereof to African communities
in their regional enclaves, was the main factor underlying negotiations for Majimbo
or regional government between African community representatives and the British
colonial administration in the Lancaster House conferences and in subsequent
meetings, including the meeting of October 1963 at which a draft of the independence

136 Leo: Land and Class, p.111.
137 Leo: Land and Class, p.111.
138 ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’, 21 November 1963, in CAB 128/38, p.5.
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constitution including a regional governance structure, was agreed. However,
Kenyatta’s administration soon introduced radical changes to the independence
constitution which eroded the regional basis for recovery, retention and utilization of
communal lands to the chagrin of many communities and their leaders.
147. In 1964, the Kenyatta administration introduced two major amendments to the
Independence Federal Constitution. The first and second amendments abolished
significant sections of the Federal (Majimbo) Constitution. These amendments
ensured that all land vested in the regions was transferred back to central control
by the President and his associates, including the Commissioner of Lands and the
Minister in charge of Lands and Settlement.139
148. Central government also conferred upon itself the power to unilaterally take over
trust lands which were, formerly, African reserves for specific ethnic groups, which
counties were to hold in trust for the groups, collectively, without compensation.
The administration’s surprising move weakened regional governments further,
leaving them without power over land or money, yet many people in the regions
were still suffering land scarcity and landlessness. Discontent of representatives
of affected communities from various regions was openly expressed, for example,
in the fiery speeches by KADU leaders who preferred a Majimbo system such as
Murgor and Seroney from Rift Valley and Ngala from the Coast, who, consequently,
demanded autonomy from central government.140
149. The leaders clamour for autonomy in ways reminiscent of the MRC’s current
demands for secession from Kenya, met with stern warning of dire consequences
from Kenyatta and his lieutenants.141 As the current political situation shows,
discontent which the Kenyatta administration compelled affected community
leaders to conceal would feature in later years through calls for a Majimbo system
of government that culminated in a constitutional referendum accepting that
system. It would appear that suppression of the discontent also precipitated the
emergence of the present MRC’s belligerent activities at the Coast, whose end
is currently, not in sight. An interview with MRC representatives discloses that
frustration, destitution and under-development resulting from landlessness at
the hands of colonial and post-independent Kenya governments, coupled with
intentioned failure by the governments to address the dire land needs of the
people at the Coast lie at the root of the MRC’s activities.142
139 ‘Amendments and Additions to be made to the Constitution’, Kenya Independence Conference 1963, Cmnd 2156 ( London,
1963),pp.12-22.
140 Odinga: Not Yet Uhuru, pp.242-247.
141 Odinga: Not Yet Uhuru, pp.242-247.
142 See, Paul Goldsmith, Report Based on Research Commissioned by Pact Kenya, The Mombasa Republican Council, Conflict
Assessment: Threats and Opportunities for Engagement, October 2011 (copy with the TJRC).
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150. Further, amendments to the independence constitution of 1963 exposed Africans
who acquired land rights to one of the vagaries of the British land tenure - the
institutionalization of the policy and power of compulsory acquisition of land by
the state. On the basis of the constitutional amendments, the state acquired the
power to extinguish any title or other interests in land held by any individual or
corporate personality and subsequently, acquire it for public or any other purpose.
This power of compulsory acquisition was derived from the feudal notion that as
sovereign, the state holds the radical title to all land within its territory. Acquisition
of land was, therefore, regarded merely as a form of re-possession by the state
of that which is its own, without recognition of the sanctity of each community’s
ownership of land for the benefit of community members that prevailed before
alien notions of land tenure were, unacceptably, wrought upon them.
151. From that particular period in time, state power of compulsory acquisition of land
was entrenched in the independence constitution of Kenya. Thus section 75 of
the constitution vested such power in the state and made it exercisable on the
state’s behalf by the responsible minister, acting through the Commissioner of
Lands. Further, the Land Acquisition Act (Cap 295 now repealed) was enacted to
give effect to section 75 of the Constitution.143 For trust lands which were meant
for local communities, the constitution, in Chapter IX, simplified the process of
compulsory acquisition, specifying that such process involved merely “setting
apart” of the land, by the Head of State or the county council holding it in trust for
a local community.144
152. Initially, the principle of compulsory land acquisition seemed noble; the state could
use it to acquire land in the interest of the public. However, in time, the public
trust doctrine was relegated to the periphery by state officials who, with wanton
impunity, resorted to illegal/irregular allocations, a widespread phenomenon
which became popularly known as ‘land grabbing’ in Kenya.145
153. It is noted that besides authorisation of compulsory acquisition of land, there
were negotiated provisions in the independence constitution whose effect
watered down claims of historical land injustices. For example, Article 75 of the
constitution provided that all the existing land rights, irrespective of the manner in
which they were acquired, would be confirmed and guaranteed.146 The provision
143 See section 75 of the Constitution of Kenya (1998 Edition). The first and second constitutional amendments not only centralized
authority of Government in the Office of an Executive President but also returned the control of land to the centre, thus at the
disposal of the Head of State, Minister for Lands and Settlement and the Commissioner of Lands. Indeed, the Kenyatta Government
succeeded to get the legal authority to acquire and allocate land at will.
144 See The land Acquisition Act ( Cap 295) of the Laws of Kenya and Chapter IX of the Repealed Constitution of Kenya.
145 Seethe Ndung’u Report on Illegal/ Irregular Allocation of land.
146 See Section 75 of the Former Constitution of Kenya, which recognized and upheld the sanctity of the Land Title deed regardless of
the manner in which it was acquired.
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was based on the notion that land redistribution should not be undertaken at
the expense of economic stability, which was dependent largely on agricultural
productivity. While the provisions favoured land merchants and speculative
owners, it diminished chances of redress for those who lost land through the
various land reform processes including alienation by the colonial administration
and adjudication and registration as already explained. Further, it opened avenues
for the phenomenon of land grabbing and related corrupt transactions involving
land, including irregular allocations of public land. It also attracted a counter
argument that historical claims were not valid in the post-colonial period and
hence the ensuing conflict of interest between the proponents and opponents of
finality in irregular acquisition, registration and award of land titles.
154. Provision for confirmation and recognition of land titles regardless of how they were
acquired may be considered as the most critical resolution in the constitutional
settlement arrived at Lancaster House. It foreclosed chances that historical claims
would ever be the basis of land distribution after independence in the whole
country, including the 10-mile Coastal Strip.
155. Yet there were and still are many individuals and communities experiencing land
scarcity, landlessness and related poverty and destitution as a result of alienation
of their ancestral land in the colonial days, not to mention that many people
and families also, as explained, lost land unjustifiably during the process of land
adjudication and registration.
156. The situation at the Coast was compounded by the fact that by an agreement
signed in 1963 between the British, the newly-independent Kenya and Zanzibar
governments, the Sultan of renounced sovereignty over the Coastal Strip, known
also as Mwambao, which, thenceforth, became fully integrated into independent
Kenya, the rights of coastal communities that lost their land to Arabs and the
British having been completely ignored or overlooked.147 That was a recipe for
conflicts in subsequent years. The only hope for a lasting solution to the problems
of communities affected by historical land injustices lay in a new constitutional
settlement to undo the legal entanglement enacted to their disadvantage during
the negotiations for Kenya’s independence.
157.

In addition, the land adjudication, consolidation and registration process introduced
in the former African reserves continued in post-independent Kenya, regardless of
strong opposition to it, especially in areas that were occupied by the Maasai and the

147 Kenya Independence Conference 1963, Cmnd 2156 ( London, HMSO, 1963); Land Acquisition Act ( Cap.295), Registration of Land
Act ( Cap.300 ), Land Titles Act ( Cap. 282)
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Kalenjin on that basis that to the communities, land had never been an individual
asset. Moreover, in the areas occupied by the communities, the process was marred
by corruption, which in the first phase of the process, raised tensions that forced
a complete re-demarcation and re-registration. However, Kenyatta’s administration
continued implementing the process on the basis of the Swynnerton Plan already
discussed, in the belief that individual title and the consolidation of fragmented
holdings were essential for long-term agricultural improvement, in addition to
reducing the cost of land litigation and the fear of land expropriation.


The One Million Acre Scheme

158. The One Million Acre Scheme, hereinafter referred to as ‘the scheme’, was
negotiated as part of the independence package between representatives of
Kenyan Africans and representatives of the British colonial administration. After
lengthy negotiations which were sustained by intense pressure on the British
government from Africans as well as white settler farmers and British politicians
to speed up land transfer plans prior to independence, details of the scheme were
agreed. However, although with regard to the land question in Kenya, the scheme
was intended to resettle Africans who had lost their land, while at the same time to
ensuring that white settlers were compensated for their farms and developments
thereon, its objective was largely political, namely: to secure an orderly transition
to independence without destroying the large farm sector and foreign aid
opportunities, and to avoid a land grab or a new emergency. As the following
discussion shows, none of the objectives was fully met, to the disappointment of
many landless and land-scarce Africans.
159. The scheme was established on the basis of agreement between the British
administration and Kenya’s elites who were preparing to take over power and
was to be implemented between 1962 and 1967, with financing mostly by the
British government. In accordance with the agreements, the British government
subsequently advanced to Kenyatta’s government a loan of 21 million sterling
pounds for the purchase of one million acres of land out of the 7.5 million acres
that was held by European settlers in the White Highlands, for the settlement of
landless and land-scarce Africans.148 Each would-be African beneficiary of land was
to be advanced a loan proportionate to the amount necessary to purchase land
from the fund and the loan was to be repaid over a period of 30 years. Part of the
reason the loan was advanced was to promote a rapid transfer of ownership of
farms belonging to settlers who wanted to leave the country after independence.149
148 It is noted that West Germany, the Land and Agriculture Bank (LAB), the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) and the United
Kingdom contributed to the development loan, but the World Bank declined to make contribution because it was not comfortable
with the resettlement arrangement.
149 Wasserman: Decolonization , pp.158-9
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The arrangement was also to safeguard European settler possessions in the event
of power transfer, thus necessitating an elaborate scheme of constitutional and
statutory guarantees of property rights,150 mostly in favour of the settlers.
160.

Contrary to the expectation of affected Africans, the outgoing colonial administration
made it clear that African settlers could not get free land but were expected to either
purchase it directly with their money or borrow the loan that was to be repaid back
to the British government. Therefore, the approximately 35,000 families that were
eventually settled on the One Million Acre Scheme had contractual obligations to
repay their loans.

161.

The scheme was designed to comprise small to medium-size holdings covering a
total of 1.5 million acres to be sold to individuals who would be facilitated by the loan
from the British government to buy out the departing white settlers. Land transfers
were based on a willing-seller, willing-buyer principle, but the people earmarked
for resettlement on the former White Highlands were supposed to be landless and
unemployed, even though long-term workers on farms identified for purchased had
priority, provided they were “acceptable to the regions”, that is; of the “right ethnic
group.”151 Once the landless and unemployed and former farm workers received land
allocations, the provincial administration selected additional beneficiaries by lot.

162. Clearly, the One Million Acre Scheme was well-planned and had many of the
ingredients that would have ensured satisfactory settlement of many of the
individuals, families and communities affected by British alienation of Africans’ land
and resultant landlessness and land scarcity. The scheme’s components included
the availability of an apparently accessible loan facility, very long-term repayment
period, settlement in one’s former ethnic domain and priority to the most needy.
163. However, as revealed next, its method of implementation which was skewed
largely by personal and ethnic interests of the government’s implementation
officials defeated its African resettlement purpose.
164.

The government established an Agricultural Settlement Fund Trust whose trustees
were mainly James Gichuru, Jackson Angaine and Bruce Mackenzie who, in liaison
with the British, controlled the fund into which all settlement loan was paid. A Central
Land Board with regional representation was established to take responsibility for
land purchase, but it was chaired by a Briton, thus ensuring only nominal autonomy.
Further, actual settlement of the landless was placed with the Ministry of Lands

150 Paul Syagga, Public Land, historical land injustices and the new Constitution: Working Paper No.9 ( Society for International
Development), p.10
151 Carey-Jones N.S., The Anatomy of Uhuru (New York, Praeger, 1966), p.157.
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and Settlement, but in practice, the ministry took over most of the functions of the
Central Land Board.152 In addition, President Kenyatta appointed Bruce McKenzie
as the Minister for Agriculture and a representative of white settlers to become
Parliamentary Secretary for Lands and Settlement, to reassure the United Kingdom
and its European settlers, in general, that their interests were being taken care of by
their own people. A question that arises is whether any of the African leaders was
incorporated into any of the established institutions to safeguard the interests of all
the landless families and communities, including those at the Coast.
165.

The resettlement plan was informed by several factors. First, there was a perceived
need on the part of colonial administration to entrench the settler community firmly
in Kenya and maintain their land rights, without having to return back to the Africans.
Secondly, the colonial administration sought to achieve the aim of socializing the
new African elites into the colonial political, economic and social patterns through
the establishment of a multi-racial alliance of European settlers and African
landowners to facilitate both independence and a majority rule under KANU. Thirdly,
the land acquisition process was geared towards preventing the mobilization of a
radical nationalist base that would be opposed to the continuation of colonial land
policies in the country after independence. Would the underlying factors facilitate
satisfactory land transfers in the interest of landless and land scarce Africans?

166. The One Million Acre Scheme and others established for similar purposes did not
resolve the land problems facing Africans in Kenya.153 Instead, their implementation
increased the potential for violent conflicts over land in the country, mainly
because in the process of their implementation, mainly the rich and those who
were politically connected in the public and private sectors benefited. Loans
could only be given to those who qualified to repay or had the financial means
to pay on cash basis. Moreover, funds from the British government that were
advanced as loans for purchase of land from the White Highlands also appear to
have been misused by officials in the administration who were entrusted with their
dispensation.154 The fact that land transfers were based on a willing-seller, willingbuyer principle, and that loans could only be advanced to those who qualified to
repay and had cash to make a down payment, also meant that the poor who could
not raise the required deposit and security to guarantee their loans were left out in
the resettlement process.
152 The fact that the Ministry of Lands and Settlement was headed by Jackson Angaine, President Kenyatta’s long term ally and friend,
cast doubt on his capacity to guarantee impartial land transactions in the interest of all affected tribes.
153 See Christopher, Leo, ‘The Failure of the “Progressive Farmer” in Kenya's Million-Acre Settlement Scheme’ (1978) 16 (4) The
Journal of Modern African Studies 622.
154 See W, G, Lamarque confidential correspondence with the London Office, 7th January, 1969, p.2.
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167. Moreover, resettlement programmes were marred by malpractices like irregular
land allocations, land grabbing, permitted engagement in settlement programmes
of corrupt land-buying cartels, political patronage in the process of land allocation
and negative ethnicity and nepotism in land allocation processes in several parts of
the country. For example, in the new settlements, several hundred white farmers’
houses and 100-acre plots around them, marked as “Z plots” were kept intact and
reserved by Angaine, the then Minister for Lands and Settlement, reportedly with
instructions from the President in May 1964 to sell them only to “senior community
figures.”155
168. In addition, there was no competitive pricing for sale of prime land and other
property such as houses in the White Highlands and many were, on the basis of
British settlement funds, sold to ministers, members of Parliament, ambassadors,
permanent secretaries and provincial commissioners, all with little farming
experience. Apparently, the irregularities were ignored by officials in charge of
administering the fund.156 As a result, rich businessmen and businesswomen, rich
and powerful politicians who were loyal the colonial administration, managed
to acquire thousands of acres at the expense of the poor and landless.157 Instead
of redressing land-related injustices perpetrated by colonialists on Africans, the
resettlement process created a privileged class of African elites, leaving those who
had suffered land alienation either on tiny unproductive pieces of land, or landless.
169. A good example of illegal and irregular acquisition of the Million Acre Scheme
can be found in the case of Sitatunga, Maridadi and Liyavo Settlement Schemes
in Trans Nzoia, which in this case can be used to paint a global picture of what
happened and continues to happen in the Settlement Schemes. To quote from the
late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta Letter of Offer;
“ I, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, EGH, MP, the President of the Republic of Kenya offers Sitatunga
Farmers Co-operative Society Ltd, a co-operative society registered under Certificate of
Reg. No. 2037 under the Co-operative Societies Act, Cap.490; the piece of land containing
the measurements 1,683 acres ( 665 hectares) and known as land Ref. No. 5519 and 5520
which piece of land is situated in Trans Nzoia District. This offer is subject to and grant
will be made under the provisions of the Government land act (Cap 280) Laws of Kenya”

170.

From the above quote, it’s clear that the land was given to the registered members
of the Sitatunga Farmers Co-operative Society who were 100 as per the letter of the
Ministry of Cooperative Development and Marketing dated 1st September, 2011;

155 See for example W.G. Lamarque’s Communication to the London Office, 7th January 1969, pp.1-2
156 Letter from B. Greatbatch to W.G. Lamarque, Ministry of Overseas Development, ‘Kenya Land Settlement Account: CAG Refused
to Certify Accounts, 1964-65’, 3 February 1965, p.2, in DO 156-15, Kenya Land Settlement Account, 1964-5.
157 Wasserman: Decolonization, pp.171-5.
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“The Society was registered on 30th March 1972 as a farm purchase co-operative society
and its registration number is C2037, the same is captured in the letter of offer that was
given by President Kenyatta in 1972. The society managed to acquire the farm through
Government assistance as per letter of offer dated 16th November, 1972 from Office
of the President. The 100 member remained active up to 1980 when they cleared the
loan advanced to them by the Settlement Fund Trustees having cleared the loans on
purchase of land”

171. Adjudication was set to begin in the early 1980s and the farmers genuinely
anticipated that they would benefit from the adjudication. However, it is at this
stage that senior government and military officers who were not members of the
society and had not been part of the group that repaid the loan were allocated
huge tracts of land in the scheme contrary to the initial objectives of setting up the
schemes which was to settle the poor and landless.
172. The members of the society who were landless, destitute and poor had little
recourse but to. Settle for the five acres that was allocated to them. The 100 acres
plots known as ‘Z plots’ were reserved for senior government officials and military
officers. At the TJRC hearings in Nairobi, Mrs. Kegode and Rtd. Lieutenant General
Sumbeiywo who were mentioned as having been irregularly allocated land in the
scheme stated that they were not aware that the land belonged to the members of
Sitatunga Farmers Co-operative Society. Mrs. Kegode stated as follows:
“As a Kenyan, if I were to advise our beloved Government, I would tell them to never
double-allocate land because we are all Kenyans. There are people who are landless,
and who are now the society people. Those are my brothers and sisters. Some of them
are my children. It will not be nice for us to have a dislike for one another or blame one
another over something we did not create”.158

173. Rtd. Lieutenant General Sumbeiywo stated:
“I feel I have provided what the Commission required but I do not know how the people
who may have been wronged will be reconciled with me because for 31 years they have
been looking at me as the person who took their rightful thing without telling them. I
do not know how it will go. I would have wished that we talk to each other so that I can
know what to do”.159

174. Though non members benefited from the land as stated above, one aspect
that comes out clearly is the role that was played by the Manager of Sitatunga
Farmers Co-operative Society namely James Gichogo, who was invited for a
hearing at the Commission but declined to appear. He would have assisted in
158 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nairobi/4 April 2012.
159 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nairobi/4 April 2012.
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shedding light on how the land was distributed to the disadvantage of the real
members. He was in charge of the process leading to the distribution of the land
to non members.
175. The Director of Land Adjudication and Settlement, the Directorate that is
charged with the management of SFT’s, Mrs. Esther Ogega presented before the
Commission on the same issue of Sitatunga, but her explanations were found
not convincing. The land belongs to the members of the Sitatunga Farmers
Co-operative Society and the Commission recommends that members of the
Sitatunga Co-operative Society be compensated and or the land is reverted back
to them.
176. In the case of Liyavo Settlement Scheme, the members registered themselves as
Liyavo Farmers Co-operative Society Limited on 1st April 1972 under the Cooperative
Societies Act, Cap 490, Section 7. The farm has an average of 2802 acres (1123
hectares) and the same is comprised in Land Reference Number 5751 situated in
Trans Nzoia County, Kwanza Division, Kapsitis Location in the Rift Valley. The said
parcel of land was given to 150 families who were squatters and landless by the
late President Mzee Jomo Kenyatta on 1 November 1972 under the provisions of
the Government Lands Act.
177. On 10 October 1974, the Liyavo members were settled on Two and a Half acres
for their homestead and subsistence farming and thereafter the members were
to work very hard on the remaining piece of land of 2427 aces as co-operators
to raise funds in order to offset the outstanding loan advanced to them by
the Settlement Fund Trustee for purposes of purchasing the farm.In 1978, the
members of the society went and visited Mzee Jomo Kenyatta at State House
Nakuru and informed him about the clearance of the loan. The then President
promised to send surveyors to go adjudicate the land so that members could
get their rightful shares. The land had 786 heads of cattle, 630 pigs and stakes of
maize crop that were left behind by the departing white settlers that assisted in
clearing the loan.
178. Indeed in 1983, during President Moi’s tenure, the land was demarcated and
only Two and a Half acres were added to the existing Two and a half acres that
the members were holding previously and the rest of the acreage was unlawfully
subdivided amongst top civil servants in government during Moi’s time and
contrary to the terms and conditions of settlement in the Shirika Settlement
Programme dated 10th November 1974, which was the constitution of the
society.
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179. The case of Maridadi farm, which is in Kwanza Division of Trans Nzoia County, is
equal and similar to that of Sitatunga and Liyavo.
180. Also, resettlement in the One Million Acre Scheme took an ethnic dimension
in favour of members of some specific ethnic communities against others.
This created suspicion, mistrust, tensions and conflicts among other ethnic
communities, who felt discriminated against by the Central Land Board and its
subsidiaries. There were instances where some ‘squatters’ could be evicted from
areas they already occupied and denied land allocation simply because of their
ethnicity, regardless of their landless status. For example, squatters and former
farm workers from the Central Province were evicted from the Lugari Settlement
Scheme in Western to make way for members of the Luhya community. Similar
evictions took place in the Aberdares where those who did not belong to
the Kikuyu community were evicted by the government to pave way for the
resettlement of the Kikuyu people.
181. It also emerges that although all Africans who were rendered landless or left
with too little pieces of land were entitled to resettlement anywhere in the
White Highlands under the arrangement with the British, meaning that any
parts of the highlands was available for their resettlement, officials in Kenyatta’s
administration reserved large former settler farms in Central and North Rift Valley
around Nakuru, Kitale and Eldoret for the willing-buyer, willing-seller arrangement,
deeming it to be the only practical approach. The Kalenjin and the Maasai who
were evicted from the reserved areas during the period of colonisation opposed
the move, considering it to be unfair and an unjust attempt to cause them to buy
land which had been alienated from them by the British from members of the
Kikuyu community to whom the large farmlands were allocated during the flawed
resettlement process.160
182. During the KADU days, Moi supported regionalism and a decentralised system
of land tenure that recognised both individual and ethnic land rights based on
historical claims. However, after the merger of KANU and KADU in 1964, Moi
changed his open resistance to centralisation of land administration under a
Central Land Board. As an influential political leader, his appointment obligated
him to support the government’s land re-settlement plans in the Rift Valley,
especially of the Kikuyu, even though he was an influential Kalenjin leader.
183.

Because of his position in Kenyatta’s government, Moi abandoned any open attempt
to restrict or resent immigrants from Central Kenya and other parts of the country

160 Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905- 1963 (London, James Currey, 1987), at 150-152.
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into the former White Highlands in Rift Valley, perhaps for fear of creating suspicion,
mistrust and tension with his boss, Jomo Kenyatta. Tensions arose over Moi,161 who, as
the most senior Kalenjin in Kenyatta’s government, was seen as allowing immigrants
from Central Province to acquire white-occupied land in Nyandarua, Laikipia, Nakuru
and other parts of the Rift Valley, outside their “traditional” areas in Central Kenya. It is
reported that, while he could not challenge the process publicly though, Moi worked
behind the scenes to help Kalenjin farmers compete with the Kikuyu to buy settler
farms.162 One of Moi’s close allies, Taita Towett, who was similarly influential, also
pressurized European land owners to sell their land within the Kalenjin spheres of
influence.163 However, the little efforts made by Moi and his close political allies from
the Kalenjin community did not fully address the land-related needs of members of
the Kalenjin community.
184.

In subsequent years, for example, during Daniel arap Moi’s regime, the situation
increased tension between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin and other communities that
similarly felt entitled to resettlement in the former White Highlands. For instance,
in 1985, Kipsigis leaders ordered members of the Kikuyu and other communities,
including the Luo who were working in tea farms in Kericho to leave Rift Valley.164
Tension and ethnic strife over flawed land settlement schemes also revived political
debates for the re-establishment of a regional (majimbo) government in Kenya, in
which case, regionalism would be understood to mean that each ethnic community
occupies its tribal domain along establishments that existed before colonisation.165

185. Therefore, it is no wonder that the majimbo debate dominated political discussions
in post-independent Kenya and that the debates were, in many cases, accompanied
by ethnic violence over land-related claims in areas such as Molo and Burnt Forest,
where communities felt that members of other communities were settled and
thereby, imposed in their areas while they remained landless or suffered land
scarcity. As early as the late 1960s and early 1970s, militia groups comprising
members of certain communities who felt defrauded of their land by the Kenyatta
administration were already taking shape, especially in the Rift Valley. One of
such groups was the Land and Freedom Army comprising non-Kikuyu members
who felt betrayed after independence by the Kenyatta administration in terms of
getting resettled on free lands acquired from the white settlers.166
161 Widner, Jennifer A., The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From Harambee! to Nyayo! (Berkeley, 1992), 8.81, quoting the unpublished
thesis of Apollo Njonjo.
162 See for example letter from T. J. Bellers to Counsell, ‘Kenya Internal’, 28 April 1971, in FCO 31/854 Political Developments in
Kenya, 1971.
163 Letter from Clay to Joy, “National Assembly,” 13 October 1971, in Foreign Commonwealth Office 31/853 Affairs of the National
Assembly in Kenya, 1971.
164 Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905- 1963 (London, James Currey, 1987), at 150-152.
165 Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau, 1905- 1963 (London, James Currey, 1987), at 150-152.
166 Leo: Land and Class, p.132
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186. The general result was that the majority of the people who were actually settled
through the One Million Acre Scheme were not necessarily the landless people
who had demanded and fought for the establishment of those schemes.167 The
beneficiaries were a few individuals, mostly Kikuyu, who had freely accumulated
money through farming, small business ventures, wage employment or sale of
their existing holdings during and after the period of colonisation. For example,
some people in Central Province simply disposed of their land or assigned it to
relatives in order to qualify for the cheaper and comparatively larger settlement
plots in the Rift Valley. Terms of the repayment loans provided by the British
government were also flexible, representing about 90 percent of the purchase
price in low-density schemes and 100 percent in high-density schemes. Ironically,
those settled in the schemes included President Kenyatta with about 216.5 acres
and his long-serving Minister for Lands and Settlement Jackson Angaine, with 252
acres; while the majority of deserving allottees were allocated between 5 and 20
acres of land only.168
187.

The foregoing elaboration illustrates the fact that the multi-million resettlement
schemes were not only mismanaged but were also ethnicised and politicised,
despite its noble goals of resettling the landless across the country.169
The competition and conflict over access, utilization and ownership increasingly
took an ethnic dimension akin to tribal political alignments in the period just before
and after independence. As a result, settlement processes intended to create
harmony among local communities as they increased their status of livelihood
instead created suspicion, mistrust, tensions and conflicts between the Kikuyu
and other ethnic communities, especially the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley, who felt
discriminated against by the Central Land Board and its subsidiaries.170 A report of
a ‘Stamp Mission’ assigned to evaluate the outcome of the One Million Acre scheme
in October 1965 found it to be a complete failure, due to numerous instances of
corruption, misallocation and mismanagement of funds by the top government
officials involved in the resettlement process. The report concluded that Britain
would reduce financial commitment to the settlement programmes in Kenya.
188. The conclusion one would make from the foregoing discussion is that Kenyatta’s
administration squandered the opportunity to fully and adequately address the
land question. Had it not, the current violent conflicts over land with political
undertones would have been prevented.
167 See Ndung’u Report findings, pp.125-128 and details in Annexes 52 and 53 in Vol.1 of the Annexes to the Ndung’u Report, 2004.
168 President Jomo Kenyatta and Minister for Lands Jackson H. Angaine were allocated large parcels of land in the settlement
schemes at the expense of the poor, landless and needy and needy individuals in society.
169 Carey- Jones: Anatomy of Uhuru (New York, Praeger, 1966).
170 Carey-Jones : Anatomy, p. 157 explains how the One Million Acre Scheme took an ethnic approach to the high density schemes,
allocating European land within their ‘sphere of influence’ each of the major ethnic groups. Few if any schemes were multi-ethnic.
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Land issues and Related Conflicts in Post
Independence Kenya
189. The overall objective of this section is to interrogate land problems in postindependent Kenya, in order to determine underlying causes of violent conflicts
that have arisen in relation to land for purposes of recommending appropriate
redress, in accordance with of the TJRC mandate. The mandate of the Commission
was to investigate causes of land-related conflicts from the post-independence
period to the present. The period before independence has been considered in
detail, with clear indications of the adoption of British colonial laws, policies and
practices in relation to land at independence.
190. Since independence, there have been three political regimes in Kenya - the
Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki regimes. This section presents findings of the various
methods of irregular and corrupt land acquisition and allocation methods that
have occurred over the years, perpetrated mostly by government officials, and how
the land-related activities have, over the years, fuelled land-related ethnic tension
and strife whose roots are, in many cases, traceable to land-related injustices
committed during the colonial period.
191. The discussion is divided into three parts, each addressing land-related challenges
during a particular regime and consequences thereof and indicates whether or
not consequences were sufficiently address or still endure, as land issues awaiting
redress. The first part considers Jomo Kenyatta’s regime, beginning with a summary
of land policies and laws that were applicable soon after independence which
should have guided official dealings with land and, in the process, demonstrates
the extent of official failure to adhere to the laws and policies, thereby occasioning
injustices to people, many of whom already suffered land alienation and related
consequences during the colonial administration and attendant victims’ resistance,
rebellion and violent retaliation.

Land irregularities at independence as causes of violent conflicts
192. This section presents findings on land-related irregularities and attendant violent
conflicts and related issues during the Kenyatta regime, beginning with mainland
Kenya and then the Coast, many of which have endured, to this day. As the previous
discussion shows, irregularities involving land acquisition, ownership and use take
many forms, including discriminatory land allocation practices, based on ethnicity
and unjustifiable allocation of land by government officials to themselves or to
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their affiliates. The foregoing section elaborates irregular land allocation practices
that occurred during Kenyatta’s administration through land allocation schemes.
However, irregularities and malpractices that characterised land allocation in the
settlement schemes were not the only form in which official corruption in relation
to land was manifested. Therefore, in order to design meaningful measures to fully
address the root causes of land-related violent conflicts that have been witnessed
in the recent years, other forms of land-related injustices that occurred during
Kenyatta’s administration are presented in this section.
193. The presentation in this section explains that official corruption in the acquisition,
allocation, ownership and disposal of land in Kenyatta’s era continued unabated
regardless of the existence of applicable laws and policies that were intended to
govern dealings in land. This raises the question whether there might have been
some inherent loopholes in the laws and policies or in their implementation that
should also form the focus of analysis as the country seeks to design appropriate
measures to address land-related conflicts with finality.
194. A number of terminologies are used in this section of the chapter on land which
require definition in order to clarify the meaning, for the purposes of this report. The
first is “irregular allocation of land”, which refers to official actions and procedures
in relation to land, leading to land acquisition, ownership, occupation and/or use
which do not conform to applicable laws and regulations.
195. The second terminology that deserves definition is “land grabbing”, which is used
here to mean official and private actions, steps and procedures in relation to land
acquisition, ownership, occupation, use or any other dealing in land, both private
and public, that is not only illegal, but is also conducted with wanton impunity,
recklessness and is blatant and widespread. An elaboration follows:
196. As the country approached independence in 1963, many communities that had
lost land to the colonial administration and its settlers were eagerly awaiting
restoration of their land, at no charge. As previously explained, there also emerged
a group of African elites and business people who were eager to acquire land,
especially in the White Highlands, for commercial purposes. African interests
generated a scramble for land in the former White Highlands and other strategic
areas. While some of the landless community members squatted in certain areas
in the hope that their occupation would be regularized by the government, others
took a confrontational and violent approach to the land question on grounds that
they were just recovering their land which had been ‘stolen’ or annexed by force
by the colonialists, with the help of their local loyalists. However, individuals and
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communities that had genuine expectations of land restoration at the instance
of the government suffered great disappointment when the first government’s
response came in the form of an announcement by President Kenyatta’s
administration that there was no free land, despite having used land as a tool to
mobilize Africans to support KANU and its struggle for independence and selfgovernance of the country.
197.

The frustration of communities disappointed by the administration’s sharp response
was expressed by Mr David Nasura Tuwei, an 85-year old member of an affected
community in the following terms:
After 1963, the Talai had hoped that our government would give us priority in the White
Highlands resettlement project as we had lost our land to the Kipsigis community.171
When the whites left the country, the leaders of the time who came into power took
over the farms that we have specified and they did not regard us. We were left on the
rocky, waterless and the barren lands.172

198. Besides continued landlessness, land scarcity, destitution and poverty, failure
to give priority, in land allocation or, more accurately, re-allocation in favour of
those who genuinely lost their land to the colonialists soon after independence,
generated another problem - the scramble for land by African elites and businesses
for purposes other than settlement. However, what heightened the situation
to propositions of violence was the engagement of public officials in Kenyatta’s
administration in irregular and illegal land acquisition and use, at the expense of
landless and land-scarce communities.

Nature of land-related illegalities and irregularities after independence
199. During Kenyatta’s administration at independence and for several years thereafter,
illegal dealings in land which left many individuals, families and communities
landless and land-scarce took many forms. They included outright land grabbing,
preferential treatment of certain communities, especially the Kikuyu, in land
allocations and settlement, establishment of settlement schemes selectively for
the benefit of members of certain communities, while other deserving individuals
and families from other communities remained unattended, and illegal alienation
of land from what was designated as public land for public purposes.
200.

The early years of Kenya’s administration ushered in Kenya, the beginning of mass
land grabbing and irregular allocations of public land and other resources, which,
in time, became a widespread and almost endless phenomenon throughout the

171 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/p. 56, para 1.
172 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/p. 5, para 3.
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country. Throughout the years of his administration, both land grabbing and
irregular land allocations were perpetrated by and for the benefit of the President
himself, members of his immediate family, his relatives and friends and officials in his
administration, including political leaders from other tribes, with wanton impunity.
201. Existing literature indicates that between 1964 and 1966, one-sixth of European
settlers’ lands that were intended for settlement of landless and land-scarce
Africans were cheaply sold to the then President Kenyatta and his wife Ngina, his
children, Daniel Moi who succeeded him as president, other political leaders at
the time including Mbiyu Koinange, Ronald Ngala, Oginga Odinga, through the
Luo Thrift and Trading Company, Gikonyo Kiano, J.M. Kariuki, Masinde Muliro and
Paul Ngei.173
202. Kenyatta himself appears to have benefited immensely from irregular allocations of
land that should have benefited those who lost land to Arab and British colonizers.
By 1965, Kenyatta is reported to have been using his position as president to buy
numerous settler farms in the White Highlands and also excising and allocating
to himself and family government forest in Kiambu.174 President Kenyatta’s direct
engagement in irregular land allocations compromised his position to prevent or
remedy similar cases of land grabbing by his close associates.175
203. In addition, there were peculiar cases of land grabbing and related malpractices
during Kenyatta’s administration which serve to illustrate how deeply the problem
of land grabbing had cut into Kenya and the wanton manner in which key
government officials, including the president grabbed what should have been
public or communal land and “dished” it to relatives.176
204. Further, there were cases involving President Kenyatta’s personal approval of the
purchase of large farms by his family, exempting the transactions from review by
the respective land control boards. In the process, his family acquired vast farms in
Nakuru, Njoro and Rongai areas in the Rift Valley.177
205. Moreover, the president and his family owned several beach plots and hotels on
the Coast where, as previously stated, many African communities lost their land,
first, to Arabs and later to Europeans, rendering many landless, to this day. It was
revealed that by 1972, the President and his family had more than eleven properties
173
174
175
176
177

Kenya National Archives on African Political Elites at Independence.
Hornsby Charles: Kenya, A History Since Independence ( I.B.Tauris and Co Ltd, 2012), pp.107- 108
Hornsby Charles: Kenya, A History Since Independence ( I.B.Tauris and Co Ltd, 2012), pp.107- 108
See Hornsby, Charles, Kenya: A History since Independence, p.314.
See Hornsby, Charles, Kenya : A History Since Independence, p.314.; see also Sunday Times, 10 August 1975, p.12
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at the coast including hotels, in addition to those he owned through proxies, yet
Mombasa Municipal Council waived all land rates due on his property in the same
year.178
206. As already noted, other key personalities also benefited from irregular land
deals during Kenyatta’s administration, especially his close associates who
also irregularly acquired prime land at the coast, mostly beach plots, including
Eliud Mahihu, the Coast Provincial Commissioner then, Isaiah Mathenge, former
Provincial Commissioner, Rift Valley, Matu Wamae, John Michuki and Beth
Mugo.179 Other long-serving provincial commissioners during the administration
who similarly acquired land irregularly at the expense of landless and land-scarce
Africans were John G. Mburu, Charles Koinange, Isaiah Cheluget, Paul Boit and
Simon Nyachae.180 Not surprisingly, all of the land allocation beneficiaries who
at the time they irregularly acquired the land served as PCs were sons of either
former colonial home guards or chiefs.181
207. Commission has compiled a list of individuals for whom there is evidence of
illegal or irregular acquisition of land during the Kenyatta administration. This list,
along with a similar list of names from the Moi and Kibaki administrations, will
be handed over to the National Land Commission for further investigation and
action. Two constitutional amendments conferred upon the president the power
to make grants of unalienated government land to himself and others, together
with corresponding parcels of land, all of which were acquired through abuse of
constitutional powers vested in the presidency.182 In the process that might be
suitably referred to as the scramble to irregularly acquire land in the former White
Highlands, key personalities from various ethnic backgrounds also acquired large
tracts of land in areas that formed part of former reserves for other different ethnic
communities.
208. For example, in Uasin Gishu, key personalities from the Kalenjin community
dominated the east and west of the region, those from the Kikuyu community
occupied the south, while those from the Luhya community occupied the northwest. In addition, members of the same communities acquired parts of the White
Highlands as follows: the Kikuyu - Nyandarua, Laikipia and most of southern
178 Ibid., pp.315-16.
179 Ibid., pp. 314-16, see also the Sunday Times, 17 August 1975.
180 Nellis, John, The Ethnic Composition of Leading Kenyan Government Positions, Research Report No. 24 (Uppsala, 1974), Table
III reinterpreted.
181 Nellis, John, The Ethnic Composition of Leading Kenyan Government Positions, Research Report No. 24 (Uppsala, 1974), Table
III reinterpreted.
182 Table 2. below illustrates some of the prominent people who were allocated land during the Kenyatta administration. The Ndung’u
Report of 2004 on the Illegal/ Irregular allocations of Public Land also describes some of Kenyatta’s activities. Unfortunately, very
few scholars have had the courage to interrogate and document the abuse of office and land grabbing witnessed during his regime
for fear of repression and attracting unspecified consequences from the family or beneficiaries of the ill gotten public lands and
property, yet silence on such malpractices is in itself part of the historical land injustices.
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Nakuru, the Luhya - western Trans Nzoia and Lugari and the Kalenjin - eastern
Trans Nzoia and northern Nakuru.183 The intermingling of communities in areas
that were not their original “homelands” resulted in competition and conflicts
throughout Kenyatta’s administration because what was perceived as foreign
settlements in the ex-reserves of other communities remained deeply unpopular,
despite official policy that was permissive of African settlement anywhere in the
country.184
209. Besides the direct engagement by key individuals in irregular land deals, various
kinds of land-buying businesses, many with questionable legal status, were
established for purposes of irregularly acquiring land meant for the landless, for
profit. Examples of such land buying companies were the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru
Association (GEMA), NDEFO and Nyakinyua, to mention a few, which operated
mainly in the Rift Valley and in Central Province, but with outreach offices in
other parts of the country. Some of the companies managed to acquire land and
re-distribute it to their members who were mostly kinsmen of their founders,
while others went underground or closed business, having received large sums
of money from their members or shareholders, thus worsening the situation of
landlessness and land scarcity in the country.
210. Although land remained a key source of political patronage and the government’s
primary tool in controlling dissenting voices or opposition, there were challenges
against the manner in which land was corruptly acquired by key government
officials and their close associates that should have warned the government of
the day of the short and long-term dangers of official malpractices in relation to
land. For example, in October 1973, Martin Shikuku, the then Butere MP, warned
that if the Kikuyu did not share the fruits of Uhuru with others, they would
eventually be “eaten by the other 41 tribes like a satisfied hyena was eaten up by
hungry hyenas.”185
211. The politician’s warning was indicative of the ethnic perception of land grabbers
and hatred and animosity that was building up over the years because of skewed
allocation of land and other public resources in favour of individuals mainly from
the Kikuyu community by the Kenyatta administration. The likelihood of landrelated conflict was enhanced by findings that during Kenyatta’s administration,
members of the Kikuyu community held 50 percent of the top jobs in the
country.186
183
184
185
186

Carey- Jones: Anatomy, p.157.
Carey- Jones: Anatomy, p.157.
Legum, Colin, Africa Contemporary Record 1973-74 ( New York, 1974), B.172.
See Table 5.5 Senior Kikuyu parastatals heads in the 1970s in Hornsby, Charles, Kenya: A History since Independence, p.256-258.
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212.

Further, the link between irregular land allocations during Kenyatta’s era and
political discontent of a nature that could cause violence was demonstrated by
sharp reactions to the malpractice by members of Parliament who were opposed
to them. Official records of the National Assembly indicate that during one of the
parliamentary sessions in 1974, the then Moyale MP Osman Araru criticized Jackson
Angaine who had been Lands and Settlement minister for 15 years for openly
facilitating the settlement of members of the Kikuyu ethnic group in the Rift Valley.
The enraged MP is reported to have asked Angaine whether he was only interested
in land that members of his community were grabbing from the Kalenjin people
in the Rift Valley, stating that land was already “finished” there.187 The Moyale MP’s
open criticism of Angaine was a strong indicator of displeasure, not just by affected
communities, but also by other communities in Kenya that were not partaking in the
malpractices related to land. Further, in 1974, a Kalenjin MP demanded Angaine’s
sacking and referred to him as “a leader to hell and darkness.”188 Both sentiments
pointed to the ethnic resentment of the Kikuyu due to the phenomenon of land
grabbing perpetrated by their leaders which could and, in subsequent years, did
result in violent conflicts among the communities living in Rift Valley.

213.

It is noted from the sharp remarks directed at Angaine by fellow MPs, that his Ministry
of Lands and Settlement also played a facilitating role in irregular land allocations
in the country. There are indications that in addition to mounting discontent over
irregular land allocations during Kenyatta’s administration, the malpractices also
threatened to mar the relationship between the administration and its external
partners, especially the British government. The British government was worried
about the negative publicity in the press and parliamentary criticism of their aid
administration which seemed to have facilitated the irregular land transactions
involving key government officials.189 In spite of its concern about the likelihood of
strained relationship with Kenya, the British government failed to intervene to stop
the corrupt practices. Instead, it continued funding the failing land resettlement
process.190

Land Problems at the Coast in Post-independent Kenya: Kenyatta’s
Administration
214. As already explained, the coastal region, unlike mainland Kenya, was first colonised
by Arabs who, during their colonisation, enslaved members of the Mijikenda
community and also took over a lot of their land. Subsequently, the Sultan of
Zanzibar who was governing the coastal area, having brought African communities
187
188
189
190
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Osman Araru, Member of Parliament for Moyale, in NAOR, 23 November 1973, col.535.
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living there under his control, handed over power to the British, as protectors of the
coastal region. In the process, much of the land previously owned and occupied by
African communities was also handed over to the British colonialists. At some point
in time, the British established a claims process through which private persons
who had lost land could seek restoration and other redress for land, but African
communities did not benefit from the process because, among other things, they
were not aware of its existence.
215. As a result, most of the individuals, families and communities at the Coast
ended up living as ‘squatters’ on land that had either been acquired by Arabs
or the British such that by the time Kenya attained independence, many at the
Coast had no titles to their land. The situation seems to have been confused
by the takeover of power by the British from Arabs in a procedure that local
communities did not well understand, especially the progression from the
Coastal Strip as a sultanate to a protectorate under the British. Equally unclear
was the status of the Coastal Strip, including land at the time of independence
when the Sultan renounced his sultanate over the region to allow it to be
merged with the mainland as Kenya.
216. The foregoing factors present unique features around land at the Coast which
make it deserve special consideration. With regard to land issues and the need for
their redress, the coastal region is also unique because very many different kinds
of land problems have arisen there requiring redress. Land problems there are
widespread and transcend many decades, including pre and post-independence
administrations. Land problems remain largely unaddressed in the coastal
region which has the largest number of landless people and has been severely
marginalized in terms of land adjudication, consolidation and registration. Because
of the myriad land problems, the majority of people at the Coast remain very poor;
it is the region where land acquisition by individuals and other bodies from outside
of the indigenous ethnic communities (considered as up country people) has been
the largest. It is also the region where land-related injustices appear to have been
the gravest and the longest lasting. For these reasons, land issues at the Coast
require urgent redress by first enumerating the kinds of land problems that have
continued to affect the region and its people.
217. As explained, there exists myriad land problems relating to alienation, acquisition,
occupation, ownership, use and disposal at the Coast including forced eviction
of coastal families and communities by private individuals and entities as well as
public entities in the process of irregular acquisition of land. There has also been
forced eviction of families and communities from community ranches, without
compensation, to pave way for large-scale government projects. Furthermore
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there has been a notable absence of consultation with potentially affected local
communities in the acquisition of land for government projects.
218. This in addition to forced evictions by private individuals from upcountry in the
process of grabbing their land and the establishment of settlement schemes
which end up benefiting individuals and families from certain upcountry ethnic
communities. The indigenous coastal people’s predicament has been compounded
by the personal and irregular alienation of land at the Coast by government officials,
including some of the former presidents, for their own private use. Their litany
of woes continues with the failure to identify and recognize certain indigenous
communities at the Coast for purposes of settlement and re-settlement and the
illegal alienation of parcels designated as trust land for the benefit of specific
coastal communities by government officials and their close associates. Then
there has been the establishment of protected wildlife areas on land occupied
by local communities without recognition of their existence and compensation,
declaration of illegal settlements in coastal communities homelands to pave
way for annexation of land for the benefit of people from outside of the region,
as well as illegal acquisition of land at the Coast by private individuals from the
mainland. Failure to complete the processes of land adjudication, consolidation
and registration exercises at the Coast and allocation of large communal lands,
including ranches and trust lands to foreign individuals and business entities
add to the grievances. These problems underlie the emergence of the MRC in the
region and threaten to give rise to more violence there unless urgent measures are
purposefully and systematically taken to address them.


Failure to re-settle and register coastal people as owners of land

219. The large number of the Mijikenda and other coastal communities who should
have been settled as part of the independence package negotiated at the Lancaster
House conferences in London were never settled. It has been explained that the
negotiations included an undertaking by the British government to provide a
loan for payment of white settlers to acquire part of the land they occupied for
settlement of Africans, but settlement programmes in that scheme excluded
the whole coastal region. Later, other settlement programmes were introduced,
including one also supported by the Word Bank but that too, was concentrated on
mainland Kenya. As a result, large numbers of families and communities occupied
lands for which they had no title deeds or any other form of proof or ownership
and thus became susceptible to land grabbers. Much of land at the Coast, including
land in Malindi was, at independence, categorized as government land, yet local
communities were living on the land. In Lamu, for example, all the land in what
currently constitutes Lamu County was categorized as government land, while
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the local indigenous population was considered as ‘squatters’ on the land, yet it
was their own.191 The same situation prevails in the Tana Delta which has, in the
recent past, featured in the media prominently when violence broke out between
communities living there over land.192
220. The squatter problem was made worse by that fact that in many cases, the process
of land adjudication, consolidation and registration was not conducted at the
Coast, thus leaving families without evidence of ownership of the land they occupy.
Since people did not have title documents to the land they occupied, it appeared
and still does appear to land grabbers that the land they occupy does not belong
to them.193 The situation was and continues to be exploited by individuals and
corporations, especially from upcountry, who consider such land as belonging to
no one and therefore available for their acquisition, regardless of the presence of
families living on the land. It has made it easy for private individuals, government
officials and local as well as foreign investors to transact irregular deals leading
to acquisition of land, whereupon, the genuine inhabitants are forcibly evicted
without compensation.
221. Lack of title deeds has also exposed coastal communities to violent evictions by
government functionaries, especially security forces in the pretext of carrying out
security operations. For example, in Kiunga, at some point, people from Somalia
crossed the border into Kenya and killed one police officer. The Kenya government
was quick to blame local people for the officers’ death and on that basis, assigned
GSU officers to the area. The GSU, in addition to torturing the local Bajuni
communities, demolished their villages, including Rasini and Mtanga Wanda
islands, causing them to flee. Upon return, community members found that their
land had been taken over and registered in the names of upcountry people who to
date, claim to be owners of the land.194
222. In Kipini where the Swahili, the Giriama and the Pokomo have been living since
the pre-independence period, the situation reflects selective adjudication and
registration exercises. Witnesses testified that although they lived together
awaiting title deeds for their land, in time, they discovered that people from other
upcountry community, especially the Akamba and the Kikuyu as well as soldiers
who had descended in the area for unexplained reasons, had sub-divided the land
and obtained title deeds while they, indigenous communities, had none and were
unable to access government land registration services.195
191
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223. The problem was worsened by the growing commercial value of coastal land
for tourism-related development. The government made grants of coastal land
suitable for tourism, often in areas already occupied by the Mijikenda, resulting in
mass evictions and subsequent conflicts. Lamu reached a boiling point after the
government failed to address the historical injustices as well as curtail ongoing
fraudulent land procurement in the area.196 Related to it is failure to resettle those
who were internally displaced at the Coast during the post-election violence (PEV)
of 2007-2008 is lack of compensation for displaced individuals and families there.
Affected people at the Coast have complained that while Kenyans displaced by

the 2007-2008 PEV have been recognized as internally displaced persons
(IDPs) and many, especially in mainland Kenya have been re-settled, the
government of Kenya has given very little, if any, consideration to large
numbers of people at the Coast who have been displaced over the years,
including those who have been, from time to time, displaced as a result of
Shifta incursions in Lamu.197
224.

It has been stated that in Lamu, since the 1960s, there have been Shifta-related wars
between the communities in the area and either local communities or government
security forces every time the Shifta from Somalia cross the border into Kenya to
either steal cattle or to perpetrate other kinds of raids.198 However, every time Kenyan
security forces are sent to the area to respond to Shifta attacks, they turn against
community members and torture them, destroy their crops, demolish their homes
and forcibly evict them. As a result, community members have been forced out
of twelve villages in the area including Shakani, Shendeni and Vundeni. All of the
community members who were evicted from their homes during such operations
became internally displaced but the government has failed to recognise them as
such and re-settle them, rendering many landless and poor. Many have resorted to
living in slums, while some moved to Tanzania in search of homelands when their
own government failed to come to their aid. Neither has the government provided
affected coastal communities any form of redress of atrocities committed against
them by the GSU and other security agencies that have tortured and rendered many
homeless in the course of conducting security operations.199

225. The Boni and the Bajuni communities have suffered similar evictions since the
early 1960s. Soon after independence, there were people at the Coast who
declined to join Kenya in preference for Somalia and crossed the border into
Somalia. However, they soon began to cross back into bordering areas in Kenya
196
197
198
199

232

TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 3.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 4.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter TWO

to steal livestock from local communities. However, the GSU that the government
sent to the areas from time to time to repel the attackers, turned against affected
community members.
226. They accused them of collaborating with the Shifta raiders, shot and killed many
of them, forcing many families to flee, having lost their livestock, crops that were
destroyed by the GSU and homelands, yet to date, the government has failed to
compensate or re-settle them.200 Because of the government’s persistent failure
to recognise and address the plight of coastal communities that have suffered
forceful evictions at the hand of the government’s own security functionaries,
many affected people hold the view that they were better off during the colonial
period. In the words of one affected person who, at the time of his testimony,
was still nursing scars from torture by the GSU who also shot him and fellow
community members as well as forcibly evicted them on account of anti-Shifta
operations:
We, as the Bajuni feel that we were better off when we were under the colonial
government than during the post-colonial period. During the colonial period, we
did not have any problems because at that time we even had our own villages. After
independence, our villages were destroyed. They were at Kiunga, Kishakani, Funambai,
Vibondeni which is our home, Ashwei and Materoni. These are the villages which were
destroyed after independence. We were left with two villages and we had the Bajuni.
We did a lot of farming and exported a lot of farm produce during the colonial period.
We were better off during the colonial period than the post-colonial period. I can tell
you that when we got independence, we were very happy and we celebrated.201

227. The foregoing statement discloses the potential danger of violent conflicts by
Kenyans whose government has not only committed atrocities against, but has
also failed over the years to recognize their plight and redress them.


Fraudulent Allocation of Government Land at the Coast

228. Coastal communities have also suffered illegal alienation of government land
in terms of manner of acquisition and allocation. Many coastal families and
communities settled on what was designated as government land upon losing
their own land, in the hope that the government would settle them on the
land. However, from the time Kenya attained independence, officials in the
administration engaged in illegal excision of the land without following the
mandatory substantive and procedural provisions of the Government Lands Act.
200 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 17.
201 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 44.
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229. In many places, including Lamu and Taita Taveta, government officials annexed
and allocated land as gifts to individuals deemed loyal to the administration
and also on the basis of ethnicity, thus advocating nepotism within government
ranks. Officials involved in illegal allocation of government land were surveyors,
physical planning officers, local authority officials including the Lamu County
Council Chairman, MPs, chiefs, the District Commissioner and the Commissioner
of Lands. While government officials benefited from illegal acquisition and
allocation of government land to themselves and their close associates,
coastal communities that were in dire need of re-settlement were excluded.
Unfortunately, local residents, for example, in Lamu, were not aware of the extent
of government land in their areas.202
230. In Taita Taveta District, many coastal families and communities settled, at
independence, on what they believed to be government land, hoping that
the government would officially re-settle them on it. However, in 1972, the
Greek Criticos family, in partnership with the then President Kenyatta himself,
acquired the land to establish sisal plantations, leaving many families living on
the land as ‘squatters’. A letter from Basil Criticos, a senior member of the family,
dated 25 November 2011 indicates that the Criticos family, alone, owned 30 000
acres of land next to a bigger parcel of land owned by the Kenyatta family. 203
This meant no one could construct a permanent building or enclose land to
signify exclusive occupation and/or use, generating another source of longrunning conflicts over access to, ownership and use of land involving not only
the Taita and other coastal communities, but those from upcountry who had
settled on large farms as farm workers.
231. Apparently over time, especially between 1996 and 2003, the Criticos family
offered a substantial proportion of the 30,000 acres of land to the government
for purchase at low rate of only KSh600 per acre to settle landless squatters.
However, after acquiring the land, the government, in its usual style of irregularity,
began to settle people from upcountry, especially the Kamba and not the coastal
communities that the land was meant for.204 The Criticos family further offered
to sell land at concessionary rates to landless communities from the Coast and
from upcountry, including those from Nyanza who had settled on the land as
farm workers but the family’s efforts were thwarted by the government which,
through the provincial administration, forcibly evicted the Criticos family from
the whole parcel of land and began to irregularly settle people on it.205 By 2008,
202
203
204
205
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the Criticos family’s efforts to give up a large portion of the land for re-settlement
of the landless appears to have been completely disrupted, to a halt, as a result if
illegal dealings with the land on orders of the then President, supplemented by
support of the local MP and the Ministry of Lands and Settlement.206 However, the
Commission could not independently verify these allegations from independent
sources.
232. In addition, the following parcels of land belonging to the government were
illegally acquired, mostly by key government officials and subsequently sold to
private individuals or private and public entities: Plot No. L.R. 16121 measuring
2.5 hectares in Shimoni, Kwale, was illegally acquired by Ali Korane, former
District Commissioner in the KANU government and later Permanent Secretary
in the NARC government. Korane subsequently sold the land, through Rahole
Enterprises, to the Kenya Ports Authority (KPA) for KSh8 million.207 Harry Mutuma
Kathurima illegally acquired plot No. L.R. 9093 in Malindi, measuring 7.0 hectares
and subsequently sold the land for KSh12 million.208 In the same manner, the
late Sharriff Nassir, then an MP, illegally acquired land title number Mombasa/
Block 1/ 1682, measuring 2.78 hectares in Mtongwe creek, Mainland South and
subsequently sold it for Sh10 million. The same politician also illegally acquired
land title number Mombasa/Block v/1614 in Kibarani, Mainland North and sold it
for KSh6 million.209
233. While individuals with connections to the government were personally acquiring
land illegally, others established companies through which land was siphoned
from the public domain. A case in point involves Winworld Limited, which
illegally acquired land title number Mombasa/Block 111/528 in Kilifi/Takaungu
(Mainland North), measuring 173 hectares. It subsequently sold the land for
KSh150 million.210 Erastus Muthamia Kiara also illegally acquired land title number
Mombasa/Block v/ 1683 in Mombasa, Mainland North, which he subsequently
sold for KSh1.2 million.211 While people, mainly government officials and their
associates, acquired land for speculative purposes and subsequently sold
it, making huge profits, indigenous individuals and families at the Coast who
had been living on the land were evicted and in most cases, left landless and
destitute while the affluent, some of whom were politicians, expected to protect
their interests, enriched themselves.
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Irregularities involving protected wildlife area lands

234.

Apart from the numerous cases of illegal allocation of government land at the Coast,
there have been cases involving establishment of protected wildlife area on lands
occupied by local communities as their homelands since the pre-independence
period. Affected areas include those over which Kiunga Marine National Reserve
and Dundori National Reserve were established. It was stated that prior to the
establishment of Kiunga Marine National Reserve in 1979, local communities had
lived on Kiwayu Island for decades, as their homeland. However, when the Kenya
Wildlife Service (KWS) was establishing a marine reserve on the land, it did not
consider that it was the people’s homeland and evicted community members
without providing them with alternative land. Upon eviction, community members
sheltered at the Dundori National Reserve, but they were evicted from there also.212

235. Chances of affected communities recovering their land in the areas aforementioned
was diminished when KWS irregularly permitted foreign investors to acquire title
deeds to lands from which communities were evicted from the island and to
establish large tourist hotels while continually harassing community members,
making it impossible for them to even cultivate land and earn a living from it.213
Moreover, community members have been denied resource rights to the gazetted
reserve despite their having lived in the reserve for long; for example, community
members lived in the temporary shelter in Dundori National Reserve. Community
members consider that by so doing, the Kenya government has applied double
standards by allowing foreigners and people from upcountry, based on their
ethnicity, to gain financial benefits from land previously theirs, while failing to
recognize indigenous people’s land rights. To affected communities, this is a gross
violation of the provisions of the new Constitution.214


Outright land grabbing

236.

Coast people emphasize that the biggest problem there is land and that the problem
has persisted since Kenya attained independence.215 Coast people maintain that in
1963, at the time Kenya attained independence and the Coastal Strip became part
of it, some land was released by the Sultan of Zanzibar and the agreement then
between the Sultan and Jomo Kenyatta, then Prime Minister, was that the land would
be given back to the rightful owners immediately after independence. However, this
did not happen for reasons that were never explained to the coastal people.216
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237. As time went on, demand for land at the Coast rose with growth of the tourism
industry which attracted both local and foreign investors to the coast.217 However,
instead of re-settling local communities and issuing them with title deeds for
their land to allow them to trade freely with investors, the government left
them to continue living on their land as ‘squatters’ and exposed them to loss of
land through land grabbing by both local and foreign investors. In many cases,
investors from upcountry took advantage of settlement exercises meant for
coastal communities to acquire land for themselves, for their own settlement, for
speculation, for business establishment and for subsequent sale to other local
and foreign investors.218 In many cases, people from outside of the coastal region
also outrightly took land belonging to coastal families and communities without
compensation.
238. The process of land grabbing at the Coast increased in the early 1970s and was
perpetrated by the then president himself, who is stated to have issued a decree
barring the sale and other transactions involving all beach plots without his
permission.219 It was argued that his objective was to control the lands and direct
their transactions in his favour, through irregular land transactions that were
overseen by the then Coast Provincial Commissioner Eliud Mahihu. On behalf of
the president, it was Eliud Mahihu who decided who could and who could not
acquire beach plots, of the people scrambling for the same from upcountry.220
239. In time, the then president, through Mahihu, allocated a lot of land at the
beach and in other parts of the coast in Likoni, Waitiki Farm, Casalak in Diani,
Msambweni and Lunga Lunga, among others, to himself, members of his
family, his relatives and friends. Other people in his government including
politicians, provincial commissioners and foreign investors also grabbed land
at the expense of coastal families and communities. 221 Affected people recalled,
for example, that Msambweni land was given to Kinyanjui, the Casalak land
was given to then minister Darius Mbela and the one in Waitiki was given to
Kenyatta’s relatives.222
217 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 5.
218 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 5.
219 There was a Presidential Edict issued by Jomo Kenyatta over the sale of beach plots. No one was allowed to buy any of them
without his personal permission or his right hand man, Eliud Mahihu, the long serving powerful Provincial Commissioner for Coast
Province. He presided over the allocation of beach plots to himself, Kenyatta family and prominent people in government and
private sector. See also Daily Nation, Business Daily, 12 and 13 November 2009, online edition.
220 See, See also Daily Nation, Business Daily, 12 and 13 November 2009, online edition.
221 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 11. The same sentiments were reiterated by other witnesses who
testified before the TJRC at the coast.
222 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 11.
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240.

There are also cases where coastal families were forcibly evicted, just to pave way
for occupation by people from upcountry. For example, after independence, the
following villages that were occupied by the Bajuni as their homelands were
destroyed - Kiunga, Kishakani, Funambai, Vibondeni, Ashwei and Materoni. The Bajuni
were, in the process, displaced without any form of compensation or assistance and
have, over the years, been rendered poor and destitute. As a result, members of the
community strongly feel that they were better off when they were under the colonial
government than during the post-colonial period because during the colonial
period, they had their own villages, were farming and exporting crops and had no
problems of the nature that they have experienced as a result of landlessness.223

241. Due to land grabbing and resultant landlessness and destitution at the Coast,
the numbers of coastal communities has reduced, while that of invaders from
upcountry has steadily risen. For example, the indigenous Bajuni have either been
displaced or outnumbered by immigrants and thus they have become a minority
in their own homeland. As a consequence of their numerical strengths, immigrants
from upcountry also began to exercise political influence, with their civic and
parliamentary candidates contesting in the elections. This in itself created fear
and suspicion between the local host community and the immigrants. As a result
of this scenario, the region continued to experience ethnic tensions and conflicts
during the electioneering period.
242. The kind of blatant land grabbing described by affected community members left
many of them poor and without education because they have no means to afford
it. Admittedly, land grabbing has angered Coast people, the majority being jobless,
uneducated and poor youth. The volatile situation created that threatens to result
in violent conflicts was described as follows:
They took our land and this brought about a lot of bitterness. The young people found
themselves without jobs. Moi’s government continued dishing out land as reward to
councilors and MPs. You would find a councilor from Duruma selling land in Digo land
and that brought a lot of enmity among the people. That is why the coastal community
feels that all people from upcountry are bad because all their land has been given
free of charge to people from upcountry. A councillor is given a beach plot and he
then sells it and buys a nice car yet the people do not have anything... the majority of
the youth are annoyed because they are supposed to be employed somewhere and
contribute economically, but they were denied that right. That is why the young men
are easily bribed because they are unemployed and their rights have been given to
other people.224
223 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January 2012/ p. 42 and 44.
224 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/ 23 January 2012/ p. 11.
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243. Evidently, the problem of land grabbing continued after Kenyatta’s administration,
leaving the coastal people in perpetual poverty. In addition to individuals and
groups of individuals who obtained land irregularly at the Coast through key
officials in both the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, there were cases involving
private individuals and corporate bodies acting on their own, in collusion with
local authority officials. In Tana River where most of the land is communal land,
many rich people have managed to acquire land and title deeds therefore, while
indigenous communities living there and their families have no titles.225
244. The situation was worse on Manda Island where the then PC Mahihu took the
opportunity between 1974 and 1976, using his junior officers, DCs and chiefs
to forcefully acquire land on Manda Island from local people. In the process six
people were killed who, together with their families, lost their right to the property
they possessed on the island and all the developments they were undertaking
thereon.226
245. The abuse of state office to aid private individuals to gain land from coastal
communities without consultation, compensation or mitigation extended to
ecologically-sensitive areas including fish landing areas in Kiwayu, Mkokoni,
Manda Island, Manda Toto, Tenewi among other areas that have been grabbed by
renowned politicians and their cronies. The practice threatens the local peoples’
livelihood as well as ecological sustainability in affected areas.227
246. In addition, there are areas that are still regarded as government land at the Coast,
without clear delineation, including large areas in Tana River. Some of the land in
the area is considered as community land but the boundaries are not clear to local
communities. Lack of clear delineation or designation of such areas has allowed
rich and influential people to acquire land and related title deeds while members
of the local indigenous communities do not have title deeds.228 Therefore,
community members demand that land adjudication should be conducted in
every area, especially in Tana River where very few people have title deeds. They
also demand that the government ensures that everyone at the Coast, including
the Tana River area, has access to land in accordance with the new constitution to
prevent upcountry people from coming to the areas any time to claim land. They
also demand that families who lost their members due to forceful evictions from
their land in affected areas be compensated.229
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247. Although a large number of people from outside the coastal area were quick to
illegally acquire land at the expense of coastal communities, many of the illegal
landowners there have held land for speculative purposes and as such they have
not put land into actual use as they wait for the value to appreciate. This has not
only reduced land available for resettlement of landless people, but has also
contributed to cases of unutilized or under-utilized land in the region. In some
cases, landowners do not live on the farms, accounting for the many cases of
absentee landowners in the region. In the meantime, indigenous communities
rendered landless by land grabbers ‘squat’ on the farms where they constantly face
evictions. Some have also, in the quest for justice, been engaged in endless court
battles as those claiming to be landowners seek to evict them from their land.230


Irregular acquisition of Tiwi and Diani trust lands
At independence, the Trust Lands Ordinance passed by the colonial government
to establish trust land for the benefit of African communities was adopted, with
little changes, as the Trust Lands Act. Both the Act and the constitution (both
the independence and the subsequently adopted constitution) provided not just
for establishment of trust lands, but also for their administration by respective
county councils, utilization by respective communities collectively and, in, any
unlikely event, alienation for public purposes, but strictly in accordance with the
law.

248. Disposal of trust lands to individuals and the issuance of individual titles to trust
lands are authorized by section 116 of the Constitution. The relevant section
provides that:
A county council may, in such manner, and subject to such condition as may be
prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, request that any law to which this section
applies shall apply to an area of trust land vested in that county council, and when the
title to any parcel of land within that area is registered under any such law otherwise
than in the name of the county council, it shall cease to be trust land.

249.

This authorization does not indicate exactly which law the section applies to, or the
considerations a county council should make before proceeding to deal with trust
land in a manner that eventually causes it to cease to be trust land. Therefore, we
look to the other statutes governing trust lands for clarification on the procedures for
disposing of trust lands to private individuals. The statute with relevant provisions in
this regards is the Land Adjudication Act. Section 3 of the Act states that:

230 The Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of Kenya, (1978) Government
Printer 5.
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The Minister may, by order apply this Act to any area of Trust land if-

(a) the county council in whom the land is vested requests; and
(b) the Minister considers it expedient that the rights and interests of
persons in the land should be ascertained and registered;…231
250.

The law proceeds to specify steps in the adjudication process. First, the Land
Adjudication Act is applied to the area in question. In light of section 116 of the
Constitution, the above provision constitutes the first requirement in the process
of alienating trusts lands to private individuals resident therein. It requires a county
council in whom the land has been vested to request the minister for the time
being responsible for matters concerning land to apply the Land Adjudication Act
to the area intended to be alienated. If, upon receiving such a request, the minister
considers that it is expedient for the rights and interests of persons living on the land
to be ascertained and registered, he issues a legal notice of the application of Cap
284 to the area of trust land in question in the Kenya Gazette. The remainder of the
process leading to the issuance of private individuals with titles to portions of trust
land (which thereupon, ceases to be trust land) is governed by the Land Adjudication
Act (unless a recording of existing rights had not been completed and certified, in
which case, the Land Consolidation Act is applied to accomplish it, before the process
of adjudication proceeds).232

251. The Land Consolidation Act provides for the following procedures to be gone
through before any portion of trust land is registered in the name of an individual
person or other body:






establishment of an adjudication for purposes of ascertainment and recording
of interests, or to establish several adjudication sections within the adjudication
area,233
publication of notice in respect of each adjudication section defining the
area of adjudication section be defined as clearly as possible and issuing a
declaration to residents that interests in land within the adjudication section
will be ascertained and recorded in accordance with Cap 284,
fixing of a period within which a person claiming an interest in land within
the adjudication section must make his claim to the recording officer, either in
writing or in person or by agent (any person making a claim may be required
to point out to the demarcation officer or to demarcate, or to assist in the

231 Land Consolidation Act, Cap 284, section 3(1)(a) & (b).
232 Land Adjudication Act, Cap. 284, Sections 3(1) (c) & section 16.
233 Adjudication Act, Cap 284, Section 5(1).
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demarcation of the boundaries of the land in which he claims to have an
interest.
252. Such person may also clear any boundaries demarcated by a demarcation officer,
conducting a survey and demarcation of parcels of land for persons therein and
preparation of a demarcation map showing every parcel of land identified by a
distinguishing number.234
253.

If in the process of conducting the foregoing activities, an act is done, an omission
made, or a decision given by a survey officer, demarcation officer or a recording officer
that is objectionable to any resident of the adjudication section, if there are two or more
conflicting claims or if there is an objection to the adjudication register, the aggrieved
party is authorized to bring the matter before an adjudication officer, an adjudication
committee or arbitration board established under the Act.235 These bodies must be
comprised of residents if the adjudication area, and not by persons with pecuniary or
personal interest in the land in question, or in the adjudication process.236

254. Subsequently, forms for every parcel of land is prepared for every parcel of land
shown on the demarcation map (in duplicate) (which may be land belonging to
an individual, or to a group).237 These forms, together, comprise an adjudication
record.238 Each form is required to contain the number of a parcel as shown on the
demarcation map and its approximate area, the name and description of the owner,
year and number of gazette notice setting apart land and purpose for setting apart.
In cases of land set apart, it must indicate the fact that land is in the ownership of
a county council and remains trust land, in cases of land entirely free from private
rights or all rights have been relinquished in favour of a county council. There
should also be an indication that any person or group is entitled to any interest in
land not amounting to ownership (including any lease, right of occupation, charge
or other encumbrance including those recognized under customary law). It should
indicate joint or ownership in common, where two or more persons are recorded
as owners of land.239 The law allows correction of errors in the adjudication record.
Finally, the original adjudication register must be available for inspection by any
interested person.
234
235
236
237
238
239
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Land Adjudication Act, Cap 284, section 16.
Cap 284, section 6, 7, 8, 21, 22.
Cap 284, section 8.
Cap 284, section 19.
Cap 284, section 23.
Cap 284, section 23. Where a group is recorded as the owner of land or as entitled to an interest not amounting to ownership of land,
the adjudication officer is authorized and required to cause the group to be advised to apply for group representatives to be incorporated
under the Land (Group Representatives) Act, Cap 287; cause the recording officer to record that the group has so been advised and
notify the Registrar of Group Representatives that the group has been so advised. See section 23(5).
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255. Clearly, there were ample and elaborate provisions of law to guide dealings
with trust land countrywide in order to ensure that beneficiaries of the lands
do not suffer injustices related to their acquisition, ownership and utilization.
However, in blatant breach of the law, the Kenyatta and Moi administrations as
well as county councils entrusted with the lands for the benefit of communities
irregularly excised and allocated parcels therefrom and had the parcels registered
in their names and that of their cronies, friends and family members. A case in
point is the Tiwi trust land.
256. The Tiwi trust land was established for the benefit of coastal communities before
independence. In 1936 after the 1st World War, the British government rewarded
those who fought on their side with land at Tiwi. Each of the beneficiaries was
allocated two acres. The remaining land in the area was established as Tiwi and
Diani trust lands. Although both trust lands were not demarcated, members of
local communities used them in common for a variety of purposes including
grazing.
257. However, in 1972 members of the local communities were evicted when a private
individual unlawfully alienated 250 acres of the land to himself.240
258. Other trust lands that suffered a similar fate were those in Shimba Hills and Kwale,
where settlement schemes were established to settle some 3,000 people from
upcountry. The local Digo and the county council were hostile to permanent land
rights of the people, who included many of the Kamba community. Therefore,
at independence, Kwale County Council took over the scheme as trust land and
leased it to the settlers for 33 years. Although the move left the upcountry people
with no title deeds and therefore no security for loans, their presence in the
area created instances of conflicts between upcountry settlers and indigenous
peoples.


Fraudulent acquisition of Mazrui trust land in Takaungu, Kilifi

259. Evidently, fraudulent acquisition of trust lands exceeded those established
under the Trust Lands Act and the old constitution. Illegal acquisition of trust
lands extended to those established by private trusts and wakfs (Islamic trusts,
like the Mazrui wakf land at Takaungu. The trust was established under the
Wakf Commissioners Act, Cap 109 of the Laws of Kenya over land measuring 2
741 acres, registered under the Land Titles Act as Number 409. 241 The wakf was
240 Testimony of Mr Salim Ali Toza, Oral submissions made to the truth, justice and reconciliation commission held on Monday 23rd
January, 2012, at the Kwale County Council Hall, at 37.
241 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at 144.
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established for the benefit of certain known beneficiaries. However, in 1989,
Parliament enacted the Mazrui Trust Repeal Act, which purported to convert
the land into either government or trust land under the Trust Lands Act. Instead
of preserving the land for the intended beneficiaries under the Act, the area
was subsequently declared an adjudication area,242 an illegal because the wakf
was private land.
260. It is recommended that the declaration that the area is an adjudication area be
revoked as a matter of urgency and the land reverted to the intended Mazrui
beneficiaries. Any title that has resulted from adjudication of the area should
similarly be revoked and the land restored to the trust. If, for any reason, the
land or part of it is necessary for settlement of the landless at the Coast, the
government, through the National Land Commission, should negotiate with
the beneficiaries of the trust for land purchase or free donation from the
beneficiaries.


Failure of illegal settlement schemes at the Coast

261. Since Kenya’s independence, settlement schemes at the Coast have been
fraught with irregularities and outright discrimination of landless coastal
communities. Settlement schemes at the Coast are occupied mainly by
upcountry communities. As a result, many members of coastal communities
who lost their land during colonialism remain landless, poor and, in many
cases, destitute, their means of livelihood having been forcefully taken away,
as described below.


Illegal settlement scheme in Magarini

262.

In the Magarini Settlement Scheme, for example, malpractices abound. Settlement
officers sidelined the intended landless coastal community beneficiaries and instead
of allocating to them land for settlement, facilitated their eviction from the scheme
and replaced them with persons from upcountry.243 Discussions over land allocations
in the scheme held in Parliament revealed that “senior government officials listed
their constituents and friends and recommended them to be given plots by the
settlement officers.”244 However, despite the revelation, no official action has ever
been taken to correct the situation.

242 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at 145.
243 K Kanyinga, ‘Politics and struggles for access to land: “Grants from above” and “squatters” in coastal Kenya’ (1998) The European
Journal of Development Research 57.
244 K Kanyinga, ‘Politics and struggles for access to land: “Grants from above” and “squatters” in coastal Kenya’ (1998) The European
Journal of Development Research 57.
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Illegal Settlement Schemes in Lamu

263. The unprocedural manner of establishing settlement schemes at the Coast,
especially during Kenyatta’s era, was reflected in many other areas than Magarini.245
In Lamu, Kenyatta’s administration, in the 1970s embarked on implementing what
appeared, on the surface, to be a policy of re-distribution of settlement schemes in
the area now falling under Lamu County were established in a dubious manner as
numerous former coastal land owners were not informed or compensated for their
land that was appropriated for resettlement.246
264. In the end, the proportion of the indigenous coastal community members settled
was much lower- between 15 and 20 per cent only, than that of members of
communities from up country.247 To make matters worse, some of the members of
coastal communities who received letters of allotment had their land subsequently
illegally misappropriated from them despite their having paid all the fees
demanded for allotment to the Ministry of Lands.248


Failed Baraka settlement schemes

265. During the 1960s and 1970s, several Baraka Settlement Schemes were established
at the Coast to provide land for about 5,000 members of coastal communities
that had been rendered squatters when their land was taken away, first, by Arabs
and subsequently, by the British. However, only a small number of the landless
was settled in Kilifi. In Lamu District where a larger settlement programme was
implemented, supported by aid from Germany, 10 000 members of the Kikuyu
community were settled between 1969 and 1979, including ex-Mau Mau soldiers.
The irregular move raised the population of the Kikuyu to 20 percent in the
district.249


Failure to consult with affected communities

266. Regarding construction of a new port in Lamu, coastal communities blame the
government for having known that the port would be built there as early as
1965, but failed to consult with affected communities; having settled people
from upcountry on part of the land on which the port would be built to make
them beneficiaries of compensation; having settled some coastal communities on
land meant for the port without re-settling them before port construction work
began. The coastal communities further claim that the government designated
245
246
247
248
249

TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.
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a lot of community ranches as land on which the port would be built without
compensating communities and finding them alternative land and failing to
consult with potentially affected coastal communities over construction of the
port.250
267. It is stated that Lamu Port, currently under construction, is being established
on a number of community ranches measuring a total of 85,000 hectares. They
included Galana Ranch, the biggest, Majengo Ranch measuring 12,000 hectares,
Umoja Ranch measuring 5,000 hectares, a ranch now registered as Abothei Limited
measuring 7,000 hectares, Mongone Ranch measuring 10,000 hectares and a
proposed ranch measuring 8,000 acres which is currently Magogoni Settlement
Scheme.251
268. The problem is that although local coastal communities were living on the land
later established as ranches, people from up country were brought in 1972 and
settled in the areas in which the ranches were established for their benefit.252
In the process of their settlement, coastal families that were living on the land
were displaced, As a result, it is the people brought in from up country who have
benefited economically from the land over the years. Thus historical injustice was
planned.253
269. Further, communities living in areas around the port that is currently being
constructed at Lamu assert that one of the ranches in the area, namely: Enkamani
Ranch belonged to their forefathers and was occupied by them. However, the
head of Kenya Navy illegally acquired it and subsequently advertised its sale on
the internet for the sum 2 million Euros on 2nd November 2009. Therefore, the
person who illegally acquired the land stands to profit immensely from its sale at
the expense of local community members without any compensation.254
270. It is maintained that there has not been any historical injustice worse than what
we Lamu people experienced because they were evicted at independence and
people from up country brought in and settled on their land. Further, on 25th
December 1963, the then President Kenyatta ordered people in areas from Witu
to Mashakani to give up their firearms only for them to be subjected to Shifta
activities followed by torture by GSU and now, Lamu Port is being constructed
on their land without consultation or compensation. People have lost their
250
251
252
253
254
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TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/p.16; TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/p.16; TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.4.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/ 9 January, 2012/p. 3, 30 & 32.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p. 30.
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Abubakar Kuchi taking oath before testifying on Lamu land issues in Kilifi

livelihood as a result if the government decision to construct a new port there
but, they ask, where is the compensation? Why were they not consulted? What
other means of livelihood will they get, having lost their homelands, pasture
lands and fishing areas?255
271. It is claimed that the government itself has misused its power to procure
land in Magongoni and other areas under the pretext of public use while
poorly compensating those concerned. The government is accused of having
misinformed communities in the area that the land was to be used for a Navy
Base in 1965. Only recently did they find out that a port is to be constructed in
the area. Moreover, the majority of Kenyans from outside of the coastal region
were settled in Hindi Magogoni area now meant for the port and they were issued
with title deeds. They now stand to benefit from compensation while affected
coastal communities in the same area that have lived on the land for over 300
years do not.256
255 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.7.
256 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/4.
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272. Further, a rush by upcountry people to develop the area around the new
port to enhance its activities and open up transport to Ethiopia, is likely
to cut deeper into indigenous communities’ lands but the government has
not made provisions for compensation or re-settlement of communities
and families likely to be affected.257 When upcountry people come, they
manage to quickly obtain title deeds, while indigenous people living there have
been trying to obtain the same for years. So upcountry people “…laugh at us and
say we are just sleeping around…”258
273. Considering the prevailing volatile situation generated by the development of
the Lamu Port and related activities, indigenous coastal communities did not
conceal their urge on the government to take action quickly to avert looming
conflict. In their own expression, the government needs to:
take a step before there is loss of life because we hear that people from other places are
fighting each other but we have not fought. We know that a monkey is cowardly but
when cornered, it can finish you. So we are like monkeys; we are cowardly but one day-- We are pleading with this Commission to take a step and ensure that the marginalized
and minorities – the Boni, Bajuni and Somali - get their rights. Since the Constitution was
changed, there is individual land and community land and government land. We were
hoping that this would be so but the Constitution is being disregarded. Even regarding
the port land, we cannot get compensation because we do not have documents. Do you
think that is right? Will that not bring war? The war after independence was not because
of elections results; people were just bitter from before and it is the same thing we are
seeing here. This will later bring problems and will mess up the peace in the area. If you
keep on trampling upon people, one day they will look for a knife and injure you in the
stomach.259
Obviously, the root causes of land-related violent clashes are preventable, if only the
government could take practical steps to meaningfully address them.


Incomplete land adjudication, consolidation and registration

274. Although the Land Adjudication Act, the Registration of Titles Act and other
enabling laws were passed to facilitate land adjudication in the whole country,
certain areas, especially at the Coast, were left out, thus perpetuating landlessness
and vulnerability of coastal lands to the phenomenon of land grabbing.
275. To date, land adjudication and registration have not been initiated or concluded in
large areas including Mombasa, Malindi, Taita, Taveta, Kwale and Malindi. In many
257 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.4.
258 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.16.
259 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p.16.
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places, local people live on land claimed to belong to the government without
clear designation of the status of the land. In other places, people live on either
communal land or ancestral land that could be recognized as communal of trust
land but without any title deed or ascertainment of their rights in the first place.
The resulting problems have been explained by an affected person as follows:
I would like the government to take steps to make sure that everybody has the right
of accessing land. Adjudication should be done in every area, especially in Tana River
where very few people have title deeds. Any rich person seems to be able to get
title deeds. Most of the land is community land. When you go down, we border the
Tharaka people. The land belongs to the government and anybody can come in and
claim it at any time; these people have no way of claiming this land. So, I would like
the government to ensure that everybody gets their own area according to the new
Constitution. Most of the people from this community who were evicted died, but
their children are still there. I would like these people to be compensated.260

276. Failure to adjudicate and register land at the Coast is not just the main reason for
the widespread squatter in the region; it has also, for very many years, exposed
coastal communities’ land to land grabbers, especially from mainland Kenya
and foreigners. The problem has been made worse by the growing commercial
value of land for tourist development and the government’s decision to make
grants of coastal land suitable for tourism, often in areas already occupied by the
Mijikenda, resulting in mass evictions and subsequent conflicts.
277. No doubt, the constant unpredictable eviction of indigenous communities in the
region has made it impossible for them to engage in any meaningful development
activities, rendering many poor and destitute. The anger and frustration that the
situation has engendered, which is a key recipe for violence is elaborated in the
following testimony from a Lamu resident:
Why is it that we are not Kenyans? We are human beings! We could get angry later. We
are old now but the youth will not accept the injustice to go on forever. When the war
starts, you will start wondering why the conflict has broken out but that is because
somebody has gone to Nairobi and managed to get ownership documents.261

278. For reasons which have never been explained, the process of land adjudication
at the Coast and in surrounding areas has been slow and often done in favour
of the immigrants who ended up having land title deeds at the expense of local
communities. The selective application of land laws in Lamu, Kwale and Tana
River districts, among other places, has been the source of ethnic suspicion,
tension and conflicts between the locals and the immigrants.
260 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Lamu/9 January, 2012/p. 13.
261 Testimony of Mr Ali Gubo Baldo, Oral Submissions Made To the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Held on Monday,
9th January, 2012, at Mkunguni, Lamu Fort, Lamu, at 16.
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Illegal Land Acquisition in Mainland Kenya during
the Post-Independence Period
279. By the time Kenya attained independence in 1963, the British colonial administration
had established a new system of land tenure, based on a number of laws which
were adopted by independent Kenya at independence. In the newly-introduced
land tenure, ownership of land would be (and still is) signified and evidenced by
ownership of title to land. Therefore, ownership of title to land provided (and still
provides) a strong basis for access to and use of land such that if any person owned
land but did not have title to it, such ownership would not be recognized in law
and in practice, unless the area in question was one pending land adjudication,
consolidation and registration or was considered trust land. The process of issuing
titles to land was also governed by law.
280. However, customary tenure continued to operate among African communities,
alongside official tenure. In customary tenure, members of a tribe/community
or family acquired rights to use land and to pass it on (transmitted it) to their
descendants without any formal procedure of conveyance. In the tenure systems
operating at independence, three main categories of land emerged - government
(including local authority land), trust land/community land and private land. The
three categories of land were governed by specific pieces of legislation in terms
of acquisition, ownership and disposal.262 This section begins by presenting key
features/provisions of the laws governing land transactions, namely: acquisition,
ownership and disposal to provide basis for understanding the extent of noncompliance with the laws, which rendered related transactions irregular and illegal,
with attendant consequences on peaceful co-existence of the people of Kenya.

Government land
281. At independence, the land laws adopted introduced various regimes for issuing
titles to land, depending on the type of land. Therefore, included in this section is
an examination of the procedures for issuing titles to each of the categories of land
separately, beginning with government land. What was considered as government
land becomes necessary to analyse in this section for a number of reasons. First,
262 At independence, the Kenya government inherited the following ordinances with very slight amendments: the Crown Lands
Ordinance (renamed Government Lands Act, Cap 280 laws of Kenya), the Trust Lands Ordinance (renamed the Trust Land Act,
Cap. 288), the Registration of titles ordinance (renamed the Registration of Titles Act, Cap 281), the Survey Ordinance (renamed
the Survey Act, Cap 299), the Land Titles Ordinance (renamed the Land Titles Act), The Land Consolidation Ordinance (renamed
the Land Consolidation Act, cap 283); and the Registration of Documents Ordinance (renamed the Registration of Documents
Act, cap 285). In addition, the following statutes were enacted to govern transactions in land: The Registered Land Act, Cap 300,
1963 [which was intended to replace the Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance; The Land Planning Act of 1968 (repealed); The
Sectional Properties Act of 1987; and the Physical Planning Act of 1986.
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there were large numbers of landless people who occupied land designated as
government land, in the hope that since the land belonged to government, they
would not be evicted from the land or, eventually, they would be settled thereon.
283. Secondly, any unauthorised activity involving government land was likely to expose
dependent communities and families to landlessness, poverty and destitution
and therefore, such activities were and still are likely to attract resistance,
including violence. Third, in later years of independence, public lands included
public amenities such as schools, hospitals, beach access routes and children’s
playgrounds for the benefit of the public and therefore any illegal dealing with
such land would and did, in many cases, attract violent reactions from the public.

Law governing government land
284. For purposes of the Government Lands Act,263 government lands are land (for
the time being) vested in the government by virtue of section 204 and 205 of
the Constitution, as contained in schedule 2 of the Kenya Independence Order–
in-Council of 1963, and sections 21, 22, 25 and 26 of the Constitution of Kenya
(Amendment) Act of 1964.264
285. The Kenya Independence Order-in-Council of 1963 (which came into effect on 11
June 1963) provides that land vested in the government of Kenya are all estates,
interests or rights over land situated in Nairobi area that were vested in the
Queen or Governor; lands registered in the name of the disbanded Trust Lands
Board and lands situated in regions (provinces) designated by the Governor as
government land.265 To these, the (former) Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act
adds all estates, interests and rights in, or over land situated in a former region
that immediately before the 22 October 1964 were vested in the former regions
(provinces); all estates and rights in, or over land that immediately before 12
December 1964 were vested in the Queen of England or the Governor-General on
behalf of the government of Kenya and lands formerly registered in the name of
the Trust Land Board under the Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance.
286. It also adds all movable and immovable property and all lands that were, before
12 December 1964 held by the Governor-General, the government of Kenya, or
by any person in trust for them; and all immovable property acquired for the
263 This is implied in the preamble to Cap 280, which states that the Government Lands Act is an Act of parliament to make further
and better provisions for regulating the leasing and other disposal of government lands, and for other purposes. The original intent/
objective of the Act (ordinance) to enable the Commissioner of Lands to set aside land for alienation to European settlers for
commercial and agricultural developments seem to have been retained.
264 The Government Lands Act, Chapter 280, Laws of Kenya 1984 (Rev. Ed., 1972), section 2
265 The Kenya (Independence) Order-in-Council, Section 3(1)- (3) [1963].
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use of regions and former regions.266 In effect, these refer to lands that are not
trust lands and have neither been alienated to private bodies (lands not privately
owned), nor currently owned by public authorities, including ‘Forest Areas’.
287. The foregoing provisions do not provide a clear and full picture of what forms
government lands. Other sources indicate other categories of government
land including remnants of land in the City of Nairobi and Mombasa that were
acquired for town planning purposes but were never used therefore;267 forest
reserves; other government reserves; lands within townships and other urban
centers; alienated government lands (for example, lands in the City of Nairobi
that have been leased for 1999 years with reversionary interest in the state);
unalienated government lands; and national parks.268
288. It is noted with concern that government lands for purposes of the Government
Lands Act may not necessarily include all land owned by the government.
Land owned by the government includes land owned by the government
for government use, for example, because it is a chief’s office, or provincial
commissioner’s office or residence, or land owned by the government by virtue
of its reservation by the government for specific purposes, such as the protection
of flora and fauna therein. The substantive law (statute) governing government
lands is the Government Lands Act, Cap 280, which, as already noted, was
derived from the colonial Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915, with only minimal
amendments. The Government Lands Act is both a substantive and procedural
statute with respect to government lands and provides for both administration
and conveyance of government lands. In addition, the Registration of Titles Act,
Cap 281, and the Registered Land Act, Cap 300, may apply in certain cases.
289. The Act, now repealed, provides that all conveyances, leases, and licenses of, or
for the occupation of government lands are to be done, subject to the provisions
of the Act.269 Statutes governing other lands owned by the government, such as
the Forests Act and the Wildlife (Management and Conservation) Act also establish
requirements and procedures for disposal and issuance of title to those other
government lands.
290. The issuance of titles to government lands is a step subsequent to the alienation
and disposal of the lands. The latter steps are also governed by the law, which
266 The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 28 of 1964, sections 21, 22, 25 & 26.
267 See the list of the functions of the Commissioner of Lands with respect to government lands shows that government lands include
remnants of land in the City of Nairobi and Mombasa that were acquired for town planning purposes but were not used therefore,
section 3, Cap 280.
268 The Principal Registrar of Government Lands has a list of government lands.
269 The Government Lands Act, Cap 280, 1982 (Revised Edition, 1962), Section 4.
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specifies that with respect to government lands, all of the procedures subsequent
to alienation must be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Act
itself.270 Therefore, in the process of examining the actual procedures for issuing
titles to government lands, procedures for alienation (disposal) of government
lands will be considered first.
291.

The key point is that the validity of titles issued with respect to government lands
depend on the validity of procedures followed in disposing of the lands. Where
procedures prescribed by the Act are not followed, any titles subsequently issued
are irregular.

292. For purposes of disposal of government lands under Cap 280 (which leads to the
issuance of title to government lands), government lands may be divided into
two categories - town plots and agricultural land.271 For both categories of lands,
Cap 280 provided for alienation and disposal primarily by grants of land to various
recipients for a variety of purposes; by leases of town plots and agricultural lands
for specified periods of time; and by sale of agricultural land, thereby conferring
freehold (absolute) titles thereto to a beneficiary.272
293. The only criterion to be met prior to disposal of government lands was that the
lands were available, meaning that they were not, at the time of proposed sale
lease or grant, needed or required for government purposes, or that land was
required for purposes of a municipality (in cases of applications by municipalities
for land grants). In the absence of proper criterion for disposal, there are dangers
with the exercise of the Commissioner of Lands of the President’s discretion with
respect to disposal of government lands.

Procedures for disposal of government lands by way of grants
294. The Governments Land Act authorised the president to make grants of any
estate, interest, or right over unalienated government land. The Act does not
prescribe the circumstances under which grants may be made. By these powers,
grants of land may be made for religious, charitable or sports purposes; for town
planning exchanges on recommendation of the town planning authority of
Nairobi; and for the use of local authorities for municipal or district purposes (for
office accommodation, town halls, public parks, fire stations, etc).
270 Section 4, Cap 280.
271 See Sections 4, 7, 9 & 19 of Cap 280.
272 See sections 4, 7, 9 & 19 of Cap 280. Mortgages and temporary occupational licenses may also be granted on government lands
but these may not require the issuance of titles thereof. There are also cases where government land may be disposed of by court
order. See section 106.
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295. Any grants of land are to be made in accordance with the provisions of Cap 280
and subject to any other written law. Cap 280 does not prescribe requirements
for the exercise of the power to grant land, and lacks provisions, which say, for
example, that land grants are to be made upon application by an interested party,
and only if the president, or the Commissioner is satisfied that the purposes for
which the land is required are valid. In practice, applications for land grants may be
made, for example by the City Council of Nairobi to the Commissioner of Lands and
it is usual for applicants to state the purposes for which land grants are needed.
296. However, there are no requirements for verification of purpose statements and Cap
280 did. There was also no clear government policy on government land grants.
The foretasted omissions notwithstanding, where the Commissioner decided to
grant land located within an urban area (a town), the Act authorised the President
or the Commissioner to specify conditions for grant. However, conditions have so
far not been effected for grants of land in urban areas. In addition to any conditions
that may be created by the President, or Commissioner, the Act contains implied
covenants against sub-division, assignment, and sub-letting, unless prior written
consent of the Commissioner is obtained.
297. In practice, where a grant of land is made, the steps are as follows: Valuation of
land for purposes of determining rent;273 Issuance of a letter of allotment; and
conveyance and registration thereof. The Act required that all transactions with
respect to government lands be registered in the Government Lands Registration
Offices in Nairobi and Mombasa (or in the registration districts within which the
land is located, in case of land located outside of Nairobi and Mombasa.274Prior to
registration, the Act required that conveyance documents be properly executed
by both parties - the Commissioner on behalf of the government, and the grantee,
but the Act does not specify what kind of document is to be executed.275 It is
presumed that a grant or a letter of allotment in one form or another would be
prepared by the Commissioner, stating that land has been granted to a person or
body, and then delivered to that person or body for execution. In practice, leases
and transfers have been prepared, depending on the statute under which the
government land in question was subsequently registered.
298. Upon execution, the original conveyance document and two copies thereof are
delivered by the Commissioner to the Principal Registrar of Government Lands
for registration.276 The statute provides that registration shall be effected by the
273
274
275
276
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GLA, Cap 280, section 18.
See Part X Cap 280.
Section 7 of Cap 280 authorizes the Commissioner to execute conveyance documents on behalf of the government.
Sections 94 and 95.
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Registrar by binding (filing) a copy of the conveyance document delivered to
him in the Register of Government Lands and entering an abstract or note of the
document in a part of the volume of the register that relates to the land affected
by the document.277 He is also required to indicate the number of the volume
and folio of the document on the filed photostat copy and to make and sign
an endorsement on the original of the document registered and the filed copy.
Finally, the original document, which is the document of title, is delivered to the
grantee.278Cap 280 did not describe or name the document of title to be issued
to a grantee at the end of the registration process but the standard application
for registration form appearing in the subsidiary legislation under the Act (Form I)
suggests that it would be a certificate of title.
299. Further, the Registration of Titles Act, Cap 281, which applied to certain government
lands, stated that title to land comprised in a grant was evidenced by the issuance
of a certificate of title thereof.279 In practice, certificates of title have been issued
conferring leasehold as well as freehold titles to government lands, including
lands within townships, pursuant to applications for land grants. In many cases,
land grants were further sold, sub-leased, or sub-divided with prior consent of the
Commissioner of Lands. It is emphasized that any title issued for government land
grants without following, or in breach of the procedures stipulated under Cap 280
was an irregularly issued title.

Disposal of government lands by leases
300. In addition to issuing grants of land for various purposes, Cap 280, the substantive
and procedural law then governing government lands, authorised disposal of
government lands(unalienated plots within township and agricultural lands)
through leases. The only requirement was that the lands were available, that is, the
lands were not, at the time of proposed lease, required for government purposes.
The procedure for disposal of the lands through leases culminated in the issuance
of titles to the lands bearing a leasehold interest for a term of years, or a freehold
interest. The procedures for issuing leasehold titles to government lands within
townships and those within agricultural areas entailed procedures for alienation
and disposal, and had to be in conformity with Cap 280.280 The procedures were:


277
278
279
280

Availability of unalienated government lands: The first procedural requirement
was availability of government land within a township, (that is; availability of
a town plot belonging to the government, for example, because it remained

Sections 95, 97 & 118.
Sections 95, 97, 118 & 119.
Se sections 21, 22 & 23 of the Registration of Titles Act, Cap 281.
Section 4.
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unsold in previous auctions), or within an agricultural area that was not
required for public purposes.281










281
282
283
284
285
286

256

The Commissioner’s exercise of the power to cause the lands to be sold:
The next requirement was that in exercise of powers conferred on him with
respect to such lands, the Commissioner caused such lands to be disposed
of in the manner prescribed by the Act.282
Establishment of an “up-set” price: Once surveys and divisions of urban plots
and agricultural lands were completed, the Act required the Commissioner
to establish an “up-set” price at which leases were to be sold. He could
also establish building conditions and special covenants to be inserted in
leases, but this is not mandatory.
Establishment of lease periods: In addition, he was required to establish
the periods into which the lease terms were to be divided (for not more
than 100 years in case of town plots and 999 years for farm plots)283 and
establish the annual rent to be paid in respect of each period.
Advertisement of availability of government lands and proposed sale by
public auction: The next step was for the Commissioner to advertise the
availability of town and agricultural plots for sale by public auction in
the Kenya Gazette, indicating the up-set price and other terms of sale. In
addition, the notice of sale was required to indicate the number of plots
available, the area of each plot and their location, the amount of survey
fees required, the cost of deeds for each plot, and the time and place where
the plan of each farm could be inspected.284 The statute authorised the
Commissioner to carry out all of these tasks alone, without any requirement
for consultation with other concerned parties or an advisory body.
Informing bidders of the terms and conditions of sale: Further the statute
required that before the commencement of sales at public auctions,
bidders be informed of the terms and conditions of sale.285 Every sale of
leases carried implied covenants and restrictions against sub-division of
plots, assignment, sub-letting, or use not specified in the lease, except with
the written consent of the Commissioner.286 Bidders were required to be
made aware of these conditions.

Sections 9 & 19 of Cap 280.
Section 9, Cap 280.
Sections 10 & 27 (2), Cap 280.
Section 13, 20 & 21.
Cap 280, sections 14, 15, 22 & 23.
Section 18 & 39.
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Sale by public auction: The Commissioner was required to dispose of
government lands through sale by public auction. Before a public auction
was held (or before some other mode of sale was adopted, if the President
so directed as authorised under section 12 of the Act), lands available within
urban areas were to be divided into plots suitable for the construction of
buildings for business or residential purposes.287 An auction would ensure
the government gets the best price; transparency in the process; and would
ensure equity between members of the public.
Sale to the highest bidder: The Commissioner was also required to ensure
that sales of government lands were made to the highest bidder.288 The
Commissioner was also charged with ensuring that the highest bidder paid
the deposit and the balance of the purchase money, rent, stamp duty and
fees for preparation and registration of lease within seven days of the date
of the auction.289 The Commissioner was also the recipient of payments
and the statute did not specify an account or fund into which purchase
moneys were to be deposited immediately after auctions. If payments were
not made in time, within a month of the date of auction, the purchaser lost
the right to lease and the deposit was forfeited.290 This latter provision was
unconscionable. It failed to take into consideration various genuine factors
that may hinder a purchaser from completing payments within one month
of the date of auction. At least, deposit of the purchase price should be
refunded if a purchaser loses the lease.
Preparation of conveyance documents: Subsequent to the foregoing
procedures, the Commissioner prepared a lease of town plot or agricultural
land, which he executed on behalf of the government, then presents to the
leasee for execution.
Registration of title: The registration requirements under Part X formed
the last stage of the procedures for issuance of titles in respect of leases
of government lands. Once a lease was prepared and executed by both
Commissioner and lessee, the Commissioner was required to deliver the
lease to the Principal Registrar, with a copy thereof.291 The lease had to
clearly describe the property affected thereby and its boundaries and
situation. It had also to indicate a reference to the volume and folio of the
register in which the property has been previously registered, or a reference

Section 9.
Sections 14, 15, 22 & 23.
Section 10 & 16.
See sections 16, 17 & 26.
Section 95.
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to the lease from the government relating to the land affected by the
transaction.292 Registration was effected by filing a photostat copy of the
document accepted for registration, and by entering an abstract or note of
the document in a part of the volume of the register of government lands
relating to the leased land. The filed photocopy had to bear the number
of the volume and folio in which the sale was registered and the date of
registration. Immediately thereafter, the Registrar signed an endorsement
on the registered document and on the photocopy and delivered the
original to the leasee.293 In practice, a certificate of lease is issued to signify
ownership of a leasehold interest in government lands.294

Disposal through sale of freehold interest in land
301. Cap 280 allowed disposal of freehold interest in government lands - town plots
and agricultural lands in two basic ways - by failing to stipulate that only leases of
government plots in urban areas could be sold, and by expressly authorising the
sale of freehold interests in the government’s agricultural lands. Section 12 which
provided for sale of government urban plots merely said that “leases of town plots
shall, unless the President otherwise orders in any particular case or cases, be sold
by auction.”
302. Similarly, with regard to agricultural lands, the statute provided that “leases of
farms shall, unless the President otherwise orders in any particular case or cases,
be sold by auction.”295 There was nothing in the Act to stop sales of town plots and
agricultural lands otherwise than by sale of leases thereof. There was nothing that
says, for example, that only leases for a term of years shall be issued on government
town plots and agricultural lands.
303. It is thought that in practice, freehold titles may have been conferred upon
disposal of urban plots and agricultural lands in addition to leaseholds. Regarding
agricultural lands, the statute made express provisions for the issuance of freehold
titles upon sale.296 Section 20 (1) provided that “when agricultural land is available
for leasing, it may be sold by auction after giving notice of sale on the gazette.”
Section 20(2) (d) went further to provide that in the notices of auction:
292 Section 97.
293 Section 118 & 119.
294 In addition to leases issued through this procedure, Cap 280 authorizes leases of government lands to be granted for “special
purposes” by the Commissioner, with the president’s approval (Part V), but it does not define what special purposes are, or any
special procedure for applying for such leases.
295 Section 20.
296 See section 20(2)(d).
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the Commissioner shall state the annual rent to be paid for each farm under the lease
and the capital sum to be paid for a grant of freehold of the land, on due compliance
with conditions thereof, under section 27

304. This is an indication that freehold titles could be issued for alienated government
lands, in addition to sale of leases of the lands.

Other laws governing the issuance of titles to government lands
305. The laws considered herein include the Forests Act, the Wildlife (Management and
Conservation) Act and the Local Government Act. The Forests Act297 is the basic
statute that regulates dealings with lands reserved as forests, or ‘Forest Areas’,
which are government lands. Regarding alienation of forest lands, section 4 of the
Act applies. First, it authorises the minister to declare any unalienated government
land to be a forest and to declare the boundaries of a forest. Secondly, it authorizes
the minister to alter those boundaries from time to time, and to declare that a forest
area shall cease to be a forest area.298 Use and occupation of forests is expressly
authorized, and the minister has the responsibility of making rules therefore.299
306. One of the statutory requirements for alienation of forest lands is that any
declaration that a forest area ceases to be a forest area must be preceded by notice
to that effect in the Kenya Gazette.300 The Act does not specify purposes for which
forest lands may be alienated, nor does it, or any other statute restrict alienation
of forest lands for certain purposes only. Nevertheless, the requirement of notice
in the Kenya Gazette does constitute a procedure that must be followed before any
alienation takes place and if ignored, any titles issued will be irregular.
307. Similarly, sections 6 and 8 of the Wildlife (Management and Conservation) Act
provides for the creation wildlife protected areas - game parks, game reserves,
wildlife sanctuaries, etc, out of private lands, government lands, and trust lands.
Once protected areas are created, the lands become government lands. Alienation
of protected areas can be effected under section 8 of the Act which authorizes the
minister to alter the boundaries of a national park by adding to, or subtracting from
it. Subtraction from protected areas would constitute alienation for other purposes.
The Act does not specify procedures for subtraction, or purposes for which
alienated lands can be devoted. With respect to lands owned by municipalities,
297 Kenya Forests Act, Cap. 385, Laws of Kenya 1982 (Rev. Ed., 1992).
298 Kenya Forests Act, Cap. 385, Laws of Kenya, section 4 (a)-(c), 1982 (Rev. Ed., 1992. Unalienated government lands are lands
for the time being vested in the government, which has not been dedicated or set aside for the use of the public and has not been
declared to be a central forest, or a forest area.
299 Section 15.
300 See section 4.
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including the City Council of Nairobi, the Local Government Act, cap 265, is the
statute that applies.
308.

Lands owned by the local authorities are government land and should have been
included under the Government Lands Act, but they have not. The relevant section
of Cap 265 with respect to alienation of local authority lands is section 144, which
authorizes local authorities to acquire and to hold land for their purposes and
functions. The same provisions authorize local authorities to sell, grant or lease any
land which it may possess and which is not required for the purposes for which it was
acquired or being used, subject to approval by the Minister for Local Government.301
In addition to these provisions, the City Council of Nairobi has created by-laws that
require that any sale, lease or grant of lands that they do not need must be approved
by a resolution of the council. These constitute procedures for issuing titles to lands
owned by local authorities that must be adhered to in any alienation. Breach of or
failure to adhere to the provisions in issuing titles gives rise to irregularly issued titles,
something that is not uncommon with many local authorities.

Procedures for issuing titles to trust lands
309. Previous discussion noted that the phenomenon of the government as an owner
of land in the region presently Kenya was introduced by the colonial Crown Lands
Ordinance of 1902. The ordinance declared “all waste and unoccupied land” in the
Kenya protectorate, ‘Crown’ land. In 1915, the Crown Lands Ordinance re-defined
the concept of ‘Crown’ land” to include land that was in actual occupation by
indigenous African communities. Later in 1938, the Crown Lands (Amendment)
Ordinance of the same year excised native reserves - areas occupied by African
‘tribes’ from ‘Crown’ lands, thereby designating them trust lands. These were
subsequently invested in an independent Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) by
the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1938 (it is not clear whether the lands were
registered in the name of the NLTB)
310. At independence, the NLTB was abolished and what was left of trust lands vested
in the County Councils within whose jurisdiction the lands were located to hold
the lands for the benefits of the ordinary residents therein.302
311. As will be discussed in detail shortly, the legal regime governing trust lands allow
for disposal of various interests in trust lands, including freehold interests therein.
301 Cap 265, section 144 (6).
302 Currently, the following County Councils hold land for the benefit of people ordinarily resident in their areas: Taveta Area Council,
The Pokot Area Council, Mosop Area Council, Tinderet Area Council, Elgeyo Area Council, Marakwet Area Council, Baringo Area
Council, Olenguruone Local Council, Mukogodo Area Council, Elgeyo Local Council, and Kuria Local Council. See section 114 (2)
of the Constitution.
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Upon adjudication and registration, trust land ceases to be trust land.Currently, trust
lands are basically the remainder of lands that were, in the colonial days, designated
as native reserves. These lands include former special reserves, temporary special
reserves, special leasehold areas, special settlement areas, communal reserves, and
lands situated outside the Nairobi Area as it was at independence in 1964, if the
freehold title thereof is registered in the name of, or vested in a county council by
escheat.303
312. An examination of the First Schedule to the Trust Land Lands Act, as in force on 31
May 1963 (The Trust Lands Ordinance of 1963), which established the boundaries
of trust lands (then native reserves) reveal that the boundaries were established
along tribal lines such that the lands comprised the Kikuyu land unit, The Maasai
land unit, the Kamba land unit, Nandi land unit, Kavirondo land unit, Kipsigis land
unit, North Pokomo land unit, the Coast land unit, and the Meru land unit. One
of the challenges currently facing administration and disposal of trust lands is
that the first schedule to the Trust Lands Ordinance defining their boundaries was
repealed. This makes it difficult to ascertain the boundaries of trust lands.304 The
relevant provisions in the Trust Lands Act describe them as certain areas in Kwale
District, Makueni area in Machakos District, Arthi-Tiva area in Makueni District,
Lambwe Valley, Sarora Settlement Area in Nandi District, Kaimosi Settlement Area
in Kakamega, Meru Concessional Area, and others.
313. The legal regime governing trust lands falls into two categories, one dealing with
the management of trust lands and the other with disposal/alienation of trust
lands at which the land ceases to be trust land and becomes either government
land or land privately owned. The substantive and procedural law governing trust
lands are primarily the Constitution, the Trust Lands Act, the Land Consolidation
Act and the Land Adjudication Act. The laws define trust lands and provide for their
administration, management, alienation (disposal) and registration. In addition,
the Registered Land Act and the Group Representatives Act apply in certain cases
of registration of trust lands. Upon adjudication and registration, trust lands cease
to be trust lands. Besides the statutes, trust lands are, in all respects, subject to “the
general law that may, from time to time be in force,” unless express provisions are
made in the statutes to the contrary.305 This implies that trust lands are subject to
Common Law.
303 Section 114 of the Constitution defines trust lands to include lands that were known before June 1, 1963 as Special Reserves,
Temporary Special Reserves, Special Leasehold Areas and Special Settlement Areas, and certain areas that were defined under
the Crown Lands Ordinance. At present, Trust Lands include Lambwe Valley and a few other areas that have not been alienated to
private individuals.
304 The boundaries of trust lands do not seem to have been surveyed on the ground in the first place.
305 Trust Lands Act, Section 59.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

261

Volume IIB

Chapter TWO

Administration and management of trust lands
314.

Section 115 of the Constitution lays out a framework for the management of trust
lands. It stipulates that trust lands shall vest in the county councils within whose
area of jurisdiction the land is situated. This section of the Constitution set out a legal
framework for the public trust in respect of land - here trust lands. In this respect,
the Constitution states that county councils in whom trust lands are vested shall
hold the land for the benefit of persons ordinarily resident thereon, and to give
effect to such of their rights, interests, or other benefits in respect of the land as
may, under the African customary law for the time being in force and applicable
thereto be vested in any ‘tribe’, group, family, or individual. Only customary rights
repugnant to written laws are to be disregarded. Having firmly placed the authority
to manage and regulate trust lands in county councils, the constitutional provisions
are confused by provisions of the Trust Land Act which give overlapping authority to
the Commissioner of Lands to administer trust lands “as an agent for the council,” in
addition to the numerous other functions and powers of the Commissioner.306

315. In administering trust lands as agent for county councils, the Commissioner is
authorised to perform certain functions relating to issuance of tiles to trust lands.
He is authorised to exercise on behalf of the council (either in person or though an
agent) powers of the council to set aside land for public and private purposes; and
to execute on behalf of the council grants, leases and other documents relating to
trust lands.307 There is no mandatory requirement that powers of the Commissioner
be exercised in accordance with any standards, guidelines or rules to ensure that
the powers are exercised in a way that would allow county councils to manage the
lands so as to give effect to the interests of people ordinarily resident therein.
316. Having placed the management, control and administration of trust lands in the
arms of the central government (county councils and the Commissioner), the
Constitution goes further to provide for alienation/disposal of trust lands. The
provisions with regard to alienation are buttressed by similar provisions in the
Trust Lands Act. In addition, the Land Adjudication Act and the Land Consolidation
Act specify procedures for alienation and disposal of trust lands to both public
and private bodies. Procedures for issuing titles to trust lands entail procedures for
their alienation and disposal and are governed by the laws.
317. In the process of examining these procedures, any existing loopholes in the laws
will be highlighted and suggestions will be made for necessary changes/measures.
306 Trust Lands Act, Section 53.
307 Trust Lands Act, section 53 (a) & (b).
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Currently, the legal regime governing trust lands authorises disposal of the lands
to the government for public purposes; to private individuals; as well as to private
bodies. In the process, freehold as well as leasehold titles can be issued.

Alienation of trust lands to individuals
318. Disposal of trust lands to individuals and the issuance of individual titles to trust
lands are authorized by section 116 of the Constitution. The relevant section
provides that:
A county council may, in such manner, and subject to such condition as may be
prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, request that any law to which this section
applies shall apply to an area of trust land vested in that county council, and when the
title to any parcel of land within that area is registered under any such law otherwise
than in the name of the county council, it shall cease to be trust land.

319. This authorization does not indicate exactly which law the section applies to,
or the considerations a county council should make before proceeding to deal
with trust land in a manner that eventually causes it to cease to be trust land.
Therefore, we look to the other statutes governing trust lands for clarification on
the procedures for disposing of trust lands to private individuals. The statute with
relevant provisions in this regards is the Land Adjudication Act. Section 3 of the Act
states that:
The Minister may, by order apply this Act to any area of Trust land if(i) the county council in whom the land is vested requests; and
(ii)

the Minister considers it expedient that the rights and interests of persons in
the land should be ascertained and registered;…308

Steps in the adjudication process


Application of the Land Adjudication Act to an area: In light of section 116
of the Constitution, the above provision constitutes the first requirement in
the process of alienating trusts lands to private individuals resident therein.
It requires a county council in whom the land has been vested to request
the minister for the time being responsible for matters concerning land to
apply the Land Adjudication Act to the area intended to be alienated. If,
upon receiving such a request, the minister considers that it is expedient
for the rights and interests of persons living on the land to be ascertained

308 Land Consolidation Act, Cap 284, section 3(1)(a) & (b).
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and registered, he issues a legal notice of the application of Cap 284 to the
area of Trust land in question in the Kenya Gazette. The remainder of the
process leading to the issuance of private individuals with titles to portions
of trust land (which thereupon, ceases to be trust land) is governed by
the Land Adjudication Act (unless a recording of existing rights had not
been completed and certified, in which case, the Land Consolidation Act is
applied to accomplish it, before the process of adjudication proceeds).309








Appointment of adjudication officers: The Land Adjudication Act (LAA)
provides that before the process of adjudication of trust land commences,
the minister appoints a public officer to be the adjudication officer for the
adjudication area to which he has authorized the LAA to apply. The statutes
do not provide any criteria, such as qualifications, experience or personal
integrity to guide the minister in his appointment of an officer to such a
crucial task. It goes further to authorize an appointed adjudication officer
to appoint (subordinate) demarcation, survey and recording officers to
demarcate, survey and record interests of residents within the adjudication
area. Additional adjudication officers may be appointed by the minister if
the situation so requires.
Establishment of an adjudication section: The next step is for the adjudication
officer to establish the whole adjudication area as an adjudication section
for purposes of ascertainment and recording of interests, or to establish
several adjudication sections within the adjudication area.310
Publication of notice: Once an adjudication section is established, the
Act requires that another notice be published by the adjudication officer
in respect of each adjudication section and that in the notice; the area
of adjudication section be defined as clearly as possible; and issue a
declaration to residents that interests in land within the adjudication
section will be ascertained and recorded in accordance with Cap 284.
Fixing of a period for making claims to land: After publication of notice,
the Act requires adjudication officers to fix a period within which a person
claiming an interest in land within the adjudication section must make his
claim to the recording officer either in writing or in person or by agent (there
is no statutory guidance as to what period of time may be appropriate for
residents to make their claim of interest); and he may require any person
making a claim to point out to the demarcation officer or to demarcate,

309 Land Adjudication Act, Cap. 284, Sections 3(1) (c) & section 16.
310 Adjudication Act, Cap 284, Section 5(1).
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or to assist in the demarcation of the boundaries of the land in which he
claims to have an interest. Such person may also clear any boundaries
demarcated by a demarcation officer.






311
312
313
314
315
316

Conducting a survey and demarcation: Upon completion of the foregoing,
survey officers are required to carry out a survey of the adjudication area
or areas and to demarcate parcels of land for persons therein. The Act does
not indicate whether parcels of land are to be demarcated for each adult
resident member of the adjudication area, for each family, or for a head
of a family and this raises serious ownership (including trust and gender)
issues in relation to registration of interests in trust land. It does provide for
demarcation of interests of a group of residents.311
Preparation of a demarcation map: Upon demarcation, survey officers
are required to prepare a demarcation map of the adjudication section,
showing every parcel of land identified by a distinguishing number.312
In carrying out demarcation of parcels of land, adjudication officers
are empowered actually to enter upon any land and to summon any
person to give information regarding boundaries of a parcel or to point
out boundaries. They may lay out fresh boundaries. If in the process of
conducting the foregoing activities, an act is done, an omission made,
or a decision given by a survey officer, demarcation officer or a recording
officer that is objectionable to any resident of the adjudication section, if
there are two or more conflicting claims or if there is an objection to the
adjudication register, the aggrieved party is authorized to bring the matter
before an adjudication officer, an adjudication committee or arbitration
board established under the Act.313 These bodies must be comprised of
residents of the adjudication area, and not by persons with pecuniary or
personal interest in the land in question, or in the adjudication process.314
Preparation of forms for every parcel of land: In the process of recording
of interests and demarcating parcels of land therefore, forms are to
be prepared for every parcel of land shown on the demarcation map
(in duplicate) (which may be land belonging to an individual, or to a
group).315 These forms, together, comprise an adjudication record.316
Each form is required to contain the number of a parcel as shown on the

Land Adjudication Act, section 18(1) (d).
Land Adjudication Act, Cap 284, section 16.
Cap 284, section 6, 7, 8, 21, 22.
Cap 284, section 8.
Cap 284, section 19.
Cap 284, section 23.
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demarcation map and its approximate area, the name and description of
the owner, year and number of the Kenya Gazette notice setting apart
land and purpose for setting apart, in cases of land set apart; the fact
that land is in the ownership of a county council and remains trust land,
in cases of land entirely free from private rights or all rights have been
relinquished in favour of a county council; and indication that any person
or group is entitled to any interest in land not amounting to ownership
(including any lease, right of occupation, charge or other encumbrance
including those recognized under customary law); and an indication of
joint or ownership in common, where two or more persons are recorded
as owners of land.317




Correction of errors in the adjudication record: Adjudication officers
are authorized to correct any errors in adjudication records.318 When
completed, the forms are to be signed by the chairman and executive
officer of the adjudication committee and by the owner of each interest
in the parcels of land demarcated. No alterations are to be made after the
forms are so signed, unless an adjudication officer does so upon objection
and arbitration, or appeal to the minister.319
Display of the original adjudication register for inspection: Upon
completion of the adjudication register, the adjudication officer is required
to so certify on the adjudication record and map and then deliver the
duplicate adjudication record (bearing a copy of the certificate) to the
Director of Land Adjudication; display the original adjudication register
for inspection at a convenient place within the adjudication section and
give notice to residents that the adjudication register had been completed
and may be inspected at a particular place during a period of sixty days
from the date of the notice.320 Any objections may be raised during the
period and the adjudication officer is authorized to determine them,
and to alter the register as he deems necessary. It is curious that the Act
allows the adjudication officer to recommend compensation to the Minister
rather than rectification of adjudication records in cases where he “considers
that altering an adjudication register would incur unreasonable expense,
delay or inconvenience.”321 The statute does not give any guidance as to

317 Cap 284, section 23. Where a group is recorded as the owner of land or as entitled to an interest not amounting to ownership of
land, the adjudication officer is authorized and required to cause the group to be advised to apply for group representatives to be
incorporated under the Land (Group Representatives) Act, Cap 287; cause the recording officer to record that the group has so
been advised and notify the Registrar of Group Representatives that the group has been so advised. See section 23(5).
318 Cap 284, section 11
319 Cap 284, section 23(7). The demarcation map and the adjudication record are collectively known as the adjudication register,
section 24.
320 Cap 284, section 25.
321 Cap 294, section 27(2).
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circumstances under which rectification of the register may be deemed
as unnecessarily expensive or inconvenient. It also authorizes divesting an
individual of interests inland without due consideration of the statutory
requirements for compulsory acquisition of land.








322
323
324
325

Presenting adjudication register to Director of Land Adjudication: After
determination of all objections and appeals, the adjudication officer is
required to send the adjudication register, along with particulars of all
determinations and objections to the Director of Land Adjudication. At
that point, only the director is authorized to make any alterations and then
certify on the adjudication register and its duplicate that it has become
final (subject to outstanding appeals) and then forward the register to the
Chief Land Registrar, together with a list of the appeals.322 Here lies another
loophole.
Certification of the adjudication register: The Act authorizes the Director of
Land Adjudication to certify that an adjudication register has become final
so that the Registrar can proceed to register and issue titles to land when
there are outstanding appeals that might even require overhauling of the
whole adjudication exercise.
Registration of titles: Upon receiving the adjudication register, the Chief
Land Registrar is authorized to cause registrations to be effected in
accordance with the adjudication register. The Act authorizes registrations
of lands on which there are outstanding appeals as well, except that
restrictions are to be placed on them until the appeals are determined.323
Moreover, it prohibits any person from instituting suits and any courts from
hearing suits concerning an interest in land in an adjudication section,
unless that person has first obtained consent of the adjudication officer.324
This provision defeats all suits that might arise from the conduct of an
adjudication official with respect to trust lands. Moreover, suits can only
be filed after the adjudication register has become final, by which time
interests in land are authorized to be registered, including land on which
there are outstanding disputes.325
Issuance of titles: The LAA is a procedural statute providing for ascertainment
and registration (recording) of individual or group interests in trust lands. It
does not clearly specify the manner of registration, or the nature of titles to

Cap 284, section 27.
Cap 284, section 28.
Cap 284, section 30.
Cap 284, section 28 & 30.
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be issued with respect to registered (recorded) interests in parcels of trust
lands. Therefore, we look to the Registered Land Act (RLA), Cap 300, which
is specifically referred to in Rule 5 of the Land Adjudication Regulations.326
The RLA, which commenced on September 16, 1963, is an Act of Parliament
to make further and better provisions for the registration of titles to land,
and for the regulation of dealings in lands so registered, and for purposes
connected therewith.327
320. The RLA applies to trust lands by virtue of section 2 thereof, which provides,
inter alia, that the Act shall apply to any area which immediately before its
commencement, the Land Registration (Special Areas) Act (Ordinance) applied;328
any area to which the LAA has been applied for purposes of ascertainment,
recording and registration of interests in land;329 and to all land which from
time to time, is set apart under sections 117 and 118 of the Constitution. Under
section 4, the RLA prevails over any written law that conflicts with its provisions
(here, with respect to trust lands).330
321. This leads one to the section of the Act that provides for registration of titles,
specifically section 32. Section 32 of the RLA authorizes the Registrar of Titles
to issue a proprietor of land or lease (if requested by that proprietor) with a title
deed or a certificate of lease where no certificate of lease or title deed has been
issued in the prescribed form. The effect of this section is that a proprietor of
land, whose proprietorship has been evidenced (in the case of rights ascertained
in trust lands) by the recording of the interests of that person in an adjudication
register, and by the registration of that interest in the prescribed form, shall be
issued with a title deed, and in cases of leasehold interests, a certificate of lease
and that a title deed or certificate of lease shall be the only prima facie evidence
of ownership of land. The meaning conveyed is that issuance of first registration
titles to trust lands are to be effected under the RLA.
322. The provision goes further to state that only a title deed or a certificate of
lease shall be issued in respect of each parcel of land,331 and that a title deed or
326 The Rule provides that a party to section 29 of the LAA (which provides for appeals to the Minister against determinations made in
the process of adjudication) are entitled to obtain copies of demarcation maps on payment of fees at the rates prescribed for certified
copies of registry maps by the Fifth Schedule to the RLA, as well as copies of relevant documents, including the proceedings and
decisions of committees, boards and adjudication officers in respect of the holdings in dispute.
327 See Preamble to the RLA.
328 These areas were later included in the designation of trust lands.
329 Section 2 of the RLA.
330 Section 4 of the RLA provides that Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no other written law and no practice or procedure relating
to land shall apply to land registered under this Act, so far as it is inconsistent with this Act: Provided that, except where a contrary
intention appears, nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as permitting any dealing which is forbidden by the express
provisions of any other written law requiring the consent or approval of any authority to any dealing.
331 Certificates of lease are issued only if leases are for a period exceeding 25 years.
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certificate of lease shall be the only prima facie evidence of matters of ownership.
Further, the Act provides that when there is more than one proprietor, the
proprietors shall agree among themselves as to who shall receive the title deed
or the certificate of lease,332 yet section the Act also provides that the registration
of a person as the proprietor of land vests in that person the absolute ownership
of that land, together with all rights and privileges belonging or appurtenant
thereto.333

Alienation of trust lands at the instance of the government
323.

The procedures for alienation of trust lands at the instance of the government, which
would lead to the issuance of titles thereof to the government, are established under
section 118 of the Constitution, and sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the TLA.




The President’s satisfaction: The first statutory requirement in the process
is that the President be satisfied that the use and occupation of an area of
trust land for specified purposes, namely: the purposes of the government
of Kenya; the purposes of a body corporate established by an Act of
Parliament; the purposes of a company registered under the law relating
to companies in which shares are held by or on behalf of the government;
and for purposes of prospecting or extraction of minerals and mineral
oils.334 The laws do not state exactly how the President gets satisfied
of the need of land for these purposes and there is no requirement for
verification of the needs and the suitability of the lands in question for
the purposes.
Consultation with respective county councils: Upon satisfaction with
matters as stated, the laws authorize the President to consult with the
respective county council and to give them notice that land is required
for one or more of the specified purposes for the setting apart of land.
After consultation and notice, land is set apart in the same manner as
in section 117 of the constitution. The setting apart extinguishes any
rights, interests and benefits of local residents of the land provided that
compensation is paid as in cases of compulsory acquisition under section
75 of the constitution. Payment must be made promptly and in full.

324. Since this setting apart, or alienation of land is to be conducted in a similar manner
as under section 117 of the constitution, a county council may subject the land in
332 Section 32(3) of the RLA. Failing agreement, the title deed or certificate is to be filed in the land’s registry.
333 RLA, section 27.
334 The Constitution, section 118(2) (a)-(d).
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question to “any law” for purposes of issuing a grant, or making a disposition of
some other kind of any estate, interest or right in the land (including leaseholds,
freeholds and licenses) to the government of Kenya, a body corporate, or any
other body or person for purposes of prospecting minerals or mineral oils. This
permits the issuing of a grant, a title deed, a certificate of lease or a license
to the government or any one or more of ten other bodies and persons upon
demarcation of land and execution of conveyance documents in respect thereof
by the Commissioner of Lands on behalf of the government or one or more of the
listed persons and bodies.
325. Where lands so conveyed are no longer required for the purposes for which they
were alienated, the TLA requires that they revert to the respective county council,
that is; they revert to trust lands.335 There is no authorization for lands no longer
needed to be disposed of to private individuals and bodies as has been happening
in some parts of Kenya including Kajiado District and any titles issued in respect
of land that should have reverted to trust land as provided by law will be irregular
(unlawful). Similarly, any titles issued without following any aspect of the stipulated
procedure for alienation of trust land at the instance of the government will be
irregular.
326. Parties aggrieved by the setting apart or any other dealings with trust lands are
authorized to seek redress in the High Court, but the provisions regarding law suits
are contradictory and difficult to reconcile. Section 54 of the TLA prohibits actions
against the government or its officers for acts done for purposes of carrying out
the provisions of the Act into effect. Section 58 thereof prohibits appeals from
any decision given, order made and matters and things done under the Act. Yet
section 63 of the same Act states that nothing contained in the TLA shall prevent a
prosecution under any other law, so long as a person is not punished twice for the
same offence.

How privately-owned lands come into being
327. Consideration of procedures for issuing titles to private lands (or lands privately
owned) requires a summary of how original titles were/are acquired in the first
place.As already noted, in the region now Kenya, land was communally and
customarily owned in pre-colonial societies without any formal titles. In the
colonial era, first, all land was ‘Crown’ land and subsequently, trust lands were
delineated and through tenure reform, large portions of trust lands all over the
country have been registered in the names of private individuals and private
335 Trust Land Act, section 119.
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groups of individuals, and land titles signifying ownership thereof issued, these
being first registrations. It has also been noted that even before this process of
creation of private land ownership began, white settlers had been allocated titles
to private lands as early as 1902 (if not earlier).
328. Colonial legislation, which introduced the idea of private ownership of land and
post-colonial legislation outline three distinct stages in the process of tenure
reform - the process leading to the issuance of first registration titles to private
owners of land.








Ascertainment of individual or group interests in land: The first stage
involves ascertaining individual or group rights under customary tenure.
Rights were, or are to be determined according to native law and custom
and with the assistance of adjudication committees constituted from the
inhabitants of the adjudication sections.
Consolidation of land: The second stage involves the aggregation of all
pieces of land over which each individual or group has rights and the
allocation to the individual or group of a single consolidated piece (that is
the process of consolidation).
Recording of rights in an official register: The last stage involves the entry of
rights shown in the Record of Existing Rights or Adjudication Register into
an official Land Register.
Issuance of title deeds: Entry of rights in an official land register is followed
by the issuance of a certificate of ownership or a title deed. That is the
process of registration.

329. Land registration in the trust lands started in 1956 and has been completed in most
of the regions in the country with high agricultural potential, including Nyanza,
Western and Central Provinces. In the areas with low agricultural potential where
pastoralism is predominant, a slightly different registration system with respect
to trust lands was adopted under the regime of the Land (Group Representatives)
Act. Under this regime, communal lands were registered into group ranches
(comprised of smaller units of land) in the names of three to ten members of the
group for the benefit of all members. In recent years, the group ranches have been
subjected to sub-division, registration and the issuance of freehold titles thereon
to individual members, thereby making the lands subject to disposal through sales
by the owners.
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330. In addition to these, freehold and leasehold titles have been issued upon
alienation to private individuals and bodies upon alienation of government lands
as discussed in previous sections. These form the basis of private ownership of land
in respect of which subsequent titles (of the registered lands) may be issued upon
sale by owner, sale by chargee (mortgagee) exercising statutory power of sale, by
transmission (upon death), upon liquidation or winding up of a company, upon
registration of a land trust, and in pursuance of a court order.

The substantive and procedural law governing privately-owned land
331. The RLA lays down the legal framework that governs registered land.336 The Act
expressly applies to areas of trust land to which the LAA has been applied, meaning
that it applies to portions of trust lands alienated to private owners through the
consolidation, adjudication and registration process already discussed. All dealings
with registered lands must be in conformity with the RLA and it supersedes any law
that conflicts with it with regard to registered lands.337
332. One of the key provisions of the RLA with respect to privately-owned land and
the issuance of titles thereto is that registration of a person as the proprietor of
land vests in that person the absolute ownership of the land, together with all
rights and privileges relating thereto. Similarly, the registration of a person as the
proprietor of a lease vests in that person the leasehold interest described in the
lease, together with all implied and express rights and privileges relating thereto.338
Such rights cannot be defeated, save as provided for in the Act, and are to be held
free from all other claims and interests.339
333. The rights conferred on a registered proprietor of land as foretasted were part
of a process intended to transform the legal status of registered land from one
susceptible to multiple customary claims, to individual absolute ownership that
would secure credit for purposes of development. However, the guaranteed
rights of a registered proprietor of land have caused considerable confusion and
insecurity of tenure in many parts of rural Kenya with respect to customary rights
of family members who entrusted one person to be registered as a proprietor in
trust for the rest, only for it to turn out that the registered individual had secured
absolute title.
336 The preamble states that it is an Act of parliament to make better provisions for the registration of titles to land and for the regulation
of dealings in registered land.
337 Section 4, Cap 300.
338 RLA, section 27.
339 RLA, section 28. The title, if freehold, is however, subject to such leases, charges, conditions and restrictions shown on the
register, and the rights of compulsory acquisition, but do not include rights of people claiming as beneficiaries of a land held in trust.
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334. Section 28(b) of the RLA states that nothing contained in the provisions for absolute
ownership and absolute rights should be taken to relieve a proprietor from any
duty or obligation to which he is subject as a trustee, but it is mandatory that a
person be described in the register as holding land as a (customary) trustee.340
Moreover, customary interests over land are not among the overriding interests
that the RLA recognises.341 These provisions have caused considerable difficulty of
interpretation, particularly with respect to the effects of registration on customary
property rights and interests.
335. In the confusion surrounding tenure reform, land is still regarded largely as a
communal (family/clan) asset. The predominant belief is that registration did not
oust family or clan title, especially where a family or clan member was registered
as proprietor with the understanding that he would hold for the benefit of all
others, but changed his mind once absolute title is issued. This has led to the
filing of many land cases in various courts across the country and increased
disputes and litigation with regard to land, challenging registered title on the
basis that the registered land is former family or clan land. In the court, the legal
provisions have given rise to two interpretations in the High Court, which is yet
to be resolved.
336. One of the views is that registration of a person as an absolute proprietor
extinguishes all customary rights and interests,342 the only exceptions being
overriding interests and beneficial interests under a trust. The position here is
that customary rights and interests if not noted in the register are consequently
extinguished since they are not overriding interests within the meaning of the Act.
337. The Court of Appeal has advanced this view further by holding that once land is
registered, not only are customary rights extinguished, but customary property
law is also, by the fact of registration, ousted by statute and Common Law.343 Given
the history and objectives of the tenure reform in Kenya, this would be the correct
interpretation under the law. However, a minority opinion in the High Court that
has found favour in the Court of Appeal asserts that in settling disputes arising out
of land registration, the vital consideration is to determine the capacity in which
the “absolute proprietor” was registered.344 If in the capacity of a trustee, then
he or she must be called upon to perform the obligation inherent in that status.
340
341
342
343
344

This was the holding in the case of Mwangi Muguthu vs. Maina Muguthu, HCCC No. 377 of 1968.
See section 30 of the RLA.
This was the position in the case of Selah Obiero vs. Orego Opiyo [1972] E.A. 227.
See the case of Belinda Murai & Ors vs. Amos Wainaina, C.A No. 46 of 1977.
The view was advanced in the cases of Mwangi Muguthu vs. Maina Muguthu, H.C.C.C. No. 377 of 1968; Samuel Thata Micheck
& Ors vs. Priscilla Wambui & Another, H.C.C.C. No. 1400 of 1973; Edward Limuli vs. Marko Sabayi, H.C.C.C. No. 22 of 1978; Alan
Kiama vs. Ndiya Mudhunya & Others, C.A. No. 42 of 1978.
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This position ought to be supported by law to redress cases where family or clan
members were disinherited by registration of clan or family land in the name of an
individual.
338. Land problems are compounded by provisions of the RLA that authorise
rectification of the register of titles, amendments and cancellation of titles where
the registrar is satisfied that registration was obtained, made or omitted by fraud
or mistake, but prohibits rectification of a first registration.345 This has allowed
people who intentionally defrauded relatives and clan members of their land to
acquire and remain in possession of absolute titles thereto .346
339. The RLA also prohibits rectification of registration that would affect the title of a
proprietor who is in possession of land, having acquired the land, lease or charge
for valuable consideration, unless he had knowledge of the omission, fraud, or
mistake in consequence of which rectification is sought. It is not clear whether
knowledge on the part of a purchaser that warrants rectification is actual or
constructive. What is clear is that lack of clarification creates room for one to
insist that knowledge must be actual. It has also given rise to many cases where
people purchase land with full knowledge of fraud, mistake and/or omission but
take cover under these provisions and insist that they had no actual knowledge.
After all,
No person dealing or proposing to deal for valuable consideration with a proprietor
shall be required or in any way concerned(a) to inquire or ascertain in or the consideration for which that proprietor or
any previous proprietor was registered; or
(b) to see to the application of any consideration or any part thereof; or
to search any register kept under the land Registration (Special Areas) Act, the
Government Lands Act, the Land Titles Act or the Registration of Titles Act…

340. In the interest of justice, knowledge should be both actual and constructive
(covering even cases where a party negligently fails to find out details about a
particular title), to make it possible for registers to be rectified and titles cancelled
where a title holder ought to have known of fraud, mistake or omission.
		
345 RLA, section 143.
346 This was the case in Selah Obiero V. Orego Opiyo (1972) E.A. 227 in which the court ruled that the title fraudulently obtained was
indefeasible because it was a first registration.
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Issuance of title to registered land
(i)

Upon sale by a proprietor

341. Sale transaction: Section 27 of the RLA provides that registration of a person
as proprietor of land - here first registration vests in that person the absolute
ownership together with all rights and privileges belonging or appurtenant
thereto. These rights and privileges include the right to sell, charge (mortgage) or
convey land as a gift.
342. Registration of transfer: Upon sale, ownership passes to a new owner (proprietor/
purchaser) and a new title is issued to the purchaser. The RLA, the Land Control
Act, the Government Lands Act and other laws regulate sale of registered land
and provides, first and foremost that transactions in respect of registered lands
shall be conducted in accordance with its provisions. The procedure for (voluntary)
sale leading to the issuance of title to a purchaser requires that: an agreement for
sale be entered into between a proprietor and a purchaser347 and that rules and
conditions developed by the Law Society of Kenya and the minister be adhered to.
343. The procedure also requires that in cases of agricultural land, consent to transfer of
the respective Land Control Board must be obtained; that the subject land be free
from encumbrances including cautions and caveats and that where land is charged
or mortgaged, consent of the chargee or mortgagee to transfer be obtained.
344. Further, it requires that in case of leases from the government, prior written consent
to transfer must be obtained from the Commissioner of Lands; that transfer be
effected by an instrument (a transfer form) in the prescribed form and that all land
rents, rates and all outgoings due to local authorities be paid in advance. Stamp
duty must be paid to the Commissioner of Lands as assessed and instruments
of disposition (transfer forms) executed by the person shown by the register of
lands to be the proprietor of the interest affected and the purchaser. Executions of
parties to a sale transaction must be verified (attested) and the transfer instrument
registered by the Registrar of Lands making an entry in the register of lands in
respect of the subject land.348
345. Issuance of a title deed or certificate of lease: After registration, the purchaser or
transferee is issued with a title deed or a certificate of lease (in case of transfer or
sale of lease for a period of more than 25 years).349 The RLA provides that a title
347 A proprietor is defined as the person named in the register as the proprietor thereof (in case of leases) and, in relation to a charge of
land or lease, the person named in the register of the land or lease as person in whose favour the charge is made.
348 See, among others, section 85 of the RLA.
349 RLA, section 32.
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deed or certificate of lease shall be the only prima facie evidence of ownership.350 If
any of the stipulated procedures is not followed, but in the end, title is issued, the
title will have been irregularly issued.
346. It should be noted that in cases of irregularities, although rectification of the
register and cancellation of titles is authorised in cases where titles are obtained
by fraud, omission or mistake, under the current legal regime, there is no
system for the Registrar of Land, or the lands office to deal with cases requiring
cancellation of titles fraudulently obtained. One has to go to court and seek an
order for cancellation before the lands registry can act to rectify such a situation.
The matter is complicated by the difficulty of telling (by the lands office) that
a title has been obtained by fraud, unless and until evidence is tendered from
external sources.
(ii)

Issuance of titles pursuant to the exercise of chargee’s power of sale

347. One objective of tenure reform in Kenya was to enable proprietors of land (including
farmers) to obtain credit for purposes of agricultural and other developments on
the security of their land. In line with this objective, the RLA accords wide powers
of ownership including the power to lease, mortgage or charge one’s land.351 In
case of default in repayment of loans, the RLA accords chargees and morgagees
wide powers of sale of the charged (mortgaged) property, without first seeking
any orders for sale from the courts.352 Once the proprietor (debtor) is given notice
of the chargees’ intention to sell the charged property, the statute authorises sale
to proceed by public auction for which a reserve price is required to be established
at the discretion of the chargee exercising the power of sale. There is no statutory
requirement that charged properties scheduled for auction be valued before
reserve prices are established.
348.

350
351
352
353
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Further, although the statute requires a chargee to have regard to the interest of
the chargor in exercising the power of sale,353 it authorizes the chargee to concur
with any person in selling the charged property. It would appear that the statutory
authority to concur has been interpreted in many cases to include collusion by the
chargee with anyone to arbitrarily sell charged property without any regard for the
interests of the chargee. What happens in practice is that in many cases, creditors
arrange for sale of charged properties upon payment default, without proper notice
to the chargor, to their employees, friends, and relatives, often at gross undervalue.

RLA section 32(2).
RLA sections 27, 28, 47, 49 & 66.
See RLA, section 74 & 77.
RLA, section 77(1).
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349. The situation requires statutory intervention through provisions that would
allow chargers (property owners) to be involved in establishing a sale price, or to
challenge sale and to recover their property upon payment of outstanding debts,
but the RLA provides that a person suffering damage by an irregular exercise of
the chargee’s power of sale has his remedy in damages only against the person
exercising the power of sale.354 This forecloses any last-minute effort by chargors
or their family members to redeem family land (property).
350. Once charged property, be it family agricultural land or a town plot or house is
sold as authorised, the chargee is authorised to prepare a transfer in favour of the
purchaser in the prescribed form and thereafter, to effect transfer by executing the
transfer form as if the owner of land.355
351. Upon execution of the transfer form by both chargee and purchaser, the form
is presented for registration and at that point, the law authorises the Registrar
of Lands to register the transfer in favour of the purchaser, at which point, the
property passes and vests in the purchaser. Thereupon, the purchaser (transferee)
is issued with title to the land - a title deed or a certificate of lease to the
property.356 Once property vests in the new owner, he (the new owner) is freed
and discharged from all liabilities that might arise on account of the charge, or on
account of any other encumbrance to which the charge has priority (other than
a lease, easement or profit to which the chargee had consented in writing).357
352. The exercise of the power of sale as authorised has occasioned great suffering to
many family members across Kenya in cases where family land used to secure a
loan by the head of the family or some other person (with consent of the head of
the family), usually without first consulting with family members. In a lot of cases,
family members are not even notified of the charge of family property to secure
a loan. After sale of family land, many families have found themselves landless
and without any recourse to the law. An attempt has been made in recent years
to moderate the harshness of the provisions regarding a chargee’s power of sale
by requiring that in cases of agricultural land, a notice of intention to sell be
served on the District Commissioner of the area in which the land is situated by
the chargee.358 Upon receipt of notice, the DC may, at the instance of an affected
party, petition the High Court to postpone sale for a definite period of time on
grounds that the sale would result in persons being evicted from the charged
354
355
356
357
358

RLA, section 77(3).
RLA, section 77 (3). A chargee exercising his power of sale has the same powers and rights as a proprietor, section 77(5).
RLA, section 32.
RLA, section 77(4).
See Act 14 of 1991.
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land, thereby occasioning undue social difficulties, or cause public disorder in
the neighbourhood. However, such application cannot be made to court if the
people who would suffer eviction or some other difficulty are the family members
of the chargor, or the chargor himself.
353. Therefore, the power of sale of a registered proprietor still has great potential of
exposing members of a family, among others, to great suffering and of causing
social disorder. It would be in order for the law to prohibit use of agricultural, or
family land to secure credit altogether, in the interest of social order and security.
Some banks and other credit institutions have resolved not to accept agricultural
land as collateral. In addition to voluntary sales and transfers upon the exercise
of chargee’s power of sale, the legal regime governing private ownership of land
(especially the RLA) authorises issuance of land titles to personal representatives,
administrators of the estate of a deceased person, and to an executor of the will
of a deceased person by transmission, upon the death of a sole proprietor, upon
production of grant of letters of administration, grant of probate of the will,
or grant of summary administration of the estate in favour of, or issued by the
public trustee.359
354. Titles to land can also be issued in respect of land owned by a company upon
winding up or liquidation of the company, in which case, a transfer may be executed
on behalf of the company by a liquidator, or sealed with the common seal of the
company and attested by the liquidator.360 A liquidator may also be registered as
proprietor of land upon the making of a vesting order under section 240 of the
Companies Act.
355. In addition, the law permits registration and issuance of land title to a person
in whose favour a court has made an order of entitlement to land or lease.361
The kind of evidence of entitlement the registrar should require ought to be
stipulated by law, instead of leaving it up to the registrar to determine what
kind of supporting evidence he deems fit to in cases where applications for
registration pursuant to court orders are made. This is necessary, especially in
view of rampant forgeries, even of court orders that have been occurring in
recent years.

359 RLA, section 119.
360 RLA, section 124.
361 RLA, section 125.
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Breaches of the Applicable Provisions of Laws
Governing Land
Irregularities and illegalities involving government lands
356. Over time, both the substantive and procedural safeguards in the Government
Lands Act, Cap 280 have been blatantly disregarded as senior government officials,
their cronies and relatives enrich themselves, at the expense of the public. In
numerous cases, public land has been in post-independence Kenya, acquired and
allocated in total disregard of the law, including the public trust doctrine. Instead
of maintaining government land in various parts of the country for development
purposes, senior government officials, over the years, intensified illegal transfer of
land from the public domain to private individuals and entities through practices
that have become commonly known as land grabbing. The practices, which became
part of official grand corruption, has diminished government land to a point where
it has become difficult to find land for public purposes, including establishment of
government offices that are urgently required to establish regional governments
in the country.
357. This section of this chapter on land presents a number of cases involving land
grabbing from the public domain, by private individuals and entities, mostly senior
government officials. It demonstrates that land allocation through direct grant
which, in colonial times, succeeded in preserving government land and in ensuring
justifiable and merited allocation for private purposes, failed in the period after
independence. After independence, the very system of land grant that succeeded
in colonial times facilitated massive illegal allocation of government land, largely
because the government, specifically the president(s) and the Commissioner(s)
of Land, abandoned a public auction system ingrained in the law and gave
themselves opportunity to illegally acquire land in ways that amounted to flagrant
abuse of office. In Kenya, the very officials supposed to be the custodians of public
land under the public trust doctrine, became the facilitators of illegal allocation
of the same and thereby, increased landlessness and land scarcity, especially
of people who were living on government land in the hope that they would be
resettled there, many of them having lost the same land to the government during
the colonial period. The practice of land grabbing also, in many cases, resulted in
violence, as ‘squatters’ on government land expecting to be settled on the land lost
it to land grabbers.
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The case of Karura Forest

358. In 1997, 85 hectares of Karura Forest were illegally excised and allocated to S.K.
Macharia, Joseph Gilbert Kibe and Ngengi Muigai. The beneficiaries almost
immediately sold the land, registered as L.R. No. 216/8 to the Kenya Re-Insurance
Corporation for KSh550 million. Allocation of the land coincided with the 1997
General Election, creating the impression that public land may have been illegally
allocated as a political reward.362 It is recommended that all such illegal land
allocations should be nullified. Land should be repossessed and restored to the
purpose for which they were reserved, in this case, a forest reserve.


The Case of Ngong Forest

359. In the year 2001, land which formed part of Ngong Forest was excised, sub-divided
into thirty two plots and sold to 13 private companies. The 13 companies, in turn,
sold the land to the Kenya Pipeline Company for KSh262,388,487.363


The Case of Bellevue

360. On unspecified dates, Micah Cheserem, Joshua Kulei and David Komen, all key
government officials at the time, illegally acquired an undeveloped government
land in Bellevue, Nairobi, registered as L.R. No. 209/10212, measuring 1.6 hectares.
They subsequently sold the land to the Kenya Airports Authority for the sum of
KSh2.6 million in 1985.364

Illegal allocation of land compulsorily acquired for public purposes
361. In addition to illegal acquisition of unalienated government land, land compulsorily
acquired from individuals and families have been the subject of land grabbing,
especially by key government officials. Under the Land Acquisition Act (now
repealed), the government acquired large tracts of land in Nairobi, Mombasa and
other towns for the construction of road by-passes to ease traffic congestion on
the main roads. However, in disregard of the provisions of the former constitution
and the Land Acquisition Act land set aside for road expansion was later
allocated to private individuals who subsequently sold them to third parties. In
Nairobi, land previously reserved for by-passes in several areas was allocated to
Sterora Investment Ltd, Munir M. Chohan, Heron Trading Co., Henry Musamate,
Maya Consultants Ltd, Lawinex Agencies Ltd, James S. Nyaga, Samuel Kiprono
362 Report of the Ndung'u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 83. See, also Report
of the Ndung'u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume II, Annex 1, page
6.
363 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 93-94.
364 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 95.

280

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter TWO

Chepkonga, Esther Rotich, Kenneth Wainaina and other current owners.365 In many
of such areas, violence has broken out as new illegal owners seek to evict ‘squatters’
in a bid to develop the land.

Local Authority Involvement in Illegal Land Allocations
362.

Local government lands, including houses, have also been subjected to land
grabbing, especially by local authority officials. In many cases, local authority officials
have, especially during the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, illegally allocated
property set aside for public purposes within their jurisdictions to themselves and
their associates, without obtaining full council approval and without following other
due procedures of law. A case in point is Woodley Estate in Nairobi. The estate was
planned as a housing facility, complete with a primary school, playing ground, a
public garden and a shopping centre for the benefit of City Council staff. However,
in September 1992, Kuria wa Gathoni, then Director of City Planning, prepared a Part
Development Plan, changing the user of the open public spaces in the estate into
residential and other private purposes of a commercial nature.

363. The Part Development Plan was approved by the then Commissioner of Lands
Wilson Gachanja, and title deeds for each sub-plot subsequently issued in the
name of the Council in 1993. In 1994, Zipporah Wandera, then Nairobi town clerk,
prepared and signed documents transferring some of the public plots to Kuria
wa Gathoni and companies and individuals related to him, including Ali Mwanzi,
Andrew Isaac Hayanga, Wilson Chebyegon, Mary Akoth, Tom Koros, John Mwangi,
and Archman Holdings, among others, who subsequently sold them to current
owners.366 It is noted that the allocating authority in all the cases involving the
Woodley property was the Commissioner of Lands. It should be recalled that the
wanton allocation of Woodley property attracted public protests that resulted in
the death of at least one person.
364. Illegal allocation of open spaces in estates for public use did not only affect
Woodley Estate only. It has been a common occurrence affecting many estates and
their developers in Nairobi and other towns in the country, including Lake View
Estate in Nairobi. In the housing scheme, as was, in the case of Woodley Estate,
the City Council of Nairobi required the developer to surrender 10 percent of land
to be developed for public purposes as a condition for development permission.
A developer would, as did in this case, surrender the acreage required to the
government, on trust, for public purposes.
365 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, at
pages 25 - 39.
366 For a full list of original and current allottees, see, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry Into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation
of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, annexe 5, at pages 49- 85.
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365. However, once surrendered, the plot would not be used for the intended public
purposes. Instead, certain private companies, mostly associated with government
officials, individuals and their cronies, would immediately apply to the
Commissioner of Lands to be allocated the surrendered land. A part development
plan would subsequently be prepared in respect of the land and submitted to the
Commissioner of Lands for approval and a letter of allotment would then be issued
to the applicant(s) upon payment or promise of pay a token sum as standard
premium.367 In the process of issuing part development plans, the Master Plan for
the City of Nairobi was completely ignored to facilitate illegal allocation of land
reserved for public utilities.
366. Thereupon, the letter of allotment would be used to transfer the unsurveyed
plot to a third party for millions of shillings by the allottee. The plots would be
subsequently surveyed and a Grant of Lease made to the third party. In many
cases, the entire process, from the surrender of the plot to the grant of lease over
the plot to a third party would take a few months and at times, a number of days.
As a result, there is hardly any open space in estates in Nairobi.
367. In the case of Lake View Estate, land surrendered by the developer of the estate
was illegally allocated to four individuals in the manner described above. The
original title, L.R. No. 2951/80 was held by New Homes Developers Limited. The
company applied to the Nairobi City Council for consent to develop an estate.
Consent was granted but on condition that the company surrenders a percentage
of the land to the government to be used as a public utility. Consequently, the
company surrendered plot L.R. No. 2951/89 to be used as a public open space.
In 1992, four individuals, namely: J.K. Chepkwony, Geoffrey Kosgey, Peter Kosgey
and J. Cheruiyot applied to the Commissioner of Lands to be allocated the plot
which had been surrendered for public purposes. A part development plan was
subsequently prepared and the land in question subdivided into three plots.
Letters of allotment were issued to the applicants who paid a standard premium
of KSh97,470 for each plot. The allottees then transferred the unsurveyed plots to
Jitesh Shah and Highland Textile Ltd as co-owners for KSh1.7 million each. Titles
were subsequently issued to the purchasers.368
368. As a result of illegal acquisition of plots surrendered by private developers for
public purposes, there have been battles between estate residents who were
intended to benefit from the surrendered lands/plots and new illegal owners.
367 See, findings of the Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page
79.
368 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 80.
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In recent years, political representatives in Nairobi, especially in Eastlands
have also been involved in public protests against illegal acquisition of open
spaces reserved for public purposes which, sometimes, result in violence. Illegal
allocation of public utility lands in estates has also diminished the concept of
open spaces, with the result that there is hardly any open space for children to
play and for estate residents to conduct public activities, thus denying many
of them the right to a clean and healthy environment now incorporated in the
Constitution.

Illegal alienation of state corporations’ land
369. Many of the 140 state corporations or parastatals have lost land reserved or
set aside for their use through land grabbing. Due to the nature of functions
of state corporations, large amounts of land were allocated for their use, thus
becoming “alienated government land.” However, in total disregard of the law,
during both Kenyatta and Moi eras, such land was, in many cases, allocated to
individuals and companies with close ties to senior government officials, largely
through the schemes of Commissioner(s) of Land. The lands so alienated were
subsequently sold by allottees to other corporations and private individuals and
entities for large sums of profit at the expense of the development objectives of
the corporations and the public that was intended to benefit from their activities.
370. In every case involving illegal allocation of state corporations’ land, the process
was initiated by the Commissioner of Lands through correspondence, followed
by issuance of a letter of allotment of land belonging to a state corporation to
an individual or private entity, without any consultation with the management
of the state corporation. In many cases, the managers of state corporations
were surprised to learn that all or portions of their land had been hived off,
allocated to private individuals or entities and titles issued therefore. There were
also cases where illegal alienation of state corporations’ land were triggered by
illegal surrender of the land by corporations’ management whereupon, the land
became available for alienation, through allotment, to private or other public
entities.
371. Subsequently, allottees would sell the land for large sums of money. The following
state corporations, among others, lost land in such schemes: the Kenya Railways
Corporation, Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, Kenya Power and Lighting
Company, Kenya Airports Authority and Kenya Industrial Estates Ltd.369 In addition
to alienation of state corporations’ land at the instance of the Commissioner of
369 For a complete list of state corporations that lost their land through land grabbing, see, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry
Into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annexe 22 – 39 at pages 449 – 549.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

283

Volume IIB

Chapter TWO

Lands, state corporations also, in many cases, illegally sold their land at very low
prices to individuals and entities that ended up selling them to third parties at
colossal sums of money, thereby making huge profits. An example is the case of
L.R. No. 209/6439 on Ojijo Road, a prime land which belonged to Kenya Railways
Corporation. On 31 January 1996, the corporation illegally sold the land to Guardian
international Ltd for KSh77 million. A few days later, on 8 February of the same year,
the beneficiary, in turn, sold the land to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) for
the sum of KSh178 million.370

Settlement schemes for undeserving people
372. To establish human settlements and address the problem of landlessness
facing many Kenyans at independence and stimulate agricultural production,
the government, in both the Kenyatta and Moi administrations, introduced
settlement schemes countrywide, besides the One Million Acre Scheme and
others negotiated as part of independence package. The establishment of the
settlement schemes has been a continuous process since independence.
373. However, in mainland Kenya, as at the Coast, the main beneficiaries of the 418
government settlement schemes in both high and low potential areas in mainland
Kenya, were undeserving individuals, families and communities, especially those
associated through ethnic affiliation to the two presidents.371 In the period
immediately after independence, the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT) was in
total control of allocation and management of settlement schemes. However, in
time, its role was diversified among the Ministry of Lands and Settlement and the
provincial administration. The practice that emerged was that the government
would set aside land for settlement, which land would, technically, fall under
the administrative jurisdiction of the SFT. However, actual implementation of a
settlement programme would be taken up by a District Plot Allocation Committee
which comprises the DC as chairman, the District Settlement Officer as secretary,
the local Member of Parliament, the District Agricultural Officer, the chairman of
the local county council and the clerk to council. The committee of six, and not
the SFT as was the case in the early days of independence, has wielded enormous
powers in land allocation processes, with the SFT having no supervisory powers
over them at all.
374. Left to their own devices, District Plot Allocation committees have, over the
years, taken into consideration irrelevant and extraneous factors in allocation of
land in settlement schemes. The committee in almost every case allocated land
370 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 102.
371 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 125.
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to totally undeserving people including the official members themselves, their
relatives, MPs, councillors and prominent politicians in areas where settlement
schemes were established, Ministry of Lands and Settlement officials, other
civil servants and individuals with connections to politicians. In the absence of
accountability, settlement scheme procedures and outcome occasioned abuses
and poverty and destitution of deserving Kenyans. Numerous irregularities also
characterised allocation processes in newly-created settlement schemes, thus
eliciting widespread public outcry and protests from members of the public, like
in the case of the Kinale Settlement Scheme in Kiambu.

Kinale Settlement Scheme in Kiambu
375. In the scheme, intended for deserving individuals, the total number of plots
scheduled for allocation to genuine allottees was 1 427. However, a second list
including undeserving beneficiaries was prepared for 1 526 plots and a third and
final one for 3 503 plots, without any explanation. To compound the problem,
the original list of genuine allottees mysteriously disappeared from the records
of the District Commissioner, Kiambu, who was the chairman of the allocation
committee.
376. A Task Force appointed to inquire into irregularities attendant the establishment
of the scheme concluded that many undeserving people were allocated plots
in the settlement scheme, while genuine landless were struck off from the
allocation list.372

Illegal settlement in the Mau Forests
377. With respect to government lands, the issuance of titles to the Ogiek community
over portions of the Mau Forests provides a good example. Forests or ‘Forest
Areas’ in Kenya are government lands that have been reserved for purposes
of protection of the forests and forest catchments, among others. Procedures
stipulated for alienation of forests or forest areas for whatever purpose, are
stipulated under the Forests Act, which requires that first, a declaration be made
by the minister that a forest area shall cease to be a forest area, and secondly,
that the declaration, which amounts to de-gazettement of the forest or forest
area (and thereby removes it from legal protection), be published in the Kenya
Gazette.
378. In breach of this legal requirement (among others), the government made efforts
to settle members of the Dorobo, also known as the Ogiek community between
372 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 127.
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1990 and 1993. Available information indicates that the process began when the
provincial administration, including the local police moved into the forest and
began allocating areas of the forest to members of the community, without any
prior notice of intention to do so to the responsible minister, not to mention that
there had been no publication of a notice that the areas would cease to be forest
areas in the Kenya Gazette prior to the move.
379. In the end, some 3 000 households (some sources indicate 3 500 households)
were allocated portions of the forest (of 5 acres per household), when the
number of the Dorobo (Ogiek) community that were to be settled was only 1 800.
Further, although the settlement was intended to provide permanent homes for
the Dorobo, allottees were issued with temporary occupation licenses. It was not
until the year 2001 that several forest areas were de-gazzetted by publication
of notices in the Kenya Gazette, ostensibly to “regularize” some of the previous
forest excisions, including areas allocated to the Ogiek. However, settlement of
the community was never finalized, thus exposing the community to further
evictions.
380. Further, between 2005 and 2011, the government, in a bid to conserve Mau Forests
as a water catchment area, evicted the Dorobo from the settlements, prompting
the community to file a case against the government in the African Commission on
Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). The ACHPR ruled against the Government of
Kenya, directing that the community’s land be restored.

Other settlement schemes illegally established
381. Other settlement schemes that were riddled with irregularities including
allocation to undeserving individuals, allocation of plots that exceeded
recommended acreage and allocation of plots in a settlement scheme illegally
established on government lands such as forests include the Kiboko “B”
Settlement Scheme in Kibwezi,373 Ndathi, Tinet, Ndoinet, Kapsita-Molo, Kibunja,
Tinet, Sigotic, and Kapchorwa settlement schemes in various parts of the Rift
Valley and Central provinces.374 Further, there were settlement schemes illegally
established in Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) farms, including
ADC Tall Trees Settlement Scheme in Nakuru, ADC Zea Settlement scheme,
ADC Sirikwa in Nakuru, ADC Nyota Complex, ADC Jabali, Moi Ndabi Settlement
Scheme, Ol Jorai Settlement Scheme and Milimani Settlement Scheme.375
373 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annex
53, at pages 876 – 884.
374 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annex
54, at pages 885 – 886.
375 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annex
55, at pages 887 – 900.
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382. In all of the cases of settlement in ADC farms, not only were the settlements
illegal because it was government land; land allocations were made to
undeserving individuals with connections to government officials, including
key politicians and, in almost all cases, the acreage allocated exceeded what
was recommended by far. In some cases, beneficiaries were allocated double of
the recommended acreage.376 In all of the foregoing cases, settlement schemes
were established by the offices of the two presidents, outside of the established
framework, at the personal initiative of the presidents. The mechanism used
was a presidential directive to the provincial administration to settle specific
groups of people, mainly members of their ethnic communities, in specified
areas. No official records were kept detailing the procedures followed in the
establishment of the schemes, but there was evidence that the due process of
law was not followed. For example, schemes that were established in gazetted
forest areas were not preceded with official degazettement of the forests as
required by law.377

Illegal acquisition of ADC farms
383. The Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) was established under the
Agricultural Development Corporation Act, Cap. 444 of the laws of Kenya in 1965,
with the objective to promote the production of the country’s essential agricultural
inputs.
384. The corporation was intended to provide an important link to the agricultural
industry through specialized activities and services and in that regard, to:
produce seeds and pedigree and high grade livestock including hybrid maize
seed; provide agricultural finance by means of loans and undertake such other
activities as it deemed fit to promote agricultural production in specific areas or
specified fields of production.
385. The corporation was expected, with intensified government support, to double
or even triple its efforts in rendering scientific and productive support to the
agricultural industry that had long been recognized as Kenya’s economic
backbone. In that regard, the corporation was expected to acquire more land for
its activities and had no authority to dispose of government land allocated to it.
However, like other government entities placed with trust over land for public
purposes, the corporation became subject of land grabbing.
376 See, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1,
Annex 55, at pages 887 – 900.
377 See, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 132.
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386. Land grabbing avenues were deliberately opened by the unexplained amendment,
in 1991 of the ADC Act which changed its specific mandate to a general one
by inserting a new section 12 which stated that the function of the corporation
shall be to promote and execute schemes for agricultural development and
reconstruction in Kenya by the initiation, assistance or expansion of agricultural
undertakings or enterprises.
387. The amendment provided basis for subsequent executive orders for dealings
with ADC lands in ways that were totally incompatible with its genuine mandate.
In 1994, an executive order was issued, directing the allocation of eight ADC
farms to individuals under the guise of settlement schemes to be financed by the
SFT. Subsequently, the corporation’s farms in various parts of the country were
sold as political reward or patronage. Others were sold to individuals favoured by
the Moi and Kenyatta administrations including L.R. No. 9917/9 measuring 5 518
acres in Machakos (formerly, ASTRA ADC farm) that was allocated to Professor
Philip Mbithi; L.R. 8466 measuring 893 acres in Uasin Gishu (formerly ADC Edge
Farm) which was sold to Karuna Units; L.R. 4486 measuring 795 acres in Trans
Nzoia (formerly ADC Edge Farm) which was sold to V arap Too; L.R. 9069 and
9062 measuring 149.33 acres in Nakuru (formerly, ADC Avondale farm) which
was allocated to Njenga Karume; and L.R. 9867 measuring 1 040 acres in Nakuru
(formerly, ADC Baraka farm).378
388. These are just a few of the ADC farms that were illegally acquired by private
individuals and entities, including high-profile government officials.379 Interestingly,
illegal allocation of ADC farms to politically-connected individuals became the
subject of investigation by the parliamentary committee on investment following
the audit of its accounts for the year ending 30 June 1997.
389. In its findings published in its Eleventh Report, the committee heavily criticized
allocation of the farms to politically-connected and well-to-do individuals and
private entities, but fell short of making specific recommendations for revocation
of titles or nullification of allocations. It is recommended that all ADC farm lands
that were allocated to government officials, including members of Parliament
and their families, local authority officials and politically connected individuals
be annulled, the lands repossessed and restored to the public domain.

378 See, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002), at page 134 and 135.
379 For a complete list of all illegal allocations of ADC farms, see, Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry Into the Illegal/Irregular
Allocation of Public Land (2002), Annexes, Volume 1, Annex 55, at pages 887 – 900.

288

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter TWO

Illegal Sub-Division and Allocation of Trust Lands


Illoodo-ariak adjudication section

390. The case of Illoodo-ariak serves to illustrate the extent of breach of customary
land rights by deliberate failure to comply with applicable laws. The adjudication
section is situated in Kajiado District. The Illoodo-ariak land is situated south-west
of Nairobi, in the district and used to be occupied and utilized in common by over
six thousand members of the Maasai community. Under the Trust Lands Act and
the former constitution, the land was designated as trust land and placed with
Ol Kejuado County Council to hold for and on behalf of the Illkeekonyokie clan
of the Maasai community who were entitled to occupy, utilize and transmit it to
succeeding generations, but this was not to be.
391. In 1979, the Illoodo-ariak area was declared an adjudication area under section
5 of the Land Adjudication Act, but with no indication of any consultation with
the Maasai owners. Subsequently, land adjudication officials were appointed and
posted to the area. The process of land adjudication was completed in 1989 and
an adjudication register was opened for inspection and objections invited within
a period of 60 days. However, the adjudication process was fraudulent in many
respects. The names of many government officials, including non-Maasai ones,
were entered on the adjudication register as owners of the land, making a total of
362 persons who were not local residents of the area but were recorded as owners
of the land and issued with title deeds. Many rightful Maasai inhabitants of the
area were omitted from the register and disinherited from their ancestral land.380
392. Obviously, the process violated the old constitution but attempts by affected
inhabitants to seek legal redress were frustrated, especially by the barriers
presented by section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act (now repealed), which made
first registrations of land under the law indefeasible, regardless of irregularities. It
is recommended that in light of enabling provisions of the current Constitution
and the Land Act of 2012, titles issued to all non-Maasai individuals for land in the
Illoodo-ariak Adjudication Section should be revoked.


Mosiro adjudication section

393. With respect to trust lands, the matters concerning the Mosiro Land Adjudication
Section in Kajiado District provide a classic case of irregularities involved in the
issuance of titles to land. These matters appear more elaborately in H.C. Misc.
380 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 141.
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Civil Application No.312 of 1991, James Ndungu Wambua vs. Director of Land
Adjudication; in James Ndungu Wambua vs. The Republic & Others, Civil Appeal No.
85 of 1992; and in the Kenya Times of 28 January 1991.381
394. By Legal Notice Number 137 of 1970, the minister approved the application of
the Land Adjudication Act to trust land, subsequently defined as the Mosiro
Land Adjudication Section in Kajiado District as required under section 3 of the
Land Adjudication Act. Subsequently, the process of adjudication commenced,
in which rights of ordinary residents over parcels of land in the adjudication area
were to be ascertained and recorded, and eventually parcels of land demarcated
(after mapping and survey) and registered in their names.
395. Contrary to the provisions of the LAA, setting out the procedure for adjudication
(as already discussed), the adjudication officials, among other irregularities, failed
to give any of the ordinary residents of the Mosiro Land Adjudication Section
[hereinafter, MLAS] any opportunity to point out or to demarcate the boundaries
of lands the people claimed, nor were they accorded opportunity to make claims
to any land in the section. They allocated land to people on a map without
such map or allocation being preceded by actual demarcation of the respective
parcels of land on the ground. They further allocated some 52 452 hectares of
land in the adjudication section to people mainly from the Central Province
(Kiambu), about 27 of them (including the daughters of the [then] Director of
Land Adjudication- Rose Muthoni Muthuri and Karen Kaguria Njuguna), and to
at least 31 government officials. The officials failed to display the original of the
land adjudication register at a convenient place or at any place at all so residents
could peruse it to verify information respecting lands allocated to them;382 and
proceeded to register parcels of land wrongfully allocated to the outsiders (nonresidents) under section 32 of the Registered Land Act, Cap 300, and to issue title
deeds in respect thereof.


Kimuri ‘A’ adjudication section, Meru

396. The area in question, which constituted trust land for the Kagwanja clan of the
Ameru community, was declared an adjudication section and the process of
adjudication commenced and completed in clear breach of the provisions of law.
397. As a result, land adjudication officials of the area allocated land to themselves, their
relatives and friends, while denying members of the clan who were entitled to the
381 Irregularities that occurred in the process of adjudication in the Mosiro Land Adjudication Section gave rise to the cases cited, and
to the minister’s comments that were reported in the Kenya Times.
382 See section 25 of the Land Adjudication Act.
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land their rights.383 Resulting titles issued to non-members of the clan are illegal
and this study recommends that they be revoked.


Fourteen Falls land in Thika

398. The land, which was held in trust by the Fourteen Falls Integrated Programme in
Thika County, forms part of the Ol Donyo Sabuk Wetland ecosystem and is trust
land. In spite of the facts, the land, measuring 11.6 hectares and registered as L.R.
no. 22425, has been illegally sub-divided and allocated to private individuals, at
the expense of ecosystem services and the rights of people in the surrounding
areas to a clean and healthy environment. It is recommended that all of the titles
issued be revoked and the land restored to the public.384


Manga Orotuba community forest land

399.

The forested land in question is located in Mwamanwa Sublocation, Kiangoso
Location, Kisii County and forms part of Manga Escarpment. It is a hilltop which the
local Abagusii community claim to have been set aside for their use as trust land,
under the trusteeship of Nyamira County Council. However, in 1991, the council,
without consulting the community, sold a piece of the forested land to the Catholic
diocese of Kisii. The council, again, in 2006, “granted” 20.23 hectares of the land to
the same diocese for construction of a monastery, on land now registered as Central
Kitutu/Mwamanwa/1594. Surprisingly, the title deed that the Catholic Church holds
over the land does not bear any name of the previous owner. It is a clear case of
illegal sale of community land by the trustee, Nyamira County Council.385

400. In efforts to recover the land, community members, through an environmental
organization, filed Civil Suit No. 38 of 2010 in the Environment and Land Court
in Kisii. The case was still pending for hearing by the time of writing this report.
The same community environmental group also challenged the issuance of an
environmental impact assessment licence by National Environmental Management
Agency (NEMA) to the Catholic Church. They were seeking to stop the church from
constructing a house, as part of its monastery for Carmelite Brothers on the land
(NET/99/2012).
401. It is recommended that the title deeds granted the Catholic Church over the
two large parcels of land illegally annexed by the Catholic Church out of Manga
Orotuba community land be revoked and the land be restored to the community.
383 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 142.
384 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 142.
385 See, Report of the Public Complaints Committee on Environment dated 10th December 2012.
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Forced eviction in Thessalia and Buru farms in Kericho

402. To most Kenyans, inhumane treatment, torture and killing of innocent Kenyans
within church grounds evoke quick memories of the recent happenings at Kiambaa
church in Eldoret during the 2007/2008 post-election violence. What most people
do not know is that other ethnic communities, especially members of the Luo
community, long before Kiambaa, suffered a similar fate at the hands of tribalist
community members and tribalist government officials, especially officials in the
notorious provincial administration. The case of forceful evictions of members
of the Luo community from, first, Buru Farm and subsequently, Thessalia Farm,
demonstrate the widespread nature of forced evictions meted against innocent
Kenyans by provincial administration officials.
403. In efforts to find a lasting solution to their problem of landlessness, some members
of the Luo community who had been working in Kericho area as farm labourers
and ‘squatting’ on the farms where they worked since the colonial days, formed
the Buru Farmers Society, while members of the Kipsigis community in a similar
situation formed the Kipsigis Farmers Society. The idea was first implemented
in 1972, with encouragement of the then Kericho District Commissioner Milton
ole Ncharo. Members of each of the societies paid all dues to the Kericho District
Treasury as required for the purchase of two separate tracts of land for sub-division
to each contributing member.386
404. Tribalism as manifested by favouritism appeared for the first time when the povincial
administration assisted the group owned by Kalenjin to quickly acquire title deeds
to their lands, while offering no similar assistance to the Luo.387 Unbeknown to
members of the Luo community, the failure of the provincial administration
was intentional - its plan was, as it later turned out, to extort money from them
and then forcibly evict them from the lawfully acquired Buru Farm. Without any
plausible explanation, members of the Luo community who had fully paid Kericho
District Treasury for the purchase of Buru Farm were later asked to pay a further
KSh21,180.10 each, which they paid.
404. However, the provincial administration declined to extend any assistance to
them to acquire ownership documents as it did for members of the Kalenjin
community.388Members of the Luo community first realized that the Kipsigis and
their leaders, including those in provincial administration were opposed to their
acquisition of Buru Farm in 1988 when a member of the Kipsigis community by the
386 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
387 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
388 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
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name Noah informed a baraza held by the provincial administration to tell the Luo
that they would eventually be evicted from Buru Farm because the land belonged
to the Kipsigis.389 In another baraza, the local councillor informed the meeting that
the Luo who were then living in Kericho area were “milking” Kipsigis land and that
land in Kericho should only be owned by the Kipsigis.390
406. As political debates for the multi-party system of democracy increased towards the
year 1991, the Kalenjin, including officials in the provincial administration perceived
members of the Luo community in their midst as being sympathetic to the multiparty system and exploited their own perception, without any basis, to forcefully
evict the Luo from Buru Farm on 16 November 1991. With the open incitement
of the then local District commissioner Timothy Sirma, several members of the
Kipsigis community invaded Buru Farm on the fateful day, burned down houses
belonging to the Luo, took away their cattle, torched sugar cane plantations and
forcibly evicted the Luo, while the local chief and administration police officers
bulldozed their houses.391 In just one night, members of the Kalenjin community
burned down more than 140 houses together with all belongings and grain stores,
but when the matter was reported to the chief, he callously retorted that “the Luo
had encroached on Kipsigis land and were expected to move out.”392
407. The Luo were thereby rendered homeless and without security. Some of the
arsonists and stock thieves from the Kalenjin community who had rendered the Luo
homeless and destitute were known to them. Despite reports that were specifically
made against the arsonist thieves at the Kericho police station, the police took
no action whatsoever.393 Thus the Kalenjin were emboldened to undertake future
acts of arson, killing and property destruction against members of other ethnic
communities living in the Rift Valley, including the atrocities at Kiambaa, which
drew the attention of a wider segment of Kenyans.
408. Members of the Luo community who were evicted from Buru Farm sought refuge
at Thessalia Mission in Kericho, where they camped outside in makeshift structures.
The notorious Timothy Sirma, again, ordered for their forceful eviction from the
mission. On 13 December 1993, their eviction was carried out by the provincial
administration “in a most cruel and inhumane manner.”394 The people were
surprised at daybreak by armed policemen who woke them up and ordered them
to leave immediately. They were not allowed time or opportunity to remove their
389
390
391
392
393
394

Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
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personal effects. Luo ‘squatters’ were in a most inhuman manner evicted from a
mission centre where they had peacefully sought refuge, without causing anybody
any harm, thanks to the local provincial administration and its known notorious
perpetrators such as Sirma.
409. It is people like Timothy Sirma, brutal acts of administration police on orders of
district commissioners, provincial commissioners and district officers and both
acquiescence and perpetration of similar acts by chiefs that make the provincial
administration most abhorrent in the current governance setup. It is recommended
that the case concerning Buru Farm be investigated thoroughly and that all
government officers who participated in the forceful eviction be prosecuted. It is
also recommended that the farm be restored to the Luo who purchased it and that
they be issued with title documents to it. Alternatively, they should be paid for the
land at current rates and those who are not able to acquire land for settlement
should be assisted to re-settle elsewhere.


Forced eviction of the Endorois community

410. The Endorois indigenous community that speaks a language closely related to
Kalenjin resides in the current Baringo County in the Rift Valley. The community,
estimated to comprise 60 000 persons, used to live mainly around Lake Bogoria. A
few of the members of the community lived in Nakuru and Laikipia districts. The
Endorois were accepted by all neighbouring tribes and as the bonafide owners of
the land around Lake Bogoria. They continued to occupy and enjoy undisturbed
use of the land during the colonial British administration even though the British
claimed overall title to the land as part of ‘Crown’ land under the Crown Lands
Ordinance. At independence, the land occupied by the Endorois community was
passed on to the respective county councils as trust land, to be held by the councils
for the benefit of all of the members of the community.
411.

In 1970, they were forcibly evicted by the government, without consultation or
compensation, to pave way for the establishment of the Hannington Game Reserve,
which was done the following year, in 1973. Their right to their homeland was further
diminished by the re-gazettement of Lake Bogoria as a game reserve in 1978. At
the time of eviction from their homeland which they had occupied for centuries as
the authentic occupants, the Endorois were neither consulted nor compensated.
The government also did not offer them any alternative settlement. The community
suffered loss, not only of ancestral land where they had lived sustainable livelihoods,
but also natural resources and cultural and religious sites.395

395 Endorois Welfare Council, Memorandum of Endorois Community to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, KabarnetBaringo County, 24 – 26 October 2011 (BRG/002), at 1& 5.
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412. Shortly after the creation of the protected wildlife area around Lake Bogoria,
the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) undertook to compensate Endorois families,
then numbering 400, and in addition, allocate to them 25 percent of revenues
generated from the game reserve and 85 percent of the jobs created thereby.
However, KWS failed to honour its undertakings. Further directives by President
Moi that KWS honours its undertakings also failed, prompting the community
to sue Baringo County Council in William Yatich Sitet, alias William arap Ngasia,
et. Al v. Baringo County Council in High Court Civil Suit No. 183 of 2000. Although
in the judgment issued in 2002, the High Court dismissed the community’s suit,
it did recognize that Endorois land around Lake Bogoria was trust land under
management by the Baringo County Council but that they lost their right to the
land when a game reserve was established thereon in 1973 and 1974.
413. The Endorois later learnt that parts of their land over which a protected wildlife
area had been established was allocated to a private mining company and
another portion, to a foreign investor who established thereon a private wildlife
conservancy, both in the year 2002. Subsequent presentation of the matter to
the National Assembly did not yield fruit as Parliament failed to address the issue,
prompting the Endorois to sue the Kenya government in the court of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), under the African Charter on
Human and People’s Rights. The court ruled in favour of the community, against
the government of Kenya, directing, among other things, that the government
recognizes the right of the community to its ancestral land.
414.

The court also ruled that the government ensures that the community has
unrestricted access to Lake Bogoria for religious, cultural and grazing purposes and
that the government pays adequate compensation to the community for the loss
incurred. The government was also ordered to pay royalty to the Endorois from the
economic activities to which their land was devoted and to table a report on the
implementation of the ACHPR’s recommendations within three months from the
date of recommendation.396 To date, the ACHPR’s ruling has not been effected by the
government. It is recommended that the terms of the judgment be implemented in
favour of the community without any further delay.



Hill Farm Kamwenja, Mathari, in Nyeri District

415. The land in question is registered as L.R. No. 9464 and measures 1 089 hectares.
It formed part of trust land, being ancestral land of residents of Mathari sublocation in Nyeri. However, during the colonial emergency period in the late
396 Endorois Welfare Council, Memorandum of Endorois Community to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, KabarnetBaringo County, 24 – 26 October 2011 (BRG/002), at 9.
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1950s, residents of the area were moved to emergency villages in 1955. Before
then, the Catholic Church had, in 1929, purchased 1 054 hectares of land,
forming part of the trust land from families living there at the time (before the
emergency), a fact which residents acknowledge. However, when residents
were moved to emergency villages in 1965, the church irregularly acquired an
additional 2 577 hectares from the same trust land while residents were away in
emergency villages, and registered the land in two parcels - LR. No. 1356 and L.R.
No.4166.397 It is recommended that this matter be investigated further and, if all
the facts are established, title for the additional land irregularly acquired while
residents were away in emergency confinement be restored to them.

Involvement of land-buying companies in illegal acquisition of land
416. In addition to individuals who applied for land in the various settlement schemes
that were implemented after Kenya attained independence, many landbuying companies were formed comprising mainly the farming communities
of Central Province to freely buy land from white settlers. By 1978 there were
over 1 000 land-buying companies in the country, with more than two-thirds
of them belonging to influential individuals and groups from Central Province
and a few from Rift Valley, Western and Kisii regions. A few of these land-buying
companies did commendable work to assist their members or shareholders
to settle on parcels of land they purchased collectively. One such company is
reported to have “settled their kin on 51 539 acres of land in Laikipia, 21 050
acres in Njoro and Nakuru, 1 200 acres in Molo, more than 4 000 acres in Bahati
area of Nakuru and 1 400 acres in Mau Narok, all parts of traditional Maasai
territory.”
417. Settlement of individuals and families especially from the Kikuyu community in
areas considered part of Maasai homeland was to later result in violent conflicts
between members of the two communities, especially around the time of
elections in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 in Molo and other parts of the Rift Valley.398
GEMA Holdings Ltd formerly chaired by Njenga Karume, is one of the land buying
institutions owned by members of the Kikuyu community that acquired land in
areas occupied by other communities for settlement of their kin.
418. It acquired 20 000 acres of land in Molo and 16 000 acres in Naivasha. It is not
surprising that it is in Molo where ethnic-related violence broke out first in 1991.
Ngwataniro Mutukanio Company and Miteitei Company Ltd also acquired land
397 Report of the Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry Into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (2002) at page 142
398 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 2 – 4.
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in Nandi, where ethnic violence also broke out in 1991. In addition, Kiambaa
Cooperative Society acquired the 500 acre of land in Kiambaa farm located in
Eldoret in 1967 from a Mr Giussepe Morat and it should be recalled that Kiambaa
is the area that witnessed one of the worst forms of ethnic-related violence
during and after the elections of December 2007 and that many of the members
of the Kikuyu community who had settled in the area were evicted and became
internally displaced persons (IDPs), some, to this day. Other private institutions
that also purchased land for their members or shareholders in the Rift Valley were
Ngati Farmers Cooperative which purchased 16 000 acres in 1965 in Naivasha
from Maiella Limited and Kipsiet Farmers Cooperative which purchased a 2,302acre farm in Kericho from Margaritis Ltd. The other farms purchased under
similar arrangement were Kamwaura Farm measuring 1,636 acre in Molo, which
was purchased in 1976 from a Lionel Caldwel, Munyeki Farm measuring 4,000
acres which was purchased in Trans Nzoia, in which case, Munyeki stood for
Murang’a, Nyeri and Kiambu, being the origins of the business shareholders and
beneficiaries.
419. Besides community strife that settlements established on the basis of land-buying
companies engendered, the companies themselves also engaged in numerous
acts of fraud against their members or shareholders, thus promoting landlessness,
scarcity and related poverty. The majority of the companies turned into dens of
corruption and many swindled large sums of money or shares from their members,
without any compensation. Notable among land buying companies in which
corruption was pervasive was Ngwataniro Group, led by maverick politician by
the name Dickson Kihika Kimani. Rampant fraud and corruption in the company
leading to the loss of large sums of shareholders’ money resulted in tensions and
violent conflicts between the company management and would-be beneficiary
contributors that went on for years.
420. Another land-buying company with a similar record is Mbo-i-Kamiti landbuying company, which had branches in Kiambu and Thika areas. By late 1970,
over 70 000 contributors had not received any parcel of land, despite clearing
payments. As a result, numerous legal cases were filed against many of the landbuying companies, which were mainly owned by influential individuals and
companies. Moreover, the establishment and financial support of land-buying
companies was discriminatory. Members of the Kikuyu ethnic seem to have
received government financial support to establish land-buying companies
in areas considered as homelands of other communities such as the Kalenjin
and the Maasai. In contrast, other communities in Kenya whose members were
facing landlessness, destitution and poverty were not similarly facilitated,

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

297

Volume IIB

Chapter TWO

especially with provision of funds to purchase land from the departing white
settlers. The fact is attributed to political patronage, entrenched negative
ethnicity in Kenyatta’s administration and dominance of members of the Kikuyu
ethnic community in key financial institutions in the country during Kenyatta’s
administration, as rightly observed:
Kikuyu elite had overwhelming influence on officials in the Ministry of Lands and
Settlement as well as the financial institutions that were providing loans for the land
purchases. The Kalenjin, however, had no senior officials in these institutions or in
the government. They had Daniel arap Moi as Vice-President to President Kenyatta,
but he lacked the influence required to commit himself to competition with the
powerful Kikuyu elite. Both groups were competing to purchase settler farms, but
the Kalenjin were standing on relatively weaker ground. Each group nonetheless
mobilized support from the political elite in its respective ethnic region to bring
political influence to bear on the land control boards, which authorized transactions
in the land market.399

421. To complicate the involvement of land-buying companies further, there were
numerous cases of conflict within communities that benefited from landbuying companies. Conflicts arose between peasant contributors of money
for land and the wealthy individuals who owned and operated the companies,
mostly Kikuyu elite. Conflicts also arose among the owners and operators of
the companies over who had the rights to acquire or purchase certain parcels
of land or specific farms. There were also cases of double and multiple claims
and multiple registrations of the same plots of land and farms to more than one
individual. As a result, by the early 1980s, there were thousands of contributors
who had not received any parcel of land, despite making all required payments.
This increasing alienation and fraudulent activities related to land purchases
led to more tensions and violent conflicts in different sites involving influential
individuals and land-buying companies as well as shareholders or contributors.
In response, President Moi, upon taking office, demanded the disbandment of
the over 1 000 land buying companies that were still operational by the early
1980s. He also ordered for subdivision of the large farms that they had purchased
on the basis that the companies had defrauded citizens.

399 Karuti, Kanyinga, ‘Land Redistribution in Kenya’ in HP B Mkhize Et al (eds.) Agricultural Land Redistribution: Towards Greater
Consensus (2010) at 107.

298

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter TWO

Illegal Land Alienations during President Moi’s
Administration
422. In August 1978, Daniel arap Moi took over as the second President of the Republic
of Kenya following the death of Jomo Kenyatta. He promised to follow the
footsteps of his predecessor. Moi’s ‘Fuata Nyayo’ philosophy literally meant that
he would follow in the footsteps of his predecessor in critical aspects of policy
and governance, including approval of illegal land allocations, and he did, with the
exception of minor policy departures, especially in relation to his pro-pastoralist
policy and his new focus on the development of arid and semi-arid lands.
During his tenure, every category of government-owned land including military
establishments, road reserves, public parks, bus parks, public toilets, forests and
cemeteries as well as trust lands were illegally acquired in what became publicly
known as the widespread phenomenon of land grabbing, mainly by the president
himself, his family, officials in his administration, politicians, civil servants, and
military officers.400 In the process, more than 200 000 illegal title deeds were
acquired which ought to be revoked.401
723. This section of the chapter on land demonstrates that like his predecessor
Kenyatta, President Moi adopted the policy and practices that facilitated the
illegal allocations of land, especially government land, in ways similar to those of
Kenyatta’s administration. In the end, there was no meaningful attempt during his
administration to redress illegalities that had characterized dealings in land during
Kenyatta’s administration. By the time Moi took over power in 1979, there were no
more parcels of land in the former White Highlands that could be purchased from
white settlers for resettlement of landless or land-scarce Africans who had lost their
land during the colonial administration, even though there were still large numbers
of communities at the Coast and in mainland Kenya in need of settlement. Also,
there was hardly any more unalienated government land that could be utilized for
settlement or farming by private entities, or for political patronage.
424. In the prevailing circumstances, Moi and his close associates resorted to massive
illegal allocations of unalienated government land and other real property in
virtually every part of the country. To facilitate unquestioned dealings in land,
Moi re-organized key ministries, including the Ministry of Lands and Settlement
and the Ministry of Defence by placing his cronies, mostly members of his ethnic
Kalenjin community in strategic positions. Moi’s close associates in key government
400 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 154 – 160.
401 Ibid. pp.154-160, Appendix one of Ndung’u Report : Document prepared by the chief Conservator of Forests,
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positions included former powerful Permanent Secretary in charge of Internal
Security Zakayo Cheruiyot,402 former Energy Minister Nicholas Biwott,403 former
Central Bank Governor Micah Cheserem404 and former of Kenya Seed Company Ltd
Managing Director Nathaniel Tum.405
425. Once in office, Moi’s cronies engaged, with his apparent approval, in massive
illegal acquisition of lands owned by the Agricultural Development Corporation
(ADC), forest lands including land in the Mau Forest complex, protected wildlife
areas, wildlife migration corridors, public beaches, government houses and lands
reserved for public utilities across the country.406 Land was mostly used during
his administration as reward for political patronage. It was also used to selectively
settle members of his community while in other cases, illegal alienation of
land led to the forceful eviction of members of other communities. During his
tenure, private entities also acquired public lands and other property across the
country illegally, with wanton impunity. Local authorities similarly participated
in massive illegal land allocations to themselves and close associates under the
cover of corrupt officials in Moi’s administration. The following paragraphs detail
pervasive cases of illegal land allocations during Moi’s tenure, which, in the new
constitutional dispensation, require redress in order to avoid violent conflicts.

Continued irregularities in land allocation at the Coast
426. Official documents indicate that land problems at the Coast were of concern to
Moi’s administration and, in the National Development Plan of 1979-1983, he
promised a review of land rights in the area. He proceeded to freeze and review
the existing allotments of beach plots, which had, previously, been massively
and illegally allocated mainly to Kenyatta’s close associates, including his family
members.
427. As a show of the seriousness of his efforts to address land issues at the Coast and in
other parts of the country, President Moi had curtailed the immense powers of the
Ministry of Lands and Settlement, effectively reducing it to a department reporting
directly to him. However, his well intentioned land reforms for the benefit of coastal
communities were never realized.
402 Ndung’u Report , p.155 on Illegal/Irregular Allocation of land in South Western Mau Forest
403 Ibid., p.158. Nicholas Biwott was irregularly allocated land excised from Kaptagat forest under a private trust known as Maria Soti
Memorial Trust ( Maria Soti was the late mother of Biwott)
404 Ibid., p.95. The three sold illegally/irregularly acquired land to the Kenya Ports Authority; Undeveloped plot L.R No.209/10212,
Bellevue, Nairobi (1.6Ha)
405 Nathaniel Tum is on the list of powerful individuals in the Moi administration that benefited of Liyavo Farm that was meant to settle
squatters in Trans Nzoia.
406 See full details in the Ndung’u Report, various secondary sources of information and various memos from the TJRC Hansard.
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428. Failure to complete the process of land adjudication and registration, as well as
failure to purposefully resettle the landless individuals and communities at the
Coast were, perhaps the twin evils that facilitated official acquisition of land in the
region in ways that were not at all lawful or acceptable. The situation was well
presented by an affected community member who observed that at the Coast:
Moi’s government continued dishing out land as reward to councillors and MPs. You
would find a councillor from Duruma selling land in Digo land and that brought a lot of
enmity among the people. That is why the coastal community feels that all people from
upcountry are bad because all their land has been given free of charge to people from
upcountry. A councillor is given a beach plot and he then sells it and buys a nice car yet
the people do not have anything.407

429. Communities at the Coast did not expect officials in Moi’s administration to
continue illegally acquiring their land because when he came to power, he was
not happy with the kind of illegal alienations of land that had occurred at the
Coast and soon after taking office in 1978, he ordered that illegally acquired land
revert to the real owners, that is, the locals. However, his wish was never actualized
because, apparently, political leaders who perceived that they had a chance to
enrich themselves through illegal land deals approached President Moi and told
him that they were not willing to return land to the locals; neither were they willing
to stop illegally acquiring land in the area.
430. Instead of acting firmly to redress the land-related injustices that coastal
communities had suffered for a long time, Moi directed that land be acquired at
the Coast on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis, yet affected communities at the
Coast were too poor to afford land purchases. Moreover, what land dealers were
offering local communities for their land was far too little compared to the actual
value of land at the time and the huge profits that speculators were making from
subsequent sale of land that they had acquired from locals for very little. In the
words of an affected community member:
They came back and told us that the owners of the land would be given KSh20 000 per
acre. There are those who took the money, but my father and others refused to take it. I
worked for Diamond Trust for 20 years. I knew the worth of our land. I used to earn KSh15,
000, but an Indian would bring a title deed and he would be given KSh430 million for ten
acres of land. He had been given 14 acres by Moi. He was given plot number 14897 which
is adjacent to Sheshe Beach Hotel. He demarcated two acres and Joseph Leting was given
No.13438. Two other acres, No.13439, were given to Mark Too. Some other two acres were
given to a European called Guy Barrington Bromnel that is No.13440. I could not take a
loan then... Moi’s son took a plot whose number is 13441. It is undeveloped to date. Ten
acres are with Travellers Beach Hotel ...It was my dad’s plot.408
407 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/23 January 2012/p. 11, para 3.
408 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kwale/23 January 2012/ p. 38, para 1-4.
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431. From the testimony of affected family members who testified before the TJRC, it
appears that officials in Moi’s administration and his political cronies demanded
land from coastal communities for very little money and that where families
objected to their acquisition of land, they took it by force and for subsequent
sale, to make profit. Just as it was in Kenyatta’s administration, during Moi’s time,
“people from far” places and privileged senior officers (government workers) and
politicians were allocated huge chunks of land at the expense local squatters
who have completely and have virtually ended up as paupers since the colonial
times.409

Illegal acquisition of land in mainland Kenya


The cases of ‘squatter’ societies

432. Unlike in Kenyatta’s administration when a number of landless individuals and
families pooled resources to acquire land in the Rift Valley and other parts of
Kenya and succeeded in settlement, in many cases, during Moi’s era, efforts by the
landless to attain settlement through loan schemes were deliberately thwarted by
officials in the administration who flagrantly took away land from them. There were
cases of people who purchased land through SFT, facilitated by the Agricultural
Finance Corporation (AFC).
433. However, upon making full repayment of the loans, group members or members
of the cooperative societies did not get title to the land. Instead, their land
was, without their consent or approval, allocated to prominent persons, some
of whom resorted to harassing the members to ensure that they did not revolt
against their illegal moves. In this regard, the Livayo, Maridadi and Sitatunga
self-help schemes in Trans Nzoia and the Koriny Tich Farmers’ Group provide
good examples of the deliberate historical land injustices. In the case of Liyavo
Farm which was meant to resettle the land less in western Kenya, on their own
initiative:
Land meant for ‘squatters’ in the farm was dished out as a gift to people who supported
the then president Daniel arap Moi and the then ruling party KANU, with a classic
example of Tolosho Ltd whose directors and owners are Mart Properties, Dinal Chelal
Chelimo, Tim Tim Holdings, Mart Holdings Ltd, Tiwai Holdings and Sammy Silas Komen
Mwaita, a former Commissioner of Lands according to the Ndung'u Commission report
revelation who blessed himself with 80.92 ha (about 200 acres) that could settle about
80 squatters given two and a half acres on equitable basis.410
409 TJRC/Memo/M0791/ p. 4.
410 TJRC/Memo/M079/p.2, para 4.
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434. Similarly, members of Koriny Tich Farmers’ Group took a loan with the AFC to
purchase their land in 1965 which loan they completed paying by 1973. Instead
of the group getting title to the land, the land was, during Moi’s administration,
illegally transferred/ allocated to Edward Kiptanui, a former Baringo South
MP. Ironically, Kiptanui had neither been one of the members of the group nor
contributed towards repayment of the loan.411 The group is said to have filed a
case against the illegal allocation and obtained judgment in their favour, upon
which the members were able to obtain a provisional title to the land, which they
intended to sub-divide amongst themselves. However, at that point, they realized
that there were unscrupulous sellers who were trying to sell their land to the
government of Kenya for the resettlement of other internally displaced persons.412
435. There is also a case of another self-help groups whose members came together
and purchased land facilitated by a loan from the SFT. However, upon completion
of repayment of the loan, the local District Commissioner took over the farm and
sold it to non-members. The DC is also said to have allocated portions of the land
to the DO and Chief who in turn sold it to third parties and to him. The DC further
sold, for his own benefit, all other assets belonging to the group members that
were in the farm, including livestock, without consulting the members.413


Illegal alienation of forest catchment areas

436. In addition to Karura Forest, there were other forests forming part of government
land in the country that were similarly illegally excised and allocated to government
officials and their close associates during Moi’s administration. One of such national
forests is the Mau Forest complex, which serves critical ecological functions to the
whole of the East Africa region in terms of being a catchment area and a source of
trans-boundary rivers between Kenya and Tanzania.
437. First, a decision was made to settle people in portions of the forest without following
due procedures of law which require, among other things, de-gazettement.
Kiptangach Extension Settlement Scheme is one of such settlement schemes that
were illegally established in the Mau Forests. Moreover, a Mau Task Force found
out that instead of settling the landless, prominent people in the government and
their cronies acquired land in the forest catchment area that had been set aside,
ostensibly to settle squatters. A list of land allottees in the extension settlement
scheme showed that prominent government officials and political leaders were
each allocated land, some in excess of 5 000 acres. Retired president Daniel Moi,
411 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/p. 14.
412 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/p. 14.
413 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/20 September 2011/ p. 31, para 7.
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some cabinet ministers and MPs, former and current key civil servants benefited
from the illegal/irregular land allocations in the Mau Complex.414


Land and re-settlement conflicts

438.

There was increasing feeling among the long –disadvantaged pastoral communities
and the Kalenjin in particular (both herders and farmers) that they should fight at
all cost to reclaim their ‘stolen land from the rich ‘foreign’ (black) settlers. Although
no attempt was made by the Moi government to revoke the land settlements of
the Kenyatta regime, it became increasingly difficult for non-indigenous people to
buy land north of Nakuru. The non–Kalenjin individuals and groups who had bought
parcels of land in Kalenjin-dominated areas found it hard to get them demarcated
or obtain title deeds. Indeed, just like in the previous regime, ethnicity played a
significant role on the ground, especially in the former White Highlands, in terms of
land allocation and employment. Although the policy of ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer
remained unchanged, in practice it was slowly diminishing in parts of Rift Valley.

439. During the Moi regime as was the case before, settlement schemes were often
used to settle immigrant communities, while local officials, ministers, and
influential civil servants allocated some plots to themselves, their families or
cronies. The result of such irregular land initiatives was often violent ethnic
conflicts and legal cases. In the meantime, the land adjudication and registration
process slowed, as roughly two- thirds of agricultural land had been demarcated
by 1980. The remainder was mostly pastoral land, grazed in common and very
difficult to demarcate. There were few individual or group title registrations after
1983, leaving North Eastern Province, Marsabit, Isiolo, Turkana, Samburu and
much of the Coast un-adjudicated.
440. In some recorded instances, development partners and donor agencies tried
repeatedly to improve the lot of pastoralists through irrigation projects that
encouraged the Turkana and Boran to become farmers. The Moi period witnessed
a change of policy and government and development agencies attitudes towards
the semi-arid and arid lands in Kenya. In fact, Moi created a special Ministry for
Reclamation and Development of Arid and Semi- Arid Lands. The ministry was
based in the Office of the President and it coordinated programmes across the 14
mapped districts, funded by eight different donors. However, in reality, very little
was accomplished to improve the livelihoods of communities in the areas. Moi’s
good intentions seem to have been overridden by the land grabbing phenomenon
that pervaded his regime. As a result, many communities that were awaiting his
414 See Ndung’u Report ; is a catalogue who is who in the Moi era that benefited from Illegal/Irregular allocation of public land
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intervention in land-related injustices were frustrated and expressed it in ways that
threatened the peace and security of other Kenyans.
441.

Among pastoral communities that had been disadvantaged during Kenyatta’s era,
especially the Kalenjin, there was growing feeling that they should fight at all cost
to reclaim their “stolen land” from the people they considered as rich foreign black
settlers. Therefore, although no attempt was made by the Moi government to revoke
or nullify the land settlements established in the Rift Valley during the Kenyatta
regime, it became increasing difficult for the non-Kalenjin to buy land in many parts
of the Rift Valley. Those who had already acquired land in the region also found it
very difficult to have them demarcated or obtain title deeds. Further, tension built
up between the Kalenjin and other ethnic communities living in the Rift Valley and
in many cases, violence erupted, especially around the time of national elections, as
explained in the following section of this chapter on the land question in Kenya.

Land and Multi-Party Politics in Kenya
442. It is important to demonstrate the critical linkage between the unresolved
land question, multi-party politics and ethnic violence in Kenya. The foregoing
discussions explain that by the end of Moi’s era, none of the outstanding issues
concerning land, especially the irregular acquisition of land from communities
by the colonial administration and later during Jomo Kenyatta’s administration,
had been resolved. The situation of affected communities that had been rendered
landless or who had become ‘squatters’ and poor was made even worse after
independence. Their resentment of other communities was kindled by the
sustained preferential resettlement of other ethnic communities, especially the
Kikuyu, on their lands and direct grabbing of their land by officials in the Kenyatta
and Moi administrations.
443. The discussion demonstrates that because of official failure to address the perennial
land problem at the Coast and in mainland Kenya, the problems remained,
lingering in the minds and agenda of members of affected communities and their
political leaders and over time, fomented anger and resort to self-help measures in
the form of violent ethnic clashes and secessionist movements.
444. It is demonstrated that affected community anger and resolve to rise against
those perceived as ‘outsider invaders of other people’s homelands’ has often
been expressed through politics, especially multi-party politics that seem to hold
the promise of change in leadership which could, hopefully, result in genuine
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resolution of the troublesome questions concerning land. Forceful evictions was
also resorted to, especially by the Kalenjin during President Moi’s era in retaliation
against communities living in areas considered by the Kalenjin as their tribal
homelands for the perceived support of multi-partyism by the non-Kalenjin
communities.415 Further, politicians from many affected communities in Kenya
have never refrained from using political platforms to promise their constituents
to resolve the problems once in office, and to mobilize their communities to rise
against those considered as ‘outsider invaders of their homelands’. Such calls
intensify around every election time, when politicians have ample opportunities
to interact with their constituents. It has been observed that election campaigns
have always been used as platforms where affected host communities and their
political leaders remind immigrants that they are living on ‘stolen’ lands that were
unfairly alienated by the colonial administration but later irregularly acquired or
grabbed and awarded or sold by a syndicate in the Kenyatta administration.
445. At such times, for some unexplained reasons, the national security apparatus is
also usually lax, thus providing opportunities for community resolution of land
problems through violence.
446. One other matter that ought now to seriously concern the government is the
tendency, over the years, to link the possibility of meaningfully addressing land
questions through politics of majimbo, meaning regionalism. It was explained in
the first section of this chapter that as the country prepared for self-rule, it was
agreed among Kenyans preparing to take over power that governance would be
based on regionalism to allow the different communities to live on and manage
their homelands in their own ways. The position was affirmed by President
Kenyatta who promised the people of Kenya at the time he took over power that
there would be regional governments through which communities/‘tribes’ would
regain and exercise control over their lands. However, this was not to be.
447. Kenyatta abolished regional governments soon after taking office, to the
disappointment of many. That placed regionalist (majimbo) on the agenda of many
affected communities. Whatever communities intended to do under a majimbo
system was reflected in violent ethnic clashes in bids to rid specific regions in the
country of people considered as outsiders. Apparently, politicians have also abused
their constituents’ trust in resolving land problems through a regional system of
government to unleash violence against members of other communities whom
they believe to be unsupportive of their candidature.
415 See, Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 12, 26 – 31
& 49.
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448. Now that we have attained regionalism without having also resolved the land
problems, might calls for ethnicised regions/countries result in violent uprisings
against perceived outsiders? Might such calls generate more calls for secession? In
order to foreclose all of such chances, the following section should provide some
lens through which political connections to the existing land problems should be
clearly understood and measures urgently taken, on the basis of recommendations
of this report, to avert looming dangers to cohesion and peaceful co-existence in
Kenya.


The danger of violence during multi-party elections

449. It appears that political leaders are determined to take cover under politics and
related debates to address land problems through all means, including violence.
This is a glaring sign of official failure to address the challenge, yet all postindependent governments in Kenya have had adequate chances and means to
address the problems with finality.
450. On the eve of the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya in 1992, there was
looming danger of renewed ethnic conflicts due to the increasing tension between
those who were agitating for pluralism and those against it. Moi repeatedly warned
and predicted that multi-parties would cause ethnic conflicts and increase tribal
hatred in the country. His predictions came true as the country faced a series of
ethnic conflicts on the eve of the 1992 multi-party elections and subsequent ones.
The land question has, since the colonial era to the present time, been interwoven
with the majimbo debate, which has been resurfacing in almost all the national
elections in the country.
451. In fact there was tension between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin as well as the
Maasai over the long-simmering issue of land in the Rift Valley that had now
acquired political undertones. The political alignments at that particular time
were influenced mainly by conflict over land rights and negative ethnicity,
resulting into “them versus us” type of confrontation in the former White
Highlands, including Maasailand. For instance, in February 1991, in a phrase
that came to epitomise his confrontational ethno- Maasai nationalism, veteran
Maasai political leader William ole Ntimama demanded that the Kikuyu
residents of Maasai land should ‘lie low like an envelope’ or they would suffer
the consequences. During the era of multi-party politics, the Kalenjin and Maasai
revived their clarion call for majimbo or regional type of government, in which
most of the public affairs, including land, would be run by regions, except foreign
affairs and defence.
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452. The pro-majimbo group of leaders convened a series of rallies in Nandi, Kericho,
Eldoret and the Coast Province to disseminate and explain their positions to the local
people in the respective regions. They agitated for a devolved and decentralized
federal system to counter the centralised system that was being championed then
by the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) under the leadership of Oginga
Odinga and other opposition figures. The pro-majimbo group publicly called upon
their supporters to expel those who had acquired land in their Rift Valley and Coast
provinces. The notion of Rift Valley as the sole entitlement of the Kalenjin, Maasai,
Turkana and Samburu (KAMATUSA) was affirmed openly.
453. A few days after the series of pro-majimbo rallies in the country, violent conflict
erupted along the border of Nandi and Kisumu districts, pitting the local Nandi
against a mixed group of other ethnic communities who had migrated there after
independence. The conflicts spread rapidly to the other farms in the area and to
the nearby Kisumu District. This period witnessed the emergence of organized
groups like the ‘Kalenjin Warriors’, who were armed with poisoned bows, arrows
and machetes which they used to kill many people from other ethnic communities.
454. They attacked the Luo and other pro-multi-party supporters in Nandi and Kericho,
looting and burning their homes and destroying crops and fences. Leaflets were
circulated in these areas calling for all non-Kalenjin to leave the area and go back to
their original home lands elsewhere. In November of the same year, ethnic conflicts
spread to Trans Nzoia, when ‘Kalenjin Warriors’ attacked members of the Luhya and
Kikuyu communities in the Rift Valley and also burnt their homes and drove them
away from settlement schemes in the area.
455. That December, violent conflicts spread to Mount Elgon and Bungoma Districts
between the pro-Majimbo Sabaot and Teso and the pro-FORD Bukusu. It took the
personal intervention of President Moi to calm the situation through a series of
peace rallies in the region. However, violence did not end. Violent conflict spread
to other areas of the Rift Valley, where members of other ethnic communities,
especially the Kikuyu from Central Province had been settled, especially to
hotspot areas of Molo and Olenguruone in the larger Nakuru District. In the areas,
leaflets were first circulated, demanding that non-Kalenjin (madoadoa or spots
in Kalenjin land) vacate the area or face dire consequences. Violent conflicts in
the area led to a number of deaths, injuries and rape. The most visible and unique
feature of these conflicts was between the Kikuyu Mungiki militia group who
were using pangas and rungus versus the ‘Kalenjin Warriors’ who were using
poisoned arrows and spears. The violent conflicts spread further to Narok and
Bomet, along the Kipsigis-Kisii border. Here the main victims were the Abagusii

308

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter TWO

and Kikuyu immigrants. There were other areas where ethnic violence similarly
broke out in the country.
456.

In Burnt Forest, Uasin Gishu District, violence broke out with just three months to the
December 27, 1992 elections. In this conflict, ‘Kalenjin Warriors’ drove away about
15 000 Kikuyu and Luhya immigrants. The intention of the warriors was to create
a pastoralist-dominated Rift Valley as a buffer zone against perceived land-hungry
members of other ethnic communities – the Kikuyu, Luhya, Ameru and Abagusii. There
was also an underlying fear that if Moi lost political power through the elections, then
the Kalenjin would lose their communal land rights. The fear drove many Kalenjin to
arm themselves to defend their traditional homeland from encroachment by those
considered as outsiders or immigrants. The negative perception and related violent
conflicts continued throughout the Moi regime, especially in Rift Valley and were
perpetrated mostly by the Kalenjin, Maasai and Samburu.

457.

Unfortunately, the government’s response to ethnic violence was half-hearted, often
engaging in blame-games with political leaders in the opposition parties. The opposition
also counter-accused Moi of facilitating ethnic conflicts to prove his earlier prediction
that multi-parties would create violence in the country. Moi’s inability to address landrelated conflicts was demonstrated by his failure to act firmly against Maasai political
leaders who facilitated violent evictions of members of other communities living in
Narok and Enoosupukia in 1993 and the Kalenjin who participated in acts of violence
against the Luo and other communities in the Rift Valley, not to mention several acts of
violence targeting upcountry communities at the Coast which were never punished,
even though in many cases, perpetrators were well-known.416

458.

However, it should be noted that the occupation of land by persons considered as
outsiders is not the only cause of land problems in Kenya. In many cases, the politicians
themselves, as well as affluent members of communities have grabbed land from
their own, especially in areas where land was, originally owned communally.

459. In the case of the Maasai community, intermingling of other factors apart from
outsider occupation in land problems, especially scarcity and landlessness has
been explained as follows:
the problems the Maasai are encountering are not caused by non-Maasai. They are just
a secondary factor. The biggest cause of land problems in Maasai land generally are the
Maasai leaders. It is the leadership.... They now use the land to secure political favours
from the powers that be. Look at any grabbing taking place in Maasailand and at the
centre of it is one or two Maasai leaders. With the competitive politics that we now have
416 See, for example, Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at
12, 26 – 31 & 49.
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because of multi-partyism since 1992, we have now seen Maasai leaders disposing of
public land to get money for campaigns.417

460. Apparently, politicians have extended land grabbing practices to their own
communities and constituents and are significantly contributing to landlessness
of their community members as well as land scarcity on the part of government.
Therefore, efforts to address land problems should exceed the establishment
of settlement schemes and completion of land adjudication and registration to
actual prosecution of perpetrators of land grabbing.


Land and political conflict over the 2005 Draft Constitution

461. The centrality of land to the structure of governance and related politics appeared
during campaigns in preparation for a national referendum over the current
Constitution. Political conflicts arose between those who supported the adoption
of a new constitution (the ‘Yes’ group) and those who opposed it (the ‘No’ group)
not just over the Draft Constitution in general, but also over the wording of the
land chapter therein. To many people, the wording of the land chapter in the
Draft Constitution, also known as the Wako Draft, conveyed the government’s
intention to centralize decisions on land issues, including decisions on acquisition,
management and use and were objectionable because it was feared that they
might support the detestable return of outsiders to areas where local communities
had resisted their presence, especially the return and occupation of members
of the Kikuyu ethnic community in the Rift Valley. The situation led to violent
referendum campaigns where a number of people were killed and scores injured
as leaflets circulated in many parts of the country warning “outsiders” in Rift Valley
and Nyanza to prepare to leave should the Wako Draft Constitution be approved
during the 2005 National Referendum. The constitutional referendum held in 2005
failed to gather enough public support for a new constitution and the people of
Kenya were, once again, left with no constitutional basis for addressing land issues.


Land and politics in the 2007 elections

462. The 2007 General Election presented another opportunity for individuals and for
members of Kenyan ethnic communities affected by illegal land alienation during
the colonial and post-colonial period to base their hope for resolution of landrelated injustices in political change, especially given the likelihood of a win by
the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) that was perceived to be favourable to
change, including in the lands sector.
417 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kajiado/08 December 2011/p. 28.
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Because Kenyans have, over the years, linked resolution of land injustices to political
change, especially the introduction of a federal (majimbo) government, it was
anticipated that an ODM government would establish necessary structures for land
to be managed at regional levels to eliminate, among other things, chances of illegal
land alienation by central government functionaries. However, instead of waiting
for change to unfold through laws and policies in a new government, members of
communities and their political leaders in many parts of the country, once again,
took advantage of the lax security situation in the country during and after the
campaigns to resort to self-help measures in attempts to rid their homelands from
immigrant communities.In the Rift Valley, the Kalenjin community was concerned
about eviction of members of the Kikuyu community whose presence in their
homeland had been considered detestable and unacceptable for many years.

464.

A similar situation prevailed at the Coast. At the Coast, indigenous communities,
especially the Mijikenda, had over the years, strongly opposed the settlement of
members of the Kikuyu community on their lands and perceived the anticipated
political change as embodying the only chance for their final resolution of land
problems.

465.

In Nairobi, property owners, especially from the Kikuyu community, considered
the likely political change as ominous because of fear that house rents might be
controlled by central government, thereby diminishing their profits. In Western
Province, land problems of the Sabaot persisted and the possibility of change in
governance held the promise of a final resolution resulting in the settlement of many
landless members of the community who had been rendered destitute for decades.

466.

In other parts of the Rift Valley, members of the Maasai community were expecting
political change to usher in resolutions of land conflicts with the Kikuyu who were
unacceptably settled on their homelands. It is, perhaps for these reasons that
Mwai Kibaki lost the support of Kalenjin, Maasai and the Mijikenda, among other
communities affected by illegal land alienations. However, all the expectations were
dashed by irregularities and illegalities that characterized especially the presidential
election of the time.

Chapter TWO

467. As a result of many communities’ failed expectations of political change that could
have facilitated the final resolution of persisting land issues, members of almost
all affected communities resorted to violent means to address the persistent land
problems from the colonial times to post-independence Kenya. These communities
also sought to vent pent-up anger at the resented dominance of members of
the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu communities in Kenya’s Treasury, Kenya Revenue
Authority, Central Bank, Internal Security and Provincial Administration, among
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other key sectors, which formed part of the broader inequalities and historical
injustices persisting in the country.
468.

In various parts of the country, several more organized militia or ethnic “self-defence”
groups emerged, with support of local politicians, to either defend their land against
invasion by members of other communities or avenge previous alienations of their
land and displacement from their homelands. In the Rift Valley, there emerged
and re-emerged ‘Maasai Warriors’ and ‘Kalenjin Warriors’, among others; in western
Kenya, there emerged the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF), in Kisii, the Chinkororo
re-emerged; and at the Coast, there emerged various militia groups, eventually
culminating in the establishment of the broader Mombasa Republican Army (MRC),
whose agenda include secession of the Coastal Strip from Kenya.418

469. The unprecedented violent activities of the various militia groups nearly drove
Kenya into civil war between December 31, 2007 soon after flawed presidential
results were announced and February 2008 when a National Peace Accord was
eventually agreed. A report of the Commission that investigated post-election
violence in Kenya traces roots of the 2007-2008 violence to inequalities in land
acquisition and settlement419 and states that as a result of the widespread violence,
more than 350 000 people were displaced from their homes and farms and at least
1 200 killed.420 The suffering and destitution that resulted has been described in
many ways that convey a sense of urgency in resettlement as been explained here:
During the displacement many people died, more than what is documented by the
Government. We lost our children, fathers and other relatives. Even it goes beyond what
the government said; 1,333 people died. We know of people who died and were buried
even before it was reported. Our property and everything that we had was destroyed.
Others were looted. Some of us sustained injuries. We are suffering because we do not
have money to buy drugs or seek medical care. It is very expensive for us because we
do not have money. Therefore, many people have died after displacement because of
psychological trauma. Some relatives got lost and have not been found to date. There
are parents who do not know where their children are to date. There are children who
cannot trace their parents. People lost their jobs. All our rights were violated. Our human
basic rights were abused. Some women and girls were raped… There are violations in
the camps. Among many violations, there is lack of shelter. IDPs are just living in those
tents that were given out in 2008. These are old and worn out tents.421

470. The severity of the 207-2008 post-election violence brought to the fore the critical
nexus between land-related injustices and politics and the potential of a mix of
both to destroy the country. It also presented, in no uncertain terms, the need for
418
419
420
421
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See, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) (2008) at 27.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) (2008) at 21-30.
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) (2008) at 271-346.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.35, para 2.
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urgent redress of existing land-related injustices. However, while lessons for the
nation concerning failure to resolve land-related disputes were clear, the manner
in which the problem of internally displaced persons was handled reflected what
Kenyans, by then, knew too well - the preferential treatment of members of certain
communities in Kenya at the expense of others.
471. The convergence of political factors with land problems brought about
displacement of people of virtually all ethnic communities in Kenya but mostly
the Kikuyu, Luo, Kalenjin, Luhya and Kamba. However, by then, there were large
numbers of other people and communities already internally displaced in historical
and political circumstances already explained, who had been awaiting settlement
for many years while living on abject poverty. Therefore, efforts to settle the most
recent IDPs, mostly members of the Kikuyu tribe, while others have been awaiting
similar government intervention for years, especially at the Coast, in the Rift Valley
and in western Kenya demonstrated, again, bias by Kibaki’s administration in
favour of members of the Kikuyu ethnic community against all others who were
similarly affected and whose discontent has been expressed as follows:
While the Kenyans who were displaced by the post-election violence of 2007 are
considered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), little consideration has been given to the
Lamu community members who were forced out of their farmland in 12 villages, including
in Shakani, Shendeni, Vundeni by the security forces during the Shifta War in the 1960s.
These locals, who were, in essence, the first IDPs in Independent Kenya, were forced to
move into slums in Lamu or to migrate to other areas of Kenya and Tanzania and, to date,
no form of redress has been given.422

472. It is the view of many affected Kenyans that the earliest IDPs in the land have
suffered for too long and, therefore, the government should give them the highest
priority in settlement.423 It has also been emphasized by affected communities
that to avoid problems that might arise from continued selective settlement, all
persons and families currently living as squatters in the country should be settled.
In the words of an affected individual:
When it comes to resettlement, all tribes should be resettled because there are squatters
even among the Kalenjin. Those differences in resettlement are causing problems and
it should be uniform...424

473.

Discrimination in settlement of IDPs worsens existing land injustices which, in totality,
contributed significantly to the post-election violence of 2007-2008. Contributions
of existing land-related injustices to the violence were clearly demonstrated by host
community resistance to the return of IDPs to their homelands. The matter was aptly
described as follows:

422 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/ Lamu/9 January 2012/ p. 4, para 3.
423 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p. 5.
424 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.46, para 2 & 6.
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Some decided to go back to where they had been displaced. However, they were not
received well. Nobody welcomed them there. They were not even given a chance to enter
into their farms. Some of them stay here with us. They went back into their farms, but they
are still living in these transit camps. These are just camps that are in shopping centres.
Others are near the District Commissioner’s office, where they feel there is safety. It is at
this point where they can do their farming during the day and return to the tents in the
evening.425

474. Obviously, resettlement of IDPs alone is not adequate. A lot of peace building
initiatives ought to accompany resettlement of all affected persons to promote
acceptance of co-existence and integration in order to avoid resurgence of
violence after settlement. Also, the fact that a very high level of ethnic violence was
witnessed in Kenya for the first time in 2007-2008 and that it was largely prompted
by land-related injustices should bring the need for resolution of all pending land
issues to the fore of the government’s agenda.
475.

Since Kenya bases its development largely on agriculture, meaningful development
will not take place unless all pending land-related issues that hamper agriculture
are resolved with finality. Moreover, resettlement efforts targeting the latest stream
of IDPs have been riddled with the same corruption that characterized dealings in
land in both the Kenyatta and Moi administrations. The following is an account of
circumstances surrounding IDP settlement efforts in the absence of transparency
and accountability:
After people are resettled, they are given tents. They are given one tent for a whole
household with adult children. They live in the same tent with their grown up children.
We know that there are iron sheets that were donated by the government of China.
Where are these iron sheets? The government says people should stay there for a whole
one year without proper shelter. Why can they not give us those iron sheets? Many of us
are exposed to cold. In such conditions, we are bound to fall sick. Malaria and pneumonia
are common diseases in those areas and even in these transit camps. After people were
settled, many of them died. With regard to water and sanitation, we feel the government
is not doing enough. After the government had taken us there, it did not care to see
where these people would get their water. I thank the Nakuru District Commissioner
then. He gave people piped water. But unfortunately, we learnt recently that there is a
bill of Ksh3.4 million, which they never knew that they were supposed to pay, and the
water was disconnected. So many toilets in the camps are full. During the rainy season,
waste overflows into the tents. This is very dangerous and poses health risks.426

476.

It appears that efforts to address past and current land injustices would have to be
accompanied with efforts to eradicate corruption in order for success to be realized.

425 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/ Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.35, para 2.
426 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.36, para 2, 3 & 4.
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Key Actors and Factors in Land-Related Problems
477.

In this chapter, origins of the current land problems persisting in the country have
been traced from the colonial period to the present time. Land-related injustices
including instances of illegalities and irregularities attendant acquisition and
ownership of land have been presented. In the foregoing elaboration, certain factors
and actors emerge that are considered to be key in the emergence and facilitation
of acts and omissions in relation to land that today, threaten to destroy the fabric of
Kenya, as a nation. It is deemed necessary that the key facts and actors be presented
here to highlight their contributions to existing land problems so that expected
redress efforts are undertaken with them in mind to avoid impeding the efforts.

The provincial administration and illegal acquisition of land
478. Whether or not officers falling under the gamut of the provincial administration
will continue to form part of the governance structure of Kenya is debatable but
as things stand today, they are likely to be erroneously subsumed in the county
structures countrywide. Therefore, with their past participation in land deals
in mind, their presence and likely contributions, negatively or positively to the
expected land reforms in the country ought to inform decisions to either include
or exclude them altogether. The provincial administration is one of the systems of
governance that Kenya inherited from the colonial government, with authority,
power and influence. It is (until subsumed in the county governance structure, if
at all) a department in the Office of the President.427 It has, over the years, been
heavily relied upon by post-independence governments for general control and
implementation of government policies.
479.

427
428
429
430

In addition, during the reign of KANU as a political party, the provincial administration
took over certain important responsibilities of the party, such as recruitment and
registration of its members, organization of KANU elections, collection and custody
of KANU funds and the issuance of permits for public meetings.428 Between 1963
and 1992 when the defunct Electoral Commission of Kenya was established, the
provincial administration also conducted national elections.429 As the central
government’s principal public relations officer, an important feature of the day-today functions of provincial administration officers is the holding of barazas, an ageold forum of communication with the public.430 Barazas are intended for government
to make known its intentions and to also seek support from the public.

Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
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480. Barazas should also allow the public to register their views and reactions,
including those concerning simmering problems and conflicts between and
within communities.431 Moreover, the provincial administration has also played
significant roles with regard to internal security. Provincial commissioners have
been the chairmen of provincial security committees and provincial intelligence
committees. At the district level, district commissioners are the chairmen of district
security committees and district intelligence committees.
481.

Other members of the committees at provincial and district levels are, respectively,
the provincial heads of the various departments of the police force and district heads
of similar institutions. Sub-district security committees are chaired by district officers
and also a similarly composed organ exists at the divisional level. Representatives of
the army may be co-opted as members of the security committees.432 Even though
the role of provincial administration and that of the police force, may, as far as
security matters are concerned, be said to be complementary, in reality, the provincial
administration dominates over the police force. Clearly, the provincial administration
has been occupying a position of considerable power as the political agent of the
Executive.433 The provincial administration consists of a network of officers at various
levels countrywide. There have been a total of eight provincial commissioners, 604
district officers (DOs), 2 190 and 6 029 assistant chiefs countrywide.434

482. Regardless of their prominent positions in government and the potential
to contribute significantly to the economic and social development of the
country throughout post-independence Kenya, officers serving in the provincial
administration have blatantly subverted the law, participated in various acts
of lawlessness, committed atrocities on the people of Kenya and remained
complacent when their action was required to redress wrongs. For example, a report
of the Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes435 established that officers in the
provincial administration of various ranks turned a blind eye to reprehensible acts
of KANU leaders in the misconception that it was their duty to sustain a continued
ascendancy of a political party under which they had thrived in power.436
483. They also directly participated in the forceful evictions of innocent Kenyans who did
not belong to their ethnic communities,437 directed armed administration police
officers to bulldoze houses of innocent Kenyans and thereby subjected them to
poverty and destitution.438 The officers were found to have withheld vital security
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
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Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 28.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 28.
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information that would have averted tribal clashes at the Coast, among other
parts of Kenya, including the attack on the Likoni police station.439 They condoned
actions of Digo youth who had attacked Likoni police station, killing at least 10
police officers440 and remained partisan when tribal clashes broke out in Gucha
District.441 They generally maintained a lukewarm attitude towards addressing
real threats of tribal clashes between 1991 and 2007,442 deliberately declined to
undertake their security-related duties and duties related to maintenance and
restoration of law and order.443 Further some of them perpetrated acts of violence
including the burning of peoples’ houses in collaboration with the administration
police in Nakuru and Kericho, among other places.444 These are just a few of the
illegal activities of officers serving in the provincial administration, which leads to
the conclusion that the persistent land-related problems are due, largely to their
acts of commission and omission.
484. For the same reasons, the provincial administration is unsuitable to serve in the
new county structures and should be scrapped. Details of their illegalities are
presented in the following paragraphs. The provincial administration is one
institution that has been used by past governments to implement settlement and
re-settlement programmes and decisions, but their participation has had disastrous
consequences. In many cases, they facilitated illegal and irregular allocation of
land for their own benefit, their cronies, collaborators and family members and,
in many cases, carried out unjustifiable and illegal evictions of landless Kenyans in
different parts of the country. Chiefs, DOs, DCs, PCs and officers in the district and
divisional plot allocation committees in various parts of the country participated
in illegal acquisition of land meant for settlement of the landless and in the sale of
some of the land meant for settlement for their own benefit.
485. Some also engaged in extorting money and other commodities, including
livestock, from the landless and landed community members. For example, in an
exercise that was intended to settle members of the Ogiek community, both the
local chief and the assistant chiefs who were trusted with the process of issuing title
deeds sold them to non-deserving individuals, even in the presence of landless
community members who were waiting to be issues with the same.445 An affected
community member present at the time of the illegal sale of the land described the
illegal transaction as follows:
439
440
441
442
443
444
445

Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 32.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 32.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 33.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 35 – 36.
TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/ p. 36 para 3.
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Some of them were actually being sold at that time. One of them was actually negotiating
with someone. He received money, but no action was taken despite our complaints at
the chief’s office. This is the letter from Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC). This
letter shows that the chief was actually selling the land. He was selling it to people and
issuing them with title deeds immediately. The chief would meet somebody and give
him the card. This card entitles you to five acres of land. The chief was selling each at
KSh500,000. I have the evidence here.446

486. The testimony describes the blatant manner in which members of the provincial
administration illegally acquired community land with wanton impunity in not just
one, but several parts of the country. It is interesting that in the case described
above, members of the affected community fought for their land to the point
of reporting the case to the Kenya Anti-corruption Commission (KACC), but
apparently no action was taken against the thieving officers.
487.

During the exercise intended to re-settle members of the Ogiek community, a DC also,
with the aid of administration police, forcibly evicted some genuine landless who should
have been allocated land and in the process, forcefully took away their livestock, leaving
them destitute.447 The act was additional to committing several other human rights
atrocities against members of the community, causing many of them to flee.448

488. In Sotik, community members struggled to establish a trust fund to jointly purchase
a farm for their settlement in 1968. However, after making all the payments,
including repayment of the loan that they had obtained for that purpose, Mr
Harry Wamubey, a former Kericho District Commissioner, illegally sold the land
to a different community and pocketed the money. As if his act of corruption
was not damaging enough to the community members, he returned, took their
prime livestock and sold them for his own profit.449 The DC’s gross violation of the
community’s land and other rights was described as follows:
we bought our farm in 1968. I am before you this morning because of the problems
caused by the DC. He has taken away the land we had bought. We bought the land on
20th August 1968 through trust fund. We sold milk to Sotik KCC and also sold 200 cows
every year to raise this money. In 1973, we sold 200 cows; in 1974 we sold others and
paid a total of KSh70,000. Later we paid KSh12,616. In 1975, we sold another 200 cows
to the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC). In 1976, there was drought and we sold more
cows to add to the loan we had. Each member contributed three bulls and we paid
KSh120,000. In 1980, we sold 500 cows to KMC and sold pyrethrum to the Pyrethrum
Board of Kenya (PBK). We also sold maize. In 1981, we completed repaying the loan
446
447
448
449
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amounting to KSh200,023. After completing paying the loan on 26th, 27th and 28th
January in 1982, the former Kericho DC, Mr Harry Wamubey, came. We stayed for a while
and heard that he had sold the farm to a different community of 363 people. He sold our
farm and the people paid him some money. He took KSh3,162,000 from those people.
He banked the money in Acc.No.001784 in Kisumu so that we could not know what was
going on. On 14th December 1982, the DC came back and sold some of the 11 heifers
that were on that farm at a cost of KSh55, 553…In 1999, the DC sub-divided the farm
again. He got a piece for himself.450

489. The account described by the affected community member smacks of looting from
poor Kenyans by an officer entrusted with the responsibility of their protection
and improvement of their livelihoods. For such kind of heinous acts, it is not right
for the provincial administration to be incorporated in county establishments all.
In Bomet, a District Officer who was placed in charge of sub-division of a farm for
distribution to community members illegally took a plot for himself, which was
registered as plot No.547, which he subsequently sold to one Micah Ng’erechi.451
490.

In the same fraudulent exercise, Assistant Chief Moses Rop took plot No.462 which
he subsequently sold to Edward Rotich.452 Senior Settlement Officer Isaya Nyamache
also, illegally acquired plot No.426 which he sold to one Chemutai Lang’at.453 Other
officers in the provincial administration also illegally acquired land as follows:
The fourth person was the chief called David Kiplang’at Ng’eno who also irregularly
acquired plot No.425 and gave it to his driver called Reuben Tanui. The other one of the
plots he acquired was No.348 which was sold to Mr Joseph Kirui. The person who was
employed as the manager of Mr Joseph Ng’eno also irregularly acquired land parcel
No.443. He gave it to his wife claiming that she was among the members. Out of all
those people, we are 234 who are original members. We have a register.454

491. Where evidence is available as in the case described above, action should be taken,
without any further delay, to prosecute the errant provincial administration officials.
Community members in many parts of the country complained that the heinous
practices of provincial administration officials was not only an unfair and irregular,
but they also created inequalities in land ownership. They also denied the country
the full benefits of environment and cultural heritage because in many cases,
officials in the provincial administration also encroached onto protected lands
such as road reserves, forests, riparian reserves, wetlands, foreshores, monuments
and historical sites as well as spiritual (shrines) sites of some communities. In
many cases, officers in the provincial administration did not act alone; they acted
450
451
452
453
454
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in collaboration with elected members of Parliament, among others, to illegally
acquire land, including land forming part of group ranches. With reference to some
of the group ranches, the problem was explained as follows:
The issue with all these group ranches [Kuku Group Ranch, Kimana, Ikiondo Group
Ranch, Mbirikani] is that it has been a play ground where Group Ranches Management
Committee, the local member of Parliament and the DC have made them their cash
cows. All revenues earned from the eco-tourism activities are just taken by the DC and
the management committee. The group ranch members have been silenced by the
provincial administration through the use of excessive force, arrests and manipulation
of the land controls. The Land Adjudication Officer and the Registrar of Group Ranches
have become tools of approving these malpractices.455

492. In many cases, as in the one above, community members protested against illegal
acquisition of their land and related resources by members of the provincial
administration. However, their protests were often violently thwarted in ways that
were likely to generate more violence and conflicts, as described below:
When he realized that we were very keen on following up this matter although we were
not being listened to, they came back and started arresting people.”456

493.

Apparently, provincial administration officials enlisted the aid of police officers to
arrest and torture community members who complained against their illegalities.
As the following sentiment discloses, provincial administration officers abused their
offices whenever the citizens protested illegalities relating to land by using the police
to effect arrests as a way of intimidating protesters. In other cases, officers serving in
the provincial administration, in total disregard of the law, entrenched robbery of
poor community members in their daily operations for very long period of time. In
this connection, former Baringo District Commissioner Philemon Mwaisaka and his
cohort, Ezekiel Barng'etuny, were notable.457 In addition to committing other human
rights violations against the very communities that they were assigned to serve, they
also, for as long as 10 years, robbed the community of livestock, their only means of
subsistence. Their deplorable conduct was described as follows:
We are seeking also direct compensation in respect of the robbery with violence
charge and our goats which we lost during the famous ‘Kimalel Goat Auction’. We were
literally robbed of our goats by Mr Philemon Mwaisaka, who was the former Baringo
District Commissioner. The goats were being auctioned by Mr Ezekiel Barng’etuny…I
want to state clearly that we never volunteered to sell goats in Kimalel. You would
wake up in the morning and find a lorry outside with administration police inside. They

455 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kajiado/08 December 2011/ p. 30, para 2.
456 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011/ p. 36, para 4.
457 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.6, para 1 &2.
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would descend on your boma and take your goats in the name of orders from the DC.
They took them to auction in Kimalel. There was no meaningful development given
to us. So, we lost goats for nearly 10 years. I wish the Commission could investigate
and see what we were given or if anything was built on our behalf. There is nothing
in place. If that was not an economic crime, then it should have been something else
like being robbed.458

494. It is recommended that all of the officers who participated in such acts of human
rights violations including illegal land acquisition while serving in the provincial
administration, who are still alive, be prosecuted.

Multiple claims over land
495. The Commission established that multiple claims over land are a cause of tension
and violent conflicts in the country. Multiple claims over land have arisen as a
result of the willing-buyer, willing-seller land transactions without a ceiling on
the maximum amount of land that one could privately own, the sale of allotment
letters to third parties, claims over land based on ancestral homelands and related
abuse of office, political patronage, official corruption, and ignorance among the
majority of citizens.
496. As elaborated below, a mix of these factors has resulted in physical violence, bodily
injuries, deaths, community displacements and violation of the human rights and
freedoms of many individuals and communities.
497. Proponents of historical claims over certain territories include the Maasai,
Kalenjin, some communities at the Coast and in the North Eastern regions who
originally lost their land either through annexation, forced evictions or irregular
land agreements by the colonialists. The claims find support in those who
believe that communal land tenure based on the traditional African customary
land tenure was the most suitable system of land tenure for indigenous Africans.
Those who maintain the position often cite the unfair, brutal and unjust means
by which they lost their land as well as the assurances by Jomo Kenyatta and
KANU during the struggle for independence which were never honoured.
498. For example, with reference to land over which some of the communities that now
live in the Rift Valley lay claim, it was stated that:
I have also included an abstract from the Provincial Commissioner in 1961, which
indicated where people were supposed to be settled, but instead people from other
458 TJRC/Hansard/Nakuru/ New County Hall Nakuru/Harun Chemjor Chepkeitany Chepkeitan/23 September 2011, p. 21 & 22.
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provinces were transported and allocated land. This land includes Wanyororo, Engashura,
Limuru Pyrethrum, Lari-Nyakinyua, Endarasha and Ikure. However, the natives were not
settled.459

499. It appears that communities that do not currently live in the foregoing areas,
having been occupied by other tribes, maintain an entitlement to the areas as
their ancestral homelands on the basis that they were the original inhabitants
of the areas. A similar situation prevails in the Rift Valley, where various
communities including the Maasai, the Pokot, the Ogiek and the Kipsigis, to
mention just a few, all claim to have been displaced because of the historical
injustice orchestrated by both the colonial government and the successive
post-colonial regimes. As elaboration in the foregoing sections of this report
reveal, such claims have been the cause of violent evictions of members of
certain ethnic communities in Eldoret, Burnt Forest, Molo, and several parts of
the Coast, among others.
500.

The likelihood of violence over multiple land claims based on historical homelands
is increased by the failure of Kenyatta’s administration to apply settlement funds
provided by the British government and other donors as part of the independence
package to benefit all deserving communities. It is on record that the British
government, through the Colonial Development Fund, gave the Kenya Government
0.75 million for purchase of farms for settlement of all tribes that were in need of
settlement or re-settlement.

501. To the contrary, members of mainly one tribe benefited, at the expense of
others who have, over the years, maintained the view that they were cheated.460
The view that members of particular ethnic communities are entitled to their
historical/original homelands has not remained unscathed. There are opponents
of the historical claims model of land rights and redress on that basis, comprising
mainly those who believe in the modern individual land rights based on the
English property rights system that has firmly taken hold in the country. Such
proponents support the willing-buyer, willing-seller model of land tenure, based
on sanctity of land titles. The two positions conflict, not only where historical
claims over land exist, but also where land was illegally acquired but title to it
made indefeasible, especially by the Registered Land Act (now repealed), making
it difficult, if not impossible for those with genuine claims to recover their “stolen”
land. It is necessary to exercise a careful balance of all the interests raised in order
to find acceptable solutions to the problems, especially of persisting landlessness
and incomplete adjudication and registration processes.
459 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p.6, para 4.
460 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Kericho/19 September 2011, p. 29, para 7.
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Allotment letters as catalyst for land grabbing
502. During the colonial era and part of the post-independence period, letters of
allotment given to qualified applicants were never transferable to a third party,
since such letters did not create an interest to be traded until registration was
completed. However, in 1994, Legal Notice No. 305 was passed, which allowed
for the sale of allotment letters to third parties on payment of consent fees
equivalent to 2 percent of the selling price or capital value of the land, whichever
was higher. This provided a leeway for and fuelled land grabbing in the country,
where individuals would be allocated land and immediately make arrangements
to sell it for millions of shillings without first paying the standard premium. The
ensuing land grabbing and forceful evictions, especially by politicians and their
cronies affected the enjoyment of other rights such as access to water, freedom of
movement, and access to education as illustrated in the following sentiment:
My sentiments here are movement and accessing water. This land where we are
disputing is possessed by the family of Moi. They have fenced along the river and for us
to get water…Molo River is the only source of water. Since Molo River passes through
that farm, they have erected gates and you do not go through them without paying.
So, you pay for natural water. We cannot also cross to the other side called Emining or
Noyuet. We are forced to go 15 or 20 kilometres until Mogotio and then back again,
yet a public road used to exist. If you have to pass through the road, payment must
be made… For our children to go to school, they have to pass through that path, but
payment must be made. We consider that as an atrocity. 461

503. Hindrance of access to water and other amenities as a result of illegal sale of
allotment letters has had worse effects on communities living in marginal
unproductive areas where they were selectively settled during the colonial period.
For example, communities in Cherangany have complained that:
Where we were placed by the colonial government is a place where water is not available;
it is rocky. Our lives centre on animals. Without grass and water, no animal will survive.
So, this river must be made accessible to us. We cannot plant maize or other crops and
so we have to be in Lomolo in order to survive.462

504. Forceful evictions of communities in the area can be traced to the colonial period
and later acquisition of their land by politicians after colonialists left, as already
elaborated. In the current Cherangany constituency in Trans Nzoia East, there have
not only been forced evictions, but the area has also experienced official brutality,
forcing many residents to flee to market centres such as Nzoia, Kaplamai, Moi's
461 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p. 15, para 8.
462 TJRC/Hansard/Public Hearing/Nakuru/23 September 2011/ p. 16, para 8.
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Bridge slums, Sibanga and Maili Saba (Sirende) for shelter.463 In many of the places,
community members who ones lived in the security of their homesteads have
been exposed to hunger, destitution, insecurity, prostitution and related vices.464

Ethnicity as a cause of land-related tension and conflicts
505. Ethnicity and ethnic stereotypes and perceptions created by the colonialists and
later entrenched by post-independence political leaders are critical variables in the
analysis of the complexities of land problems and related injustices in Kenya. It is
not unusual for members of a particular community in Kenya to stereotype another
by use of derogatory and, in some cases, dehumanizing names, terminologies,
references, characteristics and/or features that exhibit, on the part of perpetrators
and attract, from subjects, hatred, animosity, resentment, discrimination, conflict
and, in some cases, violence.
506. Soon after independence and for many years since then, ethnic consciousness
and drive to control political power in Kenya has largely been influenced by
the struggle to maintain land and related assets illegally and unjustly acquired,
especially from the now landless and land-scarce, in the midst of affected
communities seeking to restore lost land rights, including those arising from
colonialism and those generated by post-independence land grabbing.465 The
point is made plain by the not uncommon promises by politicians to assist
their communities to recover “stolen” land when they come to political power.
Obviously, those who have benefited from illegal land deals also seem to be
determined to hang on to power, at all costs, in order to protect their illegally
acquired lands, among other assets.
507.

For these reasons, ethnically-instigated conflict, especially those that revolve around
politics and political power, have endured over the years, despite many efforts to
build national identity. The vice has shaped Kenya’s political system, as influenced
perpetually by Kenyan politicians and the public institutions they occupy including
the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary.466 It could also have influenced the
resolve of national leaders, expressly and impliedly, not to address land-related
injustices. The situation has to quickly change for Kenya to remain one nation.

463 TJRC/Memo/M0791/ p. 1.
464 TJRC/Memo/M0791/ p. 1.
465 There is indeed a warped picture of the historical land injustices, consisting of historical claims, multiple claims, skewed distribution
of land during resettlement, illegal and irregular land deals that has not only caused confusion but also made the process of
addressing the land problem more complex and political.
466 This can be ascertained by examining the nature, magnitude, pattern and impact of the various ethnic and political conflicts that
have occurred in Kenya since independence, where the magnitude and impact seems to be multiplying before, during and after
every electioneering period. The information about the perennial conflicts is contained in official government reports, including the
Kiliku Parliamentary Select Committee Report on Ethnic Conflicts, The Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry Report and more recently
the Waki Commission of Inquiry Report.
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508. In most parts of Rift Valley, among other parts of Kenya, land-related tension and
structural conflicts that had simmered over the years, largely unchecked due to
negative ethnicity, have engendered lack of concern for the affected communities
have degenerated into physical violence.

Mrs. Salome Matakwei, widow of the late Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) leader Mr. Wycliffe Matakwei,
testifying before the TJRC

509. For example, the marginalised Sabaot took up arms in 2004 in Mount Elgon area to
protest decades of conflicts over land allocated to them as ‘squatters’ when, in fact,
they were the true owners of the land.
510. The unchecked violence in Mount Elgon area escalated in 2006 and 2007 when
the Sabaot Land Defence Force (SLDF) killed hundreds of people perceived
to be outsiders, and their collaborators in protest over grabbing of their land
and settlement rights in Chebyuk area in Kopsiro Division. During the Kibaki
administration, historical inequalities and injustices underlying many of the
instances of ethnic violence were exposed but so far, there has been no official
action targeting the causes. Moreover, the Ndung’u Report, so far the most detailed
on land illegalities, failed to trace the existing land problems in many parts of the
country to their historical roots.
511. Mount Elgon area is not the only part of the country that experienced landrelated violence triggered by negative ethnicity. There was also conflict between
the Maasai and the Kipsigis in Trans Mara in 2004. Water and land rights were
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also the main causes of the violent conflict that broke out in January 2005 in
Naivasha between the Maasai and the Kikuyu, where 15 people were killed and
several houses burned down. Surprisingly, instead of addressing the causes of
the violence, warring communities received reinforcements from members of
their communities. While the Maasai in Naivasha received reinforcement from
their kin (morans) in Narok, the Kikuyu received reinforcement from their kin
(Mungiki) from Kiambu. In other parts of the Rift Valley, messages prompted
by ethnic hatred, as far back as 1993, raised claims that Rift Valley was for the
Kalenjin, Maasai, and other pastoralists, and that immigrants must leave, keep
silent or support Moi, from the region, to avoid death or eviction from their
land.
512. For instance in October 1993, then cabinet minister Francis Lotodo demanded
that all the Kikuyu leave West Pokot within 48 hours, or they would be dealt
with “mercilessly.”467 There were similar anti-immigrant threats in Turkana and
other parts of Rift Valley, particularly Kericho, Bomet, Trans-Nzoia and Uasin
Gishu. On several occasions, the Kikuyu were warned that they must “toe
the line” in Maasailand or they would be punished. The numerous cases of
ethnically-instigated violent evictions in many parts of the country appeared
to be eroding the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ system that was beginning to
be closely associated with development in the country and Kenya appeared
to be heading towards a balkanised system of ethnic fragmentation and the
institutionalization of negative ethnicity, nepotism ethnic discrimination and
stigma/stereotyping. By 1997, ethnic-related trouble revolving around land and
politics spread to the erstwhile peaceful areas along the Gucha-Trans Mara–
Migori border between the Maasai, the Abagusii and the Luo, largely prompted
by differing party allegiances.
513. The Akiwumi Commission of Inquiry established in 1998 to investigate into the
ethnic clashes related to the 1997 General Election vividly demonstrated how
the skewed land allocation and ownership has over the years fuelled ethnic
tensions and subsequently led to violent ethnic conflicts in different parts of
the country, particularly in the Rift Valley and Coast regions of Kenya.468 The
Commission heard that there was a long standing Kalenjin and Maasai aversion
or grudge to ‘outsiders or strangers’ living in their midst and on their ancestral
land, which were alienated by the colonial administration for white settlers, but
at independence were not returned to the ‘first owners or traditional owners’
as a key factor that caused recurrent ethnic conflicts. The long-simmering
467 Economic Review, 1 November,1993,p.8
468 See, Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27 – 31, 49
and 53 – 55.
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ethnic tensions over land have often been exploited by the politicians to cause
conflicts around the time of elections as witnessed in the trends of 1992, 1997
and 2007/8.469
514. There has also been a gap between the government’s policy directives and their
implementation, as illustrated by a typical case in parts of the Rift Valley involving
the Maasai and immigrant communities in the Enoosupukia area of Narok District
(now Narok County). Retired president Moi is on record to have ordered the
resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in this area, but Maasai leader
William ole Ntimama and the local administration were unwilling to comply with
his directive. In fact, most of the IDPs congregated in makeshift camps in Nakuru
for a very long time. On 23 December 1994 the police forcibly rounded up 2 000
displaced persons from the Nakuru camp and dumped them at what was said to
be their “ancestral homes in Central Province.”
515. The camp was destroyed and the message it sent was loud and clear for immigrants,
“leave Enoosupukia and Maasailand.”470 It is not surprising that violence involving
the same ethnic communities recurred in Enoosupukia.471Ethnicity appears to
be reflected even in the settlement of internally displaced persons, or lack of it.
During the Moi administration, the large numbers of IDS from Enoosupukia area
who were, from 1993, being driven away by communities believing the area to be
their homeland remained largely unsettled.472 Efforts of the regime to settle the
IDPs remained slow, selective and in some cases, inappropriate. For example, the
government often used to declare curfews from 6pm to 6am, whenever ethnic
conflicts occurred, instead of decisively addressing its causes and effects. For
instance, in September the 1993, Moi’s government declared Molo, Burnt Forest
and part of Kericho security zones and continued to exercise emergency powers
until 1995.
516. The entry of journalists and observers was restricted, while attacks on IDPs
occurred. 473 The result was that that over 30 people were killed, hundreds injured
and between 25 000 and 30 000 displaced from their land and residential homes.474
The treatment seems to have been reciprocated when negative ethnicity spurred
violence in late 2007 and early 2008.
469 See, Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 27 – 31, 49
and 53 – 55.
470 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission appointed to inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Report, Nairobi,
1999, pp.165-170.
471 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Report, Nairobi, 1999 at
51.
472 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Judicial Commission appointed to inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Report, Nairobi,
1999, pp.165-170.
473 Sunday Nation, 18 June 1995,p.3
474 Sunday Nation, 18 June 1995,p.3
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517.

There were no government efforts to settle IDPs who were not from the Kikuyu
ethnic community when Mwai Kibaki was in power. It appears that non-members of
the Kikuyu community, including large numbers of the Kalenjin, the Luo, the Luhya
and even Tanzanians who were evicted, especially from Nakuru and Naivasha, were
not even officially recognized as IDPs, thanks to negative ethnicity and tribal hatred
and animosity that appear to pervade even high-ranking government decisions.

Commissions of Inquiry and Land
518. Before its formation by law in the year 2008, previous independence governments
had made a number of efforts to investigate land related injustices, sometimes
directly and other times in the course of investigating other national maladies,
such as prevalent tribal clashes. The discussion below focuses on just a few of
those commissions of inquiry.

Select committee on issue of land ownership along the 10-mile Coastal
Strip
519. The first national commission to investigate land-related problems in the country
after independence was established during the Kenyatta administration in 1976,
in the nature of a Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the
10-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya.475 As the title suggests, the committee’s mandate
with regard to land-related injustices was limited to the coastal area, specifically,
the 10-mile Coastal Strip. Establishment of the committee and its mandate was
premised on the recognition of the fact that:
land tenure system along the ten-mile Coastal Strip along the Coast Province has created
a lot of problems for the indigenous people in that they are regarded as ‘squatters’ who
have no right to own that land…476

520. The committee was tasked with the responsibility of probing the origin of the
problem and making recommendations to Parliament on how to resolve the
problems “permanently.”477
521. Previous sections of this chapter have cited some of the committee’s findings,
hereby summarised for purposes of analysing recommendations made and
475 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at i.
476 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at i.
477 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at i.
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determining if, at all, any of the recommendations has ever been implemented.
The committee found, that the Coastal Strip has the largest single concentration
of landless people in Kenya and that478 most of the landless live as ‘squatters’,
licencees and unprotected tenants on private or government land in both rural
and urban areas at the Coast.
522. The communities affected by landlessness are mostly the Mijikenda, the
Pokomo and the Taita.479 The origin of the problem of landlessness at the Coast
was traceable to the slave trade and control of the region by Arabs, which, in
subsequent years, was made worse by British colonial policies, laws and practices
and discrimination in re-settlement programmes soon after independence.480
523. The committee also established that the problem of landlessness at the Coast is
an emotive issue,481 deserves urgent attention, is of national significance and needs
urgent attention.482
524. The independence constitution of 1963 contained section 75 which ruled out any
possibility that historical claims would ever be the basis of land distribution after
independence.483 A presidential committee was established in 1972 to look into
land problems in the 10-mile Coastal Strip but the select committee was not able to
determine what became of its recommendations.484
525. The pattern of land ownership structure at the Coast has fundamentally
changed, mainly as a consequence of tourism.485 Changes in the structure of land
ownership in the area will have a direct bearing on the success or failure of any
attempt to solve the initial problem of landlessness however well-intentioned
the effort might be.486
478 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 1.
479 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 1.
480 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 1 & 4.
481 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 1.
482 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at i.
483 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 4.
484 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 4.
485 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 5.
486 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 6.
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526. Mass evictions in many coastal areas in post-independence Kenya have raised
anew the old question of the nature of the ‘squatters’ interests in permanent
improvements made by them on land,487 and the ‘squatter’ problem is a major
hindrance to land developments in the area.488
527.

On the basis of its findings, the select committee made a number of recommendations,
including the development on national guidelines on landlessness clarifying how
existing and future claims of landlessness could be resolved.489

528. It also recommended the development of a national land policy on landlessness
and the immediate registration of people claiming to be absolutely landless
at the Coast for evaluation of their claims, based on national guidelines.490
Further the committee called for urgent and accurate determination of the
amount of land available for distribution from the public and private domain
and the491 immediate commencement of compilation of a national data of the
absolute landless for purposes of redistribution of land.492 The committee also
recommended the establishment of a government programme for acquisition
of land for settlement of the absolute landless only,493 and the establishment of
an agricultural land tribunal with power to, among other things, fix rent approve
quit notices, and assess necessary compensation for fixed improvements on
land.494
529. The Committee emphasised that in order to give effect to its recommendations,
personal economic advantages should not be allowed to frustrate national goals.495
Although the select committee’s report was submitted to Parliament, it is not easy
to determine with accuracy, the nature of implementation measures or mechanisms
that the government may have established on the basis of the committee’s findings
because of absence of relevant literature. However, persistence of landlessness
487 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 6.
488 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 7.
489 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 8.
490 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 8.
491 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 8.
492 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 8.
493 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 9.
494 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 11.
495 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 13.
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and related land injustices at the Coast which only got worse in subsequent years,
suggests that not much was done to address the issues.
530. It is noted that some of the recommendations that the committee made, for
example, mandating land control boards at the Coast to ensure that land is sold
to the landless first and then to others with economic interest496 may have been
overtaken by subsequent developments, especially the substantial change in the
pattern of land ownership in the area.
531. However, other recommendations that the committee made may still be valid
and should be explored in the context of recently-created enabling law and
implementation institutions, especially the National Land commission. The
recommendations include the urgent and accurate determination of amount of
land available for distribution from public and private domain and the immediate
registration of people claiming to be absolutely landless at the Coast for evaluation
of their claims, based on national guidelines.
532.

They also include the immediate development of national guidelines on landlessness,
clarifying how existing and future claims of landlessness could be resolved, the
immediate commencement of compilation of a national data base of the absolute
landless for purposes of redistribution of land and establishment of a government
programme for acquisition of land for settlement of the absolute landless only.
The Environment and Land Court already established should exercise power to
determine claims of a historical nature involving agricultural land.

The Akiwumi Judicial Commission of Inquiry
533.

The Judicial commission of Inquiry Into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (the Akiwumi
Commission) was established in 1989 by President Moi (by Legal notice No. 3312 of 1
July 1998) to investigate the ethnic clashes that had occurred since 1991 with a view
to establishing and determining the origin, probable, immediate and underlying
causes of the clashes and actions taken by the police and other law enforcement
agencies with regard to any incident of crime arising out of or committed in the
course of the tribal clashes.

534. It was also mandated to establish the level of preparedness and effectiveness of
law enforcement agencies in controlling tribal clashes and in preventing their
future occurrence; and to inquire into and investigate any other matter that was
incidental to or connected with the foregoing. In addition, the commission was
496 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-mile Coastal Strip of Kenya
(Government Printers, Nairobi, April 1978) at 12.
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required to make recommendations as necessary, including prosecution of persons
who participated in the offences as well as ways and means that must be taken
to prevent, control or eradicate clashes.497 With the exception of one hearing held
in camera, the Commission conducted its business through public hearings held in
Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru, Kisumu and Eldoret.498
535.

In summary, the commission found out, among other things, that since the
amendment of section 2A of the former constitution to allow multi-parties in Kenya,
there had emerged political parties dangerously based on tribal allegiances,499
that ordinary Kenyans regard themselves, firstly as members of their tribe and only
secondly as nationals of a country.500 Tribal clashes had occurred in virtually every
province in Kenya since acceptance of multi-partyism, especially around election time
in 1992 and 1997.501 It also established that by the time Kenya attained independence,
tribalism was deeply rooted in Kenya largely due to lack of contact between the
ethnic communities during colonialism, which subsequently led to brutal expulsion
of, in the form of ethnic cleansing, of members of certain communities considered as
outsiders by others and that independent governments have done little to eliminate
or contain tribalism.502

536. In its report, the commission elaborated the participation of the provincial
administration in the perpetration of ethnic clashes, stating, among other things
that officers in the administration turned a blind eye to reprehensible acts of
KANU leaders in the misconception that it was their duty to sustain a continued
ascendancy of a political party under which they had thrived in power.503
537. It stated that they also directly participated in forceful evictions of innocent Kenyans
who did not belong to their ethnic communities,504 directed armed administration
police officers to bulldoze houses of innocent Kenyans and thereby subjected them
to poverty and destitution.505 They also withheld vital security information that
would have averted tribal clashes at the Coast and other parts of Kenya, including
the attack on Likoni police station,506 condoned actions of Digo youth who had
attacked Likoni police Station, killing at least 10 police officers.507
497 Republic of Kenya, Judicial commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) was established in 1989 by
President Moi (Legal notice No. 3312 of 1st July 1998) at iii.
498 Republic of Kenya, Judicial commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) was established in 1989 by
President Moi (Legal notice No. 3312 of 1st July 1998) at 3.
499 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 22.
500 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 23.
501 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 25 & 26.
502 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26.
503 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 29.
504 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 30.
505 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 30.
506 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
507 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 31.
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538. Some members of the provincial administration were also accused of remaining
partisan when tribal clashes broke out in Gucha District,508 and maintaining
a lukewarm attitude towards addressing real threats of tribal clashes between
1991 and 2007.509 They deliberately declined to undertake their security-related
duties and duties related to maintenance and restoration of law and order,510 and
perpetrated acts of violence including burning peoples’ houses in collaboration with
administration police in Nakuru and Kericho, among other places.511
539. These are just a few of the illegal activities of officers serving in the provincial
administration which would lead to the conclusion that persistent ethnic clashes,
including those related to land are due, largely, to the acts of commission and
omission of the provincial administration.
540. Although the commission’s mandate did not specifically relate to land, it did
investigate clashes arising as a result of conflicts over land and those affecting land
ownership, occupation and used part of its mandate to determine, “the origin, the
probable, the immediate and the underlying causes of such clashes.”512 Also, during
its investigations, the commission received information on matters related to land
and ethnic clashes, which it ably presented in detail in its report.
541. Of significance to the TJRC are findings, among others, that the provincial
administration participated in forceful evictions of Kenyans in many places
including the Rift Valley.513 Certain ethnic communities, especially in the Rift Valley,
expected and intended the introduction of majimboism to lead to the expulsion of
members of communities considered as “outsiders” from the Rift Valley.514 The issue
of land in Kenya is often treated with fervent sentimentality and sensitivity and is
in many ways, considered explosive.515 Although the Constitution guarantees the
right of ownership of property anywhere in the country, the peaceful co-existence
of the 42 ethnic communities that live within the national borders appears to have
been profoundly undermined by diverse man-made problems directly or indirectly
connected to land.516
542. The Akiwumi commission noted that developments in the political arena tended
to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the situation and by the same token, ushered
in such problems with far-reaching implications for communities living within
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516

Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 32.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 32.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 33.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 35 – 36.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at iii.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 30.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 49.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 53.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 53.
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multi-ethnic farm settlements.517 It stated that some tribal conflicts stemmed from
the pre-independence era, while a host of others emanated from government
policies and programmes.518 A lot of land was taken away from the Kalenjin in
the Rift Valley to settle members of other ethnic communities and as the Kalenjin
population increased, many were rendered landless, living in conspicuous poverty,
while members of other ethnic communities exclusively occupied the most fertile
arable rain-fed lands.519
543. The commission’s report detailed a number of cases of forceful evictions of
members of particular communities, including the Luo from Buru and Thessalia
farms in Kericho520 and the Kikuyu from Enoosupukia.521 It also elaborated, in a whole
chapter on land and politics as key determinants of tribal conflicts, land issues which
underlie tribal wars between the Sabaot and the Luhya in western Kenya, explaining
the injustices committed against the Sabaot in terms of illegal alienation of their
land [p 10-13 titled Land and politics at Centre of Chaos in Western Kenya).
544. The commission established that the Sabaot land problem was addressed during
the colonial period in 1932 when the Carter Commission recommended that
the community be granted 80 000 acres of land on the slopes of Mount Elgon
behind and above the forest reserve. Another 40 000 acres in the moorland area
which they already occupied was to be added to them, but the recommendation
was never considered when the independent government finally acquired and
turned certain former white settler farms in Trans Nzoia into settlement schemes
open to all Kenyans to purchase.522 This, the commission states, was the genesis
of the never-ending Sabaot wars.523 The commission found out that the Sabaot,
to date, consider the farms in Trans Nzoia as part of the 80 000 plus acres of
land which the Carter Commission had proposed should be set aside for their
exclusive use and occupation in compensation for the land they lost to the white
settlers in Trans Nzoia.524
545. The commission further established that because the issue of the Sabaot’s land
was not addressed by the post-independence governments and which issues had
been pending for a long time, were exploited by the Sabaot at the introduction of
multi-party politics to evict the non-Sabaot from the area for political gain.525
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
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Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 54.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 54.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 55.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 26 – 33.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 51.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 13.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 13.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 13.
Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 12 & 13.
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546. The commission made a number of recommendations specifically related to the
elimination of tribal clashes, including the investigation and prosecution of named
security agencies due to their involvements in the commissions and omissions that
fueled tribal clashes. In addition, the Akiwumi Commission made recommendations
that would reduce or eliminate land-related injustices that also fuel tribal clashes.
In this regard, it stated that:
(i) since land ownership and use in the various clash areas was given as one of
the causes of conflict and tribal clashes, the government should embark on
an ambitious programme to issue title documents to all persons who were
either allocated land there by the government or who bought the same
from previous owners but have not got title, to minimize land disputes and
conflicts in the areas;526
(ii) the government should protect and respect rights over land;
(iii) in order to inspire confidence in the government, all of the people who
were displaced during tribal clashes should be re-settled;
(iv) tribal-based settlements should be discontinued; and that
(v) the public should be educated on land rights.527
547. It is proposed that recommendations of the Akiwumi Commission should be
carefully evaluated in light of the provisions of the ‘new’ Constitution and the
recently-enacted land laws. One of the most important points that emerges, as a
finding of the Akiwumi Commission is that some ethnic communities in Kenya are
“…ready for the introduction of majimboism whereby every person will be required
to go back to his motherland.”528 The perception and expectation of Kenyans,
both at independence and several years after independence was that with the
introduction of a regional government, regions would have absolute control over
land within their jurisdictions for purposes which appear to be, among others,
to recover or restore the lands that they lost. The position appears to have been
guaranteed by Jomo Kenyatta in his remarks just before independence as stated
previously in this chapter.
548. So firmly rooted in the belief that regionalism would provide structures to remove
persons and communities considered as outsiders from other communities’
homelands that one member of the Kalenjin community once remarked that:
526 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998, Chapter Four, at 2.
527 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998, Chapter Five
(Recommendations) at 2.
528 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 49.
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Once we introduce majimbo in Rift Valley, all outsiders who acquired our land will have
to move and then leave the same land to our children.529

549.

Now that regional governments are being firmly established on the basis of permissive
provisions of the 2010 Constitution, what mechanisms does the government have
to ensure that exclusionist tendencies and practices that were expected to be
facilitated by majimboism are not manifested in the new majimbo (regions/counties)
governments? Could implementation of any of the foregoing recommendations
help to avert majimboism, with its original intent, in relation to land or should new
and innovative mechanisms be devised to hold the country together?

The Ndung’u Commission of Inquiry into illegal/irregular allocation of
public land
550. The Ndung’u Commission was established by President Mwai Kibaki by the Kenya
Gazette Notice No. 4559 of 30 June 2003 to inquire into illegal or irregular allocation
of public land and lands reserved for public purposes to private individuals
and corporations. The commission was mandated to prepare a list of lands so
irregularly acquired, collect and collate data on the nature and extent of unlawful
or irregular allocations of public land and ascertain the identities of perpetrators,
including public officials. The commission was to make recommendations on legal
and administrative measures for restoration of the lands to their proper title or
purpose.530
551. Obviously, the focus of the commission was illegally or irregularly alienated public
land. The mandate of the commission did not extend to illegal alienation or
acquisition of private land by private individuals and entities. Also, an analysis of
the commission’s report indicates that although in the introduction, it presented
information in relation to land of a historical nature, stating briefly, for example,
public land under African tenure [p2] some of the laws introduced in the colonial
period to provide basis for alienation of land by the colonialists [p3], policy and
administrative changes in relation to land after 1948 [p3], the practice of land
allocation after 1951 and the legal position regarding allocation of public land
before and after independence, it did not present a detailed analysis of existing
land alienation problems in a historical context.
552. It is noted and appreciated that the Ndung’u Commission report presents
numerous cases of illegal alienations of public land, but its analysis was, in the
529 Republic of Kenya, Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Commission) 1998 at 49.
530 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung'u Commission,
2004) at xvii-xviii.
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absence of any indication of scope of work in terms of time or period of coverage,
focused on the Moi administration, without similarly presenting cases of illegal
alienations of public land that occurred during Kenyatta’s administration. This
observation, in the absence of any explanation why the commission never
considered cases of illegal land alienation that occurred during Kenyatta’s era,
helps to understand that there are more cases of illegal alienations of public
land that should be included in a broader scheme of government to address the
problem as a whole. In any case, the commission completed its investigations
of land-related irregularities and illegalities in 2004, leaving cases of illegal
acquisition and use of land that occur in Kenya on a daily basis, from 2004 to
date, outside of its purview.
553. It has also been stated the commission focused its work on public land without
investigating, in a historical perspective, cases of illegal alienation of privatelyowned or occupied land which has been one of the causes of devastating ethnic
clashes, not to mention landlessness, under-development and destitution that has
resulted therefrom.
554. The gap in information had to be filled by the TJRC, not only as a matter of
execution of its mandate, but also to investigate, gather and present detailed
information as much as possible to provide the basis for incisive understanding
of the origins, nature and magnitude of the problem, which have to be very well
understood in order for responsible government agencies to know what kinds
of measures or schemes could be devised to best address them. It would not be
honest to recognise the limitations of the Ndung’u Commission’s work without
similarly acknowledging the tremendous work that the commission undertook to
investigate and subsequently, produce a reliable source of information on illegally
acquired public lands that could provide basis for both private and public entities
to make informed decisions on transactions relating to land.
555. Without legal challenge to specific aspects of the Ndung’u Commission’s report,
it remains one of the few valuable official documents that one would rely one,
for example, to determine which land would be risky to purchase, having been
irregularly or illegally acquired from the public domain. The report has also
formed the basis of government actions to recover private lands that were illegally
acquired from the public domain. It has also prompted, in a few cases, the voluntary
return or restoration of public lands that were illegally acquired by private entities.
Moreover, the commission’s report was also found useful by the TJRC in validating
some of its own findings that have been presented in various sections of this
chapter on land.
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556. For all the foregoing reasons, the Ndung’u Commission’s report should be carefully
evaluated, together with this report, by the National Land Commission and other
government agencies that will have the responsibility to address all cases of
land-related injustices to provide permanent solutions. Herein below are some of
the findings and recommendations of the Ndung’u Commission that should be
carefully evaluated in light of detailed information availed by the TJRC:






For all the foregoing reasons, the Ndung’u Commission’s report should be
carefully evaluated, together with this TJRC Final Report, by the National Land
Commission and other government agencies that will have the responsibility
to address all cases of land-related injustices to provide permanent solutions.
Herein below are some of the findings and recommendations of the Ndung’u
Commission that should be carefully evaluated in light of detailed information
availed by the TJRC: Clear provisions of law, including sections 3, 7 and 15
of the Government Land Act were flouted as personalities, including senior
government officials, participated in land grabbing.531 Officials of local
authorities in various parts of the country, in collaboration with those within and
outside of government, participated in numerous cases of illegal acquisition of
government land, especially through the means of letters of allotment.532
Unauthorized persons, including district commissioners and provincial
commissioners took part in illegally allocating public land to themselves and
their cohorts.533
Some of the illegally acquired public lands have been allocated to diplomatic
missions, contrary to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular
Relations.534 The government established settlement schemes for the landless
but land therein were distributed to undeserving people.535 Many parcels of
land reserved for public utilities have been alienated and allocated to private
individuals and entities.536 The phenomenon of land grabbing in Kenya rendered
the perceived sanctity of land title a myth.537 Past efforts to reclaim public land

531 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 7.
532 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 11 – 15.
533 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 14.
534 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 187.
535 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 126 – 127.
536 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 128 – 132.
537 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 15 – 16.
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did not bear fruit due to what may be described as official lethargy or lack
of political will to do so.538 Although the phenomenon of land grabbing was
known to the public in general, its exact nature and extent was not known to
the public.539
557. The gap in public information was filled, in relation to public land, by the
Commission’s publication of two volumes of approximately 800 pages detailing
cases of illegal acquisition of public land in virtually every part of the country,
including protected wildlife areas, land for public schools and ADC farms, among
many others. For the first time in Kenya, the commission also provided the
public with names of individuals and entities that illegally benefited from public
land.540The Ndung’u Commission made valuable recommendations that offer some
of the practical approaches that should be taken to address land-related injustices,
including those relating to public land. It recommends that all land allocated in
settlement schemes which were made to people who were, at the time, public officers,
members of Parliament, councillors, political operatives and other undeserving
people at the expense of the landless and contrary to established policies and
procedures, should be revoked. The lands in question should be repossessed and
allocated to the landless.541
558. The possibility of the expeditious implementation of this recommendation should
be explored, in the light of more information availed by the TJRC. A problem that
is likely to arise, which should be anticipated and measures designed to address
is that of bonafide purchaser for consideration, without notice of the illegality.
Mechanisms should be designed to address cases where lands illegally acquired
have subsequently been sold, especially to individuals who purchased it without
notice of illegalities attendant to the first title, in order to avoid exposing more
people to what may be perceived as another form of land-related injustice.
559.

The commission also recommended that all public officials, especially those in the
department of settlement, who facilitated illegal allocations of land in settlement
schemes should be investigated and prosecuted where offences were committed
by them in the process of such allocations.542 These recommendations should be

538 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 17 & 18.
539 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 19.
540 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004), Annexes, Volume I and II. See, also, pages 93 – 108 of the Report.
541 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 36.
542 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 137.
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implemented in the light of Chapter Six of the Constitution which renders such
officers unfit for public service. The Ndung’u Commission also recommended the
establishment of a land titles tribunal,543 the second time a land titles tribunal was
proposed, the first was made by the select committee in 1978. The proposal should
be evaluated in the light of establishment of the Environment and Land Court,
especially to determine whether cases proposed for a land titles tribunal would
adequately fall under its jurisdiction. These recommendations should be evaluated
and where suitable,544 integrated in a broader scheme of redress actions proposed by
the TJRC.

Other land reform initiatives in Kibaki’s administration
560. Mwai Kibaki ascended to power as the third President of Kenya in 2002 through a
popular vote on a National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) party ticket that saw
the end of close to four decades of KANU rule. In terms of the land question, Kibaki
was faced with similar land issues and challenges that were encountered during
the previous regimes.
561. One of the first challenges that the Kibaki administration faced when it came to
power in 2003 was how to deal with the historical claims over land that were not
resolved at Lancaster and remained unresolved throughout the Kenyatta and Moi
administrations. In addition to the establishment and operationalisation of the
Ndung’u Commission already elaborated, the following initiatives were undertaken
during his administration.
562. The initiatives included formulation of the National Land Policy, completion of the
constitutional review process culminating in the adoption of a new Constitution
with key provisions of land elaborated in subsequent sections of this TJRC Report,
appointment of new Ministers of Lands and Settlement including Amos Kimunya
and James Orengo who showed willingness to revoke illegally acquired title
deeds and the prosecution of key personalities including William Ruto, Wilson
Gachanja, Joshua Kulei and Sammy Mwaita over land-related offences.545
563. Further, in 2005, a Forest Act was eventually enacted, to help secure the county’s
remaining forests and encourage commercial forestry. Illegal logging was
reduced and some parts of Karura and Ngong’ forests repossessed, although
the Kibaki administration sooner or later proved more reluctant to act when
543 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u Commission,
2004) at 188 – 199.
544 See, Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u
Commission, 2004) at 188 – 200 which details recommendations of the Commission.
545 See for example Daily Nation, 16 April 2004, online edition.
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politicians and senior officials had been allocated the land. A number of land laws
were also passed, including the Land Act of 2012 whose details and significance
are presented in the next section of this Report.
564. During Kibaki’s regime, the then Prime Minister Raila Odinga also took a courageous
step in confronting land-related issues in the Mau Forests complex in Narok North.
He based actions to restore the health of the forests on the plausible argument
that Kenya’s declining rainfall was mainly caused by the destruction of forest water
catchment areas around Mau and other water towers. His argument attracted
the support of some external development partners and development agencies,
including the Bill Clinton Foundation. Through this institute, the government
formed a task force to review the irregular/illegal allocation of land in the Mau
Forest and to restore the health of the forest through a re-afforestation programme.
565. The initiative should have been complemented by action on the part of the
Ministry of Lands and Settlement to finally re-settle members of the Ogiek
community who were claiming residence in the protected area. Opposition of the
restoration of Mau Forests by the very ministers of government then, including
William Ruto, who is now the Deputy President of President Uhuru Kenyatta,
signal the need for unanimity in the design and implementation of government
programmes.546 The challenge for the new government is to sustain efforts that
have, so far, been implemented to genuinely address land-related issues, while
also implementing recommendations of this TJRC Report, alongside others,
including those made in the Ndung’u Commission’s Report, as appropriate.

Conclusion
566.

The bulk of the statements and memorandum, more than 40 percent, that the
Commission received related to land grievances and disputes. There are close linkages
between land injustices and ethnic violence in Kenya. More specifically, land related
injustices are prominent factors that precipitate violence between and within ethnic
communities in Kenya. Since independence, there has been no genuine political will
on the part of the state to address grievances and disputes relating to land. Policy
initiatives have more often than not failed to address the root causes of land related
grievances and disputes. As such, one thing is clear, the stability of Kenya depends
to a great extent to the willingness of political actors to address these grievances
and disputes. The creation of the National Land Commission is a step in the right
direction. But this step must be backed by genuine commitment to support its work.

546 See Daily Nation, 1st November 2009, on-line edition.
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THREE
Economic Crimes and Grand
Corruption
Introduction
1.

This Chapter focuses on the phenomenon of corruption, the causes and effects
of corruption especially on the citizenry’s enjoyment of socio- economic
rights, efforts made in Kenya to combat corruption, the challenges faced, and
institutional, administrative and legislative measures that may be put in place to
address its violation of the economic rights of Kenyans.

2.

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission) was empowered,
amongst other functions, to establish an accurate historical record of violations and
abuses of human rights and economic rights inflicted upon persons by the state,
public institutions and holders of public office between 12 December 1963 and 28
February 2008. The Commission was required to achieve this through investigations
and holding of public hearings in order to establish the causes, nature and extent of
these violations.

3.

The specific mandate to look into economic crimes is found in Section 5 of the
Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Act (TJR Act), which outlines the
objectives of the Commission. Section 5(d) provides for investigation of economic
crimes, including grand corruption, and the exploitation of natural or public
resources. Upon completion of investigations and hearings, the Commission
is required to make recommendations with regard to policy, prosecution of
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violators of human and economic rights, and any institutional, administrative
and legislative measures that may be put in place to address these violations.
4.

The following issues are considered in the Chapter: definition of economic crime
and grand corruption; causes and effects of corruption; the linkage between
grand corruption and gross violation of human rights; initiatives to combat
corruption in Kenya since 1956; the anti-corruption legal framework in Kenya;
recent legislative developments on leadership and integrity; the magnitude and
scale of grand corruption in Kenya; challenges of fighting corruption in Kenya
(legal, institutional, political, etc. Recommendations are provided at the end.

Definition of Economic Crimes and Grand
Corruption
5.

The TJR Act did not define economic crimes or grand corruption. The Commission
therefore resorted to definitions provided for in relevant international and
regional instruments to which Kenya is a signatory, and the relevant domestic
laws. Additionally, it became imperative to consider definitions used by other
institutions that are actively involved in combating corruption, for example the
World Bank and Transparency International.

6.

In order to comprehend the meaning of economic crime and grand corruption, it is
essential first to try and understand the phenomenon of corruption generally, and
the specific types of corruption referred to as grand corruption, petty corruption
and systemic corruption. An attempt will also be made to understand economic
crimes as they are defined under the Kenyan law, and how they differ from
corruption offences

The meaning of corruption
7.

344

There is no single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition of corruption,
and there are many definitions given by different scholars, institutions,
practitioners and writers. Attempts to develop such definition invariably
encounter legal, criminological and in many countries, political problems. This is
largely due to the broad nature of the phenomenon and the fact that it manifests
itself in various ways, depending on the culture of the society where it is taking
place. Since the nature and effects of corruption are unique to each country and
society, it is therefore not possible to confine it to one particular set of facts or
circumstances.
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8.

The difficulty in defining corruption was evident during the negotiations of the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2002.1 According to
information contained in the UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, when the negotiations
began in early 2002, one option under consideration was not to define corruption
at all but list specific types or acts of corruption. Proposals to require countries
to criminalise corruption mainly covered specific offences or groups of offences
that depended on what type of conduct was involved, whether those implicated
were public officers, whether cross border conduct or foreign officials were
involved, and if these cases related to unlawful or improper enrichment. 2

9.

Nevertheless, many specific forms of corruption are clearly defined and understood,
and are the subject of numerous legal or academic definitions. Many are also
criminal offences, although in some cases governments consider that specific
forms of corruption are better dealt with by regulatory or civil law proceedings.
Although the varied definitions emphasize varying elements of corruption, they
generally acknowledge corruption as dishonest behaviour where individuals or
groups of individuals abuse public office for private profit.

10.

At the international level, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC), to which Kenya is a signatory, does not define corruption. In Chapter
3 Articles 15 to 24, it lists circumstances or situations that could constitute
corruption. The Convention requires each State Party to adopt legal measures
to establish certain criminal offences, including bribery, embezzlement,
misappropriation or other diversion of property by public officials, trading in
influence, abuse of functions, illicit enrichment, bribery in the private sector,
embezzlement in the private sector, money laundering, concealment of property
obtained as a result of any of those offences, and obstructing justice. These
provisions reflect the tendency of international bodies to regard offences of
corruption as including offences beyond the confines of bribery as popularly
understood.

11.

Within the African continent, the African Union Convention On Preventing and
Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), to which Kenya is also a signatory, describes
corruption as solicitation or acceptance, directly or indirectly as by a public official
or any other person of any goods of monetary value or other benefit such as a
gift, favour or advantage for himself or herself or for another person or entity in
exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her functions.

1
2
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The Global Programme Against Corruption: UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit, 3rd Edition, Vienna , September 2004
For a detailed discussion of the attempts made to define corruption, see the UN Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy, Part II
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12.

Transparency International, one of the global organisations actively involved in
the fight against corruption, has defined corruption as the “misuse of entrusted
power for private gain.” The definition reflects the current approach to the topic,
but its usefulness is debatable. It has the advantages of simplicity as it embraces
offences of corruption strictly so-called, and related offences such as misconduct in
public office, extortion, embezzlement, fraud and theft which are distinct offences.
Although these are distinct offences, they are usually committed in the course of
corruption. The World Bank, on the other hand, defines corruption as the abuse of
power for personal gain or for the benefit of a group to which one owes allegiance.

13.

In Kenya, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act of 2003(ACECA) does
not define corruption but outlines conduct that would constitute an offence of
corruption. The Act stipulates that corruption means an offence under sections
39-44, 46 and 47 of the Act, and certain other wrongs. The wrongs as listed under
section 2 of the Act are breach of trust, an offence involving dishonesty in relation
to taxes or elections to public office. The offences enumerated under sections
39-44, 46 and 47 are bribing agents, secret inducements for advice, deceiving
principal, conflict of interest, improper benefits to trustees for appointment, bid
rigging, abuse of office and dealing with suspect property.

14.

In what is seen as a major improvement and deviation from the other legal
instruments at both international and regional levels, the ACECA creates and
defines a special category of offences referred to as economic crimes. Greater
details of the meaning of economic crimes will be explained in a later portion
of this chapter when defining the term as it relates to the major concept of
corruption.

Grand corruption
15.

3
4

346

The term grand corruption is used to describe cases where massive personal wealth
is acquired from States by senior public officials using corrupt means.3 It arises
mostly where high officials have power over the granting of large public contracts
and a local agent receives a commission if the transaction is won. It has three main
criteria: size, immediacy of its rewards and mystification. The more technical and
complicated a transaction is, the less likely it is that questions will be asked. Some
of its key mechanisms have been fully described in George Moody Stuart’s book,
Grand Corruption in Third World Development4.
Report of the Anti-Corruption Working Group of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies “Banking on Corruption, The
Legal Responsibilities of Those Who Handle the Proceeds of Corruption”, February 2002

Berlin: Transparency International, 1994
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16.

The Society of Advanced Legal Studies Anti-Corruption Working Group concluded
that grand corruption involves two main activities: bribe payments and the
embezzlement and misappropriation of state assets. The bribe can either be a
direct payment in return for showing favour or payment of part of the proceeds
of a contract granted as a result of the bribe, called a kick back. For example,
Benazir Buto’s husband, Asif Zardari, was convicted in Pakistan of taking secret
kickbacks from airline, power station, and pipeline projects, rice deals, customs
inspections, defence contracts, land sell offs, and even government welfare.5

17.

Another good example of grand corruption is the embezzlement and
misappropriation of state assets by the late Nigerian President Sani Abacha.
In addition to taking hefty cuts before approving contracts, he siphoned off
fortunes from sales of Nigerian crude oil as well as diverting huge sums from
four state- owned oil refineries leaving them in near –total collapse.6

Chapter THREE

Petty corruption
18.

Although the focus of this chapter of the Commission’s Report is grand corruption,
it is important to also understand the other type of corruption commonly referred
to as petty corruption. Petty corruption, as the term implies, may involve small
amounts and junior officials but it also has a huge impact on people’s enjoyment
of their basic rights like the rights to water, health, food, clothing and shelter. It
cannot therefore be ignored or wished away in discussing the phenomenon of
corruption. Admittedly, a discussion of grand corruption will not be complete
without mentioning the corresponding petty corruption.

19.

The term “petty corruption” is sometimes used to distinguish between grand
corruption practised by senior officials, and the petty corruption to which, for
example magistrates and judges, are subject due to inadequate remuneration
and facilities. The term is more used however to describe “facilitation” or “grease
payments” sought by officials for services the public are entitled to free of charge.
Examples are payments to customs officers to pass goods through a road border,
to immigration officers to have travel documents accepted, to medical staff to
receive prescription drugs or other benefits, payments for fictitious services, or to
avoid prosecution for traffic offences, real or imagined.

20.

The distinction from grand corruption is that an official is paid for what he is
lawfully required to do. The sums involved are usually small and paid to cut through

5
6

The Court in Pakistan convicted Mr and Mrs Zardari of corruption, sentenced them to 5 years imprisonment, ordered fines of US
8.6m, and disqualified both from holding public office, Eastern Economic Review, 29 April 1999
Davi Orr, The Scotsman, 4 December 1998
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bureaucratic red tape. In most cases it is assumed that the service required would
not be obtained without the additional payment, so there is an element of extortion.

Grand corruption Vs Petty Corruption
21.

Grand corruption is corruption that pervades the highest levels of national
government, leading to broad erosion of confidence in good governance, the rule
of law and economic stability.7 Petty corruption on the other hand, can involve
the exchange of very small amounts of money, the granting of minor favours by
those seeking preferential treatment, or the employment of friends and relatives in
minor positions. The most critical difference between grand and petty corruption is
that grand corruption involves the distortion or corruption of the central functions
of government, while petty corruption develops and exists within the context of
established governance and social frameworks.

22.

Experience and testimony received by the Commission shows that both grand and
petty corruption occurs in Kenya, with consequential violation of economic rights.
The mandate of the Commission was however specific to grand corruption.

Systemic corruption
23.

Another type of corruption that may be visible in Kenya though not expressly
mentioned in our mandate is systemic corruption. Systemic corruption or
institutional or entrenched corruption, as it is sometimes called, is corruption
brought about, encouraged or promoted by the system itself. It occurs where
bribery is routine on a large scale. The causes are usually brought about by
inefficiency, inadequacy, or undue laxity in the system.

24.

Systematic corruption arises where corruption permeates a country’s political and
economic institutions and is no longer restricted to a few dishonest individuals. It
thrives where institutions are weak or non-existent and is closely related to poor
governance, where there are inadequate legislative controls, no independent
judiciary, or oversight, and where independent media and civil society agencies
are absent.

25.

In Kenya, the judiciary and media are now relatively independent and civil society
is largely free to operate without restrictions. There is a plethora of anti-corruption
laws and an independent constitutional anti-corruption commission dedicated

7

348

Rose-Ackerman S “Democracy and Grand Corruption”, UNESCO 1996( ISSI49/1996), reprinted in Williams R Edition” Explaining
Corruption”, Elgon Reference Collection, UK 2000, PP 321-336
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fully to the fight against corruption. Experience shows that corruption has however
permeated almost all sectors of the Kenyan society and there is need for more
much more to be done to combat corruption and its insidious effects on Kenyans.

Economic crimes
26.

The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) of 2003 goes further than
the UNCAC and AUCPCC in defining corruption by isolating special corruption
related offences referred to as economic crimes. According to ACECA, an economic
crime is any act or omission by any person that results in loss or destruction of
public property, revenue or other resources. This is clearly distinguished from
corruption that is broadly seen as the improper use of power, privilege or office for
benefit to oneself or another person(s).

27.

The ACECA defines economic crimes as an offence listed under section 45, that is:


Illegal acquisition, mortgage and disposal of public property service or benefit



Unlawful damage to public property



Failure to pay taxes, fees, levies or charges that are payable to a public body



Causing or obtaining the non-payment of taxes, fees, levies, or charges that
are due to a public body

28.

Furthermore, an officer or person who is in charge of public revenue or property
commits an economic crime if he illegally makes payment or excessive payment
from public revenue for sub-standard or defective goods, for goods not supplied
or not supplied in full, for services not rendered or not adequately rendered. This
provision has the effect of creating offences in the sphere of public procurement
that consume a huge chunk of public funds.

29.

Economic crimes are also committed when a public officer wilfully fails to follow the
law or applicable procedures on procurement, allocation, sale or disposal of property,
tendering of contracts, management of funds or incurring of expenditure. Good
examples of such laws are the Public Finance Management Act, the Public Procurement
and Disposal of Goods Act, together with the regulations made there under.

30.

Finally, the ACECA makes it an economic crime for a public officer to engage in a project
without planning. This crime was intended to save deliberate wastage of public funds
by senior officials who initiate projects without any prior planning, with the sole aim
of making personal gain from such projects, in collusion with persons or companies
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awarded the contracts. Most of these projects were never included in the planned
projects for the financial year in focus. Many projects in Kenya remain incomplete
many years after their construction commenced. This has resulted in loss of shillings
that could have been used to provide basic services to millions of Kenyans
31.

Having looked at the meaning of economic crimes as defined in ACECA, it is evident
that there is a close link between economic crimes and grand corruption in Kenya.
Economic crimes result in loss or destruction of public property or revenue, especially
in the area of public procurement, public contracts, public land and general
management of public funds. These crimes inevitably involve very senior powerful
public servants awarding large public contracts running into billions of shillings,
with the assurance of getting a certain amount as a commission. This ultimately
constitutes what is referred to as grand corruption. Grand corruption is therefore a
direct product of economic crimes. In other words, economic crimes result in grand
corruption. The two are inextricably linked to each other, and for our purposes, we
use the terms interchangeably.

Causes and Effects of Corruption
32.

Since 1994, unprecedented global efforts have been made to raise awareness
about corruption, its insidious nature and damaging effects it has on the welfare of
entire nations and their peoples. Corruption not only distorts economic decisionmaking, it also deters investment, undermines competitiveness and ultimately,
weakens economic growth. There is evidence that the social, legal, political and
economic aspects of development are all linked, and that corruption in any one
sector impedes development in them all.8

33.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) describes corruption as
a complex social, political and economic phenomenon that affects all societies all
over the world. Corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic
development and contributes to government instability. Corruption attacks the
foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral processes, perverting
the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose only reason for existing
is the soliciting of bribes. Economic development is stunted because foreign direct
investment is discouraged and small businesses within the country often find it
impossible to overcome the start up cost required because of corruption 9

8
9
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The Global Programme Against Corruption: UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit , 3rd Edition, Vienna, September 2004
http//www.unodc.org/en/corruption/index.html- accessed on 26/2/2013
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34.

The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, said at the occasion of the International
Anti-Corruption Day on 9/12/2009, that it is the world’s vulnerable who suffer
“first and worst” such as the theft of public money or foreign aid for private gain.
The result, he said, is fewer resources to fund the building of infrastructure such
as schools, hospitals and roads. Mr Ban however noted that corruption “is not
some vast impersonal force but the result of personal decision, most often motivated
by greed”10

35.

In a nutshell, corruption is caused by pure greed on the part of the perpetrators,
and those who are affected most are the poor in society. Corruption deprives them
of their basic rights to shelter, food, education, decent housing, good roads and
education for their children. Although most Kenyans are now aware of the causes
and effects of corruption on their lives, it nevertheless is paramount to briefly
discuss these two issues as a basis for further in depth analysis of the phenomenon
of corruption in Kenya.

Chapter THREE

Causes of corruption
36.

As part its mandate to create awareness about the dangers of corruption and
to enlist public support in the fight against corruption, the now defunct KACC
published a lot of Information, Communication and Education (IEC) materials,
including manuals for public officers and members of the public. In trying to
explain the causes and effects of corruption, this chapter will borrow heavily
from the manual titled ‘The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003
Explained.11

37.

KACC identified some causes of corruption, which sometimes operate in combination
and should not be seen singularly or as isolated derivatives. These are:




Political patronage: When holders of public office give their loyalties to those
individuals who appoint them to their positions instead of being loyal to their
duties, the law, integrity and set standards, they stop being accountable to the
public, clients and colleagues.
Bad governance: Poor leadership and management practices and styles
that provide opportunities and loopholes for corrupt conduct is a major
cause of corruption. Leaders who are inept and who do not inspire a culture
of achievement provide a poor model to those below them resulting in poor
performance and mediocrity.

10 http//www.unodc.org/en/corruption/index.html- accessed on 26/2/2013
11 The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act,2003 Explained: A Manual for Public Officers and Members of the Public”, a
publication of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission Directorate of Preventive Services
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Lack of political will: For the fight against corruption to succeed, there has to
be willingness on the part of political leaders to show by word and deed that
they are committed and supportive of the fight. For example, they must not
only facilitate an enabling climate of corruption intolerance by enacting laws,
policies and systems but they must also provide operational support and tools.
Breakdown or erosion of societal values and norms: When a society
disregards or ignores positive moral values and laid down procedures and
regulations, it opens itself up to anarchy, ineptitude and failure. A positive
value system in society helps to benchmark individual conduct and guides
collective behaviour.
Weak or absent management systems, procedures and practices: In
organizations where systems, procedures, standards, policies and practices
are weak or absent, individuals take advantage to exploit such loopholes
leading to loss of public resources.
Misuse of discretionary power vested in individuals or offices: Use of
discretionary powers without checks and balances encourages corruption
because of families, friends and other connections.
Weak civil society and general apathy: When civil society and the general
public fail to exercise vigilance over management of public affairs, we abandon
our oversight and responsibility and fail collectively in our civic duty.
Lack of professional integrity: When those trained and paid to offer professional
services lack personal ethics and integrity, they rob their institutions and the
country a chance to develop thus leading to wastage of valuable resources.
Lack of transparency and accountability: Public affairs should always
be conducted in an open, fair and responsible manner. Opaqueness fuels
corruption because it brings an atmosphere of secrecy.
Tribalism, favouritism, nepotism and cronyism: All four have one thing in
common – a favoured entity gets to enjoy public resources at the expense
of others. Merit is disregarded and benefits such as contracts, employment,
tenders are enjoyed on the basis of favor. People are discriminated against
and generally denied equal opportunity.
Inefficient public sector: An inefficient and bureaucratic public service where
delays and under-performance are a hallmark of its culture encourages people
to seek shortcuts while seeking for services. This situation creates room for
endemic corruption.
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Greed: The tendency to live beyond one’s means or to acquire excessive
wealth without working for it contributes significantly to corruption and
economic crime. It is therefore not surprising that some of the wealthiest
people in society are also the most corrupt.
Non-enforcement of the law: Laws and regulations are made and yet they
are not implemented or there is reluctance to enforce them. In this way,
wrongdoers are encouraged to behave with impunity.

Effects of Corruption
38.

The introductory pages to the KACC Manual correctly point out that corruption is
harmful to the economy and has caused much destruction to Kenya as a country.
Corruption, according to the KACC Manual, greatly impedes the realization of
durable development at many levels thereby increasing poverty and fuelling
inequities and vulnerabilities in society. It affects everyone but harms more
those in society who are already vulnerable. This is the same observation that has
been made by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and supported by
the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon during the International Anti-Corruption
Day on 9/12 2009; that corruption affects the poor “first and worst”.

39.

Some of the effects of corruption include but are not limited to:








Poor health services – Looting of funds intended for buying drugs and the
theft of the drugs already bought leads to lack of adequate medical supplies.
When public medical practitioners run down public health facilities in order
to refer patients to their private clinics, for example, the majority will not
have access to affordable medical services leading to increased sickness and
deaths.
Poor transport and communication networks – Diversion and theft of funds
meant to construct or repair infrastructure like roads, telephone network, water
supply and so on leads to poor infrastructure making less money available for
such purposes and at the same time leading to dilapidation and wastage.
Reduced investment and relocation of investors to other countries –
Corruption increases the cost of doing business, which scares off current and
potential investors. They move instead to countries which are considered to
be more conducive to the realization of their investment. Lack of investment
affects all wealth creation plans.
Increased cost of goods and services – When a country’s economy is rundown through corruption, the cost of living rises and the poor are affected
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immensely. Corruption translates into high costs of goods and services
causing inflation and economic vulnerability.
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Delay, denial and sale of justice in courts – Justice delayed is justice
denied. When the courts become corrupt, cases are delayed and judgments
favour the unmerited sides. With access to justice dependent on corruption,
administration of justice will be compromised or frustrated thereby affecting
individuals, businesses, commerce and the economy. These lead to breakdown
in law and order.
Increased poverty – Corruption leads to misallocation of resources. It causes
scarce resources to be confined to a few undeserving hands leading to the
majority being denied access to basic necessities such as food, water, shelter,
health and education.
Shoddy work and stalled projects – Once money intended for certain
projects has been stolen or embezzled, the little that is left is hardly adequate
for the planned jobs leading to substandard/incomplete work.
Unemployment – With the relocation and reduction of investment, business
activities decline, industries are shut down and jobs are lost.
Loss of confidence in government – Corruption leads to widespread
dissatisfaction with the general management of public affairs causing loss of
public goodwill and confidence in government leading to social unrest.
Rise in crime rate and insecurity - Corruption increases poverty, contributes
to high rates of unemployment and aggravates the levels of frustration in
society, leading to a corresponding rise in the crime rate and insecurity.
Negative international image – Image is an important ingredient in the
development of a country. The perception that a country is corrupt paints
a bad image of the country to the rest of the world, negatively affecting
tourism, investment, donor relations, trade, travel and national prestige.
Irregular/illegal acquisition of public land, property and utilities –
Individuals who are corrupt are capable of using their ill-gotten wealth and
authority to steal even more public property such as playgrounds, schools,
hospitals, government houses, court premises and land, thereby denying the
public access to and use of public utilities.

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter THREE

The Linkage Between Economic Crimes and Gross
Violation of Human Rights
40.

The fight against corruption is central to the struggle for human rights.
Corruption has always greased the wheels of exploitation and injustice which
characterize our world. From violent ethnic cleansing to institutionalized racism,
political actors have abused their entrusted powers to focus on gains for the
few at great cost for the many. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, wrote in his
Foreword to the UK draft Corruption Bill in 2003: “Corruption worldwide weakens
democracies, harms economies, impedes sustainable development and can
undermine respect for human rights by supporting corrupt governments with
widespread consequences”.

41.

It is essentially important to give attention to the impact of corruption on
economic, social and cultural rights. Corruption is likely to undermine enjoyment
of these rights in relation to the state’s duty to provide or regulate public services
in relation to health, housing, water and education. These services generate large
public contracts which not only create opportunities for corruption but have a
disproportionate impact on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, in particular
women. Widespread corruption in health or educational services deters the poor
from seeking health care and education, and depresses living standards and
opportunities for poorer people in particular.

42.

International human rights standards require states to realize socio-economic
rights progressively, prioritize human rights when allocating resources, and
thereafter respect, protect and fulfill these human rights. This is based on the
principle of availability and accessibility of public services to all citizens, especially
the cost and proximity. Corruption not only reduces the resources available to
implement programmes to achieve human rights but also reduces the delivery of
services. This leads to under provision, poor quality, exaggerated prices, wastage,
fraud and unavailability. Money lost to corruption could have been used to buy
medicine, equip schools or supply water. When corruption is rampant, it implies
that the state is not taking steps in the right direction.

43.

Corruption may also violate the principles of equality and non-discrimination which
are fundamental principle of human rights. This is because corruption produces
unequal and discriminatory outcomes with regard to human rights for example,
those who cannot bribe police officers are the ones who are arrested and charged.
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Similarly, those who cannot bribe judges are the ones who are jailed. Bribery,
extortion and inducement may also scare away witnesses and entrench corruption
44

Corruption also violates the right to political participation. In Kenya, these are
referred to as political rights enumerated under Article 38 of the COK 2010. These
include the right to vote for a candidate of one’s choice, and the right to stand for
elections. These rights may be violated by corrupt practices such as bribing voters,
election officials, intimidation, inter alia. Corruption is incompatible with a free and
fair electoral process or a merit –based approach to appointment in public service.

45.

Corruption also violates the right to a fair trial (Article 50) and effective remedy.
This occurs due to bribery, extortion and intimidation by police, prosecutors and
judges. This violates a suspect’s right to presumption of innocence

46.

It is the vulnerable and marginalized – women, children and the minority groupswho often suffer corruption’s harshest consequences. While dealing with police,
judges, hospitals, schools, and other basic public services, poor citizens tend to
suffer more violations than the rich and see a larger share of their resources eaten
away. It is therefore correct to state that systemic corruption facilitates, perpetuates
and institutionalizes human rights violations, and therefore prevents individuals
from realizing and enforcing their basic human rights.

47.

Corruption destroys the fundamental values of human dignity and political
equality, making it impossible to guarantee the rights to life, personal dignity and
equality. These daily realities are a direct contravention of many human rights
conventions and basic principles enshrined in those conventions.

Human Rights Conventions

356

48.

Chapter Four of the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 (COK 2010), applies at the
national level, Kenya’s international human rights obligation undertaken through
ratification of the major instruments. Chapter Four of the COK 2010 sets out the
rights and fundamental freedoms to be enjoyed by all Kenyans.

49.

Article 19 states that the Bill of Rights is an integral part of Kenya’s democratic
state and is the framework for social, economic and cultural policies. It further
stipulates that the purpose of recognizing and protecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms is to preserve the dignity of individuals and communities,
and to promote social justice and the realization of the potential of all human
beings. Of utmost importance is the provision in Article 19(3) which provides
that the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights belong to each
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individual, are not granted by the state, and are subject only to the limitations
contemplated in the Constitution.
50.

Kenya, therefore, has an obligation to respect, protect and promote the human rights
of its citizens, and to ensure that corrupt acts do not violate these human rights.

51.

These human rights conventions set out the legal obligations of a government to
ensure that people living in a country enjoy equality, a fair justice system, access to
public goods and services. States have an obligation to respect, to protect and to
fulfill human rights. A country’s ability to respect, protect and fulfill these rights will
ultimately be defined by the levels and systematic nature of corruption. A violation
of human rights therefore occurs when a state fails to respect, protect and fulfill
recognized human rights of its citizens. It follows that where rights are guaranteed
and implemented, corruption will drastically reduce.

Corruption as a violation of human rights
52.

Before attempting to connect corruption to human rights, it is important to point
out that not all acts of corruption imply a violation of rights. All forms of corruption,
may however, in the long run, have an impact on human rights.

53.

The United Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) provides a solid basis
for holding states accountable and offers a path towards stopping human rights
abuses. The convention does this by criminalizing acts of corruption, for example
bribery, embezzlement, abuse of office, illicit enrichment, inter alia. One glaring
anomaly however is that international anti-corruption conventions rarely refer to
human rights, and major human rights conventions rarely mention corruption.
International anti-corruption treaties give little guidance on how officials are to
reconcile their commitment to fight corruption with their obligation to protect
human rights.

54.

Some linkages between corruption and human rights are however visible in some
anti-corruption and human rights instruments. For example, the Preamble of
the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption emphasizes that
“corruption threatens the rule of law, democracy and human rights, undermines
good governance, fairness and social justice, distorts competition, hinders
economic development and endangers the stability of democratic institutions and
the moral foundation of society”

55.

Another linkage between corruption and human rights is seen in the Preamble
to the Declaration of Human and Citizen’s Rights of 1789. It considered that
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ignorance, forgetfulness or contempt for human rights are the only causes of
public misfortune and the corruption of governments
56.

Nevertheless, it is indisputable that where corruption is widespread, states cannot
comply with their human rights obligations. This has been concluded by UN treaty
bodies and UN special rapporteurs. For example, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights states that “states face serious problems of corruption,
which have negative effects on the full exercise of rights covered by the Covenant”.12

57.

The Committee on the Rights of the Child stated thus “it remains concerned at the
negative impact corruption may have on the allocation of already limited resources
to effectively improve the promotion and protection of children’s rights, including
their right to education and health.”13

Victims of corruption and human rights violation
58.

59.

60.

Corruption affects children’s right to life, right to health, right to education. They
also suffer from child trafficking, sexual exploitation and child labour. A good
illustration of corruption thrives in inter country adoption where judges and
orphanages are bribed to speed up the process or they accept fake adoption
papers.

61.

Poor people are affected by corruption because it diverts public resources from
investment in infrastructure that is crucial to lift them out of poverty. Grand
corruption damages the quality of public services on which the poor depend
particularly to meet basic needs.

12
13
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While corruption violates the rights of all those affected by it, it has a
disproportionate impact on people that belong to groups that are exposed to
particular risks. Examples of these are minorities, indigenous people, the disabled,
those with HIV/AIDS, refugees, prisoners, the poor, women and children. They are
more exploited and less able to defend themselves. Their vulnerability makes them
easy victims of corruption
Women are over-represented in the poorest social segments of society and underrepresented in decision-making bodies. They are less able to afford bribes, depend
much more on public servants and sometimes that men do not, especially during
pregnancy.

E/C. 12/1/ADD.91 CESCR, 2003, paragraph 12
CRC/C/COG/COG/CO/1, paragraph 14
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The indigenous and minorities, especially those linked to land that they own
collectively, suffer effects of corruption when they are displaced by infrastructure
projects, illegal/irregular sale of public land and fraud in registration of land.

Types of human rights violations in relation to corruption
63.

Three types of violations linked to corruption are: direct, indirect and remote
violations. Direct violations that occur where corruption is the direct cause of the
violation for example a parent whose child is denied entry into a public school
because the parent is unable to bribe the head teacher of the school. This directly
violates the child’s right to education. Indirect violation where corruption is a
necessary condition, for example when a traffic police man allows an overloaded
public service vehicle to pass a police road block in return for a bribe, and that
vehicle is later involved in a road accident killing the passengers. The right to life
would be indirectly affected as a result of the bribery. The bribe is an essential
factor without which the violation would not have occurred. Remote violations
where corruption is one factor among many, for example electoral corruption may
lead to protests but may not be the cause of riots or repression.

64.

A practical illustration of the link between corruption and violation of human
rights is show in Appendix 1 in a table depicting selected corrupt practices
and their impact on human rights. Although Kenya has made some strides
in fighting corruption and protecting human rights, there still exists grand
corruption that grossly violates human rights. This aspect will be analyzed later
in this chapter, when looking at the challenges of fighting corruption in Kenya,
and recommendations on the way forward in terms of legal, institutional and
administrative frameworks.

65.

One fact that is certain however is that anti-corruption agencies need to collaborate
with human rights activists in order to adequately address violation of human rights
caused by corrupt acts. Such collaboration may take place in participatory budgeting,
tracking of public expenditure, naming and shaming of corrupt public servants,
lobbying and advocacy, raising awareness and empowering people about the effects
of corruption on violation of human rights. Corruption is a complex phenomenon with
a “no one fits all solution” but a multi-disciplinary approach is critical.

66.

Before assessing Kenya’s compliance with legal obligations to combat corruption
and protect human rights, it is important to first of all briefly look at the initiatives
made to combat corruption in Kenya, since colonial times to date. This will form the
basis of determining whether or not Kenya has protected its citizens from violation
of human rights caused by corrupt acts.
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Magnitude and Scale of Grand Corruption in Kenya
67.

In order to appreciate the magnitude and scale of grand corruption in Kenya, the
Commission resorted to documented cases of grand corruption from as early as
the KenRen scandal in the 1970s up to the IEBC’s procurement of biometric voter
registration kits in 2013. Kenya’s post- independence history has been marred by
successive cases of huge scandals, commonly referred to as grand corruption. In
the last two decades, the media and civil society exposed numerous multimillion
dollar financial scams. A few select cases of grand corruption will be briefly
mentioned, to demonstrate how much the country has lost.

The Ken Ren Scandal
68.

Sometime in the early 1970s, the Kenyan government entered into a joint venture
with an American company called Ken Ren Chemical and Fertilizer Company, to
establish a fertilizer processing plant in Mombasa. The deal collapsed, the plant
was never built, the government owned company ended up in liquidation and was
embroiled in enduring cycles of litigation in Europe.14 At the time, the treasury was
headed by Mwai Kibaki as Minister for Finance. He would later become President
and serve between 2003 and 2013. In 2007, parliament was informed that Kenya
still owed Ken Ren Kshs 4.3 billion, which was being repaid using taxpayers’ money.
For example, in the 2007/2008 Budget Estimates, the Treasury made a provision for
Kshs 192.982 million as principal repayment of the Ken Ren loans to Autria-Bawag.15

The Goldenberg Scandal
69.

The Commission analysed the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the
Goldenberg Affair (Bosire Commission) that was established by President Kibaki in
February 2004, barely a month after he was sworn into office.16 It was chaired by
Justice Samuel Bosire and was mandated to inquire into allegations of irregular
payment of export compensation to Goldenberg International and into payments
made by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) to the Exchange Bank Limited in respect
of fictitious foreign exchange claims.

70.

In the late 1980s, President Daniel Arap Moi introduced the infamous export
compensation scheme to encourage legitimate export of gold and to eliminate
smuggling of gold, thereby increasing revenue from such export business. The

14 SA Coopee Lavalin vs Ken Ren Chemicals and Fertilisers Limited (1994) 2 All ER 449, Republic of Kenya –vs- Bawag of Austria
(2000). In both cases, awards were made against Kenya
15 Government of Kenya 2007/2008 Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure for the Year ending 20th June 2008(June 2007). See also
Mars Group Kenya “The Mystery of Ken Ren Fertilizer Company” at http//www.marsgroup.org/pages/stories/ken-ren
16 The Goldernberg Report, which runs into some 848 paragraphs and appendices marked” A” to “Q”, is a collation of oral evidence
of over 102 witnesses, whose Hansard ran into a staggering 18,824 pages.
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relevant legislation, the Local Manufacturers (Export Compensation) Act, Chapter
482 of the Laws of Kenya, provided that the scheme was intended to encourage
trade and foreign exchange earnings. Unfortunately, this was never to be.
71.

The Goldernberg scandal, which began in 1991, was a massive economic scam that
cost the Kenya government over Kshs 60 billion (approximately USD 750 million).
This loss was occasioned by illegal/irregular and fraudulent foreign exchange claims
and dubious export compensation awards to Goldernberg International Limited
(GIL), based on fictitious gold and diamond jewellery exports. The architects of the
scheme also used instruments and mechanisms like pre-shipment finance facility
and Export retention schemes to defraud Kenyans of the billions of shillings, under
the watch of the CBK. In a nutshell, the scam was a high level conspiracy between
senior government officials and unscrupulous well connected businessmen, to
plunder the country’s resources at will.

72.

The scam came into the public limelight in April 1992 through the courageous
actions of a whistleblower, the late David Munyakei, a clerk at CBK. He passed on
some damning information to opposition MPs, who tabled the same in Parliament.
The Daily Nation, a major media house in Kenya, also published the first story. 17
Following the exposure, the payment scheme was stopped.

73.

After nearly three years of intensive inquiry, the Bosire Commission produced
the famous Goldernberg Report, listing several names for the Attorney General
to either prosecute or take civil action. The following individuals were adversely
mentioned in the report of the Commission;
a)

Mr. Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji Pattni (the Director, promoter and
shareholder of GIL);

b)

Mr. James Kanyotu (Pattni’s business partner and former head of the
dreaded Special Branch, deceased);

c)

Prof. George Saitoti (former Vice President and Finance Minister during
former president Moi’s reigns, deceased);

d)

Mr. Charles Mbindyo (former Treasury PS);

e)

Dr. Wilfred Karuga Koinange (former Treasury PS);

f)

Mr. Collins Owayo (former Commissioner of Mines and Geology);

g)

Mr. Arthur Ndegwa (then Senior Mining Engineer in the Office of the
Commissioner of Miners and Geology);

17 See P. Warutere “Goldernberg’s Sh 186 million Pre-Shipment Scheme, Daily Nation( 21 April 19192)
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h)

Mr. Eric Kotut (former CBK Governor);

i)

Mr. Francis Chelego Cheruiyot (former Commissioner of Customs and
Excise);

f)

Mr. Eliphas Riungu (former CBK Deputy Governor);

k)

Mr. Elijah Arap Bii (former Kenya Commercial Bank General Manager);

l)

Mr. Tom Kilalya Werunga (former CBK employee);

m) Mr. Michael Wanjihia (former CBK employee); and
n)
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Mr. Job K. Kilach (former CBK employee).

74.

In respect of “those whose specific roles could not be established, [the
Commission] recommend[ed] that at the discretion of the Attorney General
further investigations be undertaken against them to determine their respective
roles, if any, in the whole scam, and whether they were in any way, involved in any
wrong doing. Falling in this category are, among others, former president Daniel
Arap Moi, Mr. Joseph Magari (former Treasury PS), Mr. Joshua Kulei (Moi’s former
personal aide), and Multiphasic Co. Ltd. A number of individuals like Professor
George Saitoti successfully moved to court to have their names expunged from
the report.

75.

Apart from identifying individuals involved, the Report also made a startling
finding that the alleged gold and diamond jewellery exports were non-existent
and that no exports or earnings were made to warrant export compensation.
Further, the irregular payments to GIL flagrantly flouted the provisions of the Export
Compensation Act as the compensation rate of 35% was above the ceiling of 20%.
The Bosire Commission could not execute its mandate relating to the tracing of
assets acquired with monies illegally obtained from the Goldernberg scam, as it
correctly pointed out that this was a Herculean task involving a thorough forensic
audit both locally and internationally.

76.

Although the Goldernberg scam was undoubtedly a massive rip off perpetrated
by greedy individuals, the full extent of the damage is unknown. The Commission
is of the view that the report is yet to be meaningfully implemented, particularly
in the realm of conducting further investigations and prosecution of those behind
the scam. A few senior public officers in the Ministry of Finance, like Dr Wilfred
Koinange, Eliphas Riungu, Elijah Bii were dismissed and charged with abuse of
office. Others like Michael Wanjihia and Joshua Magari were dismissed but not
charged with any offence, although Joshua Magari was later charged with abuse
of office in another grand corruption case commonly known as Anglo- Leasing.
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In relation to asset recovery, the CBK repossessed the multi-billion Grand Regency
Hotel from Kamlesh Pattni, the chief architect of the Goldenberg scam. The hotel
was later sold by the Bank to the Libyan Arab African Investment Company Kenya
Limited (LAICO) under mysterious circumstances, and is now known as Laico
Regency. Following public outcry over the sale, a Commission of Inquiry set up
by President Kibaki made adverse findings against the then Minister for Finance
Amos Kimunya and Professor Njuguna Ndungu the CBK Governor, but no action
was taken against them. To date, the contents of the said report have never been
released to the public.

The Charter House Bank Scandal
78.

The Charterhouse Bank Scandal is perhaps one of the most profound scandals
in Kenya’s banking sector to date. Though it only received much attention in the
media in the recent years, the scam dates back to March/April 2004, when some
former employees of the blank blew the whistle on a raft of irregularities involving
the bank and a host of its customers, including tax evasion, money laundering
and off-shore money transfers. This was being allegedly done in collusion with
Nakumatt Holdings.

79.

The bank was in June 2006 placed under statutory receivership by the CBK. The
investigative audit uncovered considerable evidence pointing at strong indications
that the Bank’s customers were involved in tax evasion and money laundering. The
Bank was also found to have grossly violated the Banking Act and CBK’s prudential
regulations. Similar concerns had earlier been raised by the government’s Joint
Investigation Task Force.

80.

In January 2010, attempts were made to have the bank re-opened. The attempts to
have the bank reopened resurfaced on 7 July 2010 when Yatta MP Charles Kilonzo
presented a petition to Parliament on behalf of 35 depositors seeking to have the
bank re-opened. In September 2010, the Bank was the focus of a fresh probe by the
Parliamentary Committee on Finance, Planning and Trade.

81.

The Committee, chaired by Nambale MP Chris Okemo summoned and heard from,
among others, the then Finance Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, former Finance Minister
Amos Kimunya, KRA Commisioner-General Michael Waweru, CBK Governor Prof.
Njuguna Ndung’u, KACC Acting Director John Mutonyi, Deputy Solicitor-General
Muthoni Kimani, and the Director of Public Prosecutions Keriako Tobiko. In a
strange twist, the senior government officials backtracked on the government’s
earlier position, recommending the re-opening of the bank. Through its
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Commissioner-General, Michael Waweru, KRA, for instance, absolved the Bank
of any wrong-doing, asserting that its investigations on tax evasion focused on
the bank’s customers, and not the bank itself. Clearly, this contradicts KRA earlier
position (in July 2006) that the Bank had abetted massive tax evasion by its
customers.
82.

On its part, through its Governor, Prof. Ndung’u, CBK told the Committee that it
did not object to the re-opening of the Bank. Through its then Acting Director,
John Mutonyi, KACC informed the Committee that it would have no objection to
the bank’s re-opening, and that the evidence of money laundering uncovered by
the task force could not be acted upon as money laundering was not an offence in
Kenya at the time.

83.

So far, nothing substantial has been revealed to the public concerning the
operations of the Bank, as well as the circumstances surrounding its closure.
Apparently, the concerned government institutions and agencies have much to
hide. Since Kenyans have a right to the truth of the matter, it is only prudent for
the government to conduct in-depth investigations and reveal the truth.

The Anglo-Leasing Scandal
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84.

The Goldenberg Affair was only a precursor to other cases of grand corruption
in the government. Early in 2004, Kenyans awoke to the news of an even more
monstrous scandal, the “Anglo Leasing Scam”. Sadly, the precise story of the scam
cannot, as yet, be conclusively narrated as too much still remains unravelled; the
scam is heavily shrouded in secrecy.

85.

The Commission looked at the scam through the eyes of an “insider”, the former
Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President (in-charge of Ethics and
Governance), Mr. John Githongo, who blew the whistle on the scandal. Mr.
Githongo, a former head of TI-Kenya, was once forced into exile (in the UK) amidst
threats to his life and personal security. He has since returned to Kenya after
President Kibaki’s government pledged to ensure his security. The Commission
regrets that Mr. Githongo could not appear before it to shed light on the saga.
The Commission therefore relied on reports by various government agencies,
including the National Assembly’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the Kenya
Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), the defunct Office of the Controller &
Auditor-General (C&AG). The Commission also considered reports by various
non-state actors (NSAs), including the media and civil society organizations
(CSOs).
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The multimillion dollar scandal, which Transparency International (TI) has
described as an “albatross around the Kibaki government’s neck”,18 involved an
array of contracts with non-existent entities for various fictitious security projects.19
The scam, which was predicated on the condition that payments of the contract
sum of KES 56.3 billion would be in the form of irrevocable promissory notes to the
order of Anglo Leasing & Finance Company (ALFC) and other similarly fictitious
entities,20 was reportedly intended to raise funds for President Kibaki’s re-election
in December 2007.

87.

The scandal started when, sometime in 2001, the government wanted to replace its
old passport printing system with a state-of-the-art tamper-proof system. Between
late 2001 and December 2002, the Moi government had signed an overwhelming
USD 443.36 million worth of contracts with a fictitious company, Anglo Leasing
and Finance Limited. In January 2003, the Kibaki government ratified the scam;
between January 2003 and January 2004, it had signed an additional USD 277.7
million worth of contracts, once again with the fictitious company. This eventually
saw Kenya grappling with massive scams to defraud public coffer.

88.

At the height of the scandal, the PS in the Office of the President (in Charge of
Governance and Ethics), Mr. John Githongo, conducted an investigation into the
scam. He shared his findings with President Kibaki on 22 November 2005, while in
exile in the UK. This is because he ‘thought it wise to wait until the conclusion of
the politically intense referendum-related campaigning period”. And wise it was, as
he notes, once again, a release of the dossier during the campaign period “[would
have been] construed to be part of a politically-motivated action in favour or in
opposition of any political formation [of the time]”. In the report, he indicates that
the President was well aware of all that was going.

89.

The Githongo Dossier reveals that the scam involved senior-most officials in the
then infant Kibaki regime, the majority of whom were the President’s closest
associates. Adversely mentioned in this respect are:

Chapter THREE

(a) Dr. Moody A. Awori (former Vice President);
(b) Mr. Kiraitu Murungi (former Minister for Justice and Constitutional
Affairs);
18 “Its Time To Tell Kenyan People The Truth About Anglo-Leasing Corruption Scandal” TI Press Release, Jan 22, 2006, http://www.
transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_
19 J. Githongo, “Findings Of Graft In The Government Of Kenya”( November 2005), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/
pdf/09_02_06kenya_report.pdf
20 Kenya National Audit Office Special Report by the Controller and Auditor General on the Procurement of Passport Issuing
Equipment( May 2004)
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(c) Amb. Francis Muthaura (former Head of Civil Service);
(d) Mr. David Mwiraria (former Minister for Finance);
(e) Mr. Chris Murungaru (former Minister for Internal Security);
(f ) Mr. Dave Mwangi (former Permanent Secretary for Internal Security);
and
(g) Mr. Joseph Magari (former Permanent Secretary for Treasury).
90.

In April 2004, the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) requested the
Controller and Auditor General(C&AG) to conduct an audit report on the Anglo
Leasing transactions relating to procurement of passport issuing equipment. From
28 April 2004 to 7 May 2004, the C&AG conducted the audit and presented his
report, which was eventually tabled before the National Assembly on 18 May 2004.
The report disclosed that:
(a) the Department of Immigration (DOI), the actual client of the project, was
not involved in the procurement process;
(b) no due diligence tests were carried out to verify ALFC’s financial and
technical capacity;
(c) Anglo Leasing had fore-knowledge of DOI’s plans to modernize its passport
issuing system.
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91.

After scrutinizing the report, PAC tabled the report for debate and adoption by the
House. This was not to be as the report was subjected to heavy mutilations. For
instance, the recommendation that the then Minister for Finance, Hon. Mwiraria,
be held responsible for involving the government in the fraudulent project was
expunged from the report, following a successful amendment motion by the then
Minister for Water, Hon. Martha Karua. Further, the recommendation that Ministers
be held responsible for any fraudulent activities or embezzlement of funds in their
ministries was also expunged. Consequently, the motion for the adoption of the
Committee’s report was defeated on a vote by the House.

92.

This conduct by MPs clearly demonstrates the greatest challenge to fighting
corruption in Kenya; lack of political will and impunity. Disappointed, the
Committee deliberated at length over the rejection of its report by the House. It
resolved that the only way to push the report through the House was to collect
further evidence to establish the real movers of the scam, after which it would table
a comprehensive report in the House. Thus, from 7 February 2006 to sometime in
March 2006, under the leadership of its Chair (Hon. Uhuru Kenyatta), it embarked
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on a process of summoning and hearing various witnesses “star witnesses”. In
total, about 22 sittings were held, with the view of collecting further evidence
to establish the real identities of individuals and entities behind the scam. The
Committee received both oral and written submissions.
93.

In the company of a representative from the Office of the Controller & AuditorGeneral and four members of staff of the National Assembly, the Committee
members also travelled to London, where they heard the evidence of Mr. Githongo
(on 11th and 12th February 2006), which was entirely based on his earlier dossier.
The decision to take Mr. Githongo’s evidence in London was based on the fact that
though he was willing to give evidence on the subject, he had alleged that he was
receiving threats from powerful personalities.

94.

In its consensual report, the Committee observed that, generally, the witnesses
who appeared before it cooperated and gave vital information. However, it
regrettably noted that some witnesses sought refuge under the sub judice rule in
their bid to escape giving evidence. More importantly, though he appeared before
the Committee, Mr. Murungi refused to testify, contesting the legality of the probe.
On the identity of ALFC and its “shareholding”, the Committee heard evidence
pointing to the fact that the fictitious firm:
(a) “is part of an organized, systematic and fraudulent scheme to fleece the
government through the so-called special purpose financing vehicles for
purported security contracts”; and
(b) is associated with Mr. Deepak Kamani, Mr. Anura Perera, Mr. Amin Juma, Dr.
Merlvyn Kettering and Mrs. Ludmilla Kuschenko.

95.

On the features of the security contracts, the Committee observed:
The Security contracts all have the same design and features. The contracts are all for
large sums of money, and have been entered into by single sourcing. In each case, there
are two role players, a financier and a supplier. ... [Sometimes] the financing company
and the supplier are ... related companies. At other times, the supplier is a reputable
international company ... [while] the financing company is a shadowy entity whose
exact identity could not be legally verified. It seems that the role of the financing
company is to necessitate the creation of debt by the government, as opposed to
outright payments for the goods or services procured. Once debt is created, it is the
responsibility of the Treasury to service it through the Consolidated Fund Service, as
opposed to the line ministry paying for it through its voted funds. ... In effect, therefore,
the government paid money to the financing company which then paid to the supplier,
using that money, who then supplied the goods or services. The government then paid
interest to the financing company on its own money.
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96.

On the procurement process, the Committee heard that “security was used
as an excuse to procure [the] contracts using single sourcing, even where the
projects merely involved the postal services and meteorological department”. The
Committee noted with grave concern that:
(a) key ministers (in the Kibaki government) attempted to cover-up the scam,
and also hindered investigations into the same (Hon. Mwiraria and Hon.
Murungi were adversely mentioned in this respect);
(b) the Treasury abdicated its role, and particularly failed to advise the
government on the grossly unfavourable terms of the contracts;
(c) the AG was not involved in the negotiations for the contracts;
(d) there is no evidence that the Cabinet approved the contracts;
(e) “KACC was initially eager to investigate the case ... [as] demonstrated by
the preliminary report that named the vice president, Minister for Finance
and their respective permanent secretaries, and civil servants as among the
individuals that could provide useful information” but “when the final list
of names was presented to the Attorney General for prosecution, only the
names of permanent secretaries and other civil servants were included ...
[but those of ] political figures were notably missing”; and
(f ) it was not convinced about the ability of KACC to prosecute the cases fairly,
given its selective exclusion of political figures.

97.

Mr. Murgor was sacked and replaced with Mr. Keriako Tobiko, a former Chief
Defence Counsel in cases involving Mr. Cheruiyot and others in respect of the
Forensic Science Laboratory project — a clear case of conflict of interest, as Mr.
Tobiko was expected to continue with prosecution of the cases. The Committee
accepted Mr. Githongo’s evidence that:
(a) the discussion between Mr. Githongo and Hon. Mwiraria is “authentic”;
(b) the Vice President (Hon. Awori) was aware of the Anglo Leasing affair:
(c) President Kibaki was also up to date, having been “regularly briefed on the
Anglo Leasing contracted and the related contracts from the time Anglo
Leasing became the subject of a parliamentary inquiry [sometime in 2004]”.
In this respect, it observed:

98.
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The Committee was of the view that the Anglo Leasing arrangement “[was] not
possible without the most elaborate collusion on the part of all concerned” — the
business people involved in the supply of goods and services; civil servants (as
negotiators of the terms of contracts); and the political leaders in the concerned
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Ministries or departments. In this respect, the Committee went ahead to identify
“culpable” individuals at all the three levels. The Committee particularly found Hon.
Awori culpable, making its finding in the following unequivocal terms:
There is abundant evidence on record that [Hon. Awori] was, contrary to his evidence
before the committee, sufficiently involved in the implementation of the Anglo Leasing
contracts as to take responsibility for its shortcomings. First, on the evidence of his
Permanent Secretary, the [he] was involved in the procurement of the contract and was
kept informed at every stage. ... Secondly ... [he] read a ministerial statement in Parliament
in which he exonerated himself from any wrong doing in respect of the contract and
further informed Parliament that the passports contract with [ALFC] was valid. ... [He]
could only have read the ministerial statement with either the intention of facilitating a
cover up, or he was unconcerned as to whether or not the statement was true. ... Thirdly,
[he] misleadingly defended the reputation of Anglo Leasing in his ministerial statement.
... Fourthly, [nowitstanding Mr. Githongo’s warning], [he] abdicated responsibility which
allowed Anglo Leasing to sign a contract that was outrightly disadvantageous to the
public interest. ... His inaction, when his ministry was involved in a procurement process
that was questionable is completely inexcusable.

99.

Even more culpability was attributed to Hon. Mwiraria, in whose respect the
Committee made the following categorical observation:
The Minister for Finance, Hon. David Mwiraria, MP displayed a most cavalier attitude
towards the Anglo Leasing and related contracts, failing to give the much needed
leadership in the search for the resolution of these contracts. To begin with, according to
his own testimony before the Committee, [he] was only interested in the recovery of the
money paid to [ALFC] and once this had been recovered, he considered himself discharged
from any further responsibility. In the view of the Committee, [he] displayed greater fear in
finding out who was behind the Anglo Leasing contracts, as if he already knew.

100. From the evidence presented to it, the Committee particularly inferred that Hon.
Mwiraria knew the identity of the highly fictitious Anglo Leasing. Thus it noted:
The evidence of Mr. Githongo, which the Committee accepts, was that Hon. Mwiraria,
MP had instructed Mr. Oyula to call the principals of Anglo Leasing and ask them to
refund the money. ... There is evidence of expensive trips to Europe that were made by
law enforcement officers with a view to establishing the owners of Anglo Leasing when,
all along, Hon. Mwiraria and his Financial Secretary [Mr. Oyula] appear to have known
them. Mr. Oyula’s testimony also confirmed that he was instructed by Hon. Mwiraria, MP
to seek a refund from [ALFC]

101. The Committee was satisfied that Hon. Murungi “acted to protect Hon.
Murungaru, MP and Mr. [Alfred] Gitonga and hence obstruct justice given that he
was in charge of [the] ministry [responsible for providing leadership in the fight
against corruption]”. The Committee observed that Mr. Mwaliko misled it by, for
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instance, claiming that due diligence was done (when, in fact, it was not done),
and claiming that all comments forwarded to his office from the AG’s office had
been incorporated into the final project documents, when that was not the case.
Mr. Cheruiyot (former PS for Internal Security) was found to be “most evasive
and unreliable” as “[h]e appeared not to remember only those matters that were
prejudicial to him and remembered the details of everything else”. In light of the
role he played in the Forensic Laboratory Project, the Committee recommended
“[f ]urther inquiry involving persons who worked with [him], for example his
minister and the Head of Public Service at the time”.
102. On Amb. Muthaura, the Committee was of the view that “[t]he head of civil service
had in the advertisement misled the public that there had no wrong doing by
anybody”. Further, it opined that — “[t]he Principal Immigration Officer (PIO) was
transferred within the knowledge of the head of the public service fully aware that
he was one of the few officers who were opposed to the manner in which the
passport project was handled. In fact he could not offer an explanation as to why
Mr. Ole Ndiema was transferred. The Committee found it difficult not [to] believe
that he was not transferred because of being a ‘stumbling block’ in the passport
procurement contract.
103. Based on the above (and other findings), the Committee recommended further
investigation into the conduct of, among others, Hon. Awori, Hon. Mwiraria, Hon.
Murungi, Mr. Mwaliko, Mr. Cheruiyot, Amb. Muthaura and Mr. Dave Mwangi.
Unfortunately, the Committee shied from making any recommendation in respect
of the President, yet it was of the unanimous view that the President was aware of
all that was going on but failed to act.
104. Further, the Committee recommended, among other things, that:
(a) the KACC Director should liaise with the AG, the Police Commissioner and
other relevant bodies, with a view to ensuring prosecution of those involved
in the negotiations and approval of the passport procurement project;
(b) the AG should ensure legal termination of projects that had not taken off;
(c) government programmes, whether security related or otherwise, should
be included in the National Budget and tabled before the House;
(d) the office of the C&AG should urgently table its report (on the 18 “Anglo
Leasing and Anglo Leasing type” contracts);
(e) a Departmental Committee called “Parliamentary Security Committee” be
established to deal with national security related issues;

370

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter THREE

(f ) KACC should hasten its investigations and make its report public as soon as
possible; and
(g) all government projects, whether security related or otherwise, should
receive cabinet approval before the signing of any contract or payment of
any funds.
105. The Committee’s report was presented to the National Assembly (for tabling) on
28 March 2006. Initially, the government characteristically attempted to block the
tabling of the report, questioning the legality of the same. However, on 30 March
2006, the then Speaker of the House (Hon. Francis Ole Kaparo) made a landmark
ruling that, in light of the coming to fore of new evidence, PAC’s re-opening of
the investigations was justified.21 This effectively paved way for the tabling and
eventual adoption of the report (on 18 April 2006). In sanctioning the tabling of
the report, the Hon. Speaker ruled:
I am persuaded to take the view that auditing is a continuous process that moves
forward and backwards. Its aim is to establish whether public funds have been utilized
in the intended way, economically, efficiently and within the legal framework. It is also
meant to establish whether there has been impropriety in the utilisation of funds, and
if there has been, to seek redress, close the gaps and stop further impropriety. In short,
to stop waste misappropriation of public funds. It is a continuing process. In the same
breath, the PAC, being the first Committee ever to be created in the history of the House
of Commons of the United Kingdom, from where we derive our own procedures, is a
Select Committee as opposed to ad hoc, Sessional and Departmental Committees. It
is alive all the time. It watches over the application of taxes collected from the people
by the Executive. It is for this reason that it is referred to as the “Watchdog Committee”.
The “dog” must watch. The “dog” in the Committee is not allowed to sleep in its watch,
and so must the Committee. It must be vigilant and watchful on behalf of the House
at all times. It is dynamic and not static in its very nature. ... It is for this greater public
interest, in spite of my misgivings on the procedure used in compiling this Report, that
I am inclined to admit this report for consideration by this House.

106. During 2004/2005 and part of 2005/2006, the C&AG carried out audits of the 18
security related projects funded through foreign supplier/credit arrangements. The
culminating report, which was presented to the National Assembly in April 2006,
summarized the outcome of the audit, particularly highlighting issues relating to
financing, procurement and implementation of the projects.22 The report came hot
on the heels of the PAC Report.
21 National Assembly Official( Record) Hansard, 30/3/2006, 236-239
22 Kenya National Audit Office Special Report of the Controller and Auditor General on Financing, Procurement and Implementation
Strategy Related Projects( April 2006)
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107. The audit made a number of serious revelations about the scam, which, in many
respects, corroborated the findings made in the Githongo Dossier and the PAC
Report. For instance, the audit report revealed that:
(a) Out of the 18 projects, 12 were contracted and respective agreements
signed between 1997 and December, while the remaining six were
contracted and signed between January 2003 and January 2004. Out of the
latter six, three were initiated and negotiated between the years 2000 and
2002; no information was available regarding the initiation and negotiation
of the other three.
(b) The policy regarding consideration and use of lease financing and supplier
credit arrangements in respect of key priority security projects had been
approved by the cabinet in 2001, as an alternative to the unreliable and
fast-dwindling donor support.
(c) Through the 18 contracts, the government had been committed to spending
a total of KES 56.33 billion. The commitments, whose net value is equivalent
to 16.21% of Kenya’s Gross Annual Expenditure for the year 2003/2004,
assumed the character of “irrevocable Promissory Notes which were given
to the credit provides on the dates the respective credit agreements were
signed”.
(d) Competitive bidding as provided for in the Public Procurement Regulations
(2001) was not applied in the identification and ward of the contracts to the
various suppliers. In the absence of this, it was not possible for the audit
team to ascertain how the contract sums were determined and accepted
by the government as fair and competitive.
(e) Similarly, no competitive bidding was used to identify the financiers/
credit providers. In the absence of this, the audit team could not ascertain
how the terms of the credit, including the interest rates chargeable, were
determined and agreed upon. As a result, it was equally not possible to
ascertain whether the respective interest rates and other terms were fair
and competitive.
(f ) For most of the contracts, the suppliers were not subjected to due diligence
tests. Consequently, it was not possible for the audit team to establish how
the competence, capacity and capability of the contracted suppliers were
ascertained.
(g) Seven of the supplier/credit providers do not exist in the countries in which
they are purported to be registered/domiciled, and may therefore not be
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bona fide registered business firms. The seven are: Forensic Laboratories
(purportedly based in Edinburg, Scotland); Anglo Leasing & Finance Ltd.
(purportedly based in Liverpool, UK); Sound Day Corporation (purportedly
based in Daventry, Scotland); Infotalent Ltd. (purportedly based in Geneva,
Switzerland); Midland Finance & Securities Ltd. (purportedly based in Geneva,
Switzerland), Apex Finance Corporation (purportedly based in Geneva,
Switzerland); and First Merchantile Securities Corporation (purportedly
based in Geneva, Switzerland). The audit team further expressed fears
that additional firms may also prove fictitious if probes are made into their
identities.
(h) The audit team could not establish the amounts of credit disbursed or the
amounts which remained undisbursed as there were no invoices, delivery
notes or certificates of completion of works, which would ordinarily
indicate the value of the contract deliverables accomplished as at the date
of payment. n fact, the team was surprised to find out that none of the
contracts had provision requiring the suppliers to submit these documents
to the government.
(i) From the evidence and information gathered, it was evident that “the
contract sums and particularly the prices of goods/equipment were grossly
inflated compared to the market prices at the time”.
(j) In the absence of complete information on the work/goods/services
delivered in respect of each of the 18 contracts, the audit team could not
establish the extent of actual losses suffered by the government.
108. On the basis of this revelations, the C&AG recommended, among other things,
that:
(a) immediate steps be taken to establish the legal status of the respective
suppliers/financiers, including the seven earlier mentioned;
(b) the responsible Accounting Officers should be required to provide all
information and documentation necessary for the determination of the
actual losses suffered by the government in respect of each of the 18
contracts;
(c) where overpayment to the suppliers/financiers is proved, or where
payments have been made but no work/goods/services have been
received, efforts (including legal action) should be made to recover such
overpayments;
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(d) all security projects’ budgets be presented to Parliament for approval under
the respective Ministry/Department’s estimates/votes;
(e) a Special Procurement Committee to oversee the procurement of security
related equipment/services be established; and
(f ) consideration be given for the establishment of a Special Parliamentary
Committee to deal with Defence/National Security issues, including the
related accounts and audit reports.

Implementation of the various reports: Review of KACC’s responses
109. An analysis of KACC’s response to the various PAC and C&AG reports reveals a
mixed record. It was surprised that the first time KACC conducted an investigation
was in the quarterly period January-March 2005, yet the matter had come to public
limelight as early as April 2004. In the first place, why it took KACC this long to
respond was beyond the TJRC’s comprehension.
110. In the January-March 2005 quarterly period, KACC inquired into contracts relating
to the CID Forensic Laboratories Project.23 Its investigations revealed, among
other things, that “the government procurement procedures were not followed
in awarding the contract” and “the contract was signed before establishing the
legal status of the two companies”. Though it could not establish the identity of
the Directors of the two companies, the investigation revealed that, by 14 June
2004, “all the money paid to [ALFC] ... [had been] paid back to the Government”.
On this basis, KACC recoed the prosecution of Mr. Cheruiyot (former PS), Mr. John
F.A. Agili (former Finance Office in the Office of the President) and Mr. Francis Sang
(former Director of CID). The file was forward to the AG on 11 February 2005. On 2
March 2005, the AG accepted the recommendation to prosecute Mr. Cheruiyot and
Mr. Agili, but recommended that Mr. Sang be treated as a witness “as his evidence
would be vital”
111. During the January-March 2005 quarterly period, KACC also investigated the
contract relating to the supply and installation of new passport issuing system
for the Department of Immigration. Investigations revealed that “[ALFC] is not
registered either in UK or in Kenya” and “[the] contract was entered into without
verifying the legal status of the company and in total breach of procurement
procedures” The investigation further established that “the money paid to [ALFC]
... was paid back to the Government by 13th May 2004”.
23 Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) Quarterly Report for the Period January-March 2005( April 2005), 2-3
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.Based on its findings, KACC recommended the prosecution of Mr. Mwaliko
(former PS in the Office of the Vice President), Mr. Magari (former Treasury
PS), Dr. Wilson Kipsang Sitonik (former Director of the Treasury’s Government
Information Technology Systems) and Mr. David L. Onyonka (former Head of the
Treasury’s Debt Management Division). The file was forwarded to the AG on 11th
February 2005 and the recommendation to prosecute was accepted on 16th
February 2005.

113. In the July-September 2006 quarterly period, KACC inquired into allegations
of irregular contract involving Globetel Inc. (UK) relating to the supply and
installation of a multi-channel security system for the Administration Police, and
found out that the procurement process was marred with various irregularities.
For instance, “[t]he project was [neither] planned for nor was it budgeted for
as required by law”; “[n]o due diligence was done to assess the competence
and capability of the contractors”; and “[f ]urther, commitment fee and the first
instalment were paid before anything was done to implement the project”.
The file was reportedly forwarded to the AG on 27 September 2006, with clear
recommendations that the former PS, OP (in charge of Provincial Administration
& International Security) , the former Deputy Chief Finance Office t, he former
Finance Minister and the former Treasury PS be charged with criminal offences.
114. The quarterly period also saw investigations into other “Anglo Leasing and Anglo
Leasing type” projects.
115. The e-Cops Project: Investigations into this ambitious project — which was
intended to see countrywide computerization of the security, law and order
systems — established various irregularities in the procurement process. For
instance, it revealed that “[t]he project was not planned for nor was it budgeted
for as required by law” and that “[n]o due diligence was done to assess the
competence and capability of the contractors”. The file was forwarded to the AG
on 27 September 2006, with recommendation that the former PS in the Office of
the President in-charge of Internal Security), Mr. Mwiraria (former Finance Minister)
and former Treasury PS be charged in court.
116. The NEWSS Project: KACC inquiries into this project — which was intended to
modernize the country’s early warning food security system at the Meteorological
Department — established that “[t]he project was approved despite the
fact that no budgetary allocation had been made”. It also revealed that “[t]he
procurement procedures were ... not followed”. The file was forwarded to the AG
on 29 September 2006, with recommendation that the former Director of the
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Meteorological Department, former Transport Minister, former Finance Minister
and former Financial Secretary be charged in court.
117. The Spacenet Project: KACC’s investigations into this project — which was
intended to install VSAT-based internet services in all post offices in Kenya (even
in rural post offices where there is no electricity!) — revealed that the project had
been secretly negotiated between the former Postmaster General of the Postal
Corporation of Kenya and one Mr. Michael Alan of Spacenet Corporation of USA,
with the cumulative approval of the former PS, Ministry of Transport, the former
Minister for Transport and the former Minister for Finance. The investigation
further revealed that the project was camouflaged as a security project. The file
was forwarded to the AG, with the recommendation that the former Postmaster
General, the former Minister for Transport, the former PS in the Ministry of
Transport, the former Minister for Finance and the former Financial Secretary be
charged in court.
118. The Police Department Modernization Project: KACC also inquired into this
projected, which was intended to secure financing for the modernization of Police
equipment and accessories (including an assortment of arms and ammunitions).
The investigations revealed that “there was no budgetary allocation for the
project”, and that a commitment fee of EUR 1.2 million was paid upfront, but no
supplies were made. The file was forwarded to the AG on 29 September, with
recommendation that the former PS in the Office of the President in-charge of
Internal Security, the former Minister for Internal Security, the former Treasury
PS, former Finance Minister) and former Head of Treasury’s Debt Management
Department be charged.

Anglo Leasing and Related Prosecutions: Progress Review
119. So far, the government has done little to implement the PAC Repor. Mr. Mwaliko
was charged in court alongside Mr. Onyonka (Debt Management Department)
and Dr. Wilson Sitonik. In March 2012, the latter two were acquitted for lack of
sufficient evidence while Mr. Mwaliko was put on his defence. It suffices to note that
prosecution of the trio started way before the PAC recommendations. Recently,
some leaked US diplomatic cables (from the US Embassy in Nairobi) detailed how
the former AG (Wako) and the former Director of the defunct KACC (Ringera)
frustrated efforts to prosecute the big names behind Anglo Leasing scam.
120. The Grand Regency saga was an outcrop of the Goldenberg Affair. It revolved
around the famous Grand Regency Hotel, one of the properties believed to have

376

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter THREE

been acquired (by Kamlesh Pattni) with proceeds from the Goldenberg scam. The
CBK came into the tussle via a credit of KES 9.9 billion to Mr. Pattni’s Exchange
Bank, which debt was passed on to Mr. Pattni sometime in June 1993.
121. When Mr. Pattni failed to fully repay the loan, the CBK secured a charge over the
Hotel, then registered in the name of Uhuru Highway Development Ltd., one of
the many companies owned by Mr. Pattni. On 15 April 1994, CBK appointed a
receiver-manager. Later, itattempted to exercise its statutory power of sale under
the charge. This prompted Mr. Pattni and UHDL to file a suit, which resulted in
injunctive orders restraining the Bank from exercising its statutory power of sale.24
122. In 2003, KACC filed a suit against Mr. Pattni and 16 others, with the intention of
repossessing the hotel, arguing that it had been obtained using illegally acquired
public funds.25 In April 2008, after endless battles in court, Mr. Pattni and UHDL
gave in; a settlement was registered in court, by which the pending suits were
discontinued and terminated, and the hotel handed over to CBK. Thereafter, the
hotel was controversially sold to the Libyan Arab African Investment Company
Kenya Ltd (LAICO).
123. The controversy surrounding the sale of the Hotel surfaced in the National Assembly
when, on 23 April 2008, the MP for Imenti Central, Hon. Gitobu Imanyara, sought
a Ministerial Statement from the Minister for Finance. Hon. Imanyara specifically
wanted to know: (1) whether UHDL and CBK had sold, or were in the process
of selling, the Hotel to a company known as Meridian Arab African Investment
Company (MAAIC); and (2) whether the Government of Kenya had agreed to
withdraw all civil and criminal cases revolving around Pattni and his companies.26
124. On 29 April 2008, the Finance Minister Hon. Amos Kimunya issued the Ministerial
Statement, wherein he indicated, among other things, that:
(a) he had directed CBK to move and dispose of the Hotel at the earliest
opportunity;
(b) CBK would be selling the Hotel under its statutory power of sale;
(c) the public is assured that the sale value will not be less than the highest
open market value obtained during the valuation of the hotel; and
(d) the Government had a keen interest in the sale, and that the Minister would
consult and guide CBK in the sale process.
24 Uhuru Highway Development Ltd, Kamlesh Pattni & Others –Vs- Central Bank of Kenya & Others, HCC NO. 589 OF 1999
25 Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission –Vs- Kamlesh Pattni & Others, HCC NO. 1111 of 2003
26 Kenya National Assembly Hansard (23 April 2008) xxxx.
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125. Responding specifically to the issues raised by Hon. Imanyara, the Minister stated
that “[i]t is not true that the hotel has been sold to Meridian Arab African Investment
Company” and “[i]t is not true that the Government has given amnesty to Kamlesh
Pattni and his associated companies”. Certainly, this was not true as, by the time
the Minister issued the Ministerial Statement, so much water had gone under the
bridge in relation to the sale of the hotel (to LAICO). In fact, Kamlesh Pattni had
already instructed his counsels to negotiate with CBK with a view to selling the
hotel to LAICO, and the CBK had been negotiating the sale of the hotel (to LAICO)
and its Board had already sanctioned the sale.

The Cockar Probe
126. The Finance Minister’s Ministerial Statement did not settle the dust; in fact, it
generated more heated debates, both within the House and in the public domain.
On 11 July 2008, the intense public pressure prompted President Kiabki to appoint
a three-member Commission, with Justice (Rtd.) Abdul Majid Cockar, a former Chief
Justice of the Republic, as its Chairperson. Its terms of reference included a broad
mandate to investigate the circumstances surrounding the sale of the hotel, the
role played by named Treasury and CBK officials. In the end, it was expected to give
recommendations on legal and administrative measures to redress the anomaly.
On 24 November 2008, it submitted its final report to the President.
127. The report contains a precise empirical analysis of the events leading up to the
sale of the hotel. The analysis is based on the oral and written presentations made
by various individuals who appeared before the Cockar Commission, including
CBK Governor Professor Njuguna Ndung’u, Lands Minister Hon. James Orengo,
CBK Board Secretary Mr. Kennedy Kaunda Abuga, the Commissioner of Lands Mr.
Zablon Mabea, Mr. Kamles Mansukhlal Pattni, the then KACC Assistant Director
Ms. Fatuma Sichale, the then Interim Director-General of the Public Procurement
Oversight Authroity (PPOA) Mr. Robert Hunja, Mr. David Masika (a director of
Lloyd Masika Ltd.), and three former receiver-managers of the hotel. The Cockar
Commission reported that former Finance Minister Hon. Amos Kimunya chose not
to appear before it to give evidence.
128.
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On the legal front, the Cockar Commission made two recommendations of a legal
reform character. First, it called for the amendment of the Public Procurement and
Disposal Act, 2005 to explicitly extend the scope of its application to the disposal of real
property. The Cockar Commission observed that, as it is, the Act gives public officers
room to circumvent its provision when disposing real property as the Act apparently
governs disposal of “unserviceable, obsolete or surplus stores and equipment”.
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129. The Cockar Commission also recommended review of the CBK Act to strengthen
the CBK Board’s statutory responsibility of reviewing and checking any excesses of
the Governor, who happens to be its Chairperson. The Cockar Commission pointed
out that a similar recommendation had been made by the Bosire Commission, but
regrettably noted that the same had not been acted upon.
130. The Cockar Commission found that the sale of the hotel was questionable and
flawed, as it lacked transparency and “did not realise the best value for the Hotel”.
On the culpability of individuals involved in the irregular sale of the hotel, the
Cockar Commission was of the view that, though he was not directly involved
in the sale of the hotel, Hon. Kimunya was adequately briefed but failed to give
Parliament and the people of Kenya the true picture on the sale of the hotel. Thus
it concluded: “As the Minister responsible for the affairs of the CBK, he must take
responsibility for the questionable disposal of the Hotel”.
131. As for the CBK Governor, the Cockar Commission was of the view that “[he] was
not truthful to other public institutions ... about the sale of the Hotel”. Particularly
finding this conduct to be contrary to the provisions of section 18 of the Public
Officer Ethics Act, 2003, it concluded that “[t]he Governor must take responsibility
for the disposal of the hotel in a secretive and questionable manner”. A similar
finding was made in respect of the Mr. Abuga. However, at the time of publishing
this report, no action had been taken against Amos Kimunya, Njuguna Ndungu
or Kennedy Abuga for their role in the clandestine sale of the Grand Regency
Hotel.

Initiatives to Combat Corruption in Kenya
132.

The defunct Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) had carried out considerable
research into prior efforts made to fight corruption in Kenya before 2003 when the law
establishing KACC was enacted. This research, embodied in the manual developed
to educate pubic officers and members of the public, forms the content on anticorruption efforts in Kenya since colonial times.27

133. There has been growing public awareness of the consequences of corruption, its
negative and destructive effects on the economy and development, and the need
to eliminate it. In seeking to forcefully address corruption, Parliament passed the
Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 and the Public Officer Ethics Acts
27 The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 Explained: A Manual for Public Officers and Members of the Public, a
publication of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
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2003 (POEA). These Acts came into effect on 2nd May 2003, before Kenya signed
and ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).
134. Historically, the KACC Manual acknowledges the fact that corruption, as a
problem in Kenya, dated back to the colonial times. In 1956, the Prevention
of Corruption Act, Chapter 65 of the Laws of Kenya, was passed by the British
colonial authorities in an effort to provide a legal framework for combating
public corruption. It provided for the punishment of bribery involving holders of
public office. The act was amended in 1991 to provide stiffer penalties for those
convicted of corruption. In 1993 there was an established Anti-Corruption Squad
in the Police force. The Squad was established administratively to spearhead the
fight against corruption.
135.

In 1997, the Prevention of Corruption Act was amended to establish the Kenya AntiCorruption Authority (KACA). KACA existed until year 2000 when it was declared
unconstitutional by a constitutional court. This declaration was on the basis,
among others, that the powers of KACA to prosecute went against Section 26 of the
Constitution which empowers the Attorney General to prosecute cases. 28 In 2001,
the Anti-Corruption Police Unit was formed administratively to continue with the
work of KACA. This Unit existed until 2nd May 2003 when the Anti-Corruption and
Economic Crimes Act 2003 which established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
(KACC) as the main legal body with the mandate to fight corruption in Kenya came
into effect. The Commission replaced the Anti-Corruption Police Unit.

136. The new Constitution of Kenya 2010 not only entrenched the anti-corruption
commission in Chapter 6 but also, renamed it as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission (EACC). Details of the new anti-corruption laws emanating from the
new Constitution are contained in the following portion of this chapter that delves
into the legal instruments governing anti-corruption efforts in Kenya.

The Anti-Corruption Legal Framework
137. This portion of the Chapter identifies and analyses all laws that have a bearing
on anti-corruption efforts, acknowledge the gains made, and also point out legal
and institutional weaknesses that need to be addressed. The observations made
at this juncture will form part of the final recommendations by TJRC on what
Kenya should do to address past violation of economic rights. At a quick glance,
the following legal instruments govern the fight against corruption at the global,
regional and domestic levels:
28 Stephen Mwai Gachengo and Albert Muthee Kahuria –v- Republic, NRB HC MISC APP.NO. 302 of 2002
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The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)



African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption



The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2009



Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act of 2003



Public Officer Ethics Act of 2003



Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2011



Leadership and Integrity Act of 2012

Chapter THREE

138. Other relevant laws that directly or indirectly strengthen the governance and anticorruption efforts in Kenya are:


Criminal Procedure Code



Mutual Legal Assistance Act of 2011



Public Finance Management Act, 2012



Public Procurement and Disposal Act, 2005



Banking Act, Chapter 488 of the Laws of Kenya





Foreign Judgements( Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, Chapter 45 of the Laws of
Kenya
Civil Procedure Act, and Civil Procedure Rules of 2010

139. The fight against corruption in the entire world is now hinged on the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Kenya was the first country in
the world to sign and simultaneously ratify the Convention on 9/12/2003 in Merida
Mexico. At the regional level, Kenya has also ratified the African Union Convention
on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and is working with other partner states
of the East African Community (EAC) towards the development of the East African
Community Protocol on Preventing and Combating Corruption. All these efforts
are aimed at promoting good governance, ethics and integrity in the management
of public services and property.
140.

It is worth noting that Kenya’s main anti-corruption statutes, namely the AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes, 2003(ACECA) and the Public Officer Ethics
Act, 2003(POEA) were enacted in May 2003 before the adoption of the UNCAC in
December 2003. The ACECA established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
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(KACC). Kenya had therefore established her anti-corruption legal and institutional
framework before the ratification of the UNCAC. This indeed is commendable on the
part of the Government of Kenya. The lack of a national anti-corruption policy has
however been blamed for the lack of focus and disconcerted efforts in this arena.

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)
141. The four main pillars of UNCAC, that State Parties such as Kenya are measured
against, are:







142

Prevention of corruption in both the public and private sector by establishing
anti-corruption bodies, strengthening transparency and accountability in
financial matters, public procurement, funding of political parties, election
campaigns, appointments and promotions on merit, development of codes
of conduct, and the participation of the civil society and private sector in
preventing corruption
Criminalization and law enforcement
International cooperation i.e. mutual legal assistance, extradition and the use
of special investigative techniques, enact proceeds of crime and anti- money
laundering law
Asset recovery i.e. the return of corruptly acquired assets to the country of
origin through freezing, seizure, confiscation, repatriation, and compensation
of victims and legitimate owners

The UNCAC Gap Analysis Report of 2009 showed that Kenya had substantially
complied with the provisions of the UNCAC through enactment of the AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA), the Public Officer Ethics Act (POEA)
and other laws on public finance, procurement and political party financing.
There was however more to be done to strengthen public institutions in Kenya
and enhance transparency and accountability. This opportunity presented itself
in the promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya on 27/8/2010, ushering in a
new political, social and economic dispensation. Of relevance in the fight against
corruption is Chapter Six on Leadership and Integrity that gave birth to the new
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission Act (EACC Act) No 22 of 2011.

143. Article 79 gave power to parliament to enact legislation to establish an Ethics
and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) to ensure compliance with the
provisions of Chapter Six. After consultations and various drafts passing from
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one government office to another, parliament finally enacted the EACC Act that
received Presidential assent on 27 August 2011.
144. It is important to note that the EACC Act did not repeal the ACECA, but only
repealed Part III of ACECA that establishes the KACC, the Advisory Board, their
composition and respective functions. In a nutshell therefore, all the provisions of
the ACECA save for Part III still form part of the anti-corruption legal framework in
Kenya.

Constitution of Kenya 2010


Constitutional entrenchment

145. Article 79, which is housed in Chapter 6 of the Constitution, obligates parliament
to enact legislation to establish an independent ethics and anti-corruption
commission, which shall be and have the status and powers of a commission
under Chapter 15, for purposes of ensuring compliance with and enforcement of
the provisions of Chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity. The new anti-corruption
body is therefore entrenched in the Constitution, unlike KACC which was a
creature of the statute. It is therefore a permanent creature of our governance
system and cannot be disbanded at the whims or wishes or personal expediency
of a few selfish individuals, as has been in the past.
146. However, Article 79, unlike other Articles establishing constitutional commissions,
does not prescribe the specific functions required of an anti-corruption agency as
provided for in the four (4) pillars of UNCAC. These are prevention, investigation,
asset recovery and international cooperation.
147. Out of the eleven (11) Commissions established by the Constitution, it is only the
EACC that is not listed as one of the Constitutional Commissions under Article
248 of Chapter 15, and whose functions are not outlined in the enabling Article.
Other than the general objects, authority, funding, composition, removal from
office, functions and powers of bestowed upon all Commissions and Independent
Offices under Chapter 15, the specific functions and powers of the EACC are left
to parliament to determine through legislation.
148. A keen perusal of the articles establishing the ten (10) other Commissions will
illustrate this glaring legislative discrimination or bias in the establishment
of EACC. Their composition and functions are clearly enumerated in the
Constitution, thereby leaving no room for speculation, ambiguity or interference
while enacting their respective enabling statutes. These are:
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Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission (Article 59)



National Land Commission (Article 67)



Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (Article 88)



Parliamentary Service Commission (Article 127)



Judicial Service Commission (Article 171)



Commission on Revenue Allocation (Article 216)



Salaries and Remuneration Commission (Article 230)



Teachers Service Commission (Article 237)



National Police Service Commission (Article 246)



Commission on Implementation of the Constitution (Sixth Schedule-Section 5)

149. The anti-corruption commission is the key institution in the realm of good
governance, and should therefore have been accorded superior or similar status
to all the other Constitutional commissions. The importance of the EACC is further
reinforcement by the power and authority conferred upon it, as a watchdog
agency, to oversee issues of integrity and ethics in all the other public institutions,
including the Commissions which have been accorded special treatment. The
EACC is indeed the enforcer of the national values enshrined in Article 10 and
Chapter 6 of the in the New Constitution. A weak constitutional basis is a recipe
for a weak policy and legal framework, hence diluting all the gains made since
Kenya signed and ratified UNCAC on 9/12/2003. This is the negative implication
and ambiguity that Kenyans will have to grapple with until the EACC is given a
sound constitutional grounding through amendment of the Constitution.
150.
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This apparent ambiguity in the Constitution may perhaps explain the varied opinions
that emerged at the different stages of drafting the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act of
2011, as it weaved its way through the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, Ministry
of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Kenya Law Reform Commission, Commission
on Implementation of the Constitution, Attorney General’s Office, Cabinet and
Parliament. The Cabinet draft that was published on 19/8/2011 for introduction
into the National Assembly, for example, gave prosecutorial powers to the EACC
in case the Director of Public Prosecutions failed to act on recommendations from
the EACC. Parliament deleted this provision, arguing that such a function is already
constitutionally vested in the now independent office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions.
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151. Notwithstanding this weak constitutional mandate of EACC, it is a giant leap from
the previous scenario where the body existed only in statutes. It gives hope to
the future establishment and solid existence of a strong anti-corruption agency as
envisaged in UNCAC.

New governance structure
152. Article 250 of the Constitution provides that “Each commission shall consist of at
least three, but not more than nine commissioners”. In line with the provisions of
Article 250, the new law is a radical departure from the previous provisions relating
to the composition, appointment and terms of office of the commissioners. Part
III of ACECA, which created the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission and Advisory
Board, was repealed.
153. The effect of this new law is that the KACC Advisory Board under ACECA, which
consisted of 12 persons nominated by private professional bodies and religious
organisations, has been replaced by a Chairperson and two (2) Commissioners
who will be openly and competitively recruited by a Selection Panel comprising
representatives from the public, private and religious sector. The intention, it
appears, was to have a lean team of experts steering the policy and strategic
direction of the new EACC. Indeed, the number of Commissioners to serve on
the EACC was a point of diversion between the stakeholders at different stages of
the deliberations. Whereas the Cabinet had provided for nine (9) commissioners,
parliament reduced it to only three (3) commissioners. This small number of
Commissioners, although desirable, may present operational challenges.
154. Firstly, there is no provision in EACC Act on the mode of appointment or election
of the Vice-Chairperson yet Article 250(10) of the Constitution provides that the
members of a commission shall elect a vice-chairperson from among themselves.
This ought to have been part of Section 6 of EACC Act or in the section appearing
immediately thereafter.
155. Secondly, Section 14 of EACC Act empowers the EACC to establish committees for
the effective discharge of its functions. With a small number of only 3 commissioners,
it will be near impossible to establish any such committees. The effect of this is that
all the 3 commissioners will belong to all the committees, hence defeating the
purpose of setting up different committees to deal with different aspects of the
Commissions functions or powers.
156.

Thirdly, and in what appears confusing, Section 6 of the Second Schedule to the EACC
Act, that prescribes how the business and affairs of the EACC shall be conducted,
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makes reference to a vice-chairperson who shall preside at meetings in the absence
of the Chairperson. Where both are absent, the members shall elect one of them to
preside. This is where the operational challenges and weaknesses of the new law
become evident. The EACC commissioners are only three (3) in number including
the chairperson. Assuming that they have elected one of the other two to be the vice
chairperson, and that both the chair and vice chairperson are absent, this leaves only
one commissioner to continue with the meeting. This is impossible because section
5 of the Second Schedule sets the quorum for the conduct of business at a meeting
of the Commission at two thirds of all the members of the EACC.
157. Although Section 14 of EACC Act allows the EACC to co-opt persons into
membership of the Committees; these persons may only attend meetings and
deliberate but shall have no power to vote. No decision can therefore be made
where there is lack of quorum, and this could delay and or paralyse the work of the
Commission. For operational expediency and quorum requirements, it would have
been prudent to have at least five or seven commissioners.
159. There are several positive aspects of the new governance structure that are worth
noting.
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The Commissioners will appoint the Secretary who will also be the Chief
Executive Officer and accounting officer. This is a departure from the previous
CEO who was appointed by the President, hence vulnerable to executive
pressure and political interference.
The duties of the Secretary are also more explicit, clear and the chain of
command between the Secretary, the Commissioners and the staff is clear.
The Commissioners and the Secretary will serve for a single term of 6 years
in contradiction to the previous Board members who could be nominated to
serve for another term by their professional bodies. This guards against the
risk of top anti-corruption officials staying in office for too long and possibly
getting too familiar with suspects.
The Commissioners will serve on a full time basis hence able to give policy and
strategic direction by devoting all their time and energy to the affairs of the
Commission. The previous Board members were 12 in number (too many!) and
had several other public and private matters to attend to, hence diluting their
commitment and quality of service to the Commission
The Commissioners will also deal with complaints against the employees of the
Commission, such as abuse of power, impropriety, misconduct, maladministration,
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delay in investigations, unreasonable invasion of privacy, etc. Such complaints
were previously handled by the Director in a secretive and unclear manner that
left a lot of suspicion and or allegations of bias and favoritism, or outright inaction
altogether. It is hoped that all complaints will now be fairly and openly addressed
to their terminal stages. The abuse of power and delay in investigations is a
particularly critical issue as concerns had been raised by members of the public
that it took too long to investigate complaints of corruption, and or that the
KACC appeared to conduct biased or shoddy investigations.

Code of Conduct
159. Section 21 of the EACC Act provides for a Code of Conduct contained in the
Third Schedule of the Act that binds all the Commissioners and the staff of
the EACC. This differs from ACECA which left the drafting of the Code to the
CEO. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct for the Advisory Board was drafted by
themselves independently of the Commission employees. The new law therefore
ensures uniformity and equal standards of ethical behaviour for all persons
working for the Commission. This Code is heavily borrowed from Chapter Six of
the Constitution, which EACC is supposed to enforce. The enforcer must therefore
be composed of persons of integrity before they can check on the integrity of
others. The salient features of the Code are herein below summarized:






Commissioners and employees are barred from doing business with the
Commission, and are required to avoid, and to disclose any interest in a
contact, or conflict between their personal and official duties.
Most importantly, they are not supposed to receive any gifts or favours that
would influence their decisions, and not to actively participate in fundraisings
The Act also clarifies that the provisions of this Code are in addition to the
provisions of the Public Officer Ethics Act, and that where there is a conflict,
the provisions of the POEA will prevail. Officers of the new EACC will therefore
be expected to be people of unquestionable character and high levels of
integrity.

Mandate of the Commission
160. It is important to note that the new law does not repeal the entire ACECA of 2003
but has only two amendments captured in Sections 36 and 37 of the EACC Act. In
the first amendment (under Section 36), Section 2 of ACECA is amended to delete
the name “Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission” and substitute it with the new
name “Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission” established under Section 3 of the
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EACC Act, pursuant to Article 79 of the Constitution. In the second amendment
captured under Section 37 of EACC Act, Part III of the ACECA that establishes the
Advisory Board was repealed.
161. The effect of this is that all the offences created under Part V of ACECA and the
provisions relating to investigations (Part IV), compensation and recovery of
improper benefits (Part VI), evidence (Part VII), execution (Part VIIA), miscellaneous
provisions on suspension and disqualification of public officers charged with
corruption, protection of informers, e.t.c. (Part VIII), repeal, transition and
amendments (Part IX) have been retained. This is contrary to public opinion that
suggests that the new commission has been rendered weak or toothless, and
that all the work that had been carried out for the last six years would go down
the drain. On the contrary, the new Act, in the saving and transitional provisions,
clearly stipulates that all the orders and processes of the old body shall be
deemed to be carried out under the new body and new law.
162. The mandate of the Commission has, in effect been expanded, to give it more
teeth as regards the mainstreaming of ethics and integrity in the public sector.
Section 11 of EACC Act states provides or the following functions of the AntiCorruption Commission.
(i)

General functions and powers under article 252 of the Constitution

163. These include, conducting investigations on its own initiative or on a complaint
made by a member of the public; powers necessary for conciliation, mediation
and negotiation; recruiting its own staff and; other functions and powers
prescribed by legislation.
(ii)

Functions of the EACC under Chapter Six

164. The EACC established by Article 79 of the Constitution is to ensure compliance
with and enforce the provisions of Chapter Six on Leadership and Integrity as
relates to State Officers. These are; the guiding principles of leadership and
integrity( Article 73), oath of office( Article 74), conduct of state officers( Article
75), financial probity(Article 76), restriction on activities of state officers( Article
77), citizenship and leadership( Article 78).
165. In summary, the EACC will ensure that State Officers are:
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selected to public office based on personal integrity, competence and suitability



elected in free and fair elections
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not influenced by nepotism, favoritism, other improper motives or corruption
in making decisions



declare any personal interest that may conflict with public duties



subscribe to oath or affirmation of office



deliver gifts or donations given to them to the State



do not maintain bank accounts outside Kenya



do not participate in any other gainful employment



do not hold office in a political party



citizens of Kenya and do not hold dual citizenship
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retired State Officers do not hold more than two concurrent remunerative
positions in a state organ

166. Previously, the issue of ethics, development and enforcement of ethical
standards was provided for in the Public Officer Ethics Act, which gave the
powers to the Responsible Commissions to receive complaints and take
disciplinary or other administrative action against the officers involved.
Examples of the Responsible Commissions under POEA are the Public Service
Commission, Teachers Service Commission, Judicial Service Commission, inter
alia. The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) had no powers in this
regard and appeared helpless when such conduct was reported or disclosed
during investigations. The KACC could only refer such issues to the responsible
commission to deal administratively or otherwise under Sections 35-39 of
Public Officer Ethics Act (POEA).
167. Apart from investigating corruption, raising awareness about the dangers of
corruption and examining the work processes in public institutions as provided for
under the now repealed Section 7 of ACECA, the new EACCC’s functions have been
expanded, under Sections 11 and 13 of EACC Act, to include:


development of codes of conduct for public officers



oversee enforcement of codes of conduct for public officers



receive complaints on breach of codes of ethics



Investigate and recommend to the DPP prosecution for any acts of corruption
or violation of codes of ethics or other matter prescribed under this Act or any
other law enacted pursuant to Chapter 6 of the Constitution.
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recommend appropriate action to be taken against public officers for unethical
conduct
Monitor the practices of public bodies to detect corruption and secure the
revision of methods of work that are conducive to corrupt practices. This
function is however subject to Article 31 (Right to Privacy). This function
implies that the EACC can deploy undercover techniques to detect corruption.
Note that the Right to Privacy is not absolute and can be limited in public
interest, so long as the requirements of Article 24 of the Constitution are
satisfied.

Asset Recovery
168. Asset recovery, under Article 51 of UNCAC, is the fundamental anti-corruption
objective. This function, that was previously conferred upon KACC under Section
7 of ACECA, has been retained in Section 11(1)(k) of the new Act. The EACC shall
institute and conduct proceedings in court for purposes of recovery or protection
of public property, or to freeze, confiscate proceeds of corruption, payment of
compensation or other punitive or disciplinary measures.

Inter agency collaboration
169. This is a crucial provision that has been carried over from Section 12 of ACECA. The
only difference is that ACECA was more specific in naming such bodies such as the
Controller and Auditor General, and the Director of CID, among others. May be
Parliament found it prudent not to limit the state organs or agencies that the new
body may collaborate or work with.

International cooperation
170. Section 11(5) provides that the EACC may request and obtain professional
assistance from such persons or organizations as it considers appropriate. This
may loosely be interpreted to include requests for mutual legal assistance from
other countries, but it is vague and subject to narrow, domestic application.
The repealed Section 12(3) of ACECA was more explicit. It provided thus, “The
Commission may in the performance of its functions work in cooperation with
any foreign government or international or regional organization”.
171. Indeed, this is the Section that KACC relied upon to successfully appeal against a
court order that had barred it from seeking and obtaining evidence from a certain
foreign government institution. The legal framework for recovery of corruptly
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acquired assets is now found in the Mutual Legal Assistance Act of 2011(MLAA).
This Act provides for mutual legal assistance to be given and received by Kenya
in investigations, prosecutions and judicial proceedings.
172. Prior to the enactment of this law, Kenya offered or received legal assistance
through the Harare Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
within the Commonwealth (commonly referred to as the Harare Scheme). It
was signed between Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. Its purpose was
to increase the level and scope of assistance rendered between Commonwealth
governments in criminal matters. The measures enumerated in paragraph 1(3)
(i) of the said scheme include, inter alia, the tracing, seizing and confiscation of
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime.
173. The Mutual Legal Assistance Act (MLAA) of Kenya regulates the rendering of legal
assistance to any requesting state unless otherwise regulated by agreement. It
applies to requests for legal assistance from any requesting state or international
entity to which Kenya is obligated on the basis of a legal assistance agreement or
even where there is no such agreement.
174. The enactment of the MLAA by Kenya is a giant step forward in tracing and
recovery of corruptly acquired assets that may be hidden outside Kenya. It is
hope that other countries, especially those that have ratified UNCAC will give
Kenya the desired cooperation and technical assistance in this regard.

Powers to conduct mediation, conciliation and negotiation
175. The new Constitution lays emphasis on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
as a means of resolving disputes expeditiously in a less costly manner. It is a
power that is vested in all Constitutional Commissions by Article 252 of the
Constitution.
176. In the anti-corruption war, this new power that had already manifested itself in
the 2007 amendments to ACECA and the recently enacted Amnesty Regulations
of 2011 pursuant to Section 25A of ACECA. The purpose is to encourage out
of court settlements on condition that the suspect fully discloses what they
corruptly acquired and the matter is published in the daily papers in order to
enlist comments from members of the public before the matter is settled. This
is an expeditious and less costly form of determining disputes, although some
Kenyans have opposed on the basis that it will encourage impunity.
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Access to information
177. Any member of the public may request for information from the new body,
upon payment of a fee, and subject to confidentiality requirements. This will
make the EACC more transparent and accountable to the tax payers who fund its
operations.

Financial provisions
178. Funds of the EACC will be derived from money allocated by Parliament and
from grants, gifts or donations that must be disclosed to parliament and made
public before use. This will ensure transparency and accountability in the use
of public finance. This is in contradiction to the previous commission whose
expenses were charged on and issued out of the Consolidated Fund without
further appropriation other than the ACECA (See Section 13(5) of ACECA. This
may be attributed to Article 249 of the Constitution that obligates parliament
to allocate adequate funds to enable each commission to perform its functions,
and that the budget of each commission shall be a separate vote. It is only the
remuneration and benefits payable to a commissioner that shall be a charge on
the Consolidated Fund (Article 250(7).

Annual reports
179. Apart from financial and statistical issues, the EACC will report to the President
and the National Assembly about recommendations made to state departments
and any action taken upon those recommendations. Previously, the Anticorruption Commission examined work processes and made recommendations
that were never acted upon by state departments. It was often helpless in
the face of such inaction. The presentation of these recommendations to the
President and Parliament will ensure that government departments are held
accountable for failure to act upon these reports. This will enhance transparency
and accountability.

Independence of the Commission
180. This has been enhanced. Previously, KACC was accountable to Parliament (Section
10 of ACECA). The new law is however states that the EACC shall not be subject
to the control or direction of any person or authority. This independence from
legislative oversight, unless provided for in the Constitution or this Act, is good for
the new entity
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Saving and transitional provisions
181. These provisions are good in so far as they preserve the processes and assets of
the Commission. All orders, notices, transactions, investigations, prosecution, civil
proceedings, any other process carried out under ACECA are deemed to be done
under the new Act. Similarly, all the property, assets, rights, liabilities, obligations,
agreements, shall vest in the new body. Any undertakings or responsibility of the
Advisory Board will be assumed by the new Commission.
192. Staff of the Commission, except the Director and Deputy Directors, will transit to
the new body and serve for their unexpired terms of their contracts. However this
is not automatic. They will be required to apply and be vetted for their suitability
to serve in the new body. This seems to a trend in almost all the bodies that are
being set up and the staffs of KACC are no exception. This could also be explained
by the fact that the new EACC will be ensuring that other public servants maintain
integrity in their service to the citizens. They must therefore, of necessity, be
persons of unquestionable character and integrity as required by Chapter Six of
the Constitution.

Weaknesses in the new law
183. The following are some of the weaknesses in the new law and which may hamper
the fight against corruption in Kenya:


Lack of prosecutorial powers by EACC is perceived by a significant proportion
of Kenyans as an aspect that may hamper expeditious and independent
determination of corruption cases. However, under Article 157(12) of the
Constitution, Parliament may enact legislation conferring powers of prosecution
on authorities other than the Director of Public Prosecutions. There is therefore
a window of opportunity for EACC to be granted prosecutorial powers, subject
of course to proven efficiency, objectivity and fairness in investigations.



Failure to criminalise some offences in UNCAC:
Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of international organizations
(Article 16)



Trading in influence (Article 18)



Bribery in the private sector (Article 21)



Embezzlement of property in the private sector (Article 22)
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Liability of legal persons (Article 26)



Illicit enrichment (Article 20)








Concealment or continued retention of property knowing it to have been
corruptly acquired (Article 24)
Opening and maintaining bank accounts abroad
Failure to provide for anti-corruption measures targeting the private sector
(Article 12) as well as failure to provide for lifestyle audit of public servants as
a means of tracing and recovering corruptly acquired property. Equally, there
is no specific provision empowering the EACC to deploy special investigative
techniques such as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover
operations in order to combat corruption effectively as required by Article
50 of UNCAC. Moreover, there is no provision for admissibility in evidence of
evidence derived from special investigative techniques.
The anti-corruption legal framework is now contained in four (4) different
statutes, namely the ACECA, POEA, EACC Act and the Leadership and
Integrity Act (LIA). There is a lot of duplication especially in POEA and EACC
Act in relation to matters of ethics and integrity. For example, under POEA
and LIA the Responsible Commissions are required to develop and ensure
compliance with their respective Codes of Conduct. Under EACC Act, the
EACC is also legally empowered to develop and enforce codes of conduct for
all public officers. This will represent operational and jurisdictional conflict
when dealing with breaches of ethics. There is need to vest this powers in
only one commission or clearly distinguish their roles to avoid confusion and
duplicity.

Recent Legislative Developments on Leadership
and Integrity In Kenya
184. It has been acknowledged globally, that lack of integrity and ethics is what
invariably results in corruption. This chapter will therefore not be complete without
looking at the twin issues of leadership and integrity, and how they have been
addressed in order to combat corruption in Kenya. There is no other chapter in
the Constitution of Kenya 2010 (COK 2010) that is known and widely discussed in
Kenya more than Chapter 6. It has been used to qualify or disqualify persons from
seeking either appointive or elective positions in public office.
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185. Interestingly, neither the Constitution nor any other statute in Kenya defines the
term “integrity”. This could perhaps explain the various divergent opinions on what
comprises lack of integrity, and the different integrity thresholds that have been
set by both the Parliament and the Judiciary in Kenya. At the onset, it is proposed
that the term “integrity” should be defined in order to clear the ambiguity and
confusion that seems to have dogged the implementation of Chapter 6 of the
Constitution. Such a definition may however beg the question whether issues of
morality, as implied by the common meaning of integrity, should be the subject of
legislation. It remains a burning issue that may interest scholars, religious leaders
and writers on corruption and governance issues.
186.

The promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya on 27/8/2010 ushered in a
new political, social and economic dispensation. Of relevance in the fight against
corruption is Chapter Six (6) on Leadership and Integrity that gave birth to the new
EACC and the EACC Act. Article 79 gave power to Parliament to enact legislation to
establish an ethics and anti-corruption commission to ensure compliance with the
provisions of Chapter Six (6). After consultations and various drafts passing from one
government office to another, Parliament finally enacted the EACC Act that received
Presidential assent on 27 August 2011. Closely related to Chapter 6 of the COK is the
Leadership and Integrity Act (LIA) that was enacted by Parliament in August 2012.

187. Following the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010, a lot of attention
has been paid to Chapter 6 of the said COK that deals with Leadership and
Integrity. This chapter provides for the manner in which state officers shall conduct
themselves both in their public and private lives.
188. The EACC is tasked with the responsibility of ensuring compliance with, and
enforcement of the provisions of Chapter 6. The Leadership and Integrity Act of
2012 establishes procedures and mechanisms for the effective administration of
the legislation on leadership as required by Article 80. More specifically, it sets out
standards of behaviour that a person seeking or already serving in public office
may be judged against. The intention of Chapter 6 was to ensure that only persons
of high integrity standards are allowed to serve in public offices. It was hoped that
this would prevent corrupt persons from getting into or remaining in public office,
and ultimately attain good governance. This noble intention has however been
met with a lot of legal challenges that are highlighted in this section.
189. Of special concern in this chapter is Article 73(2) (a) that provides for selection of
state officers on the basis of personal integrity, competence and suitability, or election
in free and fair elections, as one of the guiding principles of leadership and integrity.
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Herein lays the distinction between appointive and elective positions in the public
office. This distinction, as will be discussed later, has posed challenges to the
implementation of Chapter 6 because it seems to place higher integrity standards
on appointed officers more than elected officers. A further distinction that has
created controversy is that between a state officer and a public officer, especially
when it relates to the mode of appointment, election, remuneration and dismissal
from office. It therefore becomes imperative to, as a preliminary issue, understand
the different categories of public officers in Kenya.
190. The COK 2010 has also created a new category of public officers known as state
officers. Previously, all officers serving in public service were all referred to as public
officers, as defined in the Public Officer Ethics Act of 2003. Chapter 6 of the COK
2010 applies specifically to state officers, although the Leadership and Integrity
Act (LIA) has extended the application of this chapter to all public officers, save for
section 18 of the LIA that applies only to state officers. This distinction becomes
important when looking at the qualification and disqualification criteria.
191. Before the promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya 2011, there was no
category of public servants referred to as State officers. All of them were referred
to as public officers as defined in the Public Officer Ethics Act. However, the
Constitution now creates a special category of senior public officers called state
officers, and clearly separates them from the rest of the other majority public
officers. Article 260 of Chapter 17 of the Constitution on General Provisions that
deals with interpretation of the Constitution defines;
192. A public officer as a state officer or a any person, other than a state officer, who
holds a public office. A public office means an office in the national government, a
county government, or the public service, if the remuneration and benefits of the
office are payable directly from the Consolidated Fund or directly out of money
provided by Parliament
193. A state officer is a person holding a state office. A state office means the;
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President,



Deputy President,



Cabinet Secretary,



Member of Parliament,



Judges and Magistrates,
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member of a Commission to which Chapter 15 applies,



holder of an independent office ,





Attorney General,
Director of Public Prosecutions,



Secretary to the Cabinet,



Principal Secretary,



Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces,



Commander of a service of the Kenya Defence Forces,



Director General of NSIS,



194.

member of a county assembly, governor or deputy governor, member of the
executive committee of a county government,
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Inspector General and Deputy Inspector General of the National Police Service;
and
an office designated as a state office by national legislation

This distinction probably explains why there was need to have another law to deal
with the newly created category of State officers, hence the drafting of the Leadership
and Integrity Act 2012. State officers obviously perform more serious public functions
than ordinary public servants do. Their process of selection and appointment is also
quite rigorous, lengthy and subject to transparency requirements.

195. Going by the definitions of economic crime and grand corruption, State officers
are also the ones most likely to engage in large procurement contracts involving
large sums of money. These officers therefore require special mention in this
chapter.

Relevant legal framework
196. In order to objectively and exhaustively deal with the twin issues of appointment
and election to public office, one must of necessity identify and analyse all the
relevant Constitutional and statutory provisions. It may also be prudent to look at
them differently since there appear to exist legal provisions that apply differently
to each of the two categories.


The Constitution of Kenya, 2010
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Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2011



Leadership and integrity Act, 2012



Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003



Public Officer Ethics Act, 2003

Constitution of Kenya
197. Article 73(1) (a) Chapter 6 of the COK 2010 sets out the guiding principles of
leadership and integrity by providing for selection of state officers on the basis
of personal integrity, competence and suitability, or election in free and fair
elections, as one of the guiding principles of leadership and integrity.
198. The EACC established by Article 79 of the Constitution is to ensure compliance
with and enforce the provisions of Chapter Six on Leadership and Integrity as
relates to State Officers. These are; the guiding principles of leadership and
integrity (Article 73), oath of office (Article 74), conduct of state officers (Article
75), financial probity (Article 76), restriction on activities of state officers (Article
77), citizenship and leadership (Article 78).
199. In summary, the EACC will ensure that State Officers are:





elected in free and fair elections
not influenced by nepotism, favoritism, other improper motives or
corruption in making decisions



declare any personal interest that may conflict with public duties



subscribe to oath or affirmation of office



deliver gifts or donations given to them to the State



do not maintain bank accounts outside Kenya



do not participate in any other gainful employment



do not hold office in a political party



citizens of Kenya and do not hold dual citizenship
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selected to public office based on personal integrity, competence and
suitability

retired State Officers do not hold more than two concurrent remunerative
positions in a state organ.
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The Leadership and Integrity Act Of 2012
200. The Leadership and Integrity Act of 2012 is an Act of Parliament to enacted to give
effect to, and establish procedures and mechanisms for effective administration of
Chapter Six of the Constitution, and for connected purposes. According to section
3, the primary purpose of this Act is to ensure that State officers respect the values,
principles and requirements of the COK.
201. The focus on state officers is based upon the provisions of Chapter Six, and the
reality that state officers ordinarily hold the highest level of responsibility in
terms of directing the management of affairs in the public service. The EACC is
responsible for overseeing and enforcing the implementation of this Act. It is also
expressly stated that the provisions of Chapter 6 of the COK and the Public Officer
Ethics Act (POEA) shall form part of the General Leadership and Integrity Code.
202. The Act establishes a General Leadership and Integrity Code for all state officers
that is distinct from the general Code of Conduct and Ethics prescribed for other
public officers under the Public Officer Ethics Act of 2003. Closely related to this is
the requirement for each public entity to have Specific Leadership and Integrity
Codes, which borrow from the general Leadership and Integrity Code.
203.

The new law also facilitates the extension of the application of the provisions
of Chapter Six of the COK and the General Leadership and Integrity Code, except
section 18 (on public collections) to all public officers as if they were State officers.
This is found in section 52 of the LIA that makes reference to Article 80(c) of the COK.

204. It also worth noting that breach of the codes under the LIA results in disciplinary
action (section 42) by the public entity responsible for the State officer, unless
the behavior warrants the institution of civil or criminal proceedings against the
State officer. The public entity shall refer civil matters to the Attorney General (AG),
whereas criminal matters shall be referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions
(DPP), or to any other appropriate entity. This will be done after investigations by
the public entity and after it is of the opinion that civil or criminal proceedings
ought to be preferred.
205. The only breaches that attract criminal sanctions under the LIA relate to opening
or operating bank accounts outside Kenya without approval from the Commission
(section 19), and acting for foreigners (section 20 as read together with section
48), obstructing or hindering persons under the Act (section 46).
206. An objective reading of Chapter 6 and the LIA does not clearly reveal the role of
EACC before an individual is elected or appointed to a public office. The Leadership
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and Integrity Bill had given the EACC a clear role of vetting such individuals and
thereafter issuing a Clearance Certificate. These vetting provisions were however
deleted by Parliament. The only duty left for EACC is to receive a Self Declaration
Form from those wishing to be elected to a state office, thus leaving it to interested
individuals to “vet” themselves.
207. An honest reading of Chapter 6 and the Leadership and Integrity Act shows
that Parliament deliberately avoided the use of the word “vetting”. If Parliament
intended to vest such a function or responsibility on the EACC, it would have
expressly used this word or referred to it. A good example of such an express
provision is found in Section 23(1) of the Sixth Schedule of the COK 2010
that requires Parliament to enact legislation establishing mechanisms and
procedures for vetting the suitability of judges and magistrates to continue to
serve.
208. Another example is found in section 34(3) of the EACC Act that empowers the
EACC to vet any member of staff of KACC who wishes to work for EACC, to ensure
that he or she is fit and proper to serve in the position applied for as a member of
staff of EACC.
209. The LIA does not state what the EACC is supposed to do with this Declaration.
However, it may be safe to infer that anyone who gives false information to the
Commission commits an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding kshs 5
million, imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years or both, as per section
46(1) (d) of the Leadership Act. Since the EACC has no prosecutorial powers, the
matter will be referred to the DPP for appropriate action. Should the officer in
question be convicted, they may thereafter be disqualified from holding a state
office if the law establishing that office provides for such action.
210. It is clear that the EACC only comes in after the state officer has assumed office to
ensure that the Leadership Code is adhered to by state officers. This role is further
expounded in the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, which establishes
the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.

The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2011 (EACC Act)
211. Apart from investigating corruption, raising awareness about the dangers of
corruption and examining the work processes in public institutions as had been
provided for under the now repealed Section 7 of ACECA, the new EACCC’s
functions have been expanded, under Sections 11 and 13 of the Ethics and AntiCorruption Commission Act to;
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development of codes of conduct for public officers



oversee enforcement of codes of conduct for public officers



receive complaints on breach of codes of ethics
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investigate and recommend to the DPP prosecution for any acts of corruption
or violation of codes of ethics or other matter prescribed under this Act or
any other law enacted pursuant to Chapter 6 of the Constitution.
recommend appropriate action to be taken against public officers for unethical
conduct
Monitor the practices of public bodies to detect corruption and secure the
revision of methods of work that are conducive to corrupt practices. This
function is however subject to Article 31 ( Right to Privacy). This function implies
that the EACC can deploy undercover techniques to detect corruption. Note
that the Right to Privacy is not absolute and can be limited in public interest, so
long as the requirements of Article 24 of the Constitution are satisfied.

Mandate of the Commission under the EACC Act
212. It is important to note that the new law does not repeal the entire ACECA of 2003
but has only two amendments captured in Sections 36 and 37 of the EACC Act.
213. In the first amendment (under Section 36), Section 2 of ACECA is amended to
delete the name “Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission” and substitute it with the
new name “Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission” established under Section 3 of
the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2011, pursuant to Article 79 of the
Constitution. In the second amendment captured under Section 37 of EACC Act,
Part III of the ACECA that establishes the Advisory Board was repealed.
214. The effect of this is that all the offences created under Part V of ACECA and the
provisions relating to investigations (Part IV), compensation and recovery of
improper benefits (Part VI), evidence (Part VII), execution (Part VIIA), miscellaneous
provisions on suspension and disqualification of public officers charged with
corruption, protection of informers, e.t.c., (Part VIII), repeal, transition and
amendments (Part IX) have been retained. This is contrary to public opinion that
suggests that the EACC has been rendered weak or toothless, and that all the
work that had been carried out for the last six years would go down the drain.
On the contrary, the new Act, in the saving and transitional provisions, clearly
stipulates that all the orders and processes of the old body shall be deemed to
be carried out under the new body and new law.
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215. The mandate of the EACC has, in effect been expanded, to give it more teeth as
regards the mainstreaming of ethics and integrity in the public sector. However, it
is notable that there is no provision in the Constitution or EACC Act empowering
the EACC to vet, qualify or disqualify any individual from election or appointment
to public office. The EACC steps into the arena after the public officer has assumed
office, to oversee enforcement of codes of conduct.

Qualification and disqualification for appointive positions in public service
216. Since there are no specific provisions in Chapter 6 or the Leadership Act for
qualification or disqualification, the EACCC may be guided by Chapter 13 of the
COK 2010 on Public Service. Article 232 lays down the values and principles of
public service, whereas Article 233 enumerates instances that make one ineligible
to serve as a member of the Public Service Commission. These criteria can be
applied, and indeed has been applied, to everyone seeking to serve as a state
officer in the public service.
217. An individual is not eligible for appointment if the person:




a member of the governing body of a political party



holds any state office





218.

has at any time within the preceding 5 years held office or stood for election
as a member of Parliament or of a county assembly

is or has been a candidate for election as a member of Parliament or county
assembly
is or has been the holder of an office in any political organization that
sponsors or supports a candidate for election as a member of Parliament
or county assembly

Apart from the Constitution, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act has
provisions on suspension on half pay after being charged in court (section 62),
suspension without pay after conviction pending any appeal (section 63), dismissal
and disqualification from being elected or appointed to public office after conviction
for ten years if appeal is lost (section 64). However, a convicted public servant is
disqualified only after exhausting their right of appeal in a superior court.

219. These provisions however do not apply to constitutional office holders, where the
constitution provides for their qualifications, or disqualification or removal from
office. They nevertheless guide the EACC and other state organs on criteria for
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qualification and disqualification from elective or appointive offices, especially
the category now referred to as public officers. State officers are covered by the
Constitution and relevant enabling legislation. It is evident that the issue whether
a person is qualified or not qualified to be elected or appointed to public office is
best addressed by looking at the Constitution and the statute establishing that
office or institution.
220. Article 38 of the COK on political rights, in summary, provides that every person is
free to make political choices, the right to free, fair and regular elections based on
universal suffrage, the free expression of the will of elections for any elective public
body or office established under this Constitution. Article 38(3), in particular,
stipulates that every adult citizen has the right, without unreasonable restrictions,
a)

to be registered as a voter

b)

to vote by secret ballot in any election or referendum

c)

to be a candidate for public office, or office within a political party of
which the citizen is a member, and if elected, to hold office

221. Although political rights are not among those that may not be limited under
Article 25, the State or any person seeking to justify a particular limitation shall
demonstrate to the court, tribunal or other authority that the requirements of
Article 24 have been satisfied. This provision is found in Article 24(3). A right or
fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not be limited except by law, and
then only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into
account all relevant factors. These are enumerated in Article 24(2) and (3).
222. Simply stated, the right to vote or seek an elective office is a fundamental right
that shall not be limited or taken away except as allowed by law. Therefore,
before preventing voters from electing a person of their choice or disqualifying a
person from seeking elective office, the State or person wishing to do so must first
acknowledge that this action may limit political rights, and therefore such action
needs to be justifiable within the constitutional limits.
223. In order to appreciate how important the political rights are, it is necessary to look
at the Constitutional provisions on qualification or disqualification for election as
Member of Parliament, President, Governor and member of the County Assembly.
224. Before looking at provisions of Article 99, it is important to note that the
Parliament of Kenya consists of the National Assembly and the Senate. Reference
to Member of Parliament therefore refers to National Assembly members and
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Senators (Article 93). Article 99(1) provides that unless disqualified as stipulated
in this Article, a person is eligible for election as a member of Parliament (MP) if
the person;
a) is registered as a voter
b) satisfies any educational, moral and ethical requirements prescribed by this
Constitution or an Act of Parliament
c)

is nominated by a political party or is an independent candidate

225. Article 99(2) stipulates that a person is disqualified from being elected as an MP if
the person;
a) is a State officer or other public officer, other than an MP
b) has within the last 5 years been a member of the Independent Electoral and
Boundaries Commission( IEBC)
c)

has not been a citizen of Kenya for the last 10 years before the election

d) is a member of a county assembly
e) is of unsound mind
f)

is an undischarged bankrupt

g) is subject to a sentence of imprisonment of at least 6 months, as at the date
of registration as a candidate, or at the date of election
h) is found in accordance with any law to have misused or abused a State
office or public office or in any way to have contravened Chapter Six.
226.

The EACC must therefore bear this Article in mind, while developing guidelines to
clear those seeking elective posts. The ethical requirements referred to in Article 99(1)
(b) are to be found in Chapter 6 of COK 2010, as read together with the Leadership
and Integrity Act and the Public Officer Ethics Act. These provisions and the role of
EACC have been exhaustively discussed in the earlier portions of this Chapter.

227. The Elections Act of 2011 borrows heavily from the Constitution. Section 24 guides
the IEBC on the criteria to be used when deciding whether one is qualified or
disqualified for election as a Member of Parliament.
228. For its part, Article 99(3) provides that “a person is not disqualified under clause
2 unless all possibility of appeal or review of the relevant sentence or decision
has been exhausted’. Article 99 therefore recognizes the right of appeal that is
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found under the Bill of Rights, specifically Article 47 and 50. Article 47 on fair
administrative action provides that if the right or fundamental freedom of a
person is adversely affected by administrative action, the person has the right to
be given written reasons for the action, and that this action can be reviewed by
a court or independent tribunal. Closely related to Article 99 and 47 is Article 50
on fair hearing. Article 50(2)(q) provides that if convicted, a person has the right
to appeal to, or apply for review by, a higher court as prescribed by law.
229. These constitutional provisions clearly mean that a person is not disqualified from
elective positions merely because they have been charged or adversely affected
by an administrative decision or convicted by a court of law. It is only after they
have exhausted their right of appeal that they may be disqualified from seeking
elective office. This constitutional threshold is aptly captured in Section 64 of
the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, 2003 (ACECA) that provides that
a person convicted of corruption is disqualified from seeking elective position
or appointment to public office for 10 years, only after his or her appeal against
conviction is lost.
230. Although ACECA applies to public officers whereas the Constitution applies to
State officers, both legal instruments find congruence in the requirement that
disqualification shall only take effect after the suspect or convict has exhausted
their right of appeal. It is important for any State organ such as EACC, or any person
seeking disqualification of persons seeking election as MPs, to bear in mind the
provisions of Article 99 of COK.
231. According to Article 137(1), a person is qualified for nomination as a presidential
candidate if the person:
a) is a citizen of Kenya
b) is qualified to stand for election as a member of Parliament
c)

is nominated by a political party or is an independent candidate

d) is nominated by not fewer than two thousand voters from each of a majority
of the counties
232. Article 137(2) lists the grounds for disqualification, that is, if the person:
a) owes allegiance to a foreign state, or
b) is a public officer, or is acting in any State office or other public office, except
the President, Deputy President and MP
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233. It is apparent that once someone is qualified to be an MP under Article 99, the
person is, subject to a few other requirements, qualified to President. The same
qualification and disqualification criteria apply to the President and MPs. Any
person or body seeking to disqualify such candidates must therefore bear these
two Articles in mind. These Constitutional requirements for disqualification or
qualification for election as President are echoed in Section 23 of the Elections
Act of 2011.
234. Just as the President and MPs, Article 180 provides that to be eligible for election as
county governor, a person must be eligible for election as a member of the county
assembly. Article 193 sets out the criteria for qualification and disqualification for
election as member of county assembly, and also governor. The criteria is the
same as that for the MPS and President. Unless disqualified under this Article, a
person is eligible for election as a member of a county assembly if the person:
a) is registered as a voter
b) satisfies any educational, moral and ethical requirements prescribed by this
Constitution or an Act of Parliament
c)

is nominated by a political party or is an independent candidate

235. Article 193(2) stipulates that a person is disqualified from being elected as a
member of a county assembly if the person:
a) is a State officer or other public officer, other than a member of the county
assembly
b) has within the last 5 years been a member of the Independent Electoral and
Boundaries Commission( IEBC)
c)

has not been a citizen of Kenya for the last 10 years before the election

d) is of unsound mind
e) is an undischarged bankrupt
f)

is subject to a sentence of imprisonment of at least 6 months, as at the date
of registration as a candidate, or at the date of election

g) is found in accordance with any law to have misused or abused a State
office or public office or in any way to have contravened Chapter 6
236. In similar fashion to disqualification for election as MP or President, Article 193
provides that “a person is not disqualified under clause 2 unless all possibility of
appeal or review of the relevant sentence or decision has been exhausted”. The
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earlier analysis on the right of appeal also applies to disqualification for election
as governor or member of county assembly. Any State organ or person seeking to
disqualify a person from election as Governor or member of county assembly must
bear this provision in mind. Just like in the case of the President and Members of
Parliament, Section 25 of the Elections Act adopts the criteria laid down in the
Constitution, for qualification or disqualification for nomination as a member of a
county assembly.
237.

Although included among the members of the National Assembly and Senate, it is
important to mention that the following persons are State officers, subject also to
the application of Article 99 and 193: Women representatives to the Senate; Youth;
Persons with disabilities; Speakers of the National Assembly, Senate and County
Assemblies.

Suggested framework for EACC in enforcing leadership provisions
238. In order to wade through this apparently complicated maze of legal framework,
the EACC is advised to:
a) Categorize the persons seeking elective or appointive offices into either
State officers or Public officers
b) Whether they seek elective positions or appointive positions
c)

Consider the applicable constitutional provisions, e.g. Chapter 6, Bill of
Rights, qualification/ eligibility, and disqualification

d) Consider the applicable statutory provisions, e.g. Leadership and Integrity
Act, Public Officer Ethics Act, Anti- Corruption and Economic Crimes Act,
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, etc
e) Consider the law establishing those offices, e.g. the Public Service Commission
Act, Police Service Commission Act, County Governments Act, etc.
239. While the EACC has the express mandate to ensure compliance with Chapter 6
on Leadership and Integrity, and while the clamour for high ethical standards has
reached fever pitch in Kenya, the EACC must not loose sight of the Bill of Rights and
other constitutional provisions that provide for qualification or disqualification for
appointment or election to public office. Chapter 6 must be read alongside other
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, such as political rights and right
of appeal. Exercise of caution and restraint is called for, particularly at this critical
point in time when Kenya is still implementing the new constitutional dispensation,
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in the midst of different interpretations of the term “integrity” by Parliament and
the Judiciary.

Emerging jurisprudence on leadership and integrity in Kenya
240. Soon after the promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya in August 2010,
most Kenyans were hopeful that a new crop of both appointed and elected
leaders would be ushered into office, and hopefully bring honour and respect to
state offices. It appears though that Kenyans may have to wait longer to enjoy
the fruits of leadership that is governed by integrity. This is attributed to the
different integrity thresholds that have been displayed by interviewing panels,
parliament and the judiciary. Different standards seem to apply to those seeking
appointment as opposed to those seeking to be elected to public office.
241. In order to illustrate the uncertainty and apparent bias, this Chapter will briefly
consider the facts and judgements in five (5) major cases touching on eligibility of
persons to serve as State officers based on Chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity.
These are:
a.

Keriako Tobiko - Director of Public Prosecutions

b.

Mumo Matemu- Chairperson of Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission

c.

Kiema Kionzo- Member of Parliament for Mutito Constituency

d.

Mary Wambui- Member of Parliament for Othaya Constituency

e.

Uhuru Kenyatta & William Ruto- President and Deputy President

Appointment of Keriako Tobiko as Director of Public Prosecutions
242. The first case that tested the integrity standard was filed against Mr. Keriako
Tobiko the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), soon after his televised public
interview, approval by Parliament and appointment by the President. 29 The
petitioners, a civil society group, sought to restrain the newly appointed DPP
from assuming office after his appointment on 16/6/2011. They submitted that,
in the light of allegations of corruption, incompetence, conflict of interest and
lack of reform credentials labelled against him by various persons, Mr Tobiko
lacked integrity as required by Chapter 6 of the COK and the Public Officer
Ethics Act.
29 Kenya Youth Alliance- Vs Keriako Tobiko and others (2012) Nairobi HC Petition No. 101 of 2011 (unreported
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243. In a unanimous decision delivered on 25 May 2012, the three judge bench
dismissed the petition by holding that the allegations of integrity had been
investigated by the selection panel and parliament, and that the court could not
reopen the process and reconsider issues which were conclusively determined.
They made the following observation;
The Constitution vests different functions to different organs, and to ask this court
to fault processes by these organs without presenting material to prove any wrong
doing, is to usurp the functions of those organs. That we shall not do. Those organs
undertook their mandate and exercised their discretion after seeing those that
presented complaints in whatever form. We cannot reopen the process and consider
issues which were conclusively determined.

244. The court in Tobiko’s case declined to interfere with the work of other organs
which had already deliberated upon the integrity issues and found them
baseless.

Appointment of Mumo Matemu as Chairperson of EACC
245. Parliament approved the nomination of Mr. Mumo Matemu to serve as the
Chairperson of EACC and the President and Prime Minister subsequently
appointed him, but a bench of three (3) High Court judges found him
unsuitable to serve after a civil society organisation challenged his suitability
on integrity grounds.30 The three judges held that although the Executive and
Parliament had inquired into integrity allegations levelled against Mr Matemu
while he served as the Legal Officer of Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC),
they interrogated the process of nomination and selection, found it wanting
due to unresolved integrity issues, and set aside the appointment. The court
found that Mr. Matemu did not meet the integrity threshold set out in Chapter
6 of the COK 2010, despite the fact that the formalities of appointment were
followed by the Executive and Parliament. According to the three judges:
A person is said to lack integrity when there are serious unresolved questions about
his honesty, financial probity, scrupulousness, fairness, reputation, and soundness
of his moral judgement or his commitment to national values enumerated in the
Constitution. For the purpose of integrity test in Kenya’s Constitution, there is no
requirement that the behaviour, attribute, or conduct in question has to rise to the
level of criminality.

30 Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance –VS- the AG and others, Nairobi High Court Petition No. 229 of 2012( unreported)
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246. This was the first major judicial pronouncement and interpretation of Chapter
6 in Kenya’s Constitution, and was lauded by many Kenyans as setting out the
integrity standards for those seeking public office. The judges seemed to have
been persuaded by the very nature and functions of the office to which he
was being appointed to; and wondered how he could preside over corruption
investigations when he had unresolved integrity issues haunting him. Mr. Matemu
however lodged an appeal, whose outcome will help Kenyans understand this
phenomenon.
247. It is worth noting that according to the submissions filed by the Director of
Public Prosecutions (DPP), Mr Matemu was neither a suspect nor a witness in
the criminal inquiry that was referred to by the petitioners to cast doubts on his
integrity. File records show that the criminal inquiry was commenced after two
directors, in a private company, differed in management of the funds allegedly
borrowed from AFC. One director reported the matter to police in Nakuru,
alleging fraud on the part of his co-director. The DPP further informed the
court that the criminal investigation file had been closed due to failure by the
complainant to submit an audit report as proof of the alleged theft or fraud. At
the time of writing this report, the EACC has no chairperson and the matter is
still pending in the Court of Appeal after Mr Matemu appealed against the High
Court decision.31

Suitability of Kiema Kilonzo to continue serving as MP for Mutito
Constituency
248. In another case involving a sitting Member of Parliament (MP), Mr Kiema Kilonzo
and the Constituency Development Fund Committee,32 the petitioners alleged
misappropriation of CDF monies allocated to Mutito Constituency by Mr Kiema
Kilonzo and the CDF committee. They, inter alia, sought court orders that Mr
Kiema had contravened Chapter 6 of COK, was unfit to hold any state office
and should be disqualified from holding any state office. While dismissing
the petition, Justice David Majanja held firstly, that the petitioners had not
exhausted the dispute resolution mechanism provide for under section 52 of
the CDF Act.
249. Secondly, he distinguished Kiema’s case from Matemu’s case by holding that the
court, in Matemu’s case did not purport to take upon itself the process of assessing,
31 Mumo Matemu –VS- Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance and others, Nairobi Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No. 290 of 2012(
unreported)
32 Benard Kasinga –VS- Kiema Kilonzo and Others, Nairobi High Court Petition No. 402 of 2012( unreported)
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nominating or appointing a specific candidate to office. Justice Majanja observed
that the court in Matemu’s case interrogated the process, found it wanting in
certain respects and intervened by setting it aside. Similarly, the judge declined
“to act as auditor general, make specific findings against the respondents, surcharge
them, remove them from office and thereafter declare them unfit for office” as prayed
by the petitioners.
250. The snapshot of Justice Majanja’s decision is that courts, while determining
integrity issues, must respect the role of other entities. This seems to materially
depart from Matemu’s case wherein the judges not only interrogated the process of
vetting, but also found it wanting. The principle of separation of powers between
the executive, judiciary and legislature comes into play, although this is not the
subject of discussion in this chapter of the Report.
251. Just before the 4 March 2013 elections in Kenya, several petitions were filed
seeking to bar several persons from being elected to public office for contravening
Chapter 6 off COK. Examples are the two petitions against Mary Wambui Munene
who was seeking to replace President Kibaki as MP for Othaya Constituency, and
the now famous petition seeking to bar Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto from
seeking Presidency and Deputy Presidency respectively.

Eligibility of Mary Wambui for election as MP for Othaya Constituency
252. In the case involving Mary Wabui Munene33, the petitioners challenged her
educational qualification and integrity as required by Chapter Six of the COK
2010. Specific to her integrity, the petitioners averred that she had been
adversely mentioned in various official reports prepared by constitutional
bodies mandated to inquire into matters of public interest, for example, a report
by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) tiled “On the Brink
of a Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya Post 2007 Election Violence”, the
Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 2007 Post Election Violence (Waki
Report), the “Report of Investigations into the Conduct of the Artur Brothers and
their Associates” prepared by the National Assembly Departmental Committee
on Administration, National Security and Local Authorities , and Administration
of Justice and Legal Affairs , an investigative journalistic piece aired in the local
media( Kenya Television Network) titled “Jicho Pevu”, and several other press
reports.
253. The petitioners contended that as a result, she did not meet the test of leadership
and integrity spelt out in Chapter Six of the COK 2010, and the Leadership and
33 Michael Wachira Munene-Vs- Mary Wambui Munene, Nairobi High Court Petition No. 549 of 2012(unreported)
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Integrity Act, No.19 of 2012 (LIA). The petitioners further averred that these issues
had not been conclusively investigated or resolved.
254. While dismissing the petition, Justice David Majanja held that although the
LIA provides for procedures and enforcement of Chapter Six of the COK 2010,
the issues as to whether Mary Wambui was qualified to vie for a parliamentary
seat was not a matter for determination by the court but for the Independent
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), in accordance with electoral laws,
in this case being the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission Act
(IEBC) of 2011, Political Parties Act, and LIA. The judge further found the petition
immature as the respondent had not presented herself to IEBC for clearance.
255. The decision in this case seems to echo those made in the Tobiko, and Kiema
Kilonzo cases; that courts should not usurp the functions of other constitutional
organs. The only case in which the court seems to have questioned the inquiry of
other state organs is that of Mumo Matemu.

Eligibility of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto for election as President
and Deputy President
256. Soon after they expressed their intention of seeking election to the two top
state offices in Kenya, four (4) petitions were filed in the High Court challenging
the eligibility of Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto based on Chapter 6 of the
Constitution. The petitions were later consolidated into one major petition for
hearing and determination since they raised similar issues of law.34 The Chief
Justice appointed a bench of five (5) judges to hear the petition that generated
a lot of interest both locally and internationally. This was largely due to the fact
that the International Criminal Court (ICC) had confirmed charges against the
two suspects for crimes against humanity, following the 2007 post election
violence in which they are alleged to have been behind the murder of over 1000
Kenyans, displacement, rape and destruction of property.
257. It was the petitioners’ submission that the confirmation of charges took
away their honour, dignity and integrity to vie for the Presidency and Deputy
Presidency respectively. The petitioners relied on the High Court decision in the
Mumo Matemu case and argued that the integrity test was not one of criminality.
They insisted that the candidacy of Uhuru and Ruto was contrary to the tenure,
ideals and spirit of the COK, especially Chapter 6 on integrity and sovereignty. It
34 International Centre For Policy and Conflict-Vs- Uhuru Kenyatta, William Ruto and Others, Nairobi HC Petition No. 552of 2012
(unreported).
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was their averment that the confirmation of charges met the integrity threshold
required to bar them from assuming public office. They pointed out that there
would be no confidence in those two offices if the two individuals were allowed
to ascend thereto.
258. In a unanimous judgement delivered on 15/2/2013, the five judges dismissed the
petition. They held that although the court had jurisdiction to consider issues
of integrity, any question relating to the qualification or disqualification of a
person who had been nominated to contest the position of Presidency can only
be determined by the Supreme Court. This, according to the judges, includes the
determination of the question whether such a person meets the test of integrity
under Chapter 6 in relation to Presidential elections; and that these two questions
could not be determined by the court outside the context of elections to be held
on 4/3/2013.
259. The judges seemed to have many reasons for dismissing the petition. They are
summarised below;
a.

Even if Uhuru and Ruto had no integrity, the Independent Electoral and
Boundaries Commission (IEBC) not the court, would determine their
eligibility to seek elective office

b. The IEBC, Supreme Court, National Assembly and Senate are the only
institutions which may interfere with or invalidate the election of a
President or Deputy President. The judges cited the case of Blackburn –VSthe AG (1971) I WLR 1037 in which it was held that “ Litigation should not
influence political decisions. Courts should only look at the effect of decisions
and enforce the law, but not say what it should be”
c.

As regards the interplay between Chapter 6 and Chapter 4(Bill of Rights),
they stated that the Bill of Rights must prevail because the two suspects
had not been convicted, they were presumed innocent until proven
guilty, and they were entitled to a fair trail. These rights, although not
absolute, could not be derogated from except as provided for by the law.

260. The judges also paid special attention to the now contentious issue of the role of the
court in interpreting Chapter 6 of the COK 2010. They made reference to the High
Court decision in the Mumo Matemu case which had held that the court has power
to review both the process of appointment and the legality. They concurred with
the integrity standard laid down by their counterparts in Matemu case; that there
is no requirement that the behaviour, attribute or conduct in question has to rise to
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the threshold of criminality. According to the judges, the fact that a person has not
been convicted of a criminal offence is not dispositive of the inquiry whether they
lack integrity or not. In the judges own words, it is enough if there are sufficient,
serious, plausible allegations which raise substantial unresolved questions about
one’s integrity.
261. The five (5) judges however disagreed with their counterparts in Matemu’s case
by stating that the court should not descend into the arena of inquiry as was
the case in Matemu’s case, wherein the three judges held that although some
inquiry had been done into integrity allegations against Matemu by Parliament,
they found it wanting. Still on the inquiry issue, the five judges found that
there was no evidence adduced to show if any inquiry ha been made into the
allegations of lack of integrity against Uhuru and Ruto, unlike in Matemu’s
case where Parliament had debated the allegations of lack of integrity against
him. It is important to note that both the EACC and IEBC had cleared the two
gentlemen to vie for elective positions, without raising any integrity issues
against them.
262. A reading of the judgement in Uhuru & Ruto case depicts a determined effort
by the five judges to shift the responsibility of determining eligibility of Uhuru
and Ruto, to vie for elective positions, to other state organs. Their decision also
manifests the challenges that several institutions in Kenya are facing in trying to
enforce the constitutional provisions on integrity, more so the different integrity
standards that seem to apply to appointive and elective positions.
263. On one hand, the judges in the Uhuru case clearly assert that behaviour that
is deemed lacking in integrity does not have to rise to the level of criminality;
and that it is sufficient if there are allegations raising unresolved questions
about one’s integrity. Since at the time of delivering their judgement, there
were unresolved issues about Uhuru and Ruto participation in the 2007 post
election violence, one would naturally expect the judges to declare Uhuru
and Ruto ineligible to vie for elective office. On this aspect, they shifted the
responsibility to the IEBC, EACC, Supreme Court, National Assembly and Senate.
264. On the other hand, the judges also state that the two individuals are presumed
innocent until proven guilty of any criminal charges. By stating so, they seem to
imply that mere allegations alone do not suffice to disqualify them for lack of
integrity, as happened in the Matemu case. Bearing in mind that Matemu was
seeking an appointive position whereas Uhuru and Ruto were seeking elective
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posts, Kenyan courts need to set establish clear consistent jurisprudence in the
realm of the integrity threshold.

Observations and way forward on integrity threshold
265. As it stands now, it seems as though the integrity standards differ; and that the
one for appointive positions is much higher than that for elective positions.
During the March 2013 general elections in Kenya, many individuals were
cleared by both IEBC, EACC and the courts to seek elective posts, despite the
fact that there had pending court cases raising unresolved integrity issues.
Many other Kenyans seeking appointive positions have been barred due to
unresolved integrity cases yet they neither face arrest nor prosecution before
any court of law.
266. This is an unacceptable, discriminatory application of the law that is in gross
violation of Chapter 6. Principles of leadership and integrity apply to all state
officers, irrespective of their mode of ascension to office. This was the intention
of Chapter 6 of COK 2010, and all those charged with making and interpreting
the law, that is Parliament and Judiciary, should strive to uphold the national
values and principles enshrined in Article 10 of COK 2010.
267. It is an onerous task to ensure that State offices are selected to office on the basis
of personal integrity, competence and suitability. It is an even more onerous
task to ensure State officers are elected to office in free and fair elections. The
EACC may need to collaborate with the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission (IEBC) in designing the framework for eligibility for election as
President, MP, Governor and member of county assembly. Collaboration with
other public recruitment agencies like the Public Service Commission may yield
a more coherent and harmonised approach pertaining to appointive posts
268. Only a fair, objective and impartial reading and interpretation of the applicable
legal framework will lend credence and credibility to EACC, IEBC and to
some extent, the Judiciary, as they embark on this sensitive yet critical task
of ensuring compliance with Chapter 6 of the COK 2010. There may also be
need to come up with a clear statutory definition of integrity and the attendant
integrity threshold that should be used to either disqualify or remove a person
from public office. Chapter 6 of COK 2010, if properly interpreted and applied,
will definitely be a major boost in the war against corruption in Kenya.
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Corruption Reports received by the Commission
269. Apart from reliance on reports of other Commissions and agencies, the
Commission also received complaints about corruption from various Kenyan
citizens during the course of its hearings throughout the country. A total of
5,646 persons who spoke to the Commission complained about corruption as
a major contributor to violation of their rights. A few examples are listed below.
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Residents of Eastleigh District Business Association (EBDA) reported that
most of them are denied citizenship in a discriminatory manner due to their
tribe, religion and ethnicity, resulting in inhuman and degrading treatment.
They reported that they are referred to as ‘Kenyan Somalis’, and are forced
to bribe in order to acquire Kenyan identity cards and passports from the
immigration officials. Those who do not have identification papers are
constantly harassed by the police and forced to bribe the police or judicial
officers to avoid arrest, prosecution or conviction on charges of being
illegally present in Kenya.
Residents from Kajiado district reported incidents of land grabbing, during
land adjudication, which was facilitated by corruption among senior
public officials. Before adjudication, land was communal and belonged
to the whole community. They reported that during adjudication, land was
illegally allocated to senior government officials, their friends and relatives
who were not originally residents, in return for financial considerations.
Most beneficiaries of the Mosiro and Illodo-Ariak land in Kajiado were
Ministers and MPs. The land was later sold to third parties despite
restrictions placed on the titles. This again, was facilitated by corruption,
at the expense of poor, illiterate residents of the Maasai community. Other
reports from Kajiado indicated that forest land was being hived off and
sold by corrupt government officials. Similar reports were received about
land in Machakos, Meru, Makueni, Nyeri, Muranga, Pokot, Ilchamus,
amongst others. Details of historical injustices pertaining to land issues
are comprehensively captured in the chapter on land.
The 7.2 billion purchase of mosquito control products in 1996: An
informer gave the Commission detailed information regarding the grand
corruption surrounding the 7.2 billion purchases of mosquito control
products in 1996. This was curiously done by the Ministry of Public Works
and Housing instead of the Ministry of Health as was expected in such
procurement. It occurred during retired President Moi’s rule.
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According to the informer, the price was not only inflated but the Government
was supplied with the wrong chemical, that is, ‘a little petroleum product
with a little bit of insecticide’. Further more, the Government bought massive
quantities to last for five (5) years yet they only required two (2) years supply.
The chemical was supplied by Equip Agencies Limited at the unit price of Kshs
2,925/= instead of the market price of Kshs 2/= per litre.
The informer also told the Commission that a report by Price WaterHouseCoopers
indicated that the order for the malaria drugs was made well above the budget
allocations for that period. A number of people were associated with Equip
Agencies Limited and some senior government officials were named in the scam.
The Commission’s further inquiry into this matter disclosed the existence of a
decision, Nairobi HCCC No. 159 of 2006 filed by Equip Agencies v Attorney general
(2011). The plaintiff was claiming a total of Kshs 1,873,335,880, being money
owed to Equip Agencies for the anti- malaria equipment supplied, delivered
and distributed to various units in the country in 1995. In a judgement delivered
by Justice Muga Apondi on 2/12/2011, the court ordered the government to
pay Equip Agencies the sum of Kshs 1,873,335,880 for the malaria drugs and
equipment, and faulted the government for purporting to cancel the contract
after goods had already been supplied, received and distributed for use by the
government.
Although this was a civil case that does not bar criminal proceedings for any
acts of corruption, it may have an impact on any criminal proceedings that
may be contemplated or commenced against any suspected loss or fraud in
the said procurement. This is due to the judge’s finding that at that point in
time, there was no complaint that the quantity, quality and price of the goods
did not meet the required standards. The judge also found that the goods
were utilized for the purpose for which they were intended. The government
did not file a defence nor lodge an appeal against the final judgement. It is not
known whether the decretal sum was paid as ordered by the court.
Interestingly, the informers told Commission that the goods were ordered
by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, whereas the evidence adduced
before the High Court in the HCCC No. 159 0f 2006 show that the contracts
were awarded by the Ministry of Health. The truth may only be unearthed
after proper investigations are conducted by the EACC. It was further alleged
that despite a report being made to the Director of the defunct Kenya AntiCorruption Commission, no action has been taken by the said Commission to
date.
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Procurement of electronic voter registration and identification devices
by the IEBC: The Commission obtained from informers volumes of documents
and correspondence with various government agencies, pointing out the
flawed procurement process that culminated in the failure of the electronic
devices during the March 4 2013 General Elections in Kenya. Although this
matter fell outside the Commission’s mandate period, the Commission received
the complaint under its mandate to ‘investigate or make recommendations
concerning any other matter with a view to promoting or achieving justice,
national unity and reconciliation’. He singled out the following tender awards
that need to be investigated:
a.

Biometric Voter Identification Kits (BVR) by Face Technologies of South
Africa that cost the tax payer close to Kshs 9 billion

b.

Ballot papers by Smith and Ouzman

c.

Indelible marker pens from Mini Mix Agencies

d.

Polling station banners from Hopeland Advertising

e.

Solar lanterns from Solarmark Technologies

f.

General electoral materials by Africa Infrastructure Development
Company

The informers pointed out that Face Technologies (FT) did not meet the technical
specifications at the time they submitted their bid to IEBC. Furthermore, the
devices supplied were different from the samples submitted at the bid opening
as witnessed by all bidders who attended the bid opening. When the first
sample failed, FT was allowed to produce another sample for testing, contrary to
procurement law. Reports were made to the Public Procurement Authority, and it
would be interesting to establish their findings.
In respect of the ballot papers, the informer alleged that the ballot printer was
privately commissioned by IEBC outside a publication log ahead of the tender
award. The entire procurement of all electoral materials was estimated to have
cost the Kenyan taxpayer close to Ksh 15 billion. Sadly, the gadgets failed during
voting on 4 April 2013 leading many Kenyans to question the procurement
process and quality of the gadgets. The Commission recommends that the matter
be investigated by the EACC to establish if any economic crimes were committed
by the IEBC staff in collusion with the suppliers of the electoral materials.
Appropriate recommendations must be forwarded to the DPP for appropriate
action.
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Challenges of Fighting Corruption in Kenya
270

The foregoing detailed discussions on the magnitude and scale of grand corruption
in Kenya expose major challenges in the fight against corruption in Kenya. In brief,
the following were noted and need to be addressed:




The lack of a national anti-corruption policy: The lack of a policy has resulted
in lack of focus and disconcerted efforts in the fight against corruption in
Kenya.
Failure to fully domesticate the UNCAC: Although Kenya has made great
strides in domesticating UNCAC, some major gaps still exist especially in
criminalisation of some acts that impede the fight against grand corruption. A
glaring omission is failure to criminalise acts like illicit enrichment that would
deter illegal acquisition of wealth, which has made it near impossible to trace
and recover corruptly acquired wealth. Apart from illicit enrichment, the AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes Act does not criminalise the following acts:




Trading in influence(Article 18)



Bribery in the private sector( Article 21)



Embezzlement of property in the private sector(Article 22)



Liability of legal persons(Article 26)



Illicit enrichment(Article 20)







Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of international organizations(
Article 16)

Concealment or continued retention of property knowing it to have been
corruptly acquired( Article 24)
Opening and maintaining bank accounts abroad

Failure to fully entrench EACC in the Constitution of Kenya 2010:
Article 79 of the COK 2010, unlike other Articles establishing constitutional
commissions, does not prescribe the specific functions required of an anticorruption agency as provided for in the four (4) pillars of UNCAC. These are
prevention, investigation, asset recovery and international cooperation. Other
than the general objects, authority, funding, composition, removal from office,
functions and powers of bestowed upon all Commissions and Independent
Offices under Chapter 15, the specific functions and powers of the EACC are
left to parliament to determine through legislation.
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This is a glaring omission that left room for speculation, ambiguity or
interference while enacting the respective enabling statutes ambiguity, which
are the EACC Act and the Leadership and Integrity Act. More ambiguity and
confusion manifested itself in the definition of integrity threshold and the
interpretation of the role of EACC, especially in ensuring compliance with
Chapter Six together with the Leadership and Integrity Act. This may perhaps
explain the varied definitions of the integrity threshold to be applied to those
seeking public office, by Parliament, the Judiciary and civil society.
Moreover, Out of the eleven (11) Commissions established by the Constitution,
it is only the EACC that is not listed as one of the Constitutional Commissions
under Article 248 of Chapter 15, and whose functions are not outlined in the
enabling Article. Article 79 attempts to cure this glaring omission by stipulating
that the anti-corruption agency established by Parliament through statute, “....
shall have all the status and powers of a commission under Chapter Fifteen “.
This deliberate omission appears to diminish the important role of EACC and
further dilute its powers and function.


Insufficient number of Commissioners at EACC: The Ethics and AntiCorruption Commission Act provides for a new governance structure of 3
Commissioners and a Secretary/CEO. This small number of Commissioners,
although desirable, may present operational challenges.
Firstly, there is no provision in EACC Act on the mode of appointment or
election of the Vice-Chairperson yet Article 250(10) of the Constitution
provides that the members of a commission shall elect a vice-chairperson
from among themselves. This ought to have been part of Section 6 of EACC
Act or in the section appearing immediately thereafter.
Secondly, Section 14 of EACC Act empowers the EACC to establish committees
for the effective discharge of its functions. With a small number of only 3
commissioners, it will be near impossible to establish any such committees. The
effect of this is that all the 3 commissioners will belong to all the committees,
hence defeating the purpose of setting up different committees to deal with
different aspects of the Commissions functions or powers.
Thirdly, and in what appears confusing, Section 6 of the Second Schedule to
the EACC Act, that prescribes how the business and affairs of the Commission
shall be conducted, makes reference to a vice-chairperson who shall preside at
meetings in the absence of the Chairperson. Where both are absent, the members
shall elect one of them to preside. This is where the operational challenges and
weaknesses of the new law become evident. The EACC commissioners are only

420

REPORT OF THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Vol u m e IIB

Chapter THREE

three (3) in number including the chairperson. Assuming that they have elected
one of the other two to be the vice chairperson, and that both the chair and
vice chairperson are absent, this leaves only one commissioner to continue with
the meeting! This is impossible because Section 5 of the Second Schedule sets
the quorum for the conduct of business at a meeting of the Commission at two
thirds of all the members of the Commission.
Although Section 14 of EACC Act allows the Commission to co-opt persons
into membership of the Committees; these persons may only attend meetings
and deliberate but shall have no power to vote. No decision can therefore be
made where there is lack of quorum, and this could delay and or paralyse the
work of the Commission.
For operational expediency and quorum requirements, it would have been
prudent to have at least five or seven commissioners. However, with the
establishment of 47 county governments after the March 4th 2013 general
election, it may be necessary for the number of commissioners to be increased
to the maximum constitutional limit of nine (9). An increased number of staff
is also required to deal with the increased workload created by the two levels
of government with the attendant huge sums of public funds being allocated
to the 47 counties. There is a real danger of corruption being devolved to the
counties unless the EACC is quickly restructured empowered and visible at
both levels of government.






Lack of prosecutorial powers by EACC: This is perceived by some Kenyans
as an aspect that may hamper expeditious and independent determination
of corruption cases. However, under Article 157(12) of the Constitution,
Parliament may enact legislation conferring powers of prosecution on
authorities other than the Director of Public Prosecutions. There is therefore a
window of opportunity for EACC to be granted prosecutorial powers, subject
of course to proven efficiency, objectivity and fairness in investigations.
Priority must however be given to strengthening EACC’s investigative capacity
at both national and county levels of government.
Failure to provide for anti-corruption measures targeting the private
sector: Article 12 of UNCAC requires State Parties to enact legislation aimed
at criminalising corruption in the private sector. This is borne out of the reality
that the private sector companies and individuals are the ones who oil the
wheels of corruption by colluding with public sector entities and officials.
Failure to provide for lifestyle audit of public servants: The current anticorruption laws have failed to provide a legal framework to audit the wealth
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of public servants as a means of tracing and recovering corruptly acquired
property. The wealth declaration process, which is now conducted once
every two (2) years, is merely ritualistic. The information is never disclosed to
the public to enable them monitor the wealth acquired by a public servant.
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Lack of specific provisions empowering the EACC to deploy special
investigative techniques: Article 50 of UNCAC requires State Parties to enact
domestic legislation that empowers anti-corruption investigative agencies
to use special investigative techniques such as electronic or other forms
of surveillance and undercover operations in order to combat corruption
effectively. In the same vein, the current Kenyan laws have also failed to provide
for admissibility in evidence of evidence derived from special investigative
techniques.
Proliferation and duplicity of anti-corruption laws: The anti-corruption
legal framework is now contained in four (4) different statutes, namely the
ACECA, POEA, EACC Act and the Leadership and Integrity Act (LIA). There is
a lot of duplication especially in POEA and EACC Act in relation to matters
of ethics and integrity. For example, under POEA and LIA the Responsible
Commissions are required to develop and ensure compliance with their
respective Codes of Conduct. The EACC is also legally empowered to develop
and enforce codes of conduct for all public officers. This will represent
operational and jurisdictional conflict when dealing with breaches of
ethics. There is need to vest this powers in only one commission or clearly
distinguish their roles to avoid confusion and duplicity.
Erosion of independence of EACC by involving Parliament in appointment
of CEO: Article 250(12) of the Constitution provides that each Commission shall
have a Secretary who shall be appointed by the Commission. While enacting
the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Act, however, Parliament required the EACC
Secretary to be subjected to parliamentary approval before assuming office.
This provision violates article 250(12) of COK, and is therefore null and void to
the extent of its inconsistency. The EACC, like other constitutional commissions,
is an independent body whose commissioners should be given a free hand
in recruiting and supervising all their staff. The EACC Act therefore needs to
be amended to delete the phrase that requires approval of the Secretary by
parliament.
Conflicting definitions of integrity threshold pursuant to Chapter Six
of COK 2010: Interestingly, neither the Constitution nor any other statute
in Kenya defines the term “integrity”. This could perhaps explain the various
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divergent opinions on what comprises lack of integrity, and the different
integrity thresholds that have been set by both the Parliament and the
Judiciary in Kenya.
Soon after the promulgation of the new Constitution of Kenya in August 2010,
most Kenyans were hopeful that a new crop of both appointed and elected
leaders would be ushered into office, and hopefully bring honour and respect to
state offices. It appears though that Kenyans may have to wait longer to enjoy
the fruits of leadership that is governed by integrity. This is attributed to the
different integrity thresholds that have been displayed by interviewing panels,
parliament and the judiciary. Different standards seem to apply to those seeking
appointment as opposed to those seeking to be elected to public office.
In order to illustrate the uncertainty and apparent bias, this Chapter, in its
preceding discussion, briefly analysed the facts and judgements in five (5)
major cases touching on eligibility of persons to serve as State officers based
on Chapter 6 on Leadership and Integrity: Keriako Tobiko - Director of Public
Prosecutions; Mumo Matemu- Chairperson of Ethics and Anti-Corruption
Commission; Kiema Kionzo- Member of Parliament for Mutito Constituency;
Mary Wambui- Member of Parliament for Othaya Constituency and; Uhuru
Kenyatta & William Ruto- President and Deputy President respectively.
From the emerging jurisprudence on leadership and integrity in Kenya,
It was not clear from these five (5) cases, at what stage an individual was
considered ineligible to assume or remain in service as a state officer. Mr
Matemu was found unfit to assume office due to unresolved allegations
about his integrity, whereas the judges in the Uhuru and Ruto case stated
that the duo were innocent until proven guilty, and that even if the were
convicted, they could not be barred until they had exhausted their right of
appeal. More confusion sets in when one considers the fact that Mr Matemu
was not under any criminal investigation whereas Uhuru and Ruto had been
indicted by the International Criminal Court and are facing trial.
As it stands now, it seems as though different integrity standards apply
and that the one for appointive positions is much higher than that for
elective positions. During the March 2013 general elections in Kenya, many
individuals were cleared by both IEBC, EACC and the courts to seek elective
posts, despite the fact that there had pending court cases raising unresolved
integrity issues. Many other Kenyans seeking appointive positions have
been barred due to unresolved integrity cases yet they neither face arrest
nor prosecution before any court of law.
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In the Commission’s view, this is an unacceptable, discriminatory application
of the law that is in gross violation of Chapter 6. Principles of leadership and
integrity apply to all state officers, irrespective of their mode of ascension to
office. This was the intention of Chapter 6 of COK 2010, and all those charged
with making and interpreting the law, that is Parliament and Judiciary, should
strive to uphold the national values and principles enshrined in Article 10 of
COK 2010.
At the onset, it is proposed that the term “integrity” should be defined in
order to clear the ambiguity and confusion that seems to have dogged the
implementation of Chapter 6 of the Constitution. Such a definition may however
beg the question whether issues of morality, as implied by the common
meaning of integrity, should be the subject of legislation. It remains a burning
issue that may interest scholars, religious leaders and writers on corruption and
governance issues.


Ambiguity in the role of EACC under Chapter 6 and the Leadership and
Integrity Act (LIA): An objective reading of Chapter 6 and the LIA does not
clearly reveal the role of EACC before an individual is elected or appointed to
a public office. The Leadership and Integrity Bill had given the EACC a clear
role of vetting such individuals and thereafter issuing a Clearance Certificate.
These vetting provisions were however deleted by Parliament. The only duty
left for EACC is to receive a Self Declaration Form from those wishing to be
elected to a state office, thus leaving it to interested individuals to “vet”
themselves.
A reading of Chapter 6 and the Leadership and Integrity Act shows that
Parliament appears to have deliberately avoided the use of the word “vetting”.
If Parliament intended to vest such a function or responsibility on the EACC, it
would have expressly used this word or referred to it. A good example of such
an express provision is found in Section 23(1) of the Sixth Schedule of the COK
2010 that requires Parliament to enact legislation establishing mechanisms
and procedures for vetting the suitability of judges and magistrates to
continue to serve. Another example is found in section 34(3) of the EACC Act
that empowers the EACC to vet any member of staff of KACC who wishes to
work for EACC, to ensure that he or she is fit and proper to serve in the position
applied for as a member of staff of EACC.
The LIA does not state what the EACC is supposed to do with this Declaration.
However, it may be safe to infer that anyone who gives false information
to the EACC commits an offence punishable by a fine not exceeding kshs
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5 million, imprisonment for a period not exceeding 5 years or both, as per
section 46(1) (d) of the Leadership Act. Since the EACC has no prosecutorial
powers, the matter will be referred to the DPP for appropriate action. Should
the officer in question be convicted, they may thereafter be disqualified
from holding a state office if the law establishing that office provides for
such action.
Once again, there is no provision in the Constitution or EACC Act empowering
the EACC to vet, qualify or disqualify any individual from election or
appointment to public office. The EACC steps into the arena after the public
officer has assumed office, to oversee enforcement of codes of conduct.
Confidentiality of wealth declaration details submitted by public servants
every two years in accordance with the Public Officer Ethics Act( POEA). This
information should be made available to the public to enable Kenyans monitor
wealth acquisition, especially by public servants.




Lack of political will to fight corruption: According to observations made
by some anti-corruption experts,”..... we have entrenched elite in power that
is built and sustained by corruption, and then a wider national elite that
is not necessarily in power but which has benefited in one way or another
from graft or graft related activities.35 Unless we deal with these challenges,
anti-corruption institutions and other tools meant to fight corruption will be
surrounded by a collective enemy so powerful that they will never succeed.
These observations were made way back in January 2001 at a public forum
organised by Transparency International, soon after a KACA was disbanded
following a court order that declared the authority unconstitutional.
Parliament and the Executive should demonstrate by words and deeds that
they support the war against corruption.
Harassment and intimidation of whistle blowers: Those who blow the
whistle on corruption expose themselves to great risks of physical harm,
death or dismissal from employment. The case of the late David Munyakei is
a good illustration of such dangers. However, Kenya has since enacted the
Witness Protection Act 2006 and set up a Witness Protection Agency to provide
several protective measures to those willing to give information or testify
about corruption. The only weakness in this law is the failure to criminalise the
harassment of witnesses or provide any form of compensation for injury or loss
suffered by whistle blowers.

35 Report of a Public Forum held on the 17th January 2001, “KACA RULING: WHAT NEXT?” at page 50-51, A paper presented by
Erastus Wamugo and John Githongo of Transparency International
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Lengthy adjudication of corruption cases in court: Although the ACECA
establishes special magistrates courts to daily hear and expeditiously
determine corruption cases, this has been made impossible due numerous
to constitutional petitions filed by accused persons in the High Court, where
they obtain orders restraining or staying proceedings in the magistrates
courts. Ironically, they cite breach of their human rights, yet the majority
of the victims of corruption are the ones who suffer gross violation of their
basic human rights due to corruption. The courts ought to weigh public
interest against individual rights, when determining such applications by
suspects.

Conclusion
271. Grand corruption and economic crimes have had a profound and far reaching
effects on the enjoyment of socio-economic rights by especially the poor in
Kenya. These two interconnected crimes are insidious; they lessen the availability
and access to the fundamental needs of human life: food, education, health care,
shelter, etc. This Chapter of the Commission’s Report has sought to make more
apparent the huge cost that Kenya is paying through corruption.
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Appendix 1
SELECTED CORRUPT PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
Corrupt
Practice

Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)

Potential Harm

Possible Human
Rights Violation

Officials bribed to
allow toxic waste to
be dumped illegally
in an area planned for
residential use.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Exposure to radio-activity
which has serious health
and life consequences.

Right to life (ICCPR, Article
6).
Right to adequate housing
(CESCR, Article 11).
Right to health (ICESCR,
Article 12).

Immigration or police
officers bribed to allow
trafficking, sale or
abduction of children
as sex workers or other
forms of exploitation.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Sexual exploitation and
abuse; forced labor; denial
of liberty and dignity.

Right to be protected
from trafficking and sexual
exploitation (CRC, Articles
34 and 35).
Right to be protected from
child labor (CRC, Article
32).
Right to freedom from
slavery or servitude (ICCPR,
Article 8).

Plaintiff offers a bride
to a judge to obtain a
favorable ruling in a
lawsuit.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Unfair and partial trial;
denial for the victim of a
right to effective remedy
and justice.

Right to a fair trial (ICCPR,
Article 14).
Right to nondiscrimination (ICCPR,
Article 2(2)).
Right to equal protection
of the law (ICCPR, Article
26).
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Corrupt
Practice

Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)

Potential Harm

Possible Human
Rights Violation

Oil company offers bribes
to public officials to build
an oil pipeline on a site
sacred to indigenous
peoples; a business bribes
official to seize lands of
a minority group, or the
shelter of urban slum
dwellers.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Arbitrary eviction and
dispossession; denial of
right to adequate shelter;
denial of enjoyment of
family heritage; denial
of means of subsistence;
restriction of access to
natural resources.

Right of selfdetermination (ICCPR,
Article 1 and 47; ICESCR,
Articles 1 and 25).
Right to privacy, and
family life (ICCPR, Article
17).
Right to minority groups
(ICCPR, Article 27).
Right to adequate
housing (ICESCR, Article
11).

Official demands a bribe
to award state registration
to religious group.

Bribery (UNCAC Article 15)

Potential threat to
freedom of religion if
followers are unable to
gather without state
permission.

Right to be protected
from trafficking and
sexual exploitation (CRC,
Articles 34 and 35).
Right to be protected
from child labour (CRC,
Article 32).
Right to freedom from
slavery or servitude
(ICCPR, Article 8).

Bribery of voters and
rigging of election by
incumbent officer holders.

Abuse of functions
(UNCAC Article 18).
Trading in influence
(UNCAC, Article 19).

Denial of free and true
participation in political
and governance process.

Right of political
participation (ICCPR,
Article 25).

Bribery (UNCAC, Article
15).
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Corrupt
Practice

Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)

Potential Harm

Possible Human
Rights Violation

Bribery of labor inspector
by an employer to prevent
enforcement of labor law.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Poor working conditions;
unreasonable working
hours; low remuneration;
unhealthy or unsafe
conditions of work.

Right to just and favorable
conditions of work
(ICESCR, Article 7).

Companies offer illegal
payment to water
regulator, to exceed water
extraction permit.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Shortage of water to
neighboring communities;
water pollution.

Right to water (ICESCR,
Articles 11 and 12).

Illegal diversion or sale
of medicines from public
clinics to private practice
by doctors and health
officers.

Misappropriation
(UNCAC, Article 17).

Reduction in drug
availability; poor and
discriminatory service by
health officials.

Right to health (ICESCR,
Article 12).

Illegal payment to a judge
or orphanage owner to
speed up the adoption of
a child in breach of rules.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Loss of identity, family
lineage, ethnic roots and
medical history.

Right to best interest
protection (CRC, Article 3).

Right to nondiscrimination (ICCPR,
Article 2(2)).

Right of the child to
preserve identity (CRC,
Article 8).
Right to best interest
protection in adoptions
(CRC, Article 21).

Corrupt
Practice

Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)

Potential Harm

Possible Human
Rights Violation

Student at primary level
has to bribe teachers to
obtain a place at school.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Restriction of access to
education; unfair privilege
given to certain students.

Right to education
(ICESCR, Article 13 and 14).

Persons who request
an official document,
such as passport, visa or
identification card, are
asked for bribes to obtain
them.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Unfair privilege given to
certain people; restriction
of access to personal
official documents;
restriction in liberty to
move within and leave a
country.

Right to equality and
non-discrimination
(ICCPR, Article 2(1) and 26;
ICESCR, Article 2(2)).

Corrupt police officers
arrest individuals for
no reason and without
warrant and request
bribes for their release.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Arbitrary restriction of
liberty.

Right to liberty of
movement (ICCPR, Article
12).
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non-discrimination
(ICCPR, Article 2(1) and 26;
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Right to liberty of
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Corrupt
Practice

Act of Corruption
(UNCAC)

Potential Harm

Possible Human
Rights Violation

A public official obtains
favourable press from
a media group in
exchange for extending
the cable-television
license of the group;
or bribes are given to
journalists to cover
up or misrepresent
information.

Trading in influence
(UNCAC, Article 19)

No fair and free
information for
population; no efficient
and fair competition for
cable- television license;
deception of public and
misinformation.

Right to freedom of
opinion, expression
and information (ICCPR,
Article 19).

Hospital patients are
asked for bribes to be
treated.

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Restriction in access to
health; unfair privilege
given to certain patients.

Right to health (ICESCR,
Articles 12).

Bribery (UNCAC Article
15)

Right to equality and
non-discrimination
(ICCPR, Article 2(1) and
26; ICESCR, Article 2(2)).

Right to equality and
non-discrimination
(ICCPR, Article 2(1) and
26; ICESCR, Article 2(2)).
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Appendix 2
LIST OF PERSONS ADVERSELY MENTIONED IN GRAND
CORRUPTION SCANDALS
Name

Corruption scandal

Year

Approximate
loss in Kshs

Ministry of Finance officials at material time

Ken Ren Chemical & Fertilizer
Co Ltd

1970

4.3 billion

Kamlesh Pattni
Eliphaz Riungu
Lazarus Wanjohi
Wilfred Karuga Koinange
Michael Wanjihia Onesmus
Job Kilachi
Professor George Saitoti
Eric Kotut
Joshua Magari
James Kanyotu
Elijah Arap Bii

Goldenberg International
Limited

1991

60 billion

Moody Awori
Kiraitu Murungi
Francis Muthaura
David Mwiraria
Chris Murungaru
Dave Mwangi
Joseph Magari
Deepak Kamani
Anura Perera
Dr Amin Juma
Dr Merlvyn Kettering
Mrs Ludmilla Kuschenko
Francis Oyula
Wilson Sitonik

Anglo Leasing Finance Co Ltd
& others

2004

56.3 billion

Amos Kimunya
Professor Njuguna Ndungu
Kennedy Abuga

Sale of Grand Regency Hotel

Equip Agencies Limited

Supply of malaria control
drugs to Ministry of Public
Works and Housing

1996

7.2 billion

Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
Face Technologies of South Africa
Smith and Ouzman
Mini Mix Agencies
Hopeland Advert
Solarmark Technologies
Africa Infrastructure Development Company

Procurement of electoral
materials for March 4 2013
General Election

20072012

15 billion
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